State ex rel. Ruessman v. Flanagan - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

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OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
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The State ex. rel. Ruessman v. Flanagan, Judge, et al.
[Cite as State ex rel. Ruessman v. Flanagan (1992),
Ohio St.3d .]
Prohibition -- Writ to prevent court of common pleas from
exercising jurisdiction on petition seeking adoption of a
foreign decree for purposes of enforcement of alimony
provisions -- Writ denied, when.
(No. 92-1312 -- Submitted November 10, 1992 -- Decided
December 11, 1992.)
In Prohibition.
On July 12, 1988, the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth
Judicial Circuit of Florida, in and for Palm Beach County,
entered a decree dissolving the marriage of relator, Norman G.
Ruessman, and Donna M. Ruessman, and ordering him to pay Donna
alimony.
On June 2, 1992, Donna filed a petition in the Court of
Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, Domestic Relations Division,
to adopt the foreign decree for purposes of enforcement
"pursuant to Local Rule 31."1 The petition alleged that
neither relator nor Donna now resides in Florida, that relator
resides in Ohio and has property in the court's jurisdiction
out of which a judgment can be satisfied, and that relator is
in substantial arrears on his alimony payments. With the
petition, Donna filed a motion for relator to show cause why he
should not be held in contempt of court, and requested the
court to determine the amount of arrearages due and order
payment thereof.
On July 7, 1992, relator filed this original action in
prohibition to prevent respondents (judges and a referee of the
court of common pleas) from exercising jurisdiction in this
matter. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss and an
alternative motion for summary judgment on September 8, 1992.
On September 14, 1992, relator filed a motion for summary
judgment to which certain evidentiary items were attached,
including a motion filed in the trial court on July 9, 1992 to
quash alleged service upon him.

Robert G. Shultz, Jr., for relator.

Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Prosecuting Attorney, and Carol
Shockley, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondents.

Per Curiam. For a writ of prohibition to issue, a
relator must establish (1) that the court or officer against
whom the writ is sought is about to exercise judicial or
quasi-judicial power, (2) that the exercise of that power is
unauthorized by law, and (3) that denying the writ will result
in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in the
ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Tollis v. Court of
Appeals for Cuyahoga Cty. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 145, 147, 532
N.E.2d 727, 729. There is no dispute that respondents are
about to exercise judicial power. Rather, relator contends
that the exercise of that power is unauthorized because
respondents lack personal and subject-matter jurisdiction.
Respondents claim that relator has an adequate remedy at law by
raising the jurisdictional issues below and, if unsuccessful,
by bringing an appeal.
Respondents' arguments are correct in stating general
propositions of law. "'[T]he rule is firmly established that
the Court of Common Pleas is a court of general jurisdiction
and, as such, possesses the authority initially to determine
its own jurisdiction over both the person and subject matter in
an action before it. * * *.'" State ex rel. Heimann v. George
(1976), 45 Ohio St. 2d 231, 232, 74 O.O.2d 376, 344 N.E.2d 130,
131; State ex rel. Zakany v. Avellone (1979), 58 Ohio St. 2d
25, 26, 12 O.O.3d 14, 14-15, 387 N.E.2d 1373, 1374. "* * * [A]
party challenging [a court's] jurisdiction has a remedy at law
in appeal from an adverse holding of the court that it has such
jurisdiction, and may not maintain a proceeding in prohibition
to prevent the prosecution of such action." State ex rel.
Miller v. Lake Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1949), 151 Ohio St.
397, 39 O.O. 232, 86 N.E.2d 464, paragraph three of the
syllabus; State ex rel Gilla v. Fellerhoff (1975), 44 Ohio
St.2d 86, 87, 73 O.O.2d 328, 338 N.E.2d 522, 523; State ex rel.
Gonzales v. Patton (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 386, 388, 71 O.O.2d
371, 372, 329 N.E.2d 104, 106.
However, we have also recognized a corollary to these
general propositions and have held that "[w]here there is a
total want of jurisdiction on the part of a court, a writ of
prohibition will be allowed * * *." State ex rel Adams v.
Gusweiler (1972), 30 Ohio St.2d 326, 59 O.O.2d 387, 285 N.E.2d
22, paragraph two of the syllabus. We have applied this
corollary only in instances where "there is a 'patent and
unambiguous restriction' on the jurisdiction of the court which
clearly places the dispute outside the court's jurisdiction
(State ex rel. Gilla v. Fellerhoff, supra [44 Ohio St.2d], at
page 88 [73 O.O.2d at 329, 338 N.E.2d at 523]) * * *." State
ex rel. Butler Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Butler Cty. Court of
Common Pleas (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 354, 356, 8 O.O.3d 359, 360,
376 N.E.2d 1343, 1345. See, also, State ex rel. Natalina Food
Co. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm. (1990), 55 Ohio St.3d 98, 562
N.E.2d 1383; State ex rel. The Ohio Company v. Maschari (1990),
51 Ohio St.3d 18, 553 N.E.2d 1356; State ex rel Pearson v.
Moore (1990), 48 Ohio St.3d 37, 548 N.E.2d 945; State ex rel.
Aycock v. Mowrey (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 347, 544 N.E.2d 657;
State ex rel Smith v. Court of Common Pleas (1982), 70 Ohio

