Gerner v. Salem City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

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OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
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Gerner, Appellant, v. Salem City School District Board of
Education, Appellee.
[Cite as Gerner v. Salem City School Dist. Bd. of Edn.
(1994), Ohio St.3d .]
Schools -- Teachers -- When board of education fails to
adequately describe circumstances that led to its decision
not to reemploy a teacher, court in an appeal under R.C.
3319.11(G)(7) may award teacher back pay.
When a board of education violates R.C. 3319.11(G)(2) by failing
to adequately describe the circumstances that led to its
decision not to reemploy a teacher, a court in an appeal
under R.C. 3319.11(G)(7) may award the teacher back pay
until the board provides an adequate statement of
circumstances.
(No. 92-2520 -- Submitted January 12, 1994 -- Decided
April 27, 1994.)
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Columbiana County,
No. 91-C-33.
Appellant, Virginia Gerner, was employed as a certified
public school teacher by the Salem City School District Board
of Education under a limited contract of employment for the
school years 1987-1988, 1988-1989, and 1989-1990.
On April 20, 1990, the Superintendent of Schools wrote the
President of the Board recommending that the board not renew
Gerner's limited teaching contract for the 1990-1991 school
year. The board followed the superintendent's advice and, in a
letter dated April 24, 1990, informed Gerner that her contract
would not be renewed for the coming school year. Paragraph one
of the letter stated, "Please be advised that at its regular
meeting of April 23rd, 1990 the Board of Education of Salem
City Schools took action to non-renew your contract for the
90/91 school year in accordance with the provisions of the Ohio
Revised Code." The remainder of the letter addressed insurance
benefits and other administrative matters.
Gerner received the board's notice on April 25, 1990.
Seven days later she wrote the board and asked for an
explanation describing the circumstances that led to its
decision. The board responded with this description:

"[T]he circumstances that led to the Board of Education's
decision not to re-employ you are that, after the evaluation
procedures required by O.R.C. 3319.11 were completed, the
Superintendent recommended to the Board of Education that you
not be re-employed, which recommendation the Board accepted at
its meeting of April 23rd, 1990, and the Board of Education
forwarded to you notice of it's [sic] action."
In a letter dated May 7, 1990, Gerner stated that she did
not believe the board's description satisfied the requirements
of R.C. 3319.11(G)(2). She repeated her request for the board
to describe the circumstances that led to its decision and
exercised her right under R.C. 3319.11(E) to request a hearing
before the board.
The board held a hearing in executive session on May 21,
1990. Gerner and her representative presented a statement to
the board concerning the nonrenewal of her teaching contract.
The board adjourned the hearing without asking any questions,
making any statements, presenting any evidence, or calling any
witnesses. Shortly thereafter, in a letter dated May 30, 1990,
the board informed Gerner, without explanation, that it had
affirmed its earlier decision not to renew her contract.
Gerner filed a complaint under R.C. 3319.11(G)(7) for
injunctive and other relief in the Columbiana County Common
Pleas Court, seeking a review of the board's decision. She
alleged in her complaint that the board had failed to comply
with the statutory procedures governing the nonrenewal of her
limited contract of employment. Both parties filed motions for
summary judgment.
Gerner argued in support of her motion for summary
judgment that R.C. 3319.11(G)(2) required the board to describe
the reason why her contract was not renewed and that the
board's failure to do so was a violation of the statute.
The board argued that it did not have to explain why it
made its decision. It argued that the use of the word
"circumstances" in R.C. 3319.11(G)(2) rather than the word
"reasons" meant that the board was required to describe only
how it reached its decision. The board claimed that it met
this requirement by advising Gerner that it had received and
accepted the superintendent's recommendation regarding the
nonrenewal of her contract.
The board arrived at its interpretation of R.C.
3319.11(G)(2) through an examination of the provision's
legislative history. The board noted that the original
language in the bill amending R.C. 3319.11 required a board of
education to state "specific and detailed reasons" for its
decision not to renew a teacher's limited teaching contract.
The board further noted that this language was deleted from the
final version of the bill and the word "circumstances" was
substituted in its place, which, the board argued, rendered it
unnecessary for the board to state why it did not renew
Gerner's contract.
The trial court disagreed with the board's interpretation
of R.C. 3319.11(G)(2). The court stated that the statute
imposed a duty on the board to explain why it did not renew
Gerner's contract. The court found that the board had provided
no such explanation and that its failure to do so amounted to a
procedural error in violation of the statute.

