Naylor v. Cardinal Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

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OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
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Naylor, Appellant, v. Cardinal Local School District Board of
Education, Appellee.
[Cite as Naylor v. Cardinal Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn.
(1994), Ohio St.3d .]
Schools -- Teachers -- R.C. 3319.11 and 3319.111 must be
liberally construed in favor of teachers -- R.C. 3319.111
does not govern evaluation of teacher employed under a
limited contract, when -- R.C. 3319.11(G)(2) requires
board of education to provide a clear and substantive
basis for its decision not to reemploy teacher --
Requirements for adequate hearing pursuant to R.C.
3319.11(G)(3), (4) and (5).
1. R.C. 3319.11 and 3319.111 are remedial statutes that must be
liberally construed in favor of teachers.
2. Unless a collective bargaining agreement specifically pro-
vides to the contrary, R.C. 3319.111 governs
the evaluation of a teacher employed under a
limited contract.
3. R.C. 3319.11(G)(2) requires a board of education to provide
a teacher under a limited contract a clear
and substantive basis for its decision not
to reemploy the teacher for the following
school year.
4. The hearing provided teachers under limited contracts pur-
suant to R.C. 3319.11(G)(3), (4) and (5)
necessarily includes the presentation of
evidence, confrontation and examination of
witnesses and the review of the arguments of
the parties.
(No. 92-2043 -- Submitted November 9, 1993 -- Decided April
27, 1994.)
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Geauga County, No.
91-G-1629.
Plaintiff-appellant, Deborah P. Naylor, was employed for
three years as a ninth grade English and high school reading
teacher by defendant-appellee, Cardinal Local School District
Board of Education, under a limited teaching contract that
expired August 25, 1990. At that time, plaintiff would have

been eligible for a continuing contract (i.e., tenure) as a
teacher. On April 9, 1990, the defendant-board voted not to
reemploy plaintiff at the expiration of her 1989-1990
contract. In a letter dated April 12, 1990, the board notified
plaintiff of its action by certified mail. Consequently,
plaintiff's attorney requested a written statement, pursuant to
R.C. 3319.11(G)(1), describing the circumstances that led to
the board's decision not to reemploy plaintiff. In a letter
dated April 26, 1990, the treasurer of the board wrote
plaintiff, on the board's behalf, in part as follows:
"In reviewing the long term needs of the District, it was
concluded by the Superintendent and accepted by the Board, that
the District would be better served by not offering [you] a
continuing contract."
Upon plaintiff's request pursuant to R.C. 3319.11(B)(3), a
hearing was held before the board in executive session on May
17, 1990. Over the objections of plaintiff's counsel, however,
the board prohibited plaintiff from calling any witnesses to
testify on her behalf. Subsequently, in an order dated May 25,
1990, the board affirmed its intention not to reemploy
plaintiff for the following school year.
Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant action in the court
of common pleas, alleging that the board had not complied with
the statutory evaluation procedures of R.C. 3319.111 prior to
its nonrenewal of her contract, or with the mandate of R.C.
3319.11(G)(2) in describing the circumstances leading to the
board's decision not to renew her teaching contract. Plaintiff
further alleged that the board had not provided her with the
type of hearing contemplated by R.C. 3319.11. In her prayer
for relief, plaintiff requested that she be awarded back pay
and ordered reemployed as a teacher for the following school
year.
In a judgment entry dated January 25, 1991, the trial court
held that while the evaluation procedures required by R.C.
3319.111(B) had not been adopted by the board, the procedures
actually followed did in fact comply with the statute. The
court also held that the explanation given to plaintiff
regarding the circumstances leading to nonrenewal of her
contract was "sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the
statute," and that the hearing held before the board "did
comply with the terms of the statute as viewed in its
legislative history."
Upon appeal, the court of appeals affirmed. The appellate
court held that R.C. 3319.111(A) "was strictly followed by the
appellee board," and that the board's adherence to the
evaluation procedures set forth in the collective bargaining
agreement exceeded the evaluation requirements of R.C.
3319.111. The court further held that the board had accorded
plaintiff the type of hearing contemplated by R.C. 3319.11.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the
allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Green, Haines, Sgambati, Murphy & Macala Co., L.P.A.,
Ronald G. Macala, Cornelius J. Baasten and Anne Piero-Silagy,
for appellant.
Christley, Herington, Pierce, Silver & Habowski, Leigh E.
Herington and Susan S. McGown, for appellee.

