State ex rel. Carver v. Hull - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

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OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
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The State ex rel. Carver, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v.
Hull, Sheriff, et al., Appellants and Cross-Appellees.
[Cite as State ex rel. Carver v. Hull (1994), Ohio
St.3d .]
Mandamus to compel reinstatement as a cook/substitute matron in
Scioto County Sheriff's Department and back pay with
interest -- Writ granted, when.
(No. 93-1514 -- Submitted July 27, 1994 -- Decided October
19, 1994.
Appeal and Cross-Appeal from the Court of Appeals for
Scioto County, No. 90CA1907.
Pauline Carver, appellee and cross-appellant, sought a
writ of mandamus in the Scioto County Court of Appeals to
compel (1) her reinstatement as a cook/substitute matron for
appellant and cross-appellee Scioto County Sheriff's
Department, and (2) back pay with interest. Carver's
reinstatement had previously been ordered by the State
Personnel Board of Review ("SPBR") on the ground that appellant
and cross-appellee Sheriff John Hull of the department had
denied her right as a classified employee to reinstatement upon
recall from layoff. Carver sued in mandamus when Hull did not
comply with the SPBR order.
Carver worked for the sheriff's office part-time as a cook
during the summers of 1983 and 1984. In January 1985, Hull
hired her as a full-time cook/substitute matron, but she was
laid off due to lack of funds on April 28, 1985. Carver did
not appeal at that time to SPBR; however, she later asked Hull
about being recalled to her job. In December 1985, Carver
learned that another woman, Geneva Cantrell, had been working
part-time as a cook/substitute matron for the sheriff's
office. In March or April 1986, Carver discovered that
Cantrell had been hired for full-time work.
Carver appealed to SPBR on April 14, 1986. Hull moved to
dismiss based on untimeliness, arguing that Ohio Adm.Code
124-1-03(B) required her to appeal within ten days after notice
of the layoff. SPBR granted the motion to dismiss. Carver
requested reconsideration on the ground that she was contesting
the loss of her recall rights, which were not violated until

months after her layoff. SPBR reconsidered, stating:
"The appeal is hereby REMANDED to the Administrative Law
Judge for further proceedings, to be treated as an
investigation of [Carver's] recall rights."1
An administrative law judge ("ALJ") found that Hull
violated Carver's right to recall under R.C. 124.327(B) (recall
from layoff list for one year after layoff). With respect to
the timeliness of her appeal, the ALJ said:
"* * * [Carver] has failed to file a timely appeal to
question the validity of a lack of funds layoff which took
place in April, 1985. However, for purposes of her recall
rights, * * * [Carver] has filed a timely appeal pursuant to
Ohio Revised Code Section 124.56 and our administrative rule,
Ohio Administrative Code 124-1-03. * * *"
On October 7, 1986, SPBR adopted the ALJ's report and
ordered Carver's reinstatement. SPBR also accepted the ALJ's
invocation of the authority conferred by R.C. 124.56, which
allows SPBR to investigate officials who may be abusing their
powers of appointment, layoff, reduction, suspension or removal
and to recommend such official's removal to the Governor, mayor
or other chief appointing authority, or board of township
trustees, as applicable. The last sentence of SPBR's order
reads:
"If [Carver] is not returned to her previous employment
within thirty (30) days of the issuance of this order this
matter will be reported to the Governor with its recommendation
that Sheriff Hull be removed for violations of Chapter 124. of
the Ohio Revised Code."
Hull appealed, but the Franklin County Common Pleas Court
granted SPBR's motion to dismiss. The common pleas court
concluded that no mechanism existed for challenging the results
of an investigation under R.C. 124.56. Its order, dated
January 29, 1988, states:
"* * * This Court finds that the instant appeal is not a
justiciable question before the Court. See Singh v. State
(1982), 7 Ohio App.3d 269 [7 OBR 349, 455 N.E.2d 522]. For
this reason this Court does not reach any of the substantive
issues raised by [Hull]. This Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction and therefore, must SUSTAIN appellees' motion to
dismiss."
Hull did not appeal the dismissal of his appeal, which
left the SPBR order intact. However, he also did not
immediately reemploy Carver, and SPBR recommended his removal
to the Governor, who took no action. Carver waited until
November 22, 1989 to file her complaint in mandamus. She was
apparently recalled to work on January 4, 1993, during the
court of appeals' review.
The court of appeals granted the writ of mandamus,
including an award of back pay in the amount of $117,838.12,
with interest and costs. It agreed with SPBR that Carver was
entitled to recall and that Hull had a duty to comply with R.C.
124.327(B). The court rejected Hull's argument that Carver had
an adequate remedy via SPBR's recommendation for his removal,
holding that the sheriff's removal was not the relief Carver
requested. The court also rejected the other arguments Hull
now raises on appeal -- that Carver lacks standing and that
laches precludes a writ of mandamus.

