Conley v. Shearer - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

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OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
The full texts of the opinions of the Supreme Court of
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1992, pursuant to a pilot project implemented by Chief Justice
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Conley, Appellant, v. Shearer, Appellee.
[Cite as Conley v. Shearer (1992), Ohio St.3d .]
Court of Claims -- R.C. 2743.02(F) does not violate the Equal
Protection Clauses of the United States and Ohio
Constitutions.
R.C. 2743.02(F) does not violate the Equal Protection Clauses
of the United States and Ohio Constitutions.
(No. 91-1009 -- Submitted February 26, 1992 -- Decided
August 12, 1992.)
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Butler County, No.
CA90-05-088.
On September 29, 1989, Dwayne Conley, appellant, filed a
complaint in Butler County Common Pleas Court, alleging that
Kurt Shearer, appellee, a Special Agent III employed by the
Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation
("BCI"),1 "maliciously, recklessly, wantonly, willfully and
wrongfully identified and continued to maintain that [Conley]
was the person who sold drugs." In addition to malicious
prosecution, Conley alleged claims of defamation and a
violation of Section 1983, Title 42, U.S.Code. Criminal
charges had been filed against Conley but were dismissed upon a
showing that Shearer had incorrectly identified Conley as the
person involved in the sale of drugs. Conley alleged that, as
a result of Shearer's wrongdoing, he lost his job and incurred
legal expenses. The complaint did not specify whether Conley
was suing Shearer in his individual capacity or his official
capacity as an employee of BCI, although it was Shearer's
actions as a BCI agent which caused criminal charges to be
filed against Conley. Neither the state of Ohio nor BCI was
named as a defendant in the complaint.
The Attorney General's office filed a motion to dismiss on
behalf of Shearer. The motion argued that the trial court was
without subject matter jurisdiction based upon R.C. 2743.02(F),
that Shearer was entitled to personal immunity under R.C. 9.86,
and that the Court of Claims must initially make a
determination with regard to immunity from suit before a court
of common pleas could have jurisdiction over the action. After
the parties had submitted memoranda but prior to the court's
decision on the motion to dismiss, Conley filed an affidavit

with the court expressly waiving any right he may have had to
sue the state of Ohio because of his claims against Shearer.
On April 16, 1990, the common pleas court dismissed the
action. The court of appeals affirmed.
The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a
motion to certify the record.

Richard L. Hurchanik, for appellant.
Lee I. Fisher, Attorney General, Raul Rosado, Jr. and
Simon B. Karas, for appellee.

Moyer, C.J. The issue presented by this appeal is
whether R.C. 2743.02(F) violates the Equal Protection Clauses
of the United States and Ohio Constitutions. R.C. 2743.02(F)
requires a plaintiff who potentially has a claim against the
state as a result of a state employee's conduct to first file
an action in the Court of Claims for an adjudication of whether
the employee is entitled to immunity under R.C. 9.86. For the
following reasons, we conclude that R.C. 2743.02(F) is
constitutional under both the United States and Ohio
Constitutions and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the court
of appeals with regard to Conley's state-law claims. However,
we reverse the court of appeals' judgment affirming the
dismissal of Conley's Section 1983 claim.
Historically, immunity for government officials and
employees was derived from the legal fiction that "[t]he King
could do no wrong, so any mistake in judgment on the part of
the King's officials was an act for which the government would
take no responsibility." Civil Actions Against State
Government, Its Divisions, Agencies and Officers (Winborne Ed.
1982) 230, Section 6.2. This court held many years ago that
the state and its officers were immune from tort and other
liability for wrongs committed by agents of the state when
acting in their official capacity. State v. Franklin Bank
(1840), 10 Ohio 91, reversed on other grounds sub nom. Franklin
Branch Bank v. Ohio (1862), 66 U.S. (1 Black) 474, 17 L.Ed.
180; Miers v. Zanesville & Maysville Turnpike Co. (1842), 11
Ohio 273.
In 1912, the Ohio Constitution was amended to allow
actions to be brought against the state. That amendment to the
Constitution, Section 16, Article I, provides in part as
follows: "Suits may be brought against the state, in such
courts and in such manner, as may be provided by law." This
provision was "not self-executing," and constituted only an
authorization for subsequent statutes in which the General
Assembly could grant its specific consent to be sued.
Raudabaugh v. State (1917), 96 Ohio St. 513, 518, 118 N.E. 102,
103. Thus, in the absence of such consent, an action based on
tort was not properly maintainable against the state or its
officers or employees. Krause v. State (1972), 31 Ohio St.2d
132, 144, 60 O.O.2d 100, 106, 285 N.E.2d 736, 743-744, appeal
dismissed sub nom. Krause v. Ohio (1972), 409 U.S. 1052, 93
S.Ct. 557, 34 L.Ed.2d 506.
In 1975, the General Assembly enacted legislation creating
the Court of Claims and specifying the forum and manner in
which actions may be brought against the state and its officers
and employees. R.C. 2743.01 to 2743.72. R.C. 2743.02(A)(1)

