State ex rel. Blair v. Balraj - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

	ROMINGER LEGAL
		Ohio Court Cases and Opinions - Ohio Legal Research
					Need Legal Help?
					Need Legal Help?
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER			LEGAL HEADLINES - CASE LAW - LEGAL FORMS	NOT FINDING WHAT YOU NEED? -RESEARCH

This court case was taken from the web sites of the Ohio Courts. Search our site for more cases - CLICK HERE

LEGAL RESEARCH

COURT REPORTERS

PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS

PROCESS SERVERS

DOCUMENT RETRIEVERS

EXPERT WITNESSES

Find a Private Investigator

Find an Expert Witness

Find a Process Server

Case Law - save on Lexis / WestLaw.

Legal News - Legal Headlines

OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
The full texts of the opinions of the Supreme Court of
Ohio are being transmitted electronically beginning May 27,
1992, pursuant to a pilot project implemented by Chief Justice
Thomas J. Moyer.
Please call any errors to the attention of the Reporter's
Office of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Attention: Walter S.
Kobalka, Reporter, or Deborah J. Barrett, Administrative
Assistant. Tel.: (614) 466-4961; in Ohio 1-800-826-9010.
Your comments on this pilot project are also welcome.
NOTE: Corrections may be made by the Supreme Court to the
full texts of the opinions after they have been released
electronically to the public. The reader is therefore advised
to check the bound volumes of Ohio St.3d published by West
Publishing Company for the final versions of these opinions.
The advance sheets to Ohio St.3d will also contain the volume
and page numbers where the opinions will be found in the bound
volumes of the Ohio Official Reports.

The State ex rel. Blair, Appellant, v. Balraj, Coroner,
Appellee.
[Cite as State ex rel. Blair v. Balraj (1994), Ohio
St.3d .]
(No. 93-1353 -- Submitted February 22, 1994 -- Decided May 18,
1994.)
Coroners -- R.C. 313.12, 313.17 and 313.19, applied -- Term
"during legal intervention" in describing how death
occurred is a purely descriptive term -- Mandamus to
compel coroner to delete phrase "during legal
intervention" from coroner's verdict for cause of death --
Declaratory judgment constitutes an adequate remedy that
will preclude mandamus when the General Assembly has
specified that the court of common pleas is the proper
forum to challenge the coroner's decision.
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No.
64980.
Appellant Betty Blair's son died while in police custody.
Appellee, Elizabeth K. Balraj, the Cuyahoga County Coroner,
received notice that the death was by violent or sudden means
and investigated, as required by R.C. 313.12. In her verdict,
appellee stated the cause of death as "cervical compression * *
* homicide-during legal intervention." Similarly, on a
supplementary medical certification, appellee stated that the
immediate cause of death was "cervical compression," and she
described how the injury occurred as "cervical compression by
police during legal intervention." Appellant requested
appellee to delete the phrase, "during legal intervention,"
from her verdict. When appellee refused, appellant filed this
mandamus action to compel her to do so, alleging that appellee
has no authority to rule on legal responsibility for death,
which is a legal judgment.
Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment in which she
argued that she has statutory authority to inquire into and
describe the manner of death. Appellant opposed the motion,
filing inter alia an affidavit of the Deputy Chief Medical
Examiner of Bexar County, Texas, in which he states that it is
improper for a coroner to use the phrase, "during legal

intervention," because it is a legal determination.
The court of appeals found that "legal intervention" was a
descriptive term contained in the Manual of the International
Statistical Classification of Diseases, Injuries and Causes of
Death, published by the World Health Organization, and that
appellee is not precluded by statute from using such a
descriptive term. The court of appeals also held that the
Texas Deputy Chief Medical Examiner's affidavit did not create
a genuine issue of fact, which would preclude granting a motion
for summary judgment and, accordingly, granted the motion for
summary judgment and denied the writ.
The cause is before this court upon an appeal as of right.

John W. Martin, for appellant.
Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, Michael P. Butler and Patrick J. Murphy, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.