Hull appeals as of right. Carver cross-appeals the court
of appeals' denial of prejudgment interest. She also moves to
strike Hull's brief and to dismiss this appeal for his failure
to comply with briefing provisions of the Supreme Court Rules
of Practice.

Miller, Dye, Huddleston & Knapp and C. Lawrence
Huddleston, for appellee and cross-appellant.
Lynn Alan Grimshaw, Scioto County Prosecuting Attorney,
and William K. Shaw, Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for
appellants and cross-appellees.

Per Curiam. This cause presents six questions for our
review. First, should the motion to strike and for dismissal
be granted? Second, does Carver have standing to maintain this
action? Third, does Hull owe Carver reinstatement, or did SPBR
abuse its discretion in finding a violation of Carver's recall
rights? Fourth, does Carver have an adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law? Fifth, should mandamus be denied due
to laches? Sixth, did the court of appeals err in denying
prejudgment interest?
For the reasons that follow, we overrule Carver's
procedural motion and find that she has standing. With respect
to the merits, we find that SPBR exceeded its authority in
determining Carver's right to recall under R.C. 124.56;
however, we also find that she is entitled to reinstatement due
to Hull's undisputed failure to comply with R.C. 124.327. We
further find that an appeal to SPBR was not available to
Carver, and that the sheriff's removal is an inadequate
remedy. Finally, we find that her delay did not cause
prejudice, but that she is not entitled to prejudgment
interest. Accordingly, we affirm.
Motion to Strike and for Dismissal
Carver urges us to strike Hull's brief and to dismiss his
appeal because (1) he did not file the record required by
former S.Ct.Prac.R. IV(1), (2) he did not file his merit brief
within the time prescribed by former S.Ct.Prac.R. V(1), which
depended on when the record was filed, or (3) he did not
include in his brief an appendix containing (a) copies of all
judgments, orders, and decisions rendered by the court of
appeals, (b) copies of any cited administrative rules, or (c)
copies of any cited constitutional provisions, as required by
former S.Ct.Prac.R. V(1)(E)(d), (f), and (g).
The prosecution of this appeal suffers from all the
infirmities Carver cites. However, Hull's noncompliance with
our former rules is not so pervasive that we are required to
dismiss, see Drake v. Bucher (1966), 5 Ohio St.2d 37, 38, 34
O.O.2d 53, 54, 213 N.E.2d 182, 183 (appeal dismissed where
party "utterly fail[ed] to comply with virtually every rule of
this court as to form or content" in writing brief), and we
generally prefer substantive dispositions to procedural. The
motion to strike and for dismissal, therefore, is overruled.
Standing
In his second proposition of law, Hull asserts Carver's
lack of standing and relies, as the common pleas court did in
dismissing his appeal, on Singh v. State (1982), 7 Ohio App.3d
269, 7 OBR 349, 455 N.E.2d 522. Singh held that an employee