provides the following:
"The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and
consents to be sued, and have its liability determined, in the
court of claims created in this chapter in accordance with the
same rules of law applicable to suits between private parties,
except that the determination of liability is subject to the
limitations set forth in this chapter ***. To the extent that
the state has previously consented to be sued, this chapter has
no applicability.
"Except in the case of a civil action filed by the state,
filing a civil action in the court of claims results in a
complete waiver of any cause of action, based on the same act
or omission, which the filing party has against any officer or
employee, as defined in section 109.36 of the Revised Code.
The waiver shall be void if the court determines that the act
or omission was manifestly outside the scope of the officer's
or employee's office or employment or that the officer or
employee acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a
wanton or reckless manner."
In Cooperman v. Univ. Surgical Assoc., Inc. (1987), 32
Ohio St.3d 191, 513 N.E.2d 288, paragraph two of the syllabus,
we held that "[a] court of common pleas does not lack
jurisdiction over an action against state officers or employees
merely because the Court of Claims has not first determined
that the act or omission, which is the subject of the action,
was manifestly outside the scope of the officer's or employee's
office or employment, or that the officer or employee acted
with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or
reckless manner, unless the aggrieved party has filed a suit in
the Court of Claims based on the same act or omission. (R.C.
2743.02[A][1], construed and applied.)"
As a result of Cooperman, the General Assembly enacted
R.C. 2743.02(F), which provides:
"A civil action against an officer or employee, as defined
in section 109.36 of the Revised Code, that alleges that the
officer's or employee's conduct was manifestly outside the
scope of his employment or official responsibilities, or that
the officer or employee acted with malicious purpose, in bad
faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner shall first be filed
against the state in the court of claims, which has exclusive,
original jurisdiction to determine, initially, whether the
officer or employee is entitled to personal immunity under
section 9.86 of the Revised Code and whether the courts of
common pleas have jurisdiction over the civil action.
"The filing of a claim against an officer or employee
under this division tolls the running of the applicable statute
of limitations until the court of claims determines whether the
officer or employee is entitled to personal immunity under
section 9.86 of the Revised Code."
Thus, under the unambiguous terms of R.C. 2743.02, the
Court of Claims has exclusive, original jurisdiction to
determine whether a state employee is entitled to personal
immunity under R.C. 9.86.
R.C. 9.86 states:
"Except for civil actions that arise out of the operation
of a motor vehicle and civil actions in which the state is the
plaintiff, no officer or employee shall be liable in any civil

