In re Adoption of Greer - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

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OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
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In re Adoption of Greer.
[Cite as In re Adoption of Greer (1994), Ohio St.3d .]
Adoption -- Trial court's finding that consent to an adoption
of a party described in R.C. 3107.06 is not required is a
final appealable order -- Putative father who has signed
the child's birth certificate as informant has a statutory
right to withhold his consent to the adoption of that
child -- Procedure for putative father who has signed the
birth certificate to preserve his right to withhold
consent to the child's adoption -- R.C. 3107.06(F)(3) and
3107.07(B), construed.
1. A trial court's finding pursuant to R.C. 3107.07 that the
consent to an adoption of a party described
in R.C. 3107.06 is not required is a final
appealable order.
2. Unless the statutory consent requirement of R.C. 3107.06(F)(3)
is excused pursuant to R.C. 3107.07(B), a
putative father who has signed the birth
certificate of a child as informant as
provided in R.C. 3705.09 has a statutory
right to withhold his consent to the
adoption of that child, thereby barring the
child's adoption by another.
3. To preserve his right to withhold consent to the child's
adoption and avoid a finding that the
requirement of his consent shall be excused,
a putative father who has signed the birth
certificate of a child must file a written
objection to the adoption with the court,
Department of Human Services, or the agency
having custody of the child, but that
objection need not be filed within thirty
days from the earlier of the date of the
adoption petition or placement of the
child. (R.C. 3107.06[F][3] and 3107.07[B],
construed.)
(No. 93-902 -- Submitted April 27, 1994 -- Decided
September 21, 1994.)

Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Hancock County, No.
5-92-34.
On July 26, 1987 Carol Lee Young, then seventeen years of
age, gave birth to Joshua Alan Young. Eric Denis Weiss,
appellee herein, signed Joshua's birth certificate as
informant, and is identified on the birth certificate as his
father. Weiss, age nineteen at the time of Joshua's birth, and
Carol Young were never married, nor was Weiss ever legally
adjudicated to be Joshua's father.
On May 14, 1992, appellant Dennis L. Greer filed a
petition in the Probate Court of Hancock County seeking to
adopt Joshua. In his petition, Greer alleged that he was
Joshua's stepfather, and that he was married on August 17,
1991. He further alleged that the consent of Eric Weiss to the
adoption was not necessary in that (1) Weiss had failed without
justifiable cause to communicate with the minor for a period of
at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the
adoption petition or the placement of the minor in his home,
and (2) Weiss had failed without justifiable cause to provide
for the maintenance and support of the minor as required by law
or judicial decree for a period of at least one year
immediately preceding the filing of the adoption petition or
the placement of the minor in his home. Simultaneously with
the filing of his petition, Carol L. Greer (nee Carol L. Young)
filed her written consent to the adoption of her son by her
husband, Dennis Greer.
On May 15, 1992, the probate court issued a notice of
hearing on the petition for adoption to Weiss. The notice
followed Form 18.2 of the Probate Forms set forth in C.P.Sup.R.
16. The notice advised Weiss that a petition for Joshua's
adoption had been filed on May 14, 1992 and further advised
that "hearing of said Petition will be had *** on the 1st day
of July, 1992." Included at the bottom of the prescribed Form
18.2 was the following statement: "FAILURE TO FILE AN OBJECTION
ON OR BEFORE THE HEARING DATE MAY RESULT IN TERMINATION OF YOUR
PARENTAL RIGHTS." Weiss received a copy of the petition and
the notice of hearing on the petition on May 20, 1992.
On June 25, 1992, Weiss formally entered his appearance in
the action through counsel and requested a continuance of the
July 1 hearing. The court granted a continuance of the July 1
date previously set for hearing the merits of the adoption
petition, and rescheduled the hearing for July 17, 1992.
On July 6, a pretrial conference was held at which counsel
for Weiss orally objected to the adoption going forward without
Weiss' consent. That afternoon a written objection to Joshua's
adoption was filed in the probate court on behalf of Weiss. As
such, Weiss' written objection was filed on the fifty-third day
after the filing of the petition for adoption, but well before
the continued hearing date of July 17, 1992.
On July 17, the probate court held an evidentiary hearing
limited to the issue of whether the adoption could proceed
without the consent of Weiss. Weiss testified that, upon
receiving the Form 18.2 notice, he consulted with his father
and contacted numerous attorneys concerning their possible
representation of him, but did not initially retain an
attorney. He testified that he understood the Form 18.2 notice
to mean that he was obligated to have an attorney present with