lacked standing to appeal the results of an R.C. 124.56
investigation. Id. at 270, 7 OBR at 351, 455 N.E.2d at 524.
Singh aside, Carver's standing to sue in mandamus is not
determined by any purported lack of standing in the underlying
SPBR appeal. That case ended without the SPBR's reinstatement
order having been reversed on appeal. Thus, Carver may now sue
for compliance with the order, and her personal stake in
enforcement manifests "the requisite concrete adverseness"
necessary for standing. Ohio Hosp. Assn. v. Community Mut.
Ins. Co. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 215, 218, 31 OBR 411, 413, 509
N.E.2d 1263, 1266, citing Baker v. Carr (1962), 369 U.S. 186,
204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663, 678.
Similarly, Carver has the "beneficial interest" required
by R.C. 2731.02 because she demands that Hull observe her
individual right to recall under R.C. 124.327. Her interest is
thus "different from and transcend[s] that of the citizenry
generally," State ex rel. Harris v. Silbert (1959), 169 Ohio
St. 261, 265, 8 O.O.2d 278, 280, 159 N.E.2d 439, 442, which
constitutes sufficient standing to maintain an action in
mandamus to compel compliance with a statute. State ex rel.
Zoller v. Talbert (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 329, 330, 16 O.O.3d
391, 405 N.E.2d 724, 725.
Duty to Reinstate and Adequate Remedy
For a writ of mandamus to issue, the court must find that
Carver has a clear legal right to Hull's performance of a clear
legal duty and that she had no adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. State ex rel. Cassels v. Dayton City School
Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 217, 631 N.E.2d 150.
In his first, third, and fourth propositions of law, Hull
maintains that SPBR abused its discretion and acted beyond its
authority by determining Carver's right to recall under the
aegis of R.C. 124.56. Hull claims the statute provides only
one form of relief -- a recommendation for the removal of an
official or other appointing authority.2
SPBR abused its discretion if its order is "'contrary to
law, or * * * there is no evidence to support its decision.'"
State ex rel. Bispeck v. Bd. of Commrs. of Trumbull Cty.
(1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 26, 27, 523 N.E.2d 502, 504.
R.C. 124.56 states:
"When the state personnel board of review * * * has reason
to believe that any officer, * * * head of a department, or
person having the power of appointment, layoff, suspension, or
removal, has abused such power by making an appointment,
layoff, reduction, suspension, or removal of an employee under
his or their jurisdiction in violation of this chapter of the
Revised Code, the board or commission shall make an
investigation, and if it finds that a violation of this
chapter, or the intent and spirit of this chapter has occurred,
it shall make a report to the governor , * * who may remove
forthwith such guilty officer, * * * head of department, or
person. The officer or employee shall first be given an
opportunity to be publicly heard in person or by counsel in his
own defense. The action or removal by the governor * * * is
final except as otherwise provided in this chapter of the
Revised Code."
Singh, supra, contains support for Hull's argument.
There, the Franklin County Court of Appeals said that R.C.

124.56 contains no provision for the rights of an employee
insofar as an investigation for violation of R.C. Chapter 124
is concerned. The statute contemplates only an investigation
of an appointing authority for abuses in employee appointments,
layoffs, reductions, suspensions or removals. Thus, in
addition to holding that an employee has no standing to appeal
from an R.C. 124.56 investigation, the court determined that
neither SPBR nor a common pleas court has subject-matter
jurisdiction to hear such an appeal.
Similarly, in In re Appeal of Howard (1991), 73 Ohio
App.3d 717, 720, 598 N.E.2d 165, 167, the Franklin County Court
of Appeals said the investigation under R.C. 124.56 is
"administrative rather than quasi-judicial in nature" and does
not provide employees either a right to be heard or a right to
appeal.
In Singh, however, SPBR dismissed an employee's appeal
based on a failure to promote, and the common pleas court
specifically dismissed his further appeal because R.C. 124.56
did not extend to denials of promotion. The court of appeals
affirmed, agreeing that the employee had no standing because
his "interests were not adjudicated." Id., 7 Ohio App.3d at
270, 7 OBR at 351, 455 N.E.2d at 524. This result implies
another rationale for the Singh decision -- that SPBR can
determine a violation of employee rights where job actions are
within the scope of R.C. 124.56, i.e., in appointments,
layoffs, reductions, suspensions, or removals. See Ketron v.
Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1991), 61 Ohio App.3d 657, 573 N.E.2d
743, in which the Franklin County Court of Appeals followed
Singh, but also based its decision on the absence of any
reference to "promotions" in R.C. 124.56, and Riddle v. State
Personnel Bd. of Review (1987), 41 Ohio App.3d 68, 534 N.E.2d
874, in which the same court seemed to conclude that SPBR can
validly determine an employee's right to reinstatement where
the contested job action is analogous to one for which
jurisdiction exists under R.C. 124.56 and 124.03(A) (SPBR
powers and duties).
Thus, Singh has been applied conservatively to mean that
R.C. 124.56 provides an administrative investigation for abuse
and no relief other than a recommendation of the offending
official's removal. Cf. Leirer v. Parma (1989), 61 Ohio App.3d
54, 572 N.E.2d 152 (only official may appeal from R.C. 124.56
investigation, and then only after his removal is ordered), and
Malone v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (Apr. 15, 1986), Lawrence App.
No. 1756, unreported (employee-termination appeal treated as
R.C. 124.56 investigation, from which he had no appeal).
However, Singh has also been interpreted to allow an
adjudication of employee rights regarding appointment, layoff,
reduction, suspension, or removal during an R.C. 124.56
investigation.
We find legislative intent is best served by the
conservative approach. Again, R.C. 124.56 provides for a
general finding of official abuse and a recommendation for
removal. It says nothing about an adjudication of individual
employee rights, much less an employee appeal. Moreover, Ohio
Adm.Code 124-1-03(F) affords at least six months for
instituting R.C. 124.56 investigations, a considerably longer
period than is ordinarily allowed for appealing appointments,