action that arises under the law of this state for damage or
injury caused in the performance of his duties, unless the
officer's or employee's actions were manifestly outside the
scope of his employment or official responsibilities, or unless
the officer or employee acted with malicious purpose, in bad
faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.
"This section does not eliminate, limit, or reduce any
immunity from civil liability that is conferred upon an officer
or employee by any other provision of the Revised Code or by
case law. This section does not affect the liability of the
state in an action filed against the state in the court of
claims pursuant to Chapter 2743. of the Revised Code."
If the Court of Claims determines that the employee was
acting within the scope of employment, in furtherance of the
interests of the state, the state has agreed to accept
responsibility for the employee's acts. R.C. 9.86 and
2743.02(A). In that event, only the state is subject to suit,
and the litigation must be pursued in the Court of Claims. If
the Court of Claims determines that the employee's acts did not
further the interests of the state, i.e., the employee was
acting outside the scope of his employment, maliciously, in bad
faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner, the state has not
agreed to accept responsibility for the employee's acts and the
employee is personally answerable for his acts in a court of
common pleas.
In a similar case recently decided by this court, we held
that R.C. 2743.02(F) is a statute which "patently and
unambiguously" takes away the common pleas court's original
jurisdiction under R.C. 2305.01 in a specific class of cases.
State ex rel. Sanquily v. Lucas Cty. Court of Common Pleas
(1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 78, 80, 573 N.E.2d 606, 609. In
Sanquily, this court allowed a writ of prohibition to prevent a
court of common pleas from proceeding with an action against a
state employee until the Court of Claims determined whether the
employee was immune from suit. We concluded that "R.C.
2743.02(F) vests exclusive original jurisdiction in the Court
of Claims to determine whether [an officer or employee of the
state] is immune from suit. Until that court decides whether
[the officer or employee] is immune, the common pleas court is
totally without jurisdiction over the litigation against him."
Id.
Although Conley has waived any claim he had against the
state, Shearer is still entitled to any immunity from suit that
may exist. Such a rule bars plaintiffs with claims against
state officers and employees from waiving claims against the
state in the hope of maintaining an action against the officer
or employee individually, thereby avoiding the jurisdictional
prerequisite of R.C. 2743.02(F). Only after the Court of
Claims determines that a state employee acted outside the scope
of his or her employment or acted with malicious purpose, in
bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner may a plaintiff
bring an action against the employee in a court of common
pleas. Tschantz v. Ferguson (1989), 49 Ohio App.3d 9, 12, 550
N.E.2d 544, 547, appeal dismissed (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 131,
566 N.E.2d 655. If the Court of Claims finds that the employee
was acting within the scope of employment and without malice,
bad faith, or wantonness or recklessness, then the plaintiff

may pursue the action against the state in the Court of Claims.
Conley argues that R.C. 2743.02(F) denies him equal
protection of the laws because that statute requires him to
first obtain a determination by the Court of Claims with regard
to the potential immunity of Shearer; that this requirement
forces him to incur the additional expense of a separate action
in the Court of Claims; that if no claim exists against the
state, the initiation of a lawsuit against the state in the
Court of Claims is a useless act; and that there is no rational
basis supporting R.C. 2743.02(F). Conley also asserts that the
statute is unconstitutional because it deprives him of his
right to a trial by jury.
"The equal protection of law implies that all litigants
similarly situated may appeal to courts for both relief and
defense under like conditions, with like protection, and
without discrimination." Sexton v. Barry (C.A.6, 1956), 233
F.2d 220, 224. "Equal protection of the law means the
protection of equal laws. It does not preclude class
legislation or class action provided there is a reasonable
basis for such classification. The prohibition against the
denial of equal protection of the laws requires that the law
shall have an equality of operation on persons according to
their relation. So long as the laws are applicable to all
persons under like circumstances and do not subject individuals
to an arbitrary exercise of power and operate alike upon all
persons similarly situated, it suffices the constitutional
prohibition against the denial of equal protection of the
laws. Senior v. Ratterman [1887], 44 Ohio St. 661 [11 N.E.
321], Xenia v. Schmidt [1920], 101 Ohio St. 437 [130 N.E.
24]." Dayton v. Keys (1969), 21 Ohio Misc. 105, 114, 50 O.O.2d
29, 34, 252 N.E.2d 655, 660.
Conley argues that R.C. 2743.02(F) discriminates against
him and others on the basis of wealth, in that the costs of
litigating his claims are increased by requiring him first to
seek a determination in the Court of Claims as to the immunity
from suit of Shearer. As a result, he argues, R.C. 2743.02(F)
violates the Equal Protection Clauses of both the United States
and Ohio Constitutions.
We first note that, as a general rule, "[a]ll legislative
enactments enjoy a presumption of constitutionality." Sedar v.
Knowlton Constr. Co. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 193, 199, 551 N.E.2d
938, 944, citing Hardy v. VerMeulen (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 45,
48, 512 N.E.2d 626, 629; State v. Dorso (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d
60, 61, 4 OBR 150, 151, 446 N.E.2d 449, 450; State ex rel.
Dickman v. Defenbacher (1955), 164 Ohio St. 142, 57 O.O. 134,
128 N.E.2d 59, paragraph one of the syllabus. Courts must
apply all presumptions and germane rules of construction to
uphold a challenged statute if at all possible. Sedar, supra,
at 199, 551 N.E.2d at 944, citing Dorso, supra, at 61, 4 OBR at
151, 446 N.E.2d at 450. Only if the unconstitutionality of a
statute is shown beyond a reasonable doubt can the statute be
declared invalid. Bd. of Edn. v. Walter (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d
368, 376, 12 O.O.3d 327, 332, 390 N.E.2d 813, 819.
The test used in determining whether a statute is
constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause depends upon
whether a fundamental interest or suspect class is involved.
"Under the equal protection clause, in the absence of state