In its judgment entry, the court ordered the board to
correct the procedural error by providing Gerner another
written statement describing the circumstances that led to its
decision and another hearing upon Gerner's request. The court
did not order the Board to renew Gerner's contract or to pay
her any salary or benefits.
Both parties appealed. Gerner appealed the trial court's
decision refusing to order the board to reinstate her with back
pay. The board cross-appealed on the issue of whether R.C.
3319.11(G)(2) required the board to tell Gerner why it chose to
nonrenew her contract.
The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court. The court held that the remedy of reemployment is not
available for a violation of R.C. 3319.11(G)(2); it therefore
declined to order the board to reemploy Gerner. On the issue
raised by the board in its cross-appeal, the court held R.C.
3319.11(G)(7) limited the trial court's review of the board's
decision to procedural issues. The court concluded that the
trial court did not err by examining whether the board had
adequately described the circumstances behind its decision to
nonrenew Gerner's contract.
The cause is before this court pursuant to the allowance
of a motion to certify the record.

Green, Haines, Sgambati, Murphy & Macala Co., L.P.A.,
Anthony P. Sgambati II and Barry Laine, for appellant.
Horning & Horning, Richard A. Horning and J. David
Horning, for appellee.

Wright, J. We assume in this case that the statement of
circumstances provided to appellant Gerner by the board is
defective in that it does not meet the requirements of R.C.
3319.11(G)(2).1 We address only the remedial power of a court
necessary to ensure that the board follows through on its
obligation to provide a statement of circumstances that is not
defective; that is, to ensure that it promptly corrects its
error. The precise issue before us is whether in an appeal
under R.C. 3319.11(G)(7) a court may either order the board to
temporarily reinstate Gerner with back pay or grant an award of
back pay alone, pending correction of the error. For the
reasons that follow, we hold that a court may award back pay
but may not order the board to reinstate Gerner. We therefore
reverse in part the decision of the court of appeals.
Gerner claims that the relief granted by the trial court
is inadequate because "it gave full effect to a non-renewal
decision that *** was procedurally defective." She argues that
R.C. 3319.11(G)(7) allows a court to order the board to
temporarily reinstate her with back pay until the board
corrects the defective statement of circumstances it provided
her. If a court is not authorized to reinstate her with back
pay, she argues that she may still be awarded back pay alone.
The procedures governing the nonrenewal of limited
contracts of employment for teachers are set forth in R.C.
3319.11, a statute amended in 1988 by Am.Sub. H.B. No. 330, 142
Ohio Laws, Part II, 3356. Prior to the enactment of this bill,
a board of education could decide not to renew a teacher's
limited contract by merely providing notice of the decision on

or before April 30 of the year in which the contract was to
expire. A teacher working under a limited contract was not
entitled to know the reasons why his or her contract was not
renewed, nor was the teacher entitled to a hearing on the
matter. See Matheny v. Frontier Local Bd. of Edn. (1980), 62
Ohio St.2d 362, 16 O.O.3d 411, 405 N.E.2d 1041. Since the
enactment of Am.Sub. H.B. No. 330, R.C. 3319.11 has afforded
limited-contract teachers some measure of protection with
respect to the nonrenewal of their contracts, protections which
are procedural in nature.2 These procedural
protections include, among others, the right under R.C.
3319.11(G)(2) to receive a statement of circumstances and the
right under R.C. 3319.11(G)(7) to appeal a board's decision.
A court in an appeal, however, "is limited to the
determination of procedural errors and to ordering the
correction of procedural errors." R.C. 3319.11(G)(7) restricts
the availability of the remedy of reemployment to two
circumstances: a failure by a board of education to properly
evaluate a teacher under R.C. 3319.111(A) and a failure to
provide timely notice of the nonrenewal decision. Unless one
of these two circumstances is present, a court in an appeal may
not invalidate a board's decision not to reemploy a teacher.
We find that the language in R.C. 3319.11(G)(7) described
above clearly precludes a court from invalidating the board's
decision and ordering the board to reinstate Gerner. Here the
board violated only the requirements of R.C. 3319.11(G)(2) and
not the evaluation requirements of R.C. 3319.111(A) or the
notice requirements of R.C. 3319.11(E). Ordering the board to
reinstate Gerner pending correction of the inadequate statement
of circumstances provided her is equivalent to ordering the
board to reemploy her, albeit temporarily. R.C. 3319.11(G)(7)
does not allow for such a result in this case. We therefore
hold that when a board of education provides an inadequate
statement of circumstances to a teacher whose limited contract
was not renewed and thereby violates R.C. 3319.11(G)(2), a
court may not order the board to reinstate the teacher with
back pay.
We do find, however, that R.C. 3319.11(G)(7) does not
preclude an award of back pay under every circumstance. The
statute allows a court to "order[] the correction of procedural
errors." Implicit within this language is the authority for a
court to fashion a means to enforce the statute, a remedy if
you will. As stated earlier, by amending R.C. 3319.11 the
General Assembly evinced an intent to provide teachers holding
limited contracts some measure of protection with respect to
the nonrenewal of their contracts. We do not find in the
language of the statute a similar intent to divest a court of
all power to see that a board of education in fact provides the
protections contemplated by the statute.
Our finding in this regard does not contravene the
limitations imposed on a court in an appeal under R.C.
3319.11(G)(7). The limitations there are meant to preserve a
board of education's ultimate authority over the employment of
teachers in its school system. They are not meant to impede a
court's ability to otherwise enforce the procedural protection
afforded those teachers under R.C. 3319.11(G)(2). Awarding
back pay to Gerner without reinstating her does not threaten

