State ex rel. Carter v. Schotten - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

	ROMINGER LEGAL
		Ohio Court Cases and Opinions - Ohio Legal Research
					Need Legal Help?
					Need Legal Help?
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER			LEGAL HEADLINES - CASE LAW - LEGAL FORMS	NOT FINDING WHAT YOU NEED? -RESEARCH

This court case was taken from the web sites of the Ohio Courts. Search our site for more cases - CLICK HERE

LEGAL RESEARCH

COURT REPORTERS

PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS

PROCESS SERVERS

DOCUMENT RETRIEVERS

EXPERT WITNESSES

Find a Private Investigator

Find an Expert Witness

Find a Process Server

Case Law - save on Lexis / WestLaw.

Legal News - Legal Headlines

OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
The full texts of the opinions of the Supreme Court of
Ohio are being transmitted electronically beginning May 27,
1992, pursuant to a pilot project implemented by Chief Justice
Thomas J. Moyer.
Please call any errors to the attention of the Reporter's
Office of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Attention: Walter S.
Kobalka, Reporter, or Deborah J. Barrett, Administrative
Assistant. Tel.: (614) 466-4961; in Ohio 1-800-826-9010.
Your comments on this pilot project are also welcome.
NOTE: Corrections may be made by the Supreme Court to the
full texts of the opinions after they have been released
electronically to the public. The reader is therefore advised
to check the bound volumes of Ohio St.3d published by West
Publishing Company for the final versions of these opinions.
The advance sheets to Ohio St.3d will also contain the volume
and page numbers where the opinions will be found in the bound
volumes of the Ohio Official Reports.

The State ex rel. Carter, Appellant, v. Schotten, Warden,
Appellee.
[Cite as State ex rel. Carter v. Schotten (1994), Ohio
St.3d .]
Mandamus to compel warden of correctional institution to
perform certain acts related to relator's circumstances of
confinement -- Writ denied, when -- Mandamus to compel
warden to provide all inmates with raincoats -- Dismissal
of petition pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) erroneous, when.
(Nos. 94-603, 94-604 and 94-670 -- Submitted May 16, 1994
-- Decided August 24, 1994.)
Appeals from the Court of Appeals for Trumbull County,
Nos. 93-T-4873, 93-T-4992 and 93-T-5006.
Relator-appellant, Kenneth L. Carter, an inmate at
Trumbull Correctional Institution ("TCI"), appeals three
judgments of the Trumbull County Court of Appeals dismissing
his petitions for writs of mandamus to compel
respondent-appellee, James L. Schotten, TCI Warden, to perform
certain acts related to Carter's circumstances of confinement.
In case No. 94-603, Carter's petition alleged that
respondent had failed to provide an adequate prison law library
and reasonable access to the library. Carter claimed that
respondent's actions had violated his constitutional rights,
R.C. 2921.45, and Section 241, Title 18, U.S. Code. Carter
requested, inter alia, that the law library be upgraded to meet
the standard for adequacy set forth by federal courts, and that
respondent prepare a schedule increasing the law library's
hours of operation.
In case No. 94-604, Carter's petition alleged that
respondent had failed to provide indigent inmates with legal
supplies, postage for legal mail, free photocopying of legal
documents, and notary services. Carter claimed that he had
been denied meaningful access to courts and that respondent
should utilize money from the industrial and entertainment
fund, established under R.C. 5120.131, to purchase a copier,
pay postage for legal mail, and provide legal supplies to every
indigent inmate.
In case No. 94-670, Carter's petition alleged that

respondent had a duty pursuant to R.C. 2921.44(C)(2) and the
Constitution to provide all inmates with adequate clothing.
Carter requested that respondent be ordered to purchase and
distribute raincoats to all TCI inmates.
The court of appeals issued alternative writs in all three
cases, ordering respondent to show cause why Carter's requested
relief should not be granted. Respondent subsequently filed
various responsive pleadings. The court of appeals ultimately
dismissed all three petitions on the basis that a federal civil
rights action under Section 1983, Title 42, U.S. Code provided
an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
These causes are now before the court upon appeals as of
right. In that they raise similar issues of law, we sua sponte
consolidate them for purposes of decision.

Kenneth L. Carter, pro se.
Lee Fisher, Attorney General, and Todd R. Marti, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.