him when he walked into the courtroom for the July 1 hearing
date set forth on the form.
On July 30, 1992, the probate court found that "the
putative father failed to timely object[] to the adoption
pursuant to ORC {3107.07(B) and therefore his consent to the
adoption is unnecessary," in that Weiss had failed to file a
written objection to the adoption within thirty days of the
filing of the adoption petition. The court expressly
designated its finding to be a final appealable order.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded the cause for
further proceedings, finding that the notice Weiss received
contained misleading legal information, and that Weiss could
not, consistent with due process and simple fairness, be held
to a standard of strict compliance with the time limits of R.C.
3107.06(F)(4) for the filing of written objections.
The cause is before this court pursuant to the allowance
of a motion to certify the record.

Karen E. Elliott, for appellant.
J. Stanley Needles, for appellee.

A.William Sweeney, J. In this case the statutory
and constitutional rights of Eric Weiss, an unwed biological
father faced with the prospect of the adoption of his natural
child by another, are at issue. Having examined the record and
the relevant law, we conclude that Weiss' right to withhold his
consent to the adoption of his child was grounded in R.C.
3107.06(F)(3) rather than R.C. 3107.06(F)(4), and that his
written objection to the adoption was not subject to the
thirty-day filing requirement set forth in R.C. 3107.06(F)(4).
We therefore find that both lower courts erred in determining
that Weiss' objection was not timely filed, and that the court
of appeals erred in finding that Form 18.2 conveyed misleading
information to him. Because Weiss timely filed an objection to
the adoption of his putative son, Joshua Young, the probate
court was without authority to excuse the requirement of Weiss'
consent without first making a finding of lack of biological
paternity, willful abandonment, or failure to support as set
forth in R.C. 3107.07(B). We affirm the court of appeals on
this basis rather than on constitutional due process grounds,
and remand the cause with instructions that the putative
father, Weiss, be given notice and an opportunity to be heard
on the question whether the requirement of his consent may be
excused based on R.C. 3107.07(B), i.e., whether he failed to
support Joshua, abandoned Joshua, or abandoned Joshua's mother
during her pregnancy and thereafter.
I
It is incumbent upon us initially to determine whether the
issues presented are properly before us. The probate court
held that, pursuant to R.C. 3107.06(F)(4) and 3107.07(B), the
consent of the putative father, Weiss, was not necessary in
that he failed to file written objections to the adoption
within thirty days of the filing of the petition. The court
expressly deemed that finding to be a final appealable order.
Only if the probate court was correct in finding its decision
to be a final appealable order did the court of appeals have

jurisdiction to review the probate court's order. Section
3(B)2), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution; Chef Italiano
Corp. v. Kent State Univ. (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 86, 541 N.E.2d
64; Noble v. Colwell (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 92, 540 N.E.2d
1381. A final appealable order is defined in R.C. 2505.02 as:
"An order that affects a substantial right in an action which
in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment, an
order that affects a substantial right made in a special
proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after
judgment, or an order that vacates or sets aside a judgment or
grants a new trial[.]" In this case, the order allowing the
adoption to proceed without Weiss' consent falls within this
statutory definition, if at all, as an order that affects a
substantial right made in a special proceeding.
The courts of appeals of this state have differed in
answering the question whether a finding excusing consent to an
adoption is an order that affects a substantial right made in a
special proceeding and, thus, a final appealable order. Courts
finding that such an order is final and appealable include the
Third District Court of Appeals in In re Adoption of Jorgensen
(1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 207, 515 N.E.2d 622; the Fourth District
Court of Appeals in In re Adoption of Payne (Mar. 24, 1988),
Ross App. No. 1414, unreported, In re Adoption of Bing (Feb.
26, 1991), Gallia App. No. 90CA1, unreported, and In re Beekman
(Mar. 30, 1994), Scioto App. No. 93-CA-2117, unreported, 1994
WL 106241; the Sixth District Court of Appeals in Sprunk v.
Sprunk (Jan. 27, 1989), Lucas App. No. L-88-087, unreported,
1989 WL 5416; and the Eighth District Court of Appeals in In re
Adoption of Hupp (1982), 9 Ohio App.3d 128, 9 OBR 192, 458
N.E.2d 878. Courts finding that such an order is interlocutory
and not appealable until judgment is issued on the adoption
petition itself include the Tenth Appellate District in In re
Adoption of Salisbury (1982), 5 Ohio App. 3d 65, 5 OBR 161, 449
N.E.2d 519; and the Eleventh Appellate District in In re
Adoption of Cline (1993), 89 Ohio App.3d 450, 624 N.E.2d 1083.
In Polikoff v. Adam (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 100, 616 N.E.2d
213, we established a two-step process by which a reviewing
court is to determine the appealability of an order pursuant to
R.C. 2505.02. "[T]he first inquiry for any reviewing court is
whether the order was entered in a special proceeding." Id.,
67 Ohio St.3d at 108, 67 N.E.2d at 218, fn. 8. A special
proceeding as used in R.C. 2505.02 is an action created by
statute and not recognized at common law or in equity. Id., 67
Ohio St.3d at 107, 67 N.E.2d at 218. If a reviewing court finds
that the order was entered in a special proceeding, the court
must then proceed to the second step of the determination
process and inquire as to whether the order affected a
substantial right. Id., 67 Ohio St.3d at 108, 67 N.E.2d at 218,
fn. 8.
A determination pursuant to R.C. 3107.07 adverse to the
party claiming a right to withhold consent to adoption
satisfies both Polikoff criteria. The right to bar an adoption
by withholding consent is a right created by statute (R.C.
3107.06 and 3107.14[C]) as are proceedings pursuant to R.C.
3107.07. Indeed, "the provisions authorizing adoptions are
purely statutory." Lemley v. Kaiser (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 258,
260, 6 OBR 324, 326-327, 452 N.E.2d 1304, 1307. As noted in In

