Streetsboro Edn. Assn. v. Streetsboro City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

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OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
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Streetsboro Education Association et al., Appellees, v.
Streetsboro City School District Board of Education, Appellant.
[Cite as Streetsboro Edn. Assn. v. Streetsboro City School Dist.
Bd. of Edn. (1994), Ohio St.3d .]
Labor relations -- Schools -- Where provision of collective
bargaining agreement conflicts with state or local law
pertaining to a specific exception listed in R.C.
4117.10(A), the law prevails and the provision is
unenforceable.
- - -
Where a provision of a collective bargaining agreement is in
conflict with a state or local law pertaining to a specific
exception listed in R.C. 4117.10(A), the law prevails and
the provision of the agreement is unenforceable.
- - -
(No. 92-2018 -- Submitted November 16, 1993 -- Decided
February 4, 1994.)
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Portage County, No.
91-P-2327.
On February 14, 1989, two teachers in the Streetsboro City
School District, plaintiffs-appellees Linda Jahn and Beverly
Thorne, along with their collective bargaining representative,
plaintiff-appellee Streetsboro Education Association ("education
association"), filed an action against defendant-appellant,
Streetsboro City School District Board of Education ("board of
education"), in Portage County Common Pleas Court. Appellees
contended that a provision of the collective bargaining agreement
entered into by the education association and the board of
education was unenforceable.
It was alleged that Jahn and Thorne each had taken unpaid
parental leaves of absence according to the terms of the parties'
collective bargaining agreement. Each chose to purchase
retirement service credit after the leave had ended from the
State Teachers Retirement System ("STRS") to cover all or some of
the times she had been on leave. The dispute between the parties
revolves around appellees' attempt to have appellant pay the
employer's share of the retirement service credit. Appellees
claim that R.C. 3307.512 mandates that appellant pay the

employer's share into STRS for the leave times covered by Jahn's
and Thorne's elections to purchase service credit. Appellant
argues that a provision in the collective bargaining agreement,
Section C(1)(b), Article 3, specifying that the board of
education "shall not be held responsible for any retirement costs
incurred as a result of an unpaid Leave of Absence," is
enforceable and absolves appellant of any responsibility to pay
the employer's share.
After Jahn elected to purchase a portion of the retirement
service credit, appellant paid the employer's share covering that
portion of Jahn's leave of absence and was reimbursed by Jahn for
that amount. Therefore, Jahn sought to recover in common pleas
court the money she had expended to reimburse appellant.
After Thorne elected to purchase the retirement service
credit, appellant paid the employer's share ($3,689.82) covering
Thorne's leave of absence, but Thorne refused to reimburse
appellant for the amount. Therefore, appellant filed a
counterclaim in the suit to recover that money from Thorne.
The trial court granted appellees' motion for summary
judgment, finding the collective-bargaining-agreement provision
at issue was unenforceable. In making that determination, the
trial court relied upon R.C. 4117.10(A), which states that
"[l]aws pertaining to *** the retirement of public employees ***
prevail over conflicting provisions of agreements between
employee organizations and public employers." The trial court
awarded Jahn the money she had spent to reimburse appellant (plus
interest), and directed appellant to make employer payments for
the purchase of the balance of the service credit. The court
awarded appellant nothing on its counterclaim against Thorne.
The court of appeals affirmed.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance
of a motion to certify the record.

Green, Haines, Sgambati, Murphy & Macala Co., L.P.A., Ronald
G. Macala and Anne Piero Silagy, for appellees.
Christley, Herington, Pierce, Silver & Habowski, Ronald J.
Habowski and Leigh E. Herington, for appellant.

Alice Robie Resnick, J. The issue presented is whether the
provision contained in the parties' collective bargaining
agreement, Section C(1)(b), Article 3,1 specifying that appellant
shall not be responsible for paying the employer's share of
retirement payments made to STRS for an unpaid leave of absence,
is valid and enforceable. Appellees claim that the provision is
not enforceable because R.C. 3307.5122 specifically requires
appellant to pay STRS the employer's share whenever an employee
who is a member of STRS elects to purchase service credit
following a period of approved absence or leave. For the reasons
which follow, we find Section C(1)(b), Article 3 of the
collective bargaining agreement unenforceable.
R.C. 4117.10(A) sets out the relationship between provisions
of a collective bargaining agreement and state or local laws.
R.C. 4117.10(A) first provides that a collective bargaining
agreement "governs the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of
public employment covered by the agreement." From this it
logically follows that if no state or local law makes a
specification about a matter (i.e., if there is no conflict