Per Curiam. We affirm the judgment of the court of
appeals.
In her first proposition of law, appellant argues that
R.C. Chapter 313 does not authorize the coroner to draw legal
conclusions from the facts she ascertains, citing State v.
Cousin (1982), 5 Ohio App. 3d 32, 5 OBR 34, 449 N.E.2d 32, in
which the Court of Appeals for Seneca County, construing R.C.
313.19, stated:
"The mode or manner can refer to the surrounding physical
mechanisms associated with the death, as for example, the
thrust of a knife, the course of a bullet or the blow of a
blunt instrument. Such things are intimately associated with
the causal chain leading to the physiological chains that
resulted in death. However, this is as far as the assigned
quality of expertise required for a coroner may go.
"The assigning of ultimate causes, human intents and
criminal responsibility is a matter for a different agency of
inquiry, and is ultimately the subject matter of judicial
inquiry. To say that the coroner is empowered by R.C. 313.19
to forestall prosecution, prevent further inquiry by
prosecutors and police and grand juries from indicting is to
interpret the section far more broadly than is warranted or
required. We would conclude that limiting the meaning of
'cause, manner and mode' to the immediate physical and
physiological mechanisms involved in the death is fully
compatible with the skills of the coroner, his required
expertise and with the clearly evident necessities of the
situation. As to human causation and criminal responsibility
-- these fall outside his area of expertise and to lend to his
ventures into this area any degree of finality or presumption
of correctness, we believe, goes far beyond the scope of the
statute and is wholly inconsistent with the general patterns of
law enforcement and justice." 5 Ohio App. 3d at 34, 5 OBR at
37, 449 N.E.2d at 35-36.
Appellant argues that by determining that the death of
appellant's son occurred "during legal intervention," the
appellee stated a legal conclusion not authorized by law,
according to Cousin. Appellee attempts to distinguish Cousin
as simply holding that a coroner's verdict does not have res

judicata effect on subsequent judicial inquiry into the cause
of death. We find that Cousin is wrong insofar as it holds, or
appears to hold, that a coroner is limited to describing only
physical or physiological facts.
R.C. 313.12 provides in part:
"When any person dies as a result of criminal or other
violent means, by casualty, by suicide, or in any suspicious or
unusual manner, * * * the physician called in attendance, or
any member of an ambulance service, emergency squad, or law
enforcement agency who obtains knowledge thereof arising from
his duties, shall immediately notify the office of the coroner
of the known facts concerning the time, place, manner, and
circumstances of the death, and any other information which is
required pursuant to sections 313.01 to 313.22 of the Revised
Code. * * *" (Emphasis added.)
R.C. 313.17 provides in part:
"The coroner * * * may * * * proceed to inquire how the
deceased came to his death, whether by violence to self or from
any other persons, by whom, whether as principals or
accessories before or after the fact, and all circumstances
relating thereto." (Emphasis added.)
Finally, R.C. 313.19 states:
"The cause of death and the manner and mode in which the
death occurred, as delivered by the coroner and incorporated in
the coroner's verdict and in the death certificate filed with
the division of vital statistics, shall be the legally accepted
manner and mode in which such death occurred, and the legally
accepted cause of death, unless the court of common pleas of
the county in which the death occurred, after hearing, directs
the coroner to change his decision as to such cause and manner
and mode of death." (Emphasis added.)
Taken together, these three statutes facially contradict
the Cousin court's assertion that the "manner and mode"
language of R.C. 313.19 is limited to "physical and
physiological mechanisms." To so state is to imply that R.C.
313.12's requirement to relate facts "concerning the time,
place, manner, and circumstances of the death" is essentially
meaningless, as is the coroner's inquiry pursuant to R.C.
313.17 as to who caused the death, together with all attendant
circumstances.
Moreover, we agree with the court of appeals below that
appellee drew no legal conclusions in this case. Rather, she
adequately demonstrated that the term "legal intervention" is
derived from the World Health Organization's Manual of the
International Statistical Classification of Diseases, Injuries,
and Causes of Death (1977), and that as defined therein it is
merely a descriptive term:
"Legal intervention [i]ncludes: injuries inflicted by the
police or other law-enforcing agents, including military on
duty, in the course of arresting or attempting to arrest
law-breakers, suppressing disturbances, maintaining order, and
other legal action[.]" Id. at 627.
Appellant argues that Ohio law, not international manuals,
must be the source of an Ohio coroner's authority. That is
true, but nothing in Ohio law appears to preclude the use of
such a manual, and insofar as the term "legal intervention" is
set forth in the manual as a purely descriptive term, it