Per Curiam. In order to be entitled to the writs of
mandamus he requested, Carter had to establish that he
possesses a clear legal right to the relief prayed for, that
respondent is under a clear legal duty to perform the requested
acts, and that Carter has no plain and adequate remedy at law.
State ex rel. Botkins v. Laws (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 383, 632
N.E.2d 897; State ex rel. Westchester Estates, Inc. v. Bacon
(1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 42, 15 O.O.3d 53, 399 N.E.2d 81,
paragraph one of the syllabus.
The court of appeals' dismissal of Carter's mandamus
actions was premised solely upon its determination that Carter
had a plain and adequate remedy at law. A writ of mandamus
will not be issued when there is a plain and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of the law. R.C. 2731.05. In order for
there to be an adequate remedy at law, the remedy must be
complete, beneficial, and speedy. See, e.g., State ex rel.
Horwitz v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Probate Div.
(1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 323, 328, 603 N.E.2d 1005, 1009; State ex
rel. Liberty Mills, Inc. v. Locker (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 102,
22 OBR 136, 488 N.E.2d 883. The court of appeals determined
that, in all three cases, a Section 19831 action was an
adequate remedy which precluded mandamus relief.
Under certain circumstances, a Section 1983 action
provides an adequate legal remedy which renders a mandamus
action unavailable in a state court proceeding. See, e.g.,
Ohio Academy of Nursing Homes, Inc. v. Barry (1990), 56 Ohio
St.3d 120, 564 N.E.2d 686. A Section 1983 action provides a
supplement to any state remedy, and there is no general
requirement that state judicial or administrative remedies be
exhausted in order to commence a Section 1983 action. 1
Steinglass, Section 1983 Litigation in State Courts (1993)
2-5-2-6, Section 2.3; 1 Schwartz & Kirklin, Section 1983
Litigation: Claims, Defenses, and Fees (2 Ed.1991) 607,
Section 10.5. Furthermore, a Section 1983 action can provide
declaratory, injunctive, and/or monetary relief. Id. at 831,
Section 16.1. In some situations, this remedy can prove
speedier than habeas corpus relief. Armstrong v. Cardwell
(C.A.6, 1972), 457 F.2d 34, 36, fn. 3. State prisoners

challenging the conditions of their confinement may utilize
Section 1983 to obtain relief. Schwartz & Kirklin, supra, at
615, Section 10.6.
In Carter's three petitions, he attacks the circumstances
of his confinement, e.g., the adequacy of the prison library,
the standard of indigency for eligibility for free legal
supplies, postage and copies, and the sufficiency of the prison
clothing. Therefore, to the extent that he claims that
respondent's actions violated his federal constitutional and
statutory rights, a Section 1983 action would provide him with
complete, beneficial, and speedy relief and therefore
constituted an adequate legal remedy which precluded mandamus
relief.2
Nevertheless, Section 1983 does not encompass official
conduct that violates only state law; rather, the statute is
limited to deprivations of federal constitutional and statutory
rights. Shirokey v. Marth (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 113, 116, 585
N.E.2d 407, 410; Kulwicki v. Dawson (C.A.3, 1992), 969 F.2d
1454, 1468; Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v. Pontiac (C.A.6, 1989),
887 F.2d 710, 714; Schwartz & Kirklin, supra, at 9, Section
1.2. Consequently, in that Carter's petitions may be construed
to raise violations of both state statutes, R.C. 2921.45 and
2921.44(C)(2), as well as state constitutional provisions,
Section 1983 could not provide an adequate legal remedy, since
these alleged violations would not necessarily deprive Carter
of any federal rights. The court of appeals erred in
concluding otherwise.
However, a reviewing court is not authorized to reverse a
correct judgment merely because erroneous reasons were assigned
as a basis thereof. State ex rel. Cassels v. Dayton City
School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 217, 222, 631
N.E.2d 150, 154; Myers v. Garson (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 610,
614, 614 N.E.2d 742, 745. In case Nos. 94-603 and 94-604,
respondent filed what were essentially motions for summary
judgment and Carter responded to both motions. In case No.
94-603, Carter claimed in his petition that he could not
"adequately respond" to any memorandum in opposition to his
application for reconsideration of his direct appeal from his
criminal conviction because of the alleged inadequacy of the
TCI law library. He stated in his petition that he had
prepared his original application in a different prison, which
he did not contend had an inadequate law library. In case No.
94-604, Carter's petition did not allege that any action filed
by him had been prejudiced by the alleged unconstitutional
indigency standard used by respondent.
In both case Nos. 94-603 and 94-604, Carter contended that
respondent's actions denied him his constitutional right of
access to the courts. The fundamental constitutional right of
access to the courts requires that prisoners have a meaningful
opportunity to present claims to the court. Bounds v. Smith
(1977), 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72. Bounds
requires that prison officials, such as respondent, provide
inmates with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from
persons trained in law, in order to assist in the preparation
for filing meaningful legal papers. State ex rel. Greene v.
Enright (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 729, 590 N.E.2d 1257. However,
"Bounds did not hold that there is a right of access to a law