action impinging on a fundamental interest or involving a
suspect class, a rational basis analysis is normally used.
Where the traditional rational basis test is used great
deference is paid to the state, the only requirement being to
show that the differential treatment is rationally related to
some legitimate state interest." State ex rel. Heller v.
Miller (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 6, 11, 15 O.O.3d 3, 6, 399 N.E.2d
66, 69. See, also, Lyle Constr., Inc. v. Div. of Reclamation
(1987), 34 Ohio St.3d 22, 516 N.E.2d 209. Where a fundamental
interest or suspect class is at issue, a stricter test is
used, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia (1976), 427
U.S. 307, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520, and the government
will have to demonstrate that a classification created by law
is necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.
State ex rel. Brown v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections (1989), 46
Ohio St.3d 166, 168, 545 N.E.2d 1256, 1259.
Generally, classifications based upon wealth do not
trigger any heightened scrutiny under an equal protection
analysis, James v. Valtierra (1971), 402 U.S. 137, 91 S.Ct.
1331, 28 L.Ed.2d 678; San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez (1973), 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16;
however, where fundamental rights are involved, a court will
look more closely at laws which distinguish on the basis of
wealth between those within and those outside a designated
class. Boddie v. Connecticut (1971), 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct.
780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (access to courts--filing fee for divorce
action); Smith v. Bennett (1961), 365 U.S. 708, 81 S.Ct. 895, 6
L.Ed.2d 39 (access to courts--filing fee for application for
writ of habeas corpus and appeal). See, also, Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections (1966), 383 U.S. 663, 668, 86 S.Ct.
1079, 1082, 16 L.Ed.2d 169, 173 ("Lines drawn on the basis of
wealth or property, like those of race, *** are traditionally
disfavored."). As Conley raises his equal protection argument
with respect to the right to sue in a civil action (access to
courts), a fundamental right is arguably involved. Section 16,
Article I of the Ohio Constitution2; Boddie, supra; Smith,
supra.
However, Conley has made no showing that R.C. 2743.02(F)
creates an impermissible wealth-based classification on its
face or in its application or effect. In fact, R.C. Chapter
2743 makes no classification on the basis of wealth at all. No
line has been drawn between rich and poor by R.C. 2743.02(F).
The Rules of the Court of Claims and the Local Rules of the
Court of Claims permit an action to be filed by an indigent
plaintiff without a filing fee, C.C.R. 2(B) and L.C.C.R. 3(B),
and the action may be transferred to the plaintiff's home
county for trial upon a showing of hardship and whenever
justice dictates, R.C. 2743.03(B) and L.C.C.R. 5(B). Contrary
to his fears, Conley may pursue an action in the Court of
Claims without incurring the expense of litigating in
Columbus. Thus, Conley has not been foreclosed from access to
the courts because of his alleged economic status.
As this court has previously held, where there is no
classification, there is no discrimination which would offend
the Equal Protection Clauses of either the United States or
Ohio Constitutions. Krause, supra. See, also, Commonwealth v.
Purdy (1990), 408 Mass. 681, 685, 562 N.E.2d 1347, 1350 (in the