the authority vested in the board to ultimately decide whether
to employ her as a teacher. It does, however, prompt the board
to act diligently in providing Gerner an adequate statement of
circumstances, which fulfills the purpose behind division
(G)(2) of the statute.
For the reasons stated above, we hold that when a board of
education violates R.C. 3319.11(G)(2) by failing to adequately
describe the circumstances that led to its decision not to
reemploy a teacher, a court in an appeal under R.C.
3319.11(G)(7) may award the teacher back pay until the board
provides an adequate statement of circumstances.
We reverse in part the decision of the court of appeals
and remand this cause to the trial court for a determination of
the amount of back pay due Gerner.
Judgment reversed in part
and cause remanded.
Moyer, C.J., A.W. Sweeney, Douglas, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney
and Pfeifer, JJ., concur.

FOOTNOTES:
1 We need not decide whether the board's description in
this case was adequate under R.C. 3319.11(G) because the board
did not appeal the decision of the court of appeals. We note,
however, that the adequacy of the board's description is
governed by the standards set forth by this court in Naylor v.
Cardinal Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994), Ohio
St.3d . In Naylor, this court held that "R.C.
3319.11(G)(2) requires a board of education to provide a
teacher under a limited contract a clear and substantive basis
for its decision not to reemploy the teacher for the following
school year." (Emphasis added.) Id., paragraph three of the
syllabus.
2 The version of R.C. 3319.11(G) in effect when this
cause arose provided in part:
"(G)(1) Any teacher receiving written notice of the
intention of a board of education not to re-employ him pursuant
to division (B), (C)(3), (D), or (E) of this section may,
within ten days of the date on which he received the notice,
file with the treasurer of the board of education a written
demand for a written statement describing the circumstances
that led to the board's intention not to re-employ the teacher.
"(2) The treasurer of a board of education, on behalf of
the board, shall, within ten days of the date on which he
receives a written demand for a written statement pursuant to
division (G)(1) of this section, provide to the teacher a
written statement describing the circumstances that led to the
board's intention not to re-employ the teacher.
"***
"(7) A teacher may appeal an order affirming the
intention of the board not to re-employ the teacher to the
court of common pleas of the county in which the largest
portion of the territory of the school district is located,
within thirty days of the date on which the teacher receives
the written decision, on the grounds that the board has not
complied with the provisions of section 3319.11 or 3319.111 of
the Revised Code.
"Notwithstanding section 2506.04 of the Revised Code, the

court in an appeal under this division is limited to the
determination of procedural errors and to ordering the
correction of procedural errors and shall have no jurisdiction
to order a board to re-employ a teacher, except that the court
may order a board to re-employ a teacher in compliance with the
requirements of division (B), (C)(3), (D), or (E) of this
section when the court determines that evaluation procedures
have not been complied with pursuant to division (A) of section
3319.111 of the Revised Code or the board has not given the
teacher written notice on or before the thirtieth day of April
of its intention not to re-employ the teacher pursuant to
division (B), (C)(3), (D), or (E) of this section. Otherwise,
the determination whether to re-employ or not re-employ a
teacher is solely a board's determination and not a proper
subject of judicial review and, except as provided in this
division, no decision of a board whether to re-employ or not
re-employ a teacher shall be invalidated by the court on any
basis, including that the decision was not warranted by the
results of any evaluation or was not warranted by any statement
given pursuant to division (G)(2) of this section.
"No appeal of an order of a board may be made except as
specified in this division."