layoffs, suspensions, removals, or reductions in pay or
position. See R.C. 124.33 and Ohio Adm.Code 124-1-03(D)
(appeal ten days after notice of transfer), R.C. 124.328 and
Ohio Adm.Code 124-1-03(B) (appeal ten days after layoff), R.C.
124.34 and Ohio Adm.Code 124-1-03(A) and (E) (appeal ten days
after appropriate order of removal, suspension, or reduction,
or ninety days after actual notice of reduction accomplished
without appropriate order). The six-month appeal period for
R.C. 124.56 investigations also exceeds the "catch-all" period
in Ohio Adm.Code 124-1-03(G), which allows thirty days after
actual notice for appealing "all other actions." These time
limits become a matter of SPBR's discretion to apply, within
the limits of Ohio Adm.Code 124-1-03(F), if R.C. 124.56 permits
a determination of individual employee rights. Accord Holt v.
State (Jan. 15, 1985), Franklin App. No. 84AP-663, unreported.
In defense of SPBR's order for her reinstatement, Carver
accuses Hull of limiting the focus of SPBR's authority under
R.C. 124.56 to pure investigation, when her appeal also invoked
SPBR's jurisdiction under R.C. 124.03(A), which enables SPBR to
affirm, disaffirm or modify "final decisions * * * relative to
reduction in pay or position, job abolishments, layoff,
suspension, discharge, assignment or reassignment to a new or
different position classification, or * * * [refusal to perform
a job audit]." Carver submits that reinstatement after recall
is an integral part of the layoff process and that recall
rights are therefore implicitly within SPBR's jurisdiction over
layoffs under R.C. 124.03(A) and 124.56.
"Layoff" is not defined in R.C. Chapter 124. However,
under Ohio Adm.Code 124-1-02(I), a "layoff" is "a suspension of
employment, expected to last less than twelve months, due to
either a lack of work or a lack of funds," and reinstatement
after recall is not mentioned. Moreover, a similar request to
extend the reach of R.C. 124.03(A) has been rejected as
judicial legislation. In Ketron, supra, 61 Ohio App.3d at 661,
573 N.E.2d at 746, the court refused to confer SPBR
jurisdiction over "promotions" by inserting that word into R.C.
124.03(A). The court said that a legislative intent to prevent
failure-to-promote appeals was evident from the omission of
promotions in R.C. 124.03(A) and references to this job action
elsewhere in R.C. Chapter 124. The same rationale applies to
appeals regarding a failure to reinstate after recall. See
State ex rel. Kelly v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections
(1994), Ohio St.3d , N.E.2d .
Accordingly, we adopt the rationale in Singh and hold that
SPBR had no jurisdiction to order Carver's reinstatement
pursuant to R.C. 124.56, and that much of its order is
unenforceable. State ex rel. Stough v. Bd. of Edn. (1977), 50
Ohio St.2d 47, 4 O.O.3d 116, 362 N.E.2d 266, overruled on other
grounds, Ohio Assn. of Pub. School Emp. Chapter No. 471 v.
Twinsburg (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 180, 184, 522 N.E.2d 532, 536.
Almost conceding this, Carver alternatively argues that she was
entitled to reinstatement because this record independently
establishes that Hull violated R.C. 124.327(B).
The court of appeals had sufficient evidence before it to
find a violation of Carver's recall rights and a duty to
reinstate her -- the relevant facts underlying Carver's claim
for reinstatement being admitted. However, to be entitled to a