library; it held that there is a right of access to the
courts." (Emphasis sic.) Strickler v. Waters (C.A.4, 1993), 989
F.2d 1375, 1385; see, also, Section 16, Article I, Ohio
Constitution. Vague and conclusory allegations do not state
the kind of specific injury or prejudice necessary for a claim
of denial of access to survive summary judgment. Strickler,
supra, at 1383; Twyman v. Crisp (C.A.10, 1978), 584 F.2d 352;
White v. White (C.A.4, 1989), 886 F.2d 721; see, also, State ex
rel. Freshour v. State (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 484, 633 N.E.2d
1124. In neither case No. 94-603 nor No. 94-604 has Carter
alleged with specificity a reasonable probability that the
outcome of any litigation would have been different or that
additional materials were necessary to respond to a memorandum
in opposition to his application for reconsideration of his
direct appeal.
Further, in case No. 94-603, R.C. 2921.45 does not afford
Carter any independent rights absent any deprivation of a
"constitutional or statutory right." Similarly, in case No.
94-604, neither R.C. 5120.131 nor Ohio Adm. Code 5120-5-04
imposes any mandatory duty on respondent to utilize money in
the industrial and entertainment fund to purchase legal
services and supplies for inmates. Accordingly, the court of
appeals properly denied Carter's requested relief in case Nos.
94-603 and 94-604, albeit based on its incorrect rationale that
Section 1983 provided an adequate remedy for all of Carter's
claims, including those based on state constitutional and
statutory law.
However, in case No. 94-670, dismissal of Carter's state
claim, based on a violation of R.C. 2921.44(C)(2), was
erroneous because respondent has a duty under that statute
provision to use ordinary care to provide inmates such as
Carter with adequate clothing. R.C. 2921.44(C)(2) provides
that "[n]o officer, having charge of a detention facility,
shall negligently *** [f]ail to provide persons confined in the
detention facility with adequate *** clothing ***." There is
no statutory prerequisite of prejudice prior to seeking
enforcement of this duty. The court of appeals erred in
dismissing Carter's petition in case No. 94-670 pursuant to
Civ.R. 12(B)(6) since, when construed most favorably to Carter,
it states a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the judgments in
case Nos. 94-603 and 94-604 are affirmed, and the judgment in
case No. 94-670 is affirmed as to any federal claims raised and
reversed as to Carter's state claims, and remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Judgments in case Nos.
94-603 and 94-604 affirmed.
Judgment in case No. 94-670
affirmed in part and,
reversed in part, and cause
remanded.
Moyer, C.J., A.W. Sweeney, Wright, F.E. Sweeney and
Pfeifer, JJ., concur.
Douglas and Resnick, JJ., concur in judgment only.

FOOTNOTES
1 The Civil Rights Act of 1871 as amended, Section 1983,
Title 42, U.S. Code, provides: "Every person who, under color
of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress. ***"
2 In its opinions in case Nos. 94-603 and 94-604, the court
of appeals stated that a Section 1983 action "in federal court"
provided an adequate legal remedy for Carter. However, state
common pleas courts have concurrent subject matter jurisdiction
over Section 1983 actions. Cooperman v. Univ. Surgical Assoc.,
Inc. (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 191, 513 N.E.2d 288; Besser v.
Dexter (1990), 68 Ohio App.3d 510, 589 N.E.2d 77.