Snide v. Columbus Bd. of Edn. - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

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OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
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Snide, Appellant, v. Columbus Board of Education, Appellee.
[Cite as Snide v. Columbus Bd. of Edn. (1993), Ohio
St.3d .]
R.C. 5923.05 (now 5923.05[A][1]) provides that an employee is
entitled to receive thirty-one days of compensation for
the calendar year in which he or she takes a military
leave of absence to go on active duty, but not for
subsequent calendar years of a multi-year leave of absence.
(No. 92-1101 -- Submitted April 27, 1993 -- Decided July
7,1993.)
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No.
91AP-1327.
Appellant, Robert Snide, was employed by the Columbus
Board of Education as a teacher when he requested a leave of
absence to serve in a full-time active duty capacity with the
Ohio National Guard. The request for leave was approved by the
board of education and, pursuant thereto, appellant went on
active duty for the following school years: 1986-1987,
1987-1988 and 1988-1989.
Subsequent to his return from active duty, appellant filed
an action for declaratory and compensatory relief, as well as a
writ for mandamus, seeking thirty-one days of compensation for
each of the four calendar years he was on active military duty
with the Ohio National Guard.
The trial court found in favor of appellant and entered a
declaratory judgment that, pursuant to R.C. 5923.05, appellant
is entitled to thirty-one days of compensation for each of the
four calendar years that he was on active military duty. The
court of appeals reversed that judgment, holding that the
appellant was entitled to receive only thirty-one days of
compensation for the year 1986.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the
allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Cloppert, Portman, Sauter, Latanick & Foley, Frederic A.
Portman and William J. Steele, for appellant.
Lawrence H. Braun; Bricker & Eckler, Jerry E. Nathan and
Betsy A. Swift, for appellee.

Francis E. Sweeney, Sr., J. The sole issue is whether
R.C. 5923.05 provides that an employee is entitled to thirty-
one days of compensation for each of the multi-calendar years
that he or she is on active military duty. For the following
reasons, we answer this question in the negative and,
accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
R.C. 5923.05,1 now 5923.05(A)(1), provides, in pertinent
part:
"All officers and employees of the state * * * who are
members of the Ohio national guard * * * are entitled to leave
of absence from their respective duties without loss of pay for
such time as they are in the military service on field training
or active duty for periods not to exceed thirty-one days in any
one calendar year."
While courts in Ohio have not previously addressed this
issue, the language of this statute was interpreted by former
Ohio Attorney General Mark McElroy, as follows:
"* * * The statute, therefore, requires, as a condition to
receipt of the benefits provided therein, that an employee
change his status from an employee to an employee on leave of
absence for military service and such change of status must
occur prior to granting of up to 31 days pay within a calendar
year." 1962 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 2936, at 266.
Based upon our reading of the statute, and guided by the
above Ohio Attorney General opinion, we believe that the
legislature intended R.C. 5923.05 to provide some additional
compensation to an employee in the calendar year in which his
status changes from "employee" to "employee on military leave
of absence" and not as a "perk" that an individual can receive
each multi-calendar year that he or she remains on active
duty. Therefore, we conclude that R.C. 5923.05 provides that
an employee is entitled to receive thirty-one days of
compensation for the calendar year in which he or she takes a
military leave of absence to go on active duty, but not for
subsequent calendar years of a multi-year leave of absence.
Accordingly, the court of appeals judgment finding that
the appellant was entitled to receive only thirty-one days of
compensation for the calendar year 1986 is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Footnote:
1. R.C. 5923.05 was amended twice in 1991. However, the
language of current R.C. 5923.05(A)(1) is the same as that in
former R.C. 5923.05.
A. William Sweeney, J., dissenting. In my view, the
majority opinion has misconstrued the intent of the General
Assembly in its enactment of R.C. 5923.05 (now 5923.05[A][1]).
Therefore, I must respectfully dissent from this erroneous
interpretation.
The majority's cursory analysis of the 1962 Attorney
General Opinion belies the fact of the subsequent and more
cogently analyzed Attorney General Opinion issued in 1986,
which overruled in relevant part the earlier opinion.
The 1986 opinion, authored by then Ohio Attorney General
Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., which is totally ignored by the
majority, reasoned in pertinent part as follows:
"R.C. 5923.05 entitles an employee to leave without loss