re Adoption of Hupp, supra, at 128, 9 OBR at 193, 458 N.E.2d at
880, fn. 1: "Adoptions are special statutory proceedings, which
have no counterpart at common law. In re Adoption of Biddle
(1958), 168 Ohio St. 209 [6 O.O.2d 4, 152 N.E.2d 105.]"
Further, the right to withhold parental consent to an
adoption provided for by R.C. 3107.06 can only be described as
substantial, dealing as it does with the continuation or
termination of the parent-child relationship, a bond which
constitutes one of the most fundamental relationships upon
which our society is based. An order pursuant to R.C. 3107.07
excusing the consent requirement must certainly be deemed to be
one affecting a substantial right within the scope of R.C.
2505.02, as it precludes the claimant from the right to
unilaterally bar the adoption of his or her child. The
prejudice resulting from a determination negating that right is
self-evident.
We thus hold that a trial court's finding pursuant to R.C.
3107.07 that the consent to an adoption of a party described in
R.C. 3107.06 is not required is a final appealable order.1
II
Having determined that we have jurisdiction to review the
probate court's final appealable order, we turn to the
substantive issues presented.
Adoption not only creates parental rights in an adoptive
parent, but also terminates all parental rights of a natural
parent. R.C. 3107.15. Because of the finality and serious
import of adoption, the law accords protections to a natural
parent when the adoption of a child is proposed. Among those
protections are the right to adequate notice and an opportunity
to be heard before any parental rights which may exist are
terminated. Lehr v. Robertson (1983), 463 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct.
2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614.2
In addition to constitutional protections which may exist,
R.C. 3107.06 provides parents, including putative unwed fathers
who fall within its scope, a statutory right to bar the
adoption of his or her child by withholding consent to that
adoption. As applicable to putative fathers, R.C. 3107.06(F)
provides:
"Unless consent is not required under section 3107.07 of
the Revised Code, a petition to adopt a minor may be granted
only if written consent to the adoption has been executed by
all of the following:
"***
"(F) Subject to division (B) of section 3107.07 of the
Revised Code, the putative father, if he:
"(1) Is alleged to be the father of the minor in
proceedings brought under sections 3111.01 to 3111.19 of the
Revised Code at any time before the placement of the minor in
the home of the petitioner;
"(2) Has acknowledged the child in a writing sworn to
before a notary public at any time before the placement of the
minor in the home of the petitioner;
"(3) Has signed the birth certificate of the child as an
informant as provided in section 3705.09 of the Revised Code;
"(4) Has filed an objection to the adoption with the
agency having custody of the minor or the department of human
services at any time before the placement of the minor in the

