Dunbar v. Dunbar - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

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Dunbar, Appellee, v. Dunbar, n.k.a. Grebler, Appellant.
[Cite as Dunbar v. Dunbar (1994), Ohio St.3d .]
Domestic relations -- Arrearages in child support which have
not been reduced to a lump-sum judgment are not subject to
interest provisions of R.C. 1343.03.
Arrearages in child support which have not been reduced to a
lump-sum judgment are not subject to the interest
provisions of R.C. 1343.03.
(No. 92-1947 -- Submitted December 7, 1993 -- Decided
March 2, 1994.)
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Butler County, No.
CA91-12-209.
The parties' decree of divorce was filed on or about
November 29, 1971. In February 1975, appellant, Frances D.
Dunbar, n.k.a. Grebler, filed a motion for contempt, alleging
arrearages in child support and payment of medical expenses.
The trial court increased support from $25 per week to $29 per
week, found child-support arrearages to be $232, and ordered
medical expenses to be reimbursed upon proper submission of
medical bills by appellant.
At the time of the hearings in the spring of 1975,
appellee, Robert E. Dunbar, received a Fullbright Fellowship to
teach in New Zealand for three years. In order to maintain his
visa and remain in New Zealand, appellee had to pay all
outstanding debts. Appellee tendered a check to appellant for
$4,524, representing advance payment of three years support at
$29 per week. Appellant refused the tendered check, whereupon
appellee's visa was revoked and he lost his Fullbright
Fellowship.
On or about April 26, 1979, appellant's husband adopted
Andrea, the parties' minor child. On April 17, 1990, appellant
filed a motion for a lump-sum judgment for child support,
medical expenses, court costs, and attorney fees. By
supplemental pleading, appellant filed for accrued interest on
the child-support arrearages and the medical expenses.
Following a hearing, the court awarded appellant $5,974 for
child support and $1,380 for medical expenses. The court also
awarded interest on the lump-sum judgment as of May 24, 1991
until paid in full. The court of appeals, finding that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion, affirmed the trial
court's judgment.
This matter is now before this court upon an allowance of
a motion to certify the record.

Beckman, Weil, Shepardson & Faller and Barbara J. Howard,
for appellee.
Stephen M. Straus, for appellant.

Francis E. Sweeney, Sr., J. In appellant's first
proposition of law, she claims that an obligee of unpaid
installments of child support has a right to statutory interest
under R.C. 1343.03(A) upon the date each installment becomes
due. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in awarding
interest only on the lump-sum judgment. For the following
reasons, we find this argument is without merit.
This court has held that even though a divorce decree is a
final judgment, any unpaid and delinquent installments must be

reduced to a lump-sum judgment before an execution can be
levied upon the monies owing. Roach v. Roach (1956), 164 Ohio
St. 587, 59 O.O. 1, 132 N.E.2d 742. Thus, arrearages in child
support which have not been reduced to a lump-sum judgment are
not subject to the interest provisions of R.C. 1343.03.
Moreover, the trial court's decision regarding prejudgment
interest will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.
See Cox v. Oliver Mach. Co. (1987), 41 Ohio App.3d 28, 38, 534
N.E.2d 855, 865.
We note that newly enacted R.C. 3113.219 (Am.Sub.S.B. No.
10) provides that on or after July 1, 1992, when a court
determines that a support order has not been paid, the obligee
has a statutory right to interest on delinquent child-support
payments. Newly amended R.C. 3109.05(C) provides that: "[O]n
or after July 1, 1992, [a court] shall assess interest on any
unpaid amount of child support pursuant to R.C. 3113.219 of the
Revised Code." While this legislation provides for a statutory
right to interest on delinquent child-support payments which
did not previously exist, this provision applies only to
support orders issued or modified on or after July 1, 1992.
Since the support order in the present case was neither issued
nor modified on or after that date, the new legislation is not
applicable to the present case. Accordingly, we find no abuse
of discretion in the trial court's decision award to appellant
interest from the date of the lump-sum judgment.
In appellant's second proposition of law, she claims that
the trial court erred in not awarding a sufficient amount for
reimbursement of medical expenses. However, the court has
considerable discretion in formulating a support award and the
court's discretion will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion. Booth v. Booth (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144, 541
N.E.2d 1028, 1030. In the present case, appellant's evidence
as to this claim consisted primarily of her own testimony, a
few dental bills, and her own handwritten list of medical
expenses as submitted on her federal income tax return.
Accordingly, based on our review of the record, we find that
the court's award of medical expenses in the amount of $1,380
was neither unreasonable, arbitrary, nor unconscionable.
Finally, appellant claims that the court erred in refusing
to award attorney fees. A court's decision on a request for
attorney fees will not be overruled absent an attitude that is
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Rand v. Rand
(1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 356, 18 OBR 415, 481 N.E.2d 609. Based
on our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court's
decision not to award attorney fees was neither unreasonable,
arbitrary, nor unconscionable.
The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Moyer, C.J., A.W. Sweeney, Douglas, Wright, Resnick and
Pfeifer, JJ., concur.