State v. Golston - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

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OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

**** SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITING ****

The full texts of the opinions of the Supreme Court of
Ohio are being transmitted electronically beginning May 27,
1992, pursuant to a pilot project implemented by Chief Justice
Thomas J. Moyer.
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The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Golston, Appellant.
[Cite as State v. Golston (1994), Ohio St.3d .]
Appellate procedure -- Criminal procedure -- Appeal
challenging felony conviction not moot even if entire
sentence has been satisfied before the matter is heard on
appeal.
A person convicted of a felony has a substantial stake in
the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction
of the judgment imposed upon him or her. Therefore, an
appeal challenging a felony conviction is not moot even if
the entire sentence has been satisfied before the matter
is heard on appeal. (State v. Wilson [1975], 41 Ohio
St.2d 236, 70 O.O.2d 431, 325 N.E.2d 236, and State v.
Berndt [1987], 29 Ohio St.3d 3, 29 OBR 173, 504 N.E.2d
712, distinguished; State v. Williams [1992], 80 Ohio
App.3d 542, 609 N.E.2d 1307, disapproved.)
(No. 93-1632 -- Submitted November 2, 1994 -- Decided
December 20, 1994.)
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No.
62857.
On February 13, 1991, Otis Golston III, appellant, was
indicted on two counts of motor vehicle grand theft in
violation of R.C. 2913.02 (felonies of the third degree), and
two counts of possession of criminal tools in violation of R.C.
2923.24 (felonies of the fourth degree). The events giving
rise to the indictment involved "key switch" scams whereby
appellant had allegedly posed as a customer at two car
dealerships in Euclid, Ohio, test-drove a vehicle at each
dealership, kept the keys to the vehicle, handed the
salesperson a different set of keys, and later stole the
vehicles from the dealerships by using the stolen keys.
In October 1991, appellant was tried before a jury. The
jury found appellant guilty of all charges in the indictment.
On October 29, 1991, the trial court sentenced appellant on the
two counts of motor vehicle grand theft (counts one and three)

and the two counts of possession of criminal tools (counts two
and four). At the sentencing hearing, appellant requested that
he be released on bond pending appeal. The trial court denied
appellant's motion. The final judgment entry imposing sentence
was filed on November 4, 1991.
On December 2, 1991, appellant appealed to the court of
appeals, seeking reversal of his convictions and sentences.
However, on June 14, 1993, the court of appeals dismissed
appellant's appeal, stating, in part:
"A review of the record indicates that Golston was
sentenced by the trial court to a term of one and one-half
years each on counts one and three, and a term of one year each
on counts two and four, counts two and four to run concurrent
with count one. * * * The one and one-half year sentences on
counts one and three are deemed to be served concurrently since
the trial court did not specify otherwise. * * *
"In the present case, there is no stay of execution in the
record. Therefore, Golston's effective total sentence of
eighteen months was served from November 4, 1991, to May 4,
1993. Additionally, Golston has not presented in the case sub
judice 'any evidence from which an inference can be drawn that
he will suffer some collateral legal disability or loss of
civil rights.' State v. Williams (Cuyahoga 1992), 80 Ohio
App.3d 542, 543, [609 N.E.2d 1307] * * *. This appeal is
therefore dismissed as moot. Id."
The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a
motion for leave to appeal.

Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Craig T. Weintraub, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, Inc.,
and William M. Saks, for appellant.

Douglas, J. This court has held that where a criminal
defendant, convicted of a misdemeanor, voluntarily satisfies
the judgment imposed upon him or her for that offense, an
appeal from the conviction is moot unless the defendant has
offered evidence from which an inference can be drawn that he
or she will suffer some collateral legal disability or loss of
civil rights stemming from that conviction. See State v.
Wilson (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 236, 70 O.O.2d 431, 325 N.E.2d
236, and State v. Berndt (1987), 29 Ohio St.3d 3, 29 OBR 173,
504 N.E.2d 712.
In Wilson, supra, a defendant pled "no contest" to a
charge of carrying a concealed weapon, a three-inch straight
razor. Carrying such a concealed weapon is a misdemeanor of
the first degree. See R.C. 2923.12. The defendant was found
guilty of the charge, and assessed a fine and costs, which the
defendant promptly paid. Thereafter, the defendant, through
counsel, appealed to the court of appeals. The court of
appeals dismissed the appeal as moot. Upon further appeal,
this court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals,
finding that the defendant had failed to establish that he had
any substantial stake in his conviction that may have survived
the payment of the fine and costs. Id. at 237, 70 O.O.2d at
432, 325 N.E.2d at 237. We held that "[w]here a defendant,

