Columbus Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

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Columbus Board of Education, Appellant, v. Franklin County
Board of Revision et al., Appellees.
[Cite as Columbus Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision
(1994), Ohio St.3d .]
Taxation -- Appeal from Board of Tax Appeals to Supreme Court
dismissed, when.
(No. 93-1862 -- Submitted June 9, 1994 -- Decided
September 28, 1994.)
Appeal from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 90-D-359.
Karl Road Corporation, appellee, which operates the
Northland Terrace Nursing Home, purchased an adjacent property
for $200,000 on March 29, 1988. The previous owner of the
property, which contained a house, refused to negotiate on the
purchase price, demanding $200,000 for the property. Karl Road
planned to expand its facility and acquired the property to
obtain an additional curb cut for the expansion. Karl Road has
since abandoned the expansion and the planned curb cut.
The Columbus Board of Education ("school board"),
appellant, filed a complaint with the Franklin County Board of
Revision ("BOR"), appellee, to increase the true value of the
property for tax year 1988, from $58,000, the value which the
Franklin County Auditor had placed on it, to $200,000, the
purchase price. The BOR affirmed the auditor's value, and the
school board appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals ("BTA").
At the BTA's hearing, the school board presented evidence
of the sale and the sale price. The BOR, on the other hand,
presented the testimony of an expert appraiser who testified
that the subject property was worth $65,000. The BTA found the
true value of property to be $200,000.
The BOR and Karl Road appealed this decision to the Court
of Appeals for Franklin County. The court of appeals concluded
that Karl Road was compelled to buy the property for economic
reasons and that the price paid did not represent the
property's true value. Observing that competent evidence of
record indicated that the true value was $65,000, the court
remanded the case to the BTA for it "to revisit the evidence
presented to it and to reach a new determination[.]" We
overruled a motion to certify the record of this case.

Columbus Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (1993),
66 Ohio St.3d 1423, 607 N.E.2d 845.
On remand, the BTA ruled that it was constrained to value
the subject property according to the expert appraiser's
testimony and found the true value to be $65,000. The BTA
noted that the court of appeals had rejected the sale price and
that the appraiser's testimony was the only remaining evidence
on which to base a value. The school board now appeals the
BTA's ruling to this court, contending that the purchase price
established the value of the property.
The cause is before this court upon an appeal as of right.

Teaford, Rich, Coffman & Wheeler, Jeffrey A. Rich and
Karol Cassell Fox, for appellant.
Michael Miller, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and
James R. Gorry, Special Assistant Prosecutor, for appellee
Franklin County Board of Revision.
Robert D. Holmes, for appellee Karl Road Corporation.

Per Curiam. We dismiss this appeal.
As argued by the BOR and Karl Road, the law of the case
would cause us to affirm the BTA's decision. In Nolan v. Nolan
(1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 11 OBR 1, 462 N.E. 2d 410, syllabus,
we stated:
"Absent extraordinary circumstances, such as an
intervening decision by the Supreme Court, an inferior court
has no discretion to disregard the mandate of a Superior Court
in a prior appeal in the same case. (State, ex rel. Potain, v.
Mathews [(1979)], 59 Ohio St.2d 32 [13 O.O.3d 17, 391 N.E. 2d
343], approved and followed.)
According to Nolan, at 3, 11 OBR at 3, 462 N.E. 2d at 413,
this rule of practice "is necessary to ensure consistency of
results in a case, to avoid endless litigation by settling the
issues, and to preserve the structure of superior and inferior
courts as designed by the Ohio Constitution. * * *
"[T]he doctrine functions to compel trial courts to follow
the mandates of reviewing courts * * *. Thus, where at a
rehearing following remand a trial court is confronted with
substantially the same facts and issues as were involved in the
prior appeal, the court is bound to adhere to the appellate
court's determination of the applicable law. * * *"
Thus, as we have not decided an intervening case that
states a rule of law in conflict with the court of appeals'
decision, Jones v. Harmon (1930), 122 Ohio St. 420, 8 Ohio Law
Abs. 321, 172 N.E. 151, syllabus, the BTA must follow the court
of appeals' mandate. However, a twist in this case is that
R.C. 5717.04 permits an appeal from the BTA to this court or to
the court of appeals. But, according to R.C. 5717.04, "[t]he
court in which notice of appeal is first filed shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of the appeal."
In Lucas Cty. Commrs. v. Lucas Cty. Budget Comm. (1967),
12 Ohio St.2d 47, 49, 41 O.O. 2d 254, 255, 231 N.E. 2d 472,
473, we held this language to be a codification of the rule of
law "that where there are two courts of concurrent jurisdiction
the court in which jurisdiction is first invoked obtains
jurisdiction of the entire matter and other courts are excluded
therefrom." In John Weenink & Sons Co. v. Court of Common

Pleas of Cuyahoga Cty. (1948), 150 Ohio St. 349, 38 O.O. 189,
82 N.E. 2d 730, paragraphs two and three of the syllabus, we
held:
"2. As between courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the one
whose power is first invoked by the institution of proper
proceedings acquires jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all
other tribunals, to adjudicate upon the whole issue and settle
the rights of the parties.
"3. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquires
jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action, its authority
continues until the matter is completely and finally disposed
of, and no court of co-ordinate jurisdiction is at liberty to
interfere with its proceedings."
Putting these cases together, under the law-of-the-case
doctrine, the BTA had to decide the case in compliance with the
mandate of the court of appeals. Second, this order of the BTA
could not be appealed to this court under the principles
announced in Weenink. See, also, State ex rel. Schneider v. N.
Olmsted Bd. of Edn. (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 281, 282, 530 N.E. 2d
206, 207. Finally, we dismiss the instant appeal because,
under Rowland v. Lindley (1979), 58 Ohio St. 2d 15, 12 O.O. 3d
8, 387 N.E. 2d 1367, the BTA's order following the mandate of
the court of appeals was not a final determination to be
appealed under R.C. 5717.04. In Rowland, the taxpayer appealed
a journal entry of the Tax Commissioner that the commissioner
had issued to carry out the express mandate of this court in an
earlier appeal of the same case. We held that such an order is
not a final determination that may be appealed.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
Appeal dismissed.
Moyer, C.J., Douglas, Wright, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney and
Pfeifer, JJ., concur.
A.W. Sweeney, J., dissents.