Means, Bichimer, Burkholder & Baker Co., L.P.A., and
Kimball H. Carey, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio
School Boards Association.

A.William Sweeney, J. In resolving the instant appeal,
we are guided by the standard that R.C. 3319.11 and 3319.111
are remedial statutes that must be liberally construed in favor
of teachers. R.C. 1.11. See, also, State ex rel. Luckey v.
Etheridge (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 404, 406, 583 N.E.2d 960, 962.
One of the issues presented in the instant cause has been
resolved by one of the two companion cases to this action,
Farmer v. Kelleys Island Bd. of Edn. (1994), Ohio St. 3d
, N.E.2d .
In Farmer, supra, this court held in the second and third
paragraphs of the syllabus that all of the evaluation
requirements of R.C. 3319.111(B) are incorporated in R.C.
3319.111(A), thus eliminating the argument that a school
board's violation of evaluation requirements in R.C.
3319.111(A) is redressable under R.C. 3319.11(G)(7), but that a
violation of evaluation requirements of R.C. 3319.111(B) is not.
In the cause sub judice, plaintiff-appellant contends that
the defendant-appellee board of education failed to adopt the
evaluation procedures set forth in R.C. 3319.111(B), and that
in ratifying the evaluations given her, the board violated R.C.
3319.111(B)(3) in not providing plaintiff with specific
recommendations regarding any improvement she needed to make in
her performance as a teacher and means by which she could
obtain assistance in making such improvements.
The board counters plaintiff's arguments by pointing out
that the collective bargaining agreement in effect at the time
this action arose already provided nonrenewal and evaluation
procedures, and that by virtue of R.C. 4117.10 the provisions
of the agreement prevail over R.C. 3319.11 and 3319.111. The
board also claims that its evaluations did comply with R.C.
3319.111. The board contends that R.C. 3319.111(B) does not
require that a new set of evaluation procedures be adopted by a
board of education, so long as it adheres to evaluation
procedures set forth in a collective bargaining agreement that
provide as much protection to teachers.
In response to the board's argument, plaintiff asserts that
a board of education is bound to adopt and apply the statutory
evaluation procedures of R.C. 3319.111, as well as the
evaluation procedures set forth in the collective bargaining
agreement, unless the agreement specifically excludes or
negates statutory evaluation procedures.
With regard to whether the evaluation provisions of the
collective bargaining prevail over R.C. 3319.111, we note that
R.C. 4117.10 states in part:
"(A) An agreement between a public employer and an
exclusive representative entered into pursuant to this chapter
governs the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of public
employment covered by the agreement. *** Where no agreement
exists or where an agreement makes no specification about a
matter, the public employer and public employees are subject to
all applicable state or local laws or ordinances pertaining to
the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment for
public employees. *** [T]his chapter prevails over any and all