St.2d 213, 24 O.O.3d 320, 436 N.E.2d 1005.
Thus, the narrow issue presented is whether there is a
patent and unambiguous restriction on the personal or
subject-matter jurisdiction of the court of common pleas. Upon
review of relator's complaint in this proceeding, we conclude
that there could be a set of facts upon which relator could
show such a lack of personal jurisdiction. Cf. O'Brien v.
University Community Tenants Union, Inc. (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d
242, 71 O.O.2d 223, 327 N.E.2d 753. Therefore, we deny
respondents' motion to dismiss and consider this matter upon
the opposing motions for summary judgment.
Relator assumes that the petition to adopt the foreign
alimony decree was filed under R.C. 2329.021 through 2329.027,
the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act ("UEFJA"), and
contends that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
because such decrees can only be enforced pursuant to R.C.
3115.01 through 3115.34, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act ("URESA"). Relator's argument lacks merit. The
petition was not filed under UEFJA, but was filed as an action
to enforce a judgment under the court's general original
jurisdiction. See Saxton v. Seiberling (1891), 48 Ohio St.
554, 558-559, 29 N.E. 179, 180; Schucker v. Metcalf (1986), 22
Ohio St.3d 33, 34, 22 OBR 27, 28, 488 N.E.2d 210, 212 ("'The
court of common pleas is a court of general jurisdiction. It
embraces all matters at law and in equity that are not denied
to it.'"). Neither URESA nor UEFJA deprives the court of this
basic jurisdiction. R.C. 3115.02 (the remedies under URESA are
"in addition to, not in substitution for, any other remedies");
R.C. 2329.026 (the UEFJA "do[es] not affect the right of a
judgment creditor to bring an action to enforce a foreign
judgment * * *"). Accordingly, we find no patent or
unambiguous restriction on the trial court's subject-matter
jurisdiction.
Relator also argues that the court is deprived of
subject-matter jurisdiction because of several alleged defects
in the petition filed below (e.g., lack of a proper affidavit
and proper authentication) and because the judgment sought to
be enforced is not final. To the extent these alleged defects
relate to the procedures for proving a foreign decree under the
UEFJA, we find relator's arguments to be without merit. The
remaining alleged defects, as well as relator's argument as to
the finality of the judgment, go to whether the foreign decree
should be given full faith and credit and are matters for
initial determination by the court of common pleas under its
original general jurisdiction.
Relator next contends that the court of common pleas lacks
personal jurisdiction because he is not a resident of Cuyahoga
County. This argument goes to venue and is not
jurisdictional. Civ.R. 3(G). Relator's proper remedy, if he
believes venue to be improper, is to file a motion to change
venue under Civ.R. 12. Civ.R. 3(C). If that determination is
adverse to relator, the remedy of appeal is available to him.
Civ. R. 3(G).
Finally, relator contends that respondents lack personal
jurisdiction because he has not been served with a copy of the
petition below. In State ex rel. Connor v. McGough (1989), 46
Ohio St.3d 188, 546 N.E.2d 407, we granted a writ of

prohibition where the trial court in the underlying case had
denied relator's motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. We found that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment clearly prevented the trial court from
assuming personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who
had no minimum contacts with this state. Such a patent lack of
jurisdiction is not present in the case before us. Here,
respondents assert that relator was duly served a copy of the
petition, and relator has challenged service by filing a motion
to quash, which is pending below. Accordingly, we find it
appropriate for the trial court to consider the pending motion
and that relator's appropriate remedy is through appeal. State
ex rel. Smith v. Avellone (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 6, 31 OBR 5,
508 N.E.2d 162.
We conclude that there is no patent or unambiguous
restriction on the court of common pleas' jurisdiction, that it
should make the intitial determinations on the jurisidictional
issues presented, and that relator has an adequate remedy by
way of appeal. Because the remedy of appeal is available to
relator, he cannot satisfy the standards for granting a writ of
prohibition. Therefore, we grant respondents' motion for
summary judgment and deny the writ.
Writ denied.
Moyer, C.J., Sweeney, Holmes, Douglas, Wright, H. Brown
and Resnick, JJ., concur.

FOOTNOTE
1 Loc.R. 31 of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas,
Rules of the Domestic Relations Division, "Petition to Adopt a
Foreign Decree for Enforcement or Modification of Support or
Property Division," provides:
"(A) Enforcement. A petition to adopt a foreign decree
may be filed for purposes of enforcing the provisions of the
decree pertaining to support or property division. The
responding party to the petition must be a resident of Ohio
unless there is property in this Court's jurisdiction out of
which a judgment can be satisfied.
"(B) Modification. A petition to adopt a foreign decree
may be filed for purposes of modifying the provisions of the
decree pertaining to support only if the decree rendering state
has relinquished jurisdiction and the responding party is an
Ohio resident. Proof that the decree rendering state has
relinquished jurisdiction shall accompany any motion to modify.
"(C) Procedure. The party seeking adoption of a foreign
decree shall file and serve on the opposing party a petition
requesting such adoption. The petition shall set forth with
specificity the reasons why this Court should assume
jurisdiction. A certified copy of the foreign decree shall be
attached to the petition. The petition shall also be supported
by an affidavit of the party seeking the adoption stating the
facts on which the petition is based.
"(D) Motions. Any motion to be filed on the foreign
decree may be filed at the same time as the petition. The
motion must also be served on the opposing party.
"(E) Hearings. The petition shall be set for hearing at
which time the Court shall determine if it should adopt the
foreign decree. Any motion filed simultaneously with the