home of the petitioner, or with the probate court or the
department of human services within thirty days of the filing
of a petition to adopt the minor or its placement in the home
of the petitioner, whichever occurs first."
Because Weiss identified himself as Joshua's father at the
time of the child's birth by signing Joshua's birth certificate
as informant, Weiss was vested with a right to refuse consent
by virtue of R.C. 3107.06(F)(3) and not on the basis of his
having filed written objections to the adoption within the
thirty-day period described in R.C. 3107.06(F)(4). Thus,
unless the statutory consent requirement of R.C. 3107.06(F)(3)
is excused pursuant to R.C. 3107.07(B), a putative father who
has signed the birth certificate of a child as informant as
provided in R.C. 3705.09 has a statutory right to withhold his
consent to the adoption of that child, thereby barring the
child's adoption by another.
Weiss' legal status may be contrasted to that of a
putative father who neither signed the child's birth
certificate nor took the steps described in R.C. 3107.06(F)(1)
or (2) to validate his paternity. Ohio statutory law
distinguishes between putative fathers who have stepped forward
to accept the responsibilities of parenthood in these ways, and
those who have not. Where an unadjudicated biological father
has not taken any of the steps described in R.C. 3107.06(F)(1),
(2) or (3), he may have a statutory right to bar the adoption
of his biological child by withholding his consent, but only
where he meets the criteria set forth in R.C. 3107.06(F)(4),
i.e., where he timely files an objection to placement or
adoption with an appropriate body.
Where a natural putative father falls within any division
of R.C. 3107.06(F), however, the requirement of obtaining his
consent to the adoption of his putative child is not absolute.
On the contrary, the requirement of his consent may be excused
pursuant to R.C. 3107.07, which provides, in part:
"Consent to adoption is not required of any of the
following:
"***
"(B) The putative father of a minor if the putative father
fails to file an objection with the court, the department of
human services, or the agency having custody of the minor as
provided in division (F)(4) of section 3107.06 of the Revised
Code, or files an objection with the court, department, or
agency and the court finds, after proper service of notice and
hearing, that he is not the father of the minor, or that he has
willfully abandoned or failed to care for and support the
minor, or abandoned the mother of the minor during her
pregnancy and up to the time of her surrender of the minor, or
its placement in the home of the petitioner, whichever occurs
first." (Emphasis added.)
In construing adoption statutes this court has recognized
that "[a]ny exception to the requirement of parental consent
must be strictly construed so as to protect the right of
natural parents to raise and nurture their children." In re
Adoption of Schoeppner (1976), 46 Ohio St. 2d 21, 24, 75 O.O.2d
12, 13, 345 N.E.2d 608, 610. Accord In re Adoption of Holcomb
(1985), 18 Ohio St. 3d 361, 366, 18 OBR 419, 424, 481 N.E.2d
613, 619; In re Adoption of Masa (1986), 23 Ohio St. 3d 163,

165, 23 OBR 330, 331, 492 N.E.2d 140, 142. Initially, we note
that R.C. 3107.07(B) does not expressly set forth a time
limitation for the filing of a putative father's objection.
More importantly, R.C. 3107.06(F) does not specifically
designate whether the divisions of subsection (F) are to be
read in the conjunctive or the disjunctive, as neither the word
"or" or "and" is used at the conclusion of R.C. 3107.06(F)(1,
(2), and (3). The statute cannot, however, be logically read
to require a putative father to comply with each and every
subsection of division (F), i.e., a putative father need not
sign a birth certificate and initiate a paternity action, and
acknowledge his child before a notary public to procure a right
to withhold consent. That being the case, it is unlikely that
the legislature intended that putative fathers falling within
the scope of R.C. 3107.07(F)(1), (2), or (3) should also be
required to comply with R.C. 3107.06(F)(4). We would be
requiring such a step were we to read the thirty-day
requirement of the latter provision into R.C. 3107.07(B) as to
these fathers.
Moreover, this court has long recognized it to be a
well-settled principle of statutory construction that "where
constitutional questions are raised, courts will liberally
construe a statute to save it from constitutional
infirmities." State v. Sinito (1975), 43 Ohio St.2d 98, 101,
72 O.O.2d 54, 56, 330 N.E.2d 896, 898 (citing State ex rel.
Prospect Hosp., v. Ferguson [1938], 133 Ohio St. 325, 10 O.O.
493, 13 N.E.2d 723, and Wilson v. Kennedy [1949], 151 Ohio St.
485, 40 O.O. 500, 86 N.E.2d 722); State v. Dickerson (1989), 45
Ohio St. 3d 206, 543 N.E.2d 1250. Similarly, pursuant to R.C.
1.47, a court must presume that in enacting a statute the
legislature intended it to comply with the United States and
Ohio Constitutions. Upon taking the actions described in R.C.
3107.06(F)(1), (2), and (3), putative fathers are vested with a
significant right, i.e., the right to withhold consent to the
adoption of children they claim to be their natural offspring,
thereby precluding their adoption by another. Once vested with
that property interest, such fathers may not be deprived of
that interest in the absence of procedural due process
requirements of adequate notice and an opportunity to be
heard. See Cleveland Bd. of Edn. v. Loudermill (1985), 470
U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494. In accord with
constitutional requirements, R.C. 3107.07(B) expressly provides
that upon filing an objection, the putative father shall be
given "proper service of notice and hearing" on the issues of
biological paternity, abandonment, or lack of support. Were we
to construe R.C. 3107.07(B) so as to impose the thirty-day time
restriction of 3107.06(F)(4) upon an R.C.3107.06(F)(1),(2), or
(3) putative father, we would thereby jeopardize the
constitutionality of the entire statutory scheme, by allowing
the deprivation of the right to withhold consent without first
providing for notice and opportunity to be heard.
Accordingly, pursuant to a proper interpretation of R.C.
3107.07(B), the consent requirement of a putative father who
falls within the scope of R.C. 3107.06(F) and has filed an
objection3 with the court prior to the conclusion of the
hearing on the merits of the adoption hearing may be excused
only where the court finds "after proper service of notice and