of pay for a period of up to thirty-one days 'in any one
calendar year.' The statute, therefore, merely limits the
number of days in each calendar year for which a public
employee on a military leave of absence may be compensated by
his employer. R.C. 5923.05 does not, however, require the
employee to render service to the public employer during that
time. See R.C. 5903.02 (during a military leave of absence, a
public employee 'shall, for all purposes, be considered as
having rendered service [to the public employer]'). Further,
R.C. 5923.05 places no limitation on the number of years for
which a public employee may be granted a military leave of
absence and be compensated by the public employer. See
Northern Ohio Patrolmen's Benevolent Association v. City of
Parma, 61 Ohio St.2d 375, 377, 402 N.E.2d 519, 521 (1980)
('R.C. 5923.05 mandates that the city pay each employee on
military leave of absence his or her full salary for a maximum
of 31 days every calendar year irrespective [of military pay]'
(emphasis added). See generally Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock &
Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 285 [66 S.Ct. 1105, 1111, 90 L.Ed.
1230, 1240] (1946) (veterans rights statutes are 'to be
liberally construed for the benefit of those who *** serve
their country'); accord Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp., 447 U.S.
191, 196 [100 S.Ct. 2100, 2104, 65 L.Ed.2d 53, 59] (1980).
Consequently, if an individual is an employee of the state or a
political subdivision at the time he enters active duty, he is
entitled to a maximum of thirty-one days of compensation per
year for each year during which he serves on military duty. In
light of my disagreement with 1962 Op.No. 2936, I must overrule
paragraph three of the syllabus of that opinion." (Emphasis
sic.) 1986 Ohio Atty. Gen. Ops. No. 86-050, at 2-263, 2-266.
Similar to the reasoning in the foregoing opinion, I
believe that R.C. 5923.05 is a remedial law which "*** shall be
liberally construed in order to promote [its] object and assist
the parties in obtaining justice." R.C. 1.11. In this regard,
I believe that R.C. 5923.05 should be liberally construed for
the benefit of those who serve their state or country in the
armed services.
In addition, I find the reasoning of Judge Tommy L.
Thompson to be particularly persuasive with respect to his
construction of R.C. 5923.05 in ruling upon defendant's motion
to dismiss in the trial court below:
"If the legislature had intended the plaintiff to receive
compensation for only 31 days regardless of the length of
active duty service, then the statute simply would read that
'all officers and employees are entitled to leave of absence
from their respective duties without loss of pay for such time
as they are in military service *** or active duty for a period
not to exceed 31 days.' Because the legislature specifically
stated '31 days in any one calendar year', the legislature must
have envisioned that active duty can encompass a time frame of
more than one year.
"***
"*** To adopt the argument of the [defendant] Board and
require the active duty employee to leave active duty, return
to his employment and leave again would be 'stretching' the
language of the statute, to say the least."
Another defect in the majority opinion is its failure to

acknowledge our prior decision in N. Ohio Patrolmen's
Benevolent Assn. v. Parma (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 375, 377, 15
O.O. 3d 450, 451, 402 N.E. 2d 519, 521, wherein we stated that
R.C. 5923.05 mandates that a governmental entity "pay each
employee on military leave of absence his or her full salary
for a maximum of 31 days every calendar year irrespective of
any monetary compensation awarded to such employee from the
military." (Emphasis added.)
Contrary to the reasoning of the majority in the cause sub
judice, this court in Benevolent Assn., supra, has already
found the benefit contained in R.C. 5923.05 to be a "perk" of
governmental employees who are on military leave of absence.
Id. at 383, 15 O.O.3d at 455, 402 N.E.2d at 525. I sincerely
believe that the legislature promulgated this additional
compensation to reward government employees and encourage them
to serve their state or country in the military. However, in
its own way, the majority has unfortunately eviscerated this
small token of appreciation that the General Assembly has
otherwise deemed appropriate.
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the
court of appeals and reinstate the trial court judgment.
Wright, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.