between the agreement and a law), then the agreement governs the
parties as to that matter. Conversely, if a collective
bargaining agreement makes no specification about a matter (i.e.,
if there is no conflict between a law and the agreement), then
R.C. 4117.10(A) further provides that state and local laws
generally apply to a public employer and its public employees
regarding "wages, hours and terms and conditions" of employment.
When a provision in a collective bargaining agreement
addresses a subject also addressed by a state or local law, so
that the two conflict, R.C. 4117.10(A) delineates whether the
collective bargaining provision or the law prevails. To do this,
R.C. 4117.10(A) specifies certain areas in which laws will
prevail over conflicting provisions of collective bargaining
agreements. Consequently, where a provision of a collective
bargaining agreement is in conflict with a state or local law
pertaining to a specific exception listed in R.C. 4117.10(A), the
law prevails and the provision of the agreement is
unenforceable. However, if a collective bargaining provision
conflicts with a law which does not pertain to one of the
specific exceptions listed in R.C. 4117.10(A), then the
collective bargaining agreement prevails. See State ex rel.
Rollins v. Cleveland Hts.- University Hts. Bd. of Edn. (1988), 40
Ohio St.3d 123, 532 N.E.2d 1289, paragraph one of the syllabus
(collective bargaining agreement prevails over conflicting law
unless the law falls within an exception listed in R.C.
4117.10[A]). See, also, Cuyahoga Falls Edn. Assn. v. Cuyahoga
Falls City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 193,
574 N.E.2d 442, paragraph two of the syllabus; Jurcisin v.
Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 137, 143,
519 N.E.2d 347, 352-353.
Hence, the analysis employed to resolve whether the
collective bargaining agreement or the state or local law
prevails is straightforward: (1) Initially, we examine the
relevant provision of the collective bargaining agreement and the
relevant state or local law, and ask whether the agreement and
the law conflict. (2) If there is a conflict, we then ask
whether the conflicting law pertains to one of the areas listed
in R.C. 4117.10(A). The law prevails if the two questions above
are answered in the affirmative. If that is the case, the
conflicting provision in the collective bargaining agreement is
unenforceable.
R.C. 3307.512(B) provides that a member of STRS who has been
on leave and is unable to make contributions through employer
payroll deductions to STRS during the leave time may purchase
service credit. Jahn and Thorne could purchase service credit
following their leaves under R.C. 3307.512(B). This statute
allows any member of STRS to purchase service credit if the
member has been absent from work due to "his [or her] own illness
or injury, or who is, or has been, granted a leave for
educational, professional, or other purposes pursuant to section
3319.13." The parental leave taken by Jahn and Thorne was an
approved leave of absence for "other purposes" as provided for in
R.C. 3319.13.
A member of STRS who chooses to purchase this service credit
has several options on how to make the payments, depending on the
member's situation. The differing methods for making the
payments are set out in R.C. 3307.512(C), (D), and (E). Both

R.C. 3307.512(C) and (D) state that "[t]he employer shall pay
[STRS] the employer contributions on the compensation amount
certified under this division." R.C. 3307.512(E) states that
"[t]he employer shall pay to [STRS] for each year of credit
purchased under this division ***." Jahn and Thorne proceeded
under R.C. 3307.512(D) to purchase service credit. Because R.C.
3307.512 requires appellant to pay the employer's share of
service credit purchased, and the collective bargaining agreement
provides that appellant is not responsible for paying the
employer's share, the statute and the collective bargaining
agreement are in conflict.
Appellant argues that the statute and the agreement do not
conflict, pointing to R.C. 3319.13, which provides that a board
of education "may grant a leave of absence *** for educational or
professional or other purposes, and shall grant such leave where
illness or other disability is the reason for the request."
(Emphasis added.) Appellant reasons that, pursuant to this
provision, a board of education has discretion whether to grant a
leave for certain purposes, but must grant a leave when the leave
is for "illness or other disability." Appellant argues that
Jahn's and Thorne's parental leave falls within the "other
purposes" language of the discretionary portion of the statute,
and that, therefore, state law does not require that the leave be
granted. Thus, appellant claims that the leave was granted
pursuant to a provision of the collective bargaining agreement
and not pursuant to any statute.
The provision of the collective bargaining agreement under
which Jahn and Thorne were granted leave, Section B(2)(a),
Article 3, reads: "A staff member *** shall be entitled to a
Leave of Absence, without pay for maternity or child care reasons
***. Requests for extension of this leave shall be granted for
one (1) or two (2) additional semesters ***." (Emphasis added.)
Appellant essentially claims that the board of education gave up
its discretion whether to grant unpaid parental leave in return
for the education association's agreement that the board of
education would not be responsible for paying the employer's
share of such leave. Appellant contends that the collective
bargaining agreement does not conflict with R.C. 3307.512 because
the agreement provision which allegedly conflicts with that
statute was given as a quid pro quo for another benefit. In
other words, appellant in effect argues that appellees should be
estopped from alleging that a conflict exists.
We do not accept appellant's argument in this regard. There
is evidence in the record that during the collective bargaining
negotiations over the provision specifying that appellant would
not be responsible for the employer's share for service credit
purchased after a parental leave was taken, the education
association contended that the provision was unenforceable.
Despite this contention, appellant opposed negotiating over the
removal of that provision from the agreement. In addition, given
the record before us, we are not prepared to speculate whether
one provision was given as a quid pro quo for the other.
Furthermore, whether the board of education has discretion
(either statutorily or contractually) to approve a parental leave
does not change the fact that a statute, R.C. 3307.512, specifies
without qualification that appellant is required to pay the
employer's share. It does not matter whether appellant had given