other conflicting laws, resolutions, provisions, present or
future, except as otherwise specified in this chapter or as
otherwise specified by the general assembly. ***" (Emphasis
added.)
This court has held that a provision in a collective
bargaining agreement prevails over a conflicting statute.
Cuyahoga Falls Edn. Assn. v. Cuyahoga Falls City School Dist.
Bd. of Edn. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 193, 574 N.E.2d 422; State ex
rel. Rollins v. Cleveland Hts.-Univ. Hts. Bd. of Edn. (1988),
40 Ohio St.3d 123, 532 N.E.2d 1289.
However, given the remedial nature of R.C. 3319.111 we hold
that unless a collective bargaining agreement specifically
provides to the contrary, R.C. 3319.111 governs the evaluation
of a teacher employed under a limited contract. See State ex
rel. Clark v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth. (1990),
48 Ohio St.3d 19, 548 N.E.2d 940, where we held that a
collective bargaining agreement must specifically exclude
statutory rights in order to negate the application of those
rights.
The collective bargaining agreement was entered into prior
to the effective date of R.C. 3319.111, and therefore does not
specifically exclude or negate the rights contained in this
statute. However, R.C. 3319.111(A) specifically states that a
school board which employs a teacher under a limited contract
"*** shall evaluate such a teacher in compliance with the
requirements of this section in any school year in which the
board may wish to declare its intention not to reemploy him
***." Moreover, R.C. 3319.111(B) provides that "[a]ny board of
education evaluating a teacher pursuant to this section shall
adopt evaluation procedures that shall be applied each time a
teacher is evaluated pursuant to this section." (Emphasis
added.)
Under these circumstances, we believe that while the board
was bound by the provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement, it was also bound by the statutory evaluation
procedures contained in R.C. 3319.111. In failing to adopt the
evaluation procedures set forth in R.C. 3319.111, the school
board acted improperly in its decision not to reemploy
plaintiff. Accordingly, we hold that the lower courts erred in
excusing the board from complying with R.C. 3319.111.
With respect to the issue concerning the procedures that
were conducted in evaluating plaintiff's performance as a
teacher, the record indicates that plaintiff was evaluated,
among other times, on November 27, 1989, December 19, 1989 and
March 27, 1990. In each of these evaluation reports, the
evaluator cited one or more areas in which plaintiff needed
improvement in her teaching performance. While the evaluator
in these reports did in some areas provide adequate specific
recommendations for improvement and means to obtain assistance,
in other areas such as "encourages student participation" he
did not. Similar to our holding in the third paragraph of the
syllabus in Farmer, supra, we hold that the failure of a board
of education to satisfy the requirements of R.C. 3319.111(B)(3)
constitutes a failure to comply with the evaluation
requirements of R.C. 3319.111(A), and such failure will permit
a reviewing court to order the board to reemploy the teacher
pursuant to R.C. 3319.11(G)(7). 1

An even more compelling argument raised by plaintiff
concerns the board's failure to comply with R.C. 3319.11(G) 2
by not providing plaintiff "a written statement describing the
circumstances that led to the board's intention not to
reemploy" her. In response to plaintiff's timely written
demand for a written statement describing the circumstances
that led the board to decide not to reemploy her, the board
issued the following statement to plaintiff:
"According to the Ohio Revised Code, Section 4117 and the
terms of the teacher's Master Agreement, the Board of Education
cannot issue another limited teaching contract after a teacher
has taught three (3) continuous years at the Cardinal Schools
and holds a valid professional teaching certificate. If Mrs.
Naylor were to receive another contract in the District, she
could only be offered a continuing contract. In reviewing the
long term needs of the District, it was concluded by the
Superintendent and accepted by the Board, that the District
would be better served by not offering Mrs. Naylor a continuing
contract."
In our view, this statement by the board is totally
inadequate in satisfying what is required by the board under
R.C. 3319.11(G)(2). The board's statement does not describe
any circumstances explaining how it arrived at its decision.
The board's statement is merely conclusory and leaves plaintiff
groping for answers as to why she was not offered a continuing
contract. If R.C. 3319.11(G)(2) is to have any meaning
whatsoever, the written statement from the board must provide
the teacher with an explanation of why his or her employment
contract is not being renewed. Therefore, we hold that R.C.
3319.11(G)(2) requires a board of education to provide a
teacher under a limited contract a clear and substantive basis
for its decision not to reemploy the teacher for the following
school year. However, under the second paragraph of R.C.
3319.11(G)(7), the failure of the board to provide plaintiff
with a clear and substantive basis for its decision not to
reemploy her cannot be a ground for an order to reemploy her.
See Farmer, supra. Such a failure can be remedied only by an
order to give a specific reason, so that a teacher can have a
statement of reasons on the record.
Last, plaintiff contends that the board did not provide her
with the type of hearing contemplated by R.C. 3319.11(G)(3),
(4) and (5). 3 It is plaintiff's argument that the term
"hearing" includes the presentation of evidence, confrontation
and examination of witnesses and the review of the arguments of
the parties.
The board responds that the hearing referred to in R.C.
3319.11(G)(5) is not a full evidentiary hearing such as that
provided for tenured teachers in R.C. 3319.16, and that, in any
event, it carefully followed the precise statutory procedures
set forth in R.C. 3319.11(G) in the hearing.
Additionally, the amicus curiae, Ohio School Boards
Association, argues that all Ohio courts that have addressed
the issue have unanimously held that a full evidentiary hearing
is not required by R.C. 3319.11(G)(5). See, e.g., Gerner v.
Salem City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (May 16, 1991) Columbiana
C.P. No. 90-CIV-320, affirmed (Oct. 19, 1992), Columbiana App.
No. 91-C-33, unreported, 1992 WL 308372; Lavens v.