hearing, that he is not the father of the minor, or that he has
willfully abandoned or failed to care for and support the
minor, or abandoned the mother of the minor during her
pregnancy and up to the time of her surrender of the minor, or
its placement in the home of the petitioner, whichever occurs
first." R.C. 3107.07(B).
We thus hold that in order to preserve his right to
withhold consent to the child's adoption and avoid a finding
that the requirement of his consent shall be excused, a
putative father who has signed the birth certificate of a child
must file an objection to the adoption with the court,
department, or agency having custody of the child, but that his
objection need not be filed within thirty days from the earlier
of the date of filing of the adoption petition or placement of
the child.
III
Although we resolve this case on the basis of statutory
construction, we would be remiss were we not to advise the
probate courts of this state as to what has clearly been
illustrated in this case to be a potential defect in Probate
Form 18.2. Probate Form 18.2 is not well adapted for use in
situations where a biological putative father is given notice
of the pendency of adoption proceedings of his natural child.
Initially, we note that the form4 sets forth expressly only
the standards of R.C. 3107.07(A), which are not applicable to
putative fathers but rather to parties whose status as parent
has been legally adjudicated. In re Adoption of Sunderhaus
(1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 127, 585 N.E.2d 418. Of more substantive
concern, however, is the fact that the prominent notice
"FAILURE TO FILE AN OBJECTION ON OR BEFORE THE HEARING DATE MAY
RESULT IN TERMINATION OF YOUR PARENTAL RIGHTS" which appears at
the bottom of Probate Form 18.2 conveys misleading information
to putative fathers not falling within the scope of R.C.
3107.06(F)(1), (2), or (3). Among all biological parents, it
is only the R.C. 3107.06(F)(4) putative father who must file an
objection within a thirty-day period from placement or filing
of an adoption petition to establish and protect his statutory
right to withhold consent. Where the hearing date set forth on
Form 18.2 is in excess of thirty days from the filing of the
petition or the placement of the child, the above-quoted notice
prescribed by Probate Form 18.2 may falsely lull the putative
father who does not fall within the scope of R.C. 3107(F)(1),
(2), or (3) to believe that failure to act promptly upon
receipt of Form 18.2 will not cause him to suffer adverse
effects. Such a party may well believe that his interests will
be protected so long as he "files an objection on or before the
hearing date." In fact, in such a situation a putative father
must take action in advance of the hearing date to establish
his statutory right to withhold consent, i.e., within thirty
days of the filing of the adoption petition or placement of the
child, whichever is earlier. The court of appeals below
recognized this misleading aspect of Form 18.2 and held that it
rose to the level of a deprivation of the constitutional right
to adequate notice. Because we have held that Weiss was not
subject to the thirty-time limitation of R.C. 3107.07(F)(4), it
is not necessary for us to affirm or deny this aspect of the
court of appeals' decision. Nevertheless, until such time as