convicted of a criminal offense, has voluntarily paid the fine
or completed the sentence for that offense, an appeal is moot
when no evidence is offered from which an inference can be
drawn that the defendant will suffer some collateral disability
or loss of civil rights from such judgment or conviction." Id.
at syllabus. We concluded that the burden of presenting
evidence that the defendant has such a "substantial stake in
the judgment of conviction," is upon the defendant. Id. at
237, 70 O.O.2d at 432, 325 N.E.2d at 237.
In Berndt, supra, a criminal defendant was convicted for
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol,
a misdemeanor of the first degree. See R.C. 4511.19 and
4511.99. The defendant pled guilty to the charge. Upon
acceptance of the plea, the court sentenced the defendant to
six months' incarceration and imposed a fine of $1000, of which
all but three days and $150 were suspended. The defendant
voluntarily served his sentence and paid the fine. Thereafter,
the defendant appealed to the court of appeals, which addressed
the merits of the appeal. In Berndt, this court, applying
Wilson, supra, held that the court of appeals should have
dismissed the appeal as moot since the defendant had not
established that he would suffer some collateral disability or
loss of civil rights resulting from his conviction. Id. 29
Ohio St.3d at 4-5, 29 OBR at 174, 504 N.E.2d at 713-714.
In the case at bar, appellant appealed to the court of
appeals seeking reversal of his felony convictions. The court
of appeals dismissed the appeal as moot since appellant had
already served his sentence and had offered no evidence
demonstrating that he would suffer some collateral legal
disability or loss of civil rights stemming from the challenged
convictions. In so holding, the court of appeals relied upon
Williams, supra, 80 Ohio App.3d 542, 609 N.E.2d 1307, an Ohio
appellate decision which applied the law of Wilson and Berndt
to an appeal from a felony conviction. We find that the court
of appeals erred in this regard. We hold that the test for
mootness outlined in Wilson and Berndt applies only to appeals
from misdemeanor convictions.
The Ohio Revised Code contains numerous examples of
restrictions imposed upon convicted felons. See, generally,
Williams, supra, 80 Ohio App.3d at 543-547, 609 N.E.2d at
1308-1310 (Dyke, P.J., dissenting). For instance, a convicted
felon is denied the privilege of serving as a juror, and may
never hold an office of "honor, trust, or profit." See R.C.
2961.01. A convicted felon is also statutorily precluded from
engaging in certain occupations and professions. See, e.g.,
R.C. 4738.07(D), 4751.10(D) and 4749.03. Moreover, in addition
to the various statutory disabilities imposed upon those
convicted of a felony, the infamy and disgrace resulting from a
felony conviction seriously affects a person's reputation and
economic and social opportunities in our society. The same
stigma does not ordinarily attach to those who have been
convicted of misdemeanor offenses.
Given the numerous adverse collateral consequences imposed
upon convicted felons, it is clear to us that a person
convicted of a felony has a substantial stake in the judgment
of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the judgment
imposed upon him or her. Therefore, an appeal challenging a

felony conviction is not moot even if the entire sentence has
been satisfied before the matter is heard on appeal. The
collateral legal consequences associated with a felony
conviction are severe and obvious. Thus, a convicted felon,
who has completed his or her sentence during the pendency of an
appeal from the felony conviction, need not present evidence
that he or she will suffer some collateral legal disability or
loss of civil rights in order to maintain the appeal. In this
regard, we specifically disapprove of Williams, supra, 80 Ohio
App.3d 542, 609 N.E.2d 1307, which improperly extended the rule
of Wilson and Berndt to cases involving appeals from felony
convictions.
As a final matter, we note that appellant was convicted of
a felony in 1989. Obviously, that conviction predated his
convictions in the case at bar. In this vein, appellee urges
that since appellant has a prior felony record, appellant will
suffer no collateral disabilities resulting from the
convictions he seeks to challenge in this appeal. We
disagree. Appellant's statutory right to seek expungement of
the 1989 felony conviction will necessarily be lost if
appellant is unable to successfully obtain reversal of his 1991
felony convictions. Further, in our judgment, appellant's
interest in clearing his name in this case by seeking reversal
of the 1991 felony convictions is enough to establish the
existence of a justiciable controversy.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the
court of appeals and remand the cause to that court for
reinstatement of appellant's appeal.
Judgment reversed
and cause remanded.
Moyer, C.J., A.W. Sweeney, Wright and Pfeifer, JJ., concur.
Resnick and F.E. Sweeney, JJ., dissent.
Francis E. Sweeney, Sr., J., dissenting. I respectfully
dissent. While I agree with the majority that a convicted
felon may succumb to certain statutory disabilities resulting
from a felony conviction, I am unwilling to follow the
majority's logic that a convicted felon, simply because of his
status, automatically suffers adverse collateral consequences.
In my opinion, in order to maintain an appeal a convicted
felon must present evidence that he or she will in fact
personally suffer some collateral disability or loss of civil
rights from such judgment or conviction. Therefore, I would
approve the decision of State v. Williams (1992), 80 Ohio
App.3d 542, 609 N.E.2d 1307, as applied to the facts of this
case.
Resnick, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.