Caddell v. Ohio Bur. of Workers' Comp. - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

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OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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Caddell, Appellant, v. Bureau of Workers' Compensation,
Appellee.
[Cite as Caddell v. Bur. of Work. Comp. (1995), Ohio St.
3d .]
Workers' compensation -- Interruption of temporary total
disability compensation payments by Bureau of Workers'
Compensation without conducting a hearing -- hearing
subsequently provided which remedied claimant's objection
-- Not a deprivation of due process.
(No. 93-1600 -- Submitted November 1, 1994 -- Decided
December 23, 1994.)
Appeal from the Court of Appeals of Franklin County, No.
92AP-1466.
Edward Caddell, appellant, suffered two injuries while
working for his employer, the Southern Ohio Regional Transit
Authority ("SORTA"). His first injury occurred on February 11,
1983, and resulted in claim No. PEL-22773 (the "first claim")
at the Bureau of Workers' Compensation (the "bureau"),
appellee. Appellant's second injury occurred on May 2, 1984,
and resulted in claim No. PEL-28892 (the "second claim") at the
bureau. In addition to filing claims with the bureau,
appellant applied for and received sickness and accident
benefits from SORTA's insurance provider, Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co.
After a court upheld appellant's claim for workers'
compensation benefits, SORTA informed appellant that because he
would receive both workers' compensation benefits and sickness
and accident benefits for the same injury, he must repay the
sickness and accident benefits he received from the employer's
insurance provider.
After appellant did not repay the sickness and accident
benefits, SORTA filed a motion with the bureau to have its
workers' compensation risk credited for the amount of sickness
and accident benefits paid to appellant. A district hearing
officer concluded that there had been no overpayment. The

Dayton Regional Board of Review ("DRB") reversed this
conclusion of the district hearing officer and ordered the
bureau to credit SORTA's risk for the periods from April 29,
1983 to August 6, 1983 and September 29, 1983 to April 2,
1984. The DRB also let stand the district hearing officer's
finding that appellant concurrently received sickness and
accident benefits and workers' compensation benefits for the
above mentioned periods. Appellant's counsel was present at
this hearing.
The bureau credited SORTA's risk and issued an adjustment
order to collect the overpayment that appellant had received.
The adjustment order in effect directed the bureau to deduct
the amount that appellant had been overpaid in his first claim
from the temporary total disability compensation benefits that
appellant was receiving for his second claim. The adjustment
order was sent to appellant on April 15, 1989. Attached to the
order was a form letter, which informed appellant that he had
ten days to appeal the order. Appellant filed his objection on
April 27, 1989. The bureau declined to provide appellant with
a hearing because it contended that the objection was filed
more than ten days after its order was sent to appellant.
On July 31, 1989, and November 2, 1989, the bureau
deducted the calculated overcompensation that appellant
received in the first claim from payments the bureau was making
to appellant for the second claim.
On January 19, 1990, appellant's request for a hearing was
granted. After the hearing was conducted, a district hearing
officer found that the bureau had miscalculated the amount that
appellant had been overpaid. The hearing officer found that
appellant received overlapping payments from April 23, 1983
through July 10, 1983 and from October 6, 1983 to November 10,
1983, rather than from April 29, 1984 to August 6, 1983 and
September 29, 1983 to April 2, 1984. The bureau had deducted
too much from the payments that appellant was receiving for his
second claim. The bureau was ordered to recalculate the
overpayment and compensate appellant for the money the bureau
had wrongly deducted from appellant's second-claim payments.
Appellant did not object to or appeal this order.
On March 1, 1990, the bureau repaid appellant $10,362,63,
and on April 26, 1990, payment of appellant's temporary total
compensation for his second claim recommenced.
Appellant filed a complaint in the Court of Claims
alleging that the bureau had intentionally inflicted emotional
distress on appellant; and urging that the bureau had violated
his constitutional rights, and that the bureau had acted
illegally when it -- without conducting a hearing -- set-off
the amount of money which was overpaid to him in his first
claim from the amount of money he was receiving from his second
claim. The case was tried to the trial court in a bench trial
on stipulated evidence and briefs. The trial court entered
judgment for the bureau. The trial court held that appellant
had failed to prove that the bureau acted in bad faith,
violated his right to due process, or was guilty of conversion
or other tortious conduct.
The Court of Appeals of Franklin County affirmed the
judgment of the trial court.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the

allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Stewart Jaffy & Assoc. Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy and
Marc J. Jaffy, for appellant and urging reversal for amici
curiae, Ohio AFL-CIO and Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers.
Lee I. Fisher, Attorney General, and Peter E. DeMarco,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Pfeifer, J.
I
This court has never recognized the common-law-based cause
of action for deprivation of due process. Assuming that such a
tort exists, appellant in order to prevail would need to prove,
at the very least, that he was deprived of due process. In the
present case, appellant was not deprived of due process. A
deprivation of procedural due process does not occur when a
claimant is initially deprived of a hearing if a hearing is
subsequently provided to the claimant. State, ex rel. Weimer
v. Indus. Comm. (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 159, 161, 16 O.O.3d 174,
175, 404 N.E.2d 149, 151.
In this case, the bureau interrupted appellant's temporary
total disability compensation payments without conducting a
hearing, but subsequently provided appellant with a hearing
that remedied his objection. During this hearing, appellant
demonstrated to the bureau that it had miscalculated the amount
of double compensation that appellant had received for his
first injury. As a result of the hearing, the bureau
acknowledged its miscalculation and ordered an adjustment so
that appellant would be repaid the amount of money which was
wrongfully withheld from him. According to Weimer, this
subsequent hearing afforded appellant due process.
II
Appellant contends that the bureau should be liable when
it in bad faith terminates a claimant's workers' compensation
benefits. We decline to address this proposition of law.
While it may become necessary to hold the bureau liable when
it, or its employees, have intentionally and wrongfully
withheld a claimants' benefits, this case does not present such
a scenario. This case involves a claimant who admits that he
received double compensation for his injury from his employer
and who admits that he was eventually paid those benefits that
the bureau had improperly withheld. Because appellant's
treatment by the bureau does not involve a matter of public or
great general interest, we dismiss those portions of this
appeal addressing the bad faith issue, sua sponte, as having
been improvidently allowed.
III
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of
appeals in part and dismiss this cause in part.
Judgment affirmed in part
and appeal dismissed in part.
Moyer, C.J., A.W. Sweeney, Douglas, Wright, Resnick and
F.E. Sweeney, JJ., concur.