Gorham-Fayette Local School Bd. of Edn. (July 24, 1992), Fulton
App. No. 91FU000009, unreported.
While we agree with the board that the type of hearing
described in R.C. 3319.11(G)(5) does not necessarily entail the
same procedures delineated in R.C. 3319.16, we find that the
General Assembly intended a more thorough and formal proceeding
than that which was accorded plaintiff. If the General
Assembly had intended to restrict a nontenured teacher's right
to the simple recitation of a position statement, it could have
easily done so by use of another phrase, such as "presentation
of argument" or "oral argument." In our view, the requirements
of R.C. 3319.11(G)(5) envision more than an informal session
between a school board and the teacher, where the teacher makes
a verbal presentation protesting nonrenewal of his or her
contract. The General Assembly must have intended more in
light of the elaborate and comprehensive procedures appearing
in R.C. 3319.11, as amended. R.C. 3319.11(G)(5) and (6) speak
of a "hearing" and an "order," words clearly suggesting a
proceeding that possesses some formality, especially in light
of the liberal construction standard which must be applied to
this remedial statutory scheme.
In contrast to the hearing established in R.C. 3319.11(G)
for teachers under limited contracts, administrators are merely
accorded a "meeting" with the school board to "discuss reasons"
for nonrenewal under R.C. 3319.02(D). State ex rel. Smith v.
Etheridge (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 501, 507, 605 N.E.2d 59, 64.
We are also guided by the well-established principle that a
statute susceptible of either of two opposing interpretations
must be read in the manner which effectuates, rather than
frustrates, the major purpose of the General Assembly. See
State v. Glass (1971), 27 Ohio App.2d 214, 219, 56 O.O.2d 391,
394, 273 N.E.2d 893, 897.
Upon a careful review of the hearing transcript, we
determine that the hearing provided plaintiff was woefully
inadequate. The inadequacy of the hearing, along with the fact
that the board failed to provide plaintiff a clear and
substantive basis for its decision not to reemploy her as
required by R.C. 3319.11(G)(2), leaves plaintiff at a loss to
address, explain or defend against the reasons for nonrenewal,
whether to the school board or to a prospective employer.
Given the General Assembly's use of the term "hearing" in
R.C. 3319.11(G)(3), (4) and (5), we can only conclude that the
legislature intended the term to be given its ordinary meaning,
to provide some measure of security to the nontenured teacher
faced with the possibility of nonrenewal of his or her teaching
contract. Our conclusion is further compelled by the remedial
nature of these provisions. R.C. 1.11. Therefore, we hold
that the hearing provided teachers under limited contracts by
R.C. 3319.11(G)(3), (4) and (5) necessarily includes the
presentation of evidence, confrontation and examination of
witnesses and the review of the arguments of the parties.
Based on all of the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of
the court of appeals and order defendant board of education to
reinstate plaintiff to a one-year extended limited contract and
to award plaintiff all compensation and benefits that she lost
as a result of the board's unlawful action, in accordance with
the fourth paragraph of the syllabus in Farmer, supra.