writ of mandamus without a valid SPBR order, Carver must also
establish that she had no adequate remedy by way of an appeal
to SPBR. State ex rel. Weiss v. Indus. Comm. (1992), 65 Ohio
St.3d 470, 477, 605 N.E.2d 37, 42 (mandamus may not be
substituted for a civil service appeal). Hull proposes in his
fifth proposition of law that Carver should have appealed the
SPBR order within ten days after receipt thereof pursuant to
Ohio Adm.Code 124-1-03(B). That rule applies to layoffs, job
abolishments, and displacements, or "bumping" rights, see State
ex rel. Blinn v. Ohio Dept. of Adm. Serv. (1984), 21 Ohio
App.3d 117, 118, 21 OBR 125, 126, 487 N.E.2d 343, 345; it does
not apply to reinstatement after recall. The other remedy Hull
suggests -- enforcement of the recommendation for his removal
-- does not redress Carver's right to recall and, therefore, is
inadequate. Thus, neither of these remedies precludes mandamus.
Based on the foregoing, SPBR abused its discretion in
attempting to determine Carver's right to recall under the
investigative authority conferred by R.C. 124.56, and its
reinstatement order is void. However, Carver has shown her
clear right to recall and Hull's clear duty to reinstate her.
Moreover, because SPBR lacks jurisdiction to determine recall
rights under R.C. 124.03(A), Carver had no adequate remedy via
appeal and has satisfied the test for the issuance of a writ of
mandamus.
Laches
In his last proposition of law, Hull claims laches because
Carver filed this mandamus action at least three years after
she was replaced. He also assails Carver's delay in enforcing
SPBR's reinstatement order.
Laches occurs when unreasonable and inexcusable delay in
asserting a known right causes material prejudice. State ex
rel. Cater v. N. Olmsted (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 315, 325, 631
N.E.2d 1048, 1056. The question whether laches has barred a
claim in mandamus rests in in the court's sound discretion.
State ex rel. Moore v. Sanders (1981), 65 Ohio St.2d 72, 75, 19
O.O.3d 264, 266, 418 N.E.2d 1339, 1341.
Carver's appeal to SPBR occurred only a month or so after
her discovery of Cantrell's full-time employment and, as the
court of appeals concluded, the time required for review by
SPBR and the common pleas court was not due to Carver's delay.
Accord State ex rel. Case v. Indus. Comm. (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d
383, 386, 28 OBR 442, 445, 504 N.E.2d 30, 34. But, Carver
waited from January 29, 1988, when Hull's SPBR appeal was
dismissed, until November 22, 1989 to file a complaint in
mandamus. While the court of appeals observed that "Carver * *
* persistently tried to enforce her statutory right to recall,"
it did not explain what those efforts were during this period.
Carver's excuse basically is her lack of sophistication.
In State ex rel. Smith v. Witter (1926), 114 Ohio St. 357,
151 N.E. 192, mandamus was denied to an employee who waited two
years after a civil service commission determined that he was
discharged unlawfully before seeking the writ to compel his
reinstatement and back pay. The court, which suspected the
employee had delayed to "tak[e] advantage of his own laches,"
said:
"A respondent often might be seriously prejudiced, if,
after restoration, a relator should be permitted to use the