absence of a sufficient legal classification, equal protection
analysis is not triggered). Additionally, Conley's argument
fails as there is no fundamental right to sue the state or its
employees. The state voluntarily consents to be sued and may
qualify and draw perimeters around the granted right without
violating equal protection. Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Columbus
(1989), 49 Ohio App.3d 50, 52, 550 N.E.2d 524, 527.
Conley also attacks R.C. 2743.02 on equal protection
grounds because the statute requires him to pursue an action in
the Court of Claims as a condition precedent to an action in
common pleas court against a state employee. He essentially
asserts that R.C. 2743.02(F) violates the Equal Protection
Clauses of both the United States and Ohio Constitutions by
imposing a condition not present in a suit against other
individuals. As no fundamental interest or suspect class is
involved, we will apply the rational basis test. Lyle Constr.,
Inc., supra; see, also, State ex rel. Heller v. Miller, supra.
Applying that test, we conclude that R.C. 2743.02(F) is
reasonable and does not violate equal protection of the laws.
The statute does not create an arbitrary limitation on
litigation against state employees. The immunity-from-lawsuit
provisions found in R.C. 2743.02(F) and 9.86 contribute to
effective government by freeing state employees from the
intimidation of vexatious litigation, the burden of defending
lawsuits, and personal liability. As Judge Learned Hand noted
in Gregoire v. Biddle (C.A.2, 1949), 177 F.2d 579, 581:
"The justification for *** [immunity for public officials
and employees] is that it is impossible to know whether the
claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and that
to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to
the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its
outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute,
or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of
their duties."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
also noted public policy reasons supporting immunity for public
officials, and indirectly all public employees, in Bauers v.
Heisel (C.A.3, 1966), 361 F.2d 581, 590, fn. 9, certiorari
denied (1966), 386 U.S. 1021, 87 S.Ct. 1367, 18 L.Ed.2d 457,
quoting Note (1953), 66 Harv.L.Rev. 1285, 1295, fn. 54:
"'(1) the danger of influencing public officials by threat
of a law suit; (2) the deterrent effect of potential liability
on [people] *** who are considering entering public life; (3)
the drain on the valuable time of the official caused by
insubstantial suits (which would require inordinate private
record keeping ***); (4) the unfairness of subjecting officials
to liability for the acts of their subordinates; (5) the theory
that the official owes a duty to the public and not to the
individual; (6) the feeling that the ballot and the formal
removal proceeding are more appropriate ways to enforce honesty
and efficiency of public officers.'"
Further, as the court of appeals in this case noted,
determination of immunity by the Court of Claims, in a single
forum, "prevents the possibility of widely divergent
interpretations of when R.C. 9.86 immunity applies."
Therefore, because it is rationally related to a legitimate
legislative purpose, we hold that R.C. 2743.02(F) does not

violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and
Ohio Constitutions.
Conley further challenges R.C. 2743.02 as a violation of
his right to a trial by jury. The question of whether Shearer
is entitled to immunity as a governmental employee is a
question of law for which there is no right to trial. A jury
trial is necessary only when the case requires resolution of
factual issues which are triable to a jury in comparable civil
actions. See Erie Ins. Group v. Fisher (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d
380, 381-382, 15 OBR 497, 498-499, 474 N.E.2d 320, 322. See,
also, R.C. 2311.04 and Civ.R. 56(C). "Whether immunity may be
invoked is a purely legal issue, properly determined by the
court prior to trial, Donta v. Hooper (C.A.6, 1985), 774 F.2d
716, 719, certiorari denied (1987), 483 U.S. 1019 [107 S.Ct.
3261, 97 L.Ed.2d 760], and preferably on a motion for summary
judgment." Roe v. Hamilton Cty. Dept. of Human Serv. (1988),
53 Ohio App.3d 120, 126, 560 N.E.2d 238, 243.
If the Court of Claims determines that a state employee
was acting outside the scope of employment and, therefore, is
personally responsible for his or her acts and is subject to
suit in a common pleas court, the plaintiff and the state
employee retain the right to have a jury hear and determine all
factual issues presented at trial. Thus, any right to a jury
trial which Conley may have had was not infringed by the
procedure found in R.C. 2743.02(F). Alternatively, because
R.C. 2743.02(F) is procedural in nature, it does not violate
any substantive rights, including the right to a trial by
jury. Shew v. Greene (Apr. 24, 1989), Warren App. No.
CA88-09-070, unreported, 1989 WL 38943.
Finally, we address an issue not expressly raised by
Conley, but which is evident from the record and constitutes
plain error: dismissal of his claim under Section 1983, Title
42, U.S. Code. A cause of action under Section 1983 must
allege that a person, acting "under color of law," deprived the
plaintiff of a constitutionally guaranteed federal right.
Cooperman, supra. The trial court dismissed Conley's Section
1983 claim on the same grounds as his other claims, i.e., lack
of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to R.C. 2743.02 and
R.C. 9.86. Those sections, however, do not apply to claims
brought under federal law. R.C. 9.86 expressly limits its
coverage to "any civil action that arises under the law of this
state ***." (Emphasis added.)
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has concluded
that "'"[c]onduct by persons acting under color of state law
which is wrongful under 42 U.S.C. { 1983 or { 1985(3) cannot be
immunized by state law,"'" "'even though the federal cause of
action [was] being asserted in the state courts.'" Howlett v.
Rose (1990), 496 U.S. 356, 376, 110 S.Ct. 2430, 2443, 110
L.Ed.2d 332, 353, quoting Martinez v. California (1980), 444
U.S. 277, 284, 100 S.Ct. 553, 558, 62 L.Ed.2d 481, 488, and at
fn. 8. The court in Howlett continued, "'[a] construction of
[Section 1983 or 1985(3)] which permit[s] a state immunity
defense to have controlling effect would transmute a basic
guarantee into an illusory promise; and the supremacy clause of
the Constitution insures that the proper construction may be
enforced.'" Id. Similarly, federal courts in Ohio have
concluded that R.C. 9.86 and 2743.02(F) do not apply to Section

1983 claims even when such claims are pursued in state court.
Haynes v. Marshall (C.A.6, 1989), 887 F.2d 700; Evans v.
Celeste (S.D.Ohio 1989), 718 F.Supp. 641; see, also, Parks v.
Wilkins (S.D.Ohio 1988), 716 F.Supp. 1028. Further, we have
previously held that a court of common pleas has jurisdiction
to hear claims brought under Section 1983 against the state and
officers and employees of the state. Schwarz v. Ohio State
Univ. Bd. of Trustees (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 267, 31 OBR 493,
510 N.E.2d 808.
Because it was not necessary for Conley to comply with the
requirements of R.C. 2743.02 in bringing his Section 1983
claim, a federal law claim, we find that it was plain error for
the trial court to dismiss his claim on those grounds. See
Calmes v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 470,
475, 575 N.E.2d 416, 420, fn. 3; O'Connell v. Chesapeake & Ohio
RR. Co. (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 226, 229-230, 569 N.E.2d 889,
892-893. Therefore, we remand that claim to the trial court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
court of appeals' judgment in part, reverse it in part, and
remand the cause to the trial court.
Judgment affirmed in part,
reversed in part
and cause remanded.
Sweeney, Holmes, Douglas, Wright, H. Brown and Resnick,
JJ., concur.
FOOTNOTES:
1 The Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation
is a subdivision of the Ohio Attorney General's office, an
official agency of the state of Ohio. R.C. 109.51.
2 Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides:
"All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury
done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice
administered without denial or delay.
"Suits may be brought against the state, in such courts
and in such manner, as may be provided by law."