Judgment reversed.
Douglas, F.E. Sweeney and Pfeifer, JJ., concur.
Moyer, C.J., Wright and Deshler, JJ., dissent.
Dana A. Deshler, Jr., J., of the Tenth Appellate District,
sitting for Resnick, J.
FOOTNOTES:
1 R.C. 3319.11(G)(7) provides in part:
"Notwithstanding section 2506.04 of the Revised Code, the
court in an appeal under this division is limited to the
determination of procedural errors and to ordering the
correction of procedural errors and shall have no jurisdiction
to order a board to reemploy a teacher, except that the court
may order a board to reemploy a teacher in compliance with the
requirements of division (B), (C)(3), (D), or (E) of this
section when the court determines that evaluation procedures
have not been complied with pursuant to division (A) of section
3319.111 of the Revised Code or the board has not given the
teacher written notice on or before the thirtieth day of April
of its intention not to reemploy the teacher pursuant to
division (B), (C)(3), (D), or (E) of this section." (Emphasis
added.)
2 R.C. 3319.11(G) provides in relevant part as follows:
"(1) Any teacher receiving written notice of the intention
of a board of education not to reemploy him pursuant to
division (B), (C)(3), (D), or (E) of this section may, within
ten days of the date on which he received the notice, file with
the treasurer of the board of education a written demand for a
written statement describing the circumstances that led to the
board's intention not to reemploy the teacher.
"(2) The treasurer of a board of education, on behalf of
the board, shall, within ten days of the date on which he
receives a written demand for a written statement pursuant to
division (G)(1) of this section, provide to the teacher a
written statement describing the circumstances that led to the
board's intention not to reemploy the teacher."
3 R.C. 3319.11(G) provides in pertinent part:
"(3) Any teacher receiving a written statement describing
the circumstances that led to the board's intention not to
reemploy the teacher pursuant to division (G)(2) of this
section may, within five days of the date on which he received
the statement, file with the treasurer of the board of
education a written demand for a hearing before the board of
education pursuant to divisions (G)(4) to (6) of this section.
"(4) The treasurer of the board of education *** shall ***
provide to the teacher a written notice setting forth the time,
date, and place of the hearing. The board shall schedule and
conclude the hearing within forty days of the date on which the
treasurer of the board receives a written demand for a hearing
pursuant to division (G)(3) of this section.
"(5) Any hearing conducted pursuant to this division shall
be conducted by a majority of the members of the board of
education. The hearing shall be held in executive session of
the board of education unless the board and the teacher agree
to hold the hearing in public. The superintendent, assistant
superintendent, the teacher, and any person designated by
either party to take a record of the hearing may be present at
the hearing. The board may be represented by counsel and the

teacher may be represented by counsel or a designee. A record
of the hearing may be taken by either party at the expense of
the party taking the record."
Moyer, C.J., dissenting. "[A]n unambiguous statute
means what it says." Hakim v. Kosydar (1977), 49 Ohio St.2d
161, 164, 3 O.O.3d 211, 213, 359 N.E.2d 1371, 1373 (citing
Chope v. Collins [1976], 48 Ohio St.2d 297, 300, 2 O.O.3d 442,
444, 358 N.E.2d 573, 575, fn. 2). This maxim leads me to
conclude that R.C. 3319.11(G)(7) permits the reinstatement of a
limited contract teacher only when a court finds a violation of
R.C. 3319.111(A). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
R.C. 3319.11 and 3319.111 are remedial in nature and
entitled to a liberal interpretation. Nevertheless, even the
liberal interpretation of a statute does not justify a court in
reading into it a result that the language does not reasonably
imply. Szekely v. Young (1963), 174 Ohio St. 213, 22 O.O.2d
214, 188 N.E.2d 424, paragraph two of the syllabus. R.C.
3319.11(G)(7) states in pertinent part: "[T]he court in an
appeal under this division *** shall have no jurisdiction to
order a board to reemploy a teacher, except *** when the court
determines that evaluation procedures have not been complied
with pursuant to division (A) of section 3319.111 of the
Revised Code." R.C. 3319.111 enumerates the procedural
requirements that school boards must follow in separate
divisions, (A) and (B). I believe this separation was
intentional. The clear import of the above-quoted language is
that the General Assembly intended the remedy of reinstatement
to be available only for violations of division (A), not for
violations of division (B).
If the General Assembly had intended reinstatement to be an
available remedy for violations of division (B), it could have
done so, quite clearly, in two ways. It could have deleted the
words "division (A) of" from the above-quoted portion of R.C.
3319.11(G)(7). Else, it could have added the words "or (B)" to
the same clause. Either method would have unequivocally made
violations of division (B) grounds for reinstatement.
A court must interpret a statute so as to give effect to
every word in it. See, e.g., E. Ohio Gas Co. v. Pub. Util.
Comm. (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 295, 530 N.E.2d 875; State ex rel.
Bohan v. Indus. Comm. (1946), 147 Ohio St. 249, 34 O.O. 151, 70
N.E.2d 888. The majority's interpretation effectively reads
the words "division (A) of" out of R.C. 3319.11(G)(7). If the
General Assembly had intended reinstatement to be a remedy for
violations of R.C. 3319.111(B), it would have expressly said
so. Because it did not, I respectfully dissent.
Wright and Deshler, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting
opinion.