the probate adoption forms may be reviewed or amended, we
strongly urge the bench and bar of this state to revise or
adapt those forms as may be appropriate when prepared for
delivery to unwed putative fathers not qualifying under R.C.
3107.06(F)(1), (2), or (3), but who may nevertheless be
constitutionally entitled to notice of the initiation of
adoption proceedings.5 Ultimately, the interests of the child,
as well as those who love and care for him or her, are best
served when adoption decrees possess the finality which results
from proceedings of unquestionable procedural propriety and
fairness.
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is
affirmed and the cause is remanded to the trial court with
instructions.
Judgment affirmed
and cause remanded.
Moyer, C.J., Wright, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney and Pfeifer,
JJ., concur.
Douglas, J., concurs in judgment only.
FOOTNOTES:
1 It should, therefore, be well-noted by practitioners
before the probate bar that, to be timely, an appeal of an R.C.
3107.07 decision adverse to one claiming a right to withhold
consent must be appealed within thirty days of the entry of the
order finding consent unnecessary. Cf. In re Adoption of
Jorgensen (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 207, 208-209, 515 N.E.2d 622,
624 ("[W]e conclude that the July 6, 1984 order was a final
appealable order and, no appeal having been taken within thirty
days therefrom, all the matters which could have been reviewed
had an appeal been taken have now become res judicata and are
not reviewable in a subsequent appeal taken from the final
adoption order.").
2 See Lehr, supra, at 463 U.S. 261-262, 103 S.Ct. at
2993-2994, 77 L.Ed.2d at 626-627 ("[W]hen an unwed father
demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood by 'com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing
of his child,' *** [citation omitted] his interest in personal
contract with his child acquires substantial protection under
the Due Process Clause. *** The significance of the
biological connection is that it offers the natural father an
opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a
relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity
and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's
future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child
relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the
child's development. If he fails to do so, the Federal
Constitution will not automatically compel a State to listen to
his opinion of where the child's best interests lie.").
3 We express no opinion as to whether a putative father
who objects to the adoption for the first time by making an
oral objection at the hearing of the adoption petition has
"filed" an objection within the scope of R.C. 3107.07(B). Cf.
In re Adoption of Youngpeter (1989), 65 Ohio App.3d 172; 583
N.E.2d 360 (implicitly holding that oral objection suffices to
trigger right to hearing on R.C. 3107.07[B] issues of
abandonment or failure to support).
4 Form 18.2 reads, in part:

"It is alleged in the Petition that (R.C. 3107.07)
[name to be inserted]
"( ) the parent has failed without justifiable cause to
communicate with the minor for a period of at least one year
immediately preceding the filing of the adoption petition or
the placement of the minor in the home of the petitioner.
"( ) the parent has failed without justifiable cause to
provide for the maintenance and support of the minor as
required by law or judicial decree for a period of at least one
year immediately preceding the filing of the adoption petition
or the placement of the minor in the home of the petitioner.
"( ) (state other grounds under R.C. 3107.07)[.]"
Form 18.0 (Petition for Adoption of Minor Child) contains
similar language in setting forth options which a petitioner
may indicate as the basis for failure to submit with the
petition written consents of persons identified in R.C. 3107.06.
5 See, Lehr, supra; In re Adoption of Holt (1991), 75
Ohio App. 3d 450, 599 N.E.2d 812 (objections to adoption of
putative father were appropriately heard despite failure to
file objection within thirty-day period where strict
application of R.C. 3107.06[F][4] would have deprived father of
due process rights; putative father was not notified of the
filing of the adoption proceedings until well after the running
of the statutory thirty-day period); and In re Adoption of
McMillon (Feb. 20, 1980), Montgomery App. No. 6505, unreported
(a putative father may not be foreclosed from objecting to a
proposed adoption based a failure to file objections within the
thirty-day period of R.C. 3107.06(F)(4) in the absence of a
proper and complete notice of the statutory requirement.)
Accord In re Adoption of Waugh (May 26, 1989), Richland App.
No. CA-2647, unreported. Cf. In re Adoption of Hudnall (1991),
71 Ohio App 3d 376, 594 N.E.2d 45 (Neither the Constitution of
the United States nor R.C. 3107.06[F][4] requires either a
trial judge or a litigant to give notice of the pendency of
adoption proceedings.).