judgment of the court as a basis for his recovery of continued
compensation over a long period of time, a plight which could
be avoided by seasonably bringing his action." Id. at 359, 151
N.E. at 192-193.
Smith does not apply here. No evidence suggests that
Carver delayed in order to be paid for not working. However,
Smith was followed by Moore, supra, which Hull cites as
dispositive.
In Moore, a writ of mandamus was denied to a deputy
sheriff who waited nearly two years before asserting a right to
reinstatement in any forum. By contrast, Carver did not delay
in asserting her right to recall; she delayed in enforcing the
administrative order for her reinstatement -- an order that,
until voided by our decision today, was facially valid. This
distinction means that Hull knew Carver's claim had some
validity, yet still withheld an offer of reinstatement to avoid
the prejudice he now claims.
In Connin v. Bailey (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 34, 15 OBR 134,
472 N.E.2d 328, we refused to excuse thirty-five years of
noncompliance with a court order for child support and alimony
because "'[t]he mere inconvenience of having to meet an
existing obligation imposed * * * by an order or judgment of a
court of record at a time later than that specified in such * *
* order cannot be called material prejudice.'" Id. at 37, 15
OBR at 136, 472 N.E.2d at 330, quoting Smith v. Smith (1959),
168 Ohio St. 447, 457, 7 O.O.2d 276, 281, 156 N.E.2d 113, 120.
A facially valid administrative order requires the same
compliance and, absent affirmative evidence of deliberate delay
in enforcing that order, cannot be ignored to the detriment of
the prevailing party. Thus, while Carver delayed in enforcing
her right to reinstatement, we find that Hull has not shown the
material prejudice necessary for this equitable defense.
Prejudgment Interest
A reinstated public employee may maintain an action in
mandamus to recover compensation due for a period of wrongful
exclusion from employment, provided the amount is established
with certainty. State ex rel. Martin v. Bexley Bd. of Edn.
(1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 36, 37, 528 N.E.2d 1250, 1251; Monaghan
v. Richley (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 190, 61 O.O.2d 425, 291 N.E.2d
462, syllabus. Thus, having found that Hull had a duty to
reinstate Carver and that she was entitled to this
reinstatement, the court of appeals assigned a referee to
determine whether Carver was also entitled to back pay.
The referee recommended, based primarily on stipulations,
that Carver receive $117,838.12 in back pay. Carver objected
to the denial of prejudgment interest, arguing that interest
accrued (1) as for a contractual obligation under R.C.
1343.03(A), or (2) as for a judgment under R.C. 1343.03(C).
The court of appeals overruled her objections, explaining:
"The granting of prejudgment interest is a relative
newcomer to the law, reflecting a greater economic awareness of
the courts. Often, as a case drags on, one party benefits by
the delay because he obtains an economic advantage from the
delay. To offset that advantage, to prevent a party from
benefitting from the contract, or to sanction unfjustified
delay, prejudgment interest is sometimes allowed. Without
question, there was inordinate delay by [Hull] in this matter.

This case should have been resolved years ago, and to that
extent [Carver] may have been harmed. However, during this
entire period of delay, the clock kept ticking and each day of
delay caused by [Hull's] failure to reinstate was also counted
as a day of lost wages for [Carver]. We see no basis for
prejudgment interest in this case under R.C. 1343.03(A) or
under R.C. 1343.03(C)."
In her cross-appeal, Carver contends that prejudgment
interest accrued on a bi-weekly basis beginning with Cantrell's
first paycheck because the debt to Carver was then due and
payable per R.C. 1343.03(A). Carver also claims that
prejudgment interest accrued as of the date her cause of action
arose because Hull made no good-faith settlement efforts per
R.C. 1343.03(C). We agree with the court of appeals that
neither subsection of the statute applies.3
Prejudgment interest did not accrue as a contractual
matter under R.C. 1343.03(A) because Carver was entitled to her
civil service position as a matter of law, not contract. Lewis
v. Benson (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 66, 67, 14 O.O.3d 269, 397
N.E.2d 396, 397. Furthermore, R.C. 1343.03(C) requires a
showing that Hull "failed to make a good faith effort to
settle," and that Carver "did not fail to make a good faith
effort to settle the case." No evidence or argument suggests
that either party ever offered to settle, which is generally
required to show lack of good faith in such negotiations.
Kalain v. Smith (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 157, 25 OBR 201, 495
N.E.2d 572, syllabus.
Conclusion
Having found that Carver has a right to recall and Hull
has duty to reinstate her, that she has no adequate remedy at
law, that her delay in enforcing her right to recall did not
prejudice Hull, that she is not entitled to prejudgment
interest, and that she has standing, we affirm the court of
appeals' judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
Moyer, C.J., A.W. Sweeney, Wright, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney
and Pfeifer, JJ., concur.
Douglas, J., concurs in judgment only.

FOOTNOTES
1 This order was not provided to the court of appeals, but
the parties do not dispute its contents.
2 Hull's collateral attack on SPBR's order is permissible
because he was unable to appeal directly. State ex rel. Ogan
v. Teater (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 235, 244, 8 O.O.3d 217, 222,
375 N.E.2d 1233, 1239.
3 Carver's authority does not specifically establish that a
county can be held liable for interest on a judgment at all,
much less for prejudgment interest. Either way, Hull
apparently did not contest this award in the court of appeals,
and he has not responded to the instant cross-appeal.