appears entirely consistent with R.C. 313.12, 313.17, and
313.19. Accordingly, we reject appellant's first proposition
of law.
Second, appellant argues "during legal intervention" is an
equivocal phrase, which could be interpreted to mean that the
intervention was justifiable instead of just meaning "inflicted
by the police." She suggests using clearer phrases: (1)
"homicide--during arrest," or (2) "homicide--during
apprehension." However, to prevail in mandamus, appellant must
show that appellee has a clear duty to use appellant's
preferred term over that chosen by appellee from the World
Health Organization's Manual. Clearly, she has not and cannot
make such a showing.
Further, under her second proposition of law, appellant
states that following the death of her son, the Mayor of
Cleveland commissioned a study into police procedures, and that
the advisory committee appointed cited a San Diego report of
similar import, which appellant attaches to her brief.
Appellee has filed a motion to strike the report on grounds it
is evidence not contained in the record. Appellee's motion is
well taken. S. Ct. Prac. R.V(1)(E) specifies the contents of
the appendix to an appellant's brief. It does not provide for
new evidence not considered in the court of appeals.
Accordingly, we grant appellee's motion to strike the report.
In her third proposition of law, appellant argues that
appellee and other coroners are under a clear legal duty not to
make legal conclusions in their verdicts, and when they do,
mandamus will compel them to stay within the scope of their
authority. The court of appeals held that appellee's use of
the phrase, "during legal intervention," is a discretionary act
which mandamus may not control, citing Goldsby v. Gerber
(1987), 31 Ohio App. 3d 268, 31 OBR 553, 511 N.E.2d 417, in
which the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County held that a
person may not compel the county coroner to delete a suicide
finding from a death certificate by an action in mandamus, or
by action seeking declaratory or injunctive relief.
We find Goldsby to be correct insofar as it holds that
mandamus will not interfere with discretion. However, shortly
after the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County issued the
Goldsby opinion, we decided Vargo v. Travelers Ins. Co. (1987),
34 Ohio St.3d 27, 516 N.E.2d 226, in which we held in paragraph
two of the syllabus:
"R.C. 313.19 does not deprive a civil litigant of due
process of law. The statute does not compel the fact-finder to
accept, as a matter of law, the coroner's factual findings
concerning the manner, mode and cause of decedent's death."
R.C. 313.19 states that the coroner's findings as to the
mode and manner of death are the "legally accepted manner and
mode * * * unless the court of common pleas of the county in
which the death occurred, after hearing, directs the coroner to
change his decision or as to such cause and manner and mode of
death." (Emphasis added.) In Vargo, we identified declaratory
judgment as the proper way to challenge a coroner's findings
pursuant to R.C. 313.19.
Similarly, a little over a month after the court of
appeals issued its decision in the instant case, we decided
Perez v. Cleveland (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 397, 613 N.E.2d 199,

in which we again identified an action for declaratory judgment
in the court of common pleas as the way to implement R.C.
313.19's hearing provisions in a case where plaintiff sought to
have the coroner's verdict changed from "homicide" to "natural
causes." Although declaratory judgment will not always
constitute an adequate remedy that will preclude mandamus --
State ex rel. Fenske v. McGovern (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 129, 11
OBR 426, 464 N.E.2d 525, paragraph two of the syllabus -- we
hold it precludes it when the General Assembly has specified
that the court of common pleas is the proper forum to challenge
the coroner's decision.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
court of appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
Moyer, C.J., A.W. Sweeney, Douglas, Wright, Resnick and
F.E. Sweeney, JJ., concur.
Pfeifer, J., dissents.