up the discretion afforded by R.C. 3319.13 to approve or deny the
taking of the leave in the first place. R.C. 3307.512's
requirement is triggered after the leave has been approved and
taken, regardless of the reason for the approval, if the
conditions precedent to the requirement are fulfilled. Those
conditions were fulfilled here, R.C. 3307.512's clear requirement
was triggered, and the collective bargaining agreement conflicts
with R.C. 3307.512.
Having determined that a conflict exists, we next determine
whether the statute or the collective bargaining agreement
prevails. R.C. 4117.10(A) provides that "[l]aws pertaining to
*** the retirement of public employees *** prevail over
conflicting provisions of agreements between employee
organizations and public employers." Despite appellant's
arguments to the contrary, it is evident that R.C. 3307.512 is a
law pertaining to the retirement of public employees. As such,
through the application of R.C. 4117.10(A), that statute prevails
over the conflicting provision of the collective bargaining
agreement.
This state favors allowing public employers and their
employees to negotiate the terms and conditions of their
relationship at the bargaining table. Nevertheless, the General
Assembly has made it clear through the exceptions listed in R.C.
4117.10(A) that as to certain matters, parties to a collective
bargaining agreement are bound by state and local laws, and are
not free to negotiate provisions that conflict with those laws.
In so doing, the General Assembly has unequivocally evinced a
willingness to take a subject or part of a subject out of the
realm of collective bargaining. Section C(1)(b), Article 3 of
the collective bargaining agreement conflicts with R.C.
3307.512's requirement that appellant pay the employer's share of
Jahn's and Thorne's service credit, and pursuant to R.C.
4117.10(A), that provision of the agreement is unenforceable.
Appellees were entitled to summary judgment.
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is
affirmed.3
Judgment affirmed.
Moyer, C.J., A.W. Sweeney, Douglas, Wright, F.E. Sweeney and
Pfeifer, JJ., concur.

FOOTNOTES:
1 The parties' collective bargaining agreements for the
1985-1988 school years and for the 1988-1991 school years
contained identical versions of Section C(1)(b), Article 3: "The
Board shall not be held responsible for any retirement costs
incurred as a result of an unpaid Leave of Absence. The employee
may purchase this credit, if eligible, under STRS policy and at
their [sic] own expense." The parties' collective bargaining
agreement for the 1982-1985 school years contained no comparable
provision.
2 R.C. 3307.512 provides, in pertinent part:
"(B) Any member of the state teachers retirement system who
is, or has been, prevented from making contributions under
section 3307.51 of the Revised Code because of an absence due to
his own illness or injury, or who is, or has been, granted a
leave for educational, professional, or other purposes pursuant
to section 3319.13, 3319.131, or 3345.28 of the Revised Code or

for any other reason approved by the state teachers retirement
board, may purchase service credit, not to exceed two years for
each such period of absence or leave, either by having deductions
made in accordance with division (C) of this section or by making
the payment required by division (D) or (E) of this section.
"(C) If the absence or leave begins and ends in the same
year, the member may purchase credit for the absence or leave by
having the employer deduct and transmit to the system ***
employee contributions ***. The employer shall pay the system
the employer contributions on the compensation amount certified
under this division. ***
"(D) During or following the absence or leave, *** a member
may purchase credit for the absence or leave by paying to the
employer, and the employer transmitting to the system, employee
contributions ***. The employer shall pay the system the
employer contributions on the compensation amount certified under
this division. ***
"(E) After two years following the last day of the year in
which an absence or leave terminated, a member may purchase
credit for the absence or leave by paying the employer, and the
employer transmitting to the system, the sum of the following for
each year of credit purchased:
"(1) An amount determined ***;
"(2) Interest compounded annually *** on the amount
determined under division (E)(1) ***;
"(3) Interest compounded annually *** on an amount equal to
the employer's contribution required by this division ***.
"The employer shall pay to the system for each year of
credit purchased under this division ***." (Emphasis added.)
3 Judge Hendrickson, in his dissent below, expressed the opinion
that appellant's duty to pay the employer's share of service
credit could not apply to leave taken by Jahn and Thorne before
R.C. 3307.512's effective date (April 4, 1985). As the parties
do not raise arguments regarding the permissible reach of the
statute, we do not address this issue.