State ex rel. Riser Foods, Inc. v. Trimble - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

	ROMINGER LEGAL
		Ohio Court Cases and Opinions - Ohio Legal Research
					Need Legal Help?
					Need Legal Help?
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER			LEGAL HEADLINES - CASE LAW - LEGAL FORMS	NOT FINDING WHAT YOU NEED? -RESEARCH

This court case was taken from the web sites of the Ohio Courts. Search our site for more cases - CLICK HERE

LEGAL RESEARCH

COURT REPORTERS

PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS

PROCESS SERVERS

DOCUMENT RETRIEVERS

EXPERT WITNESSES

Find a Private Investigator

Find an Expert Witness

Find a Process Server

Case Law - save on Lexis / WestLaw.

Legal News - Legal Headlines

OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
The full texts of the opinions of the Supreme Court of
Ohio are being transmitted electronically beginning May 27,
1992, pursuant to a pilot project implemented by Chief Justice
Thomas J. Moyer.
Please call any errors to the attention of the Reporter's
Office of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Attention: Walter S.
Kobalka, Reporter, or Deborah J. Barrett, Administrative
Assistant. Tel.: (614) 466-4961; in Ohio 1-800-826-9010.
Your comments on this pilot project are also welcome.
NOTE: Corrections may be made by the Supreme Court to the
full texts of the opinions after they have been released
electronically to the public. The reader is therefore advised
to check the bound volumes of Ohio St.3d published by West
Publishing Company for the final versions of these opinions.
The advance sheets to Ohio St.3d will also contain the volume
and page numbers where the opinions will be found in the bound
volumes of the Ohio Official Reports.

The State ex rel. Riser Foods, Inc., f.k.a. American Seaway
Foods, Inc., Appellant, v. Trimble et al., Appellees.
[Cite as State ex rel. Riser Foods, Inc. v. Trimble
(1995), Ohio St.3d .]
Workers' compensation -- Denial of handicap reimbursement to
self-insured employer by Industrial Commission not an
abuse of discretion, when.
(No. 93-2626 -- Submitted March 21, 1995 -- Decided May
24, 1995.)
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No.
92AP-827.
Appellant Riser Foods, Inc. (f.k.a. American Seaway Foods,
Inc.) is a self-insured employer. In 1983, a Riser worker, who
was a handicapped employee within the meaning of R.C. 4123.343,
sustained an industrial injury. Relator, in turn, filed for
handicap reimbursement for the compensation and benefits paid
as a result. A one-hundred-percent reimbursement was granted
on August 18, 1986.
On August 22, 1986, statutory amendments to R.C. 4123.343
significantly changed the handicap reimbursement system. Am.
Sub. S.B. No. 307, 141 Ohio Laws, Part I, 718. One of these
changes afforded, for the first time, an opportunity for
self-insured employers to opt out of the handicap reimbursement
program. R.C. 4123.343(G)(141 Ohio Laws, Part I, 745).
The record contains what is apparently the last page of a
letter. A portion of this page reads:
"I have certified that I am empowered to make this
election on behalf of American Seaway Foods, Inc. [Riser
Foods], a self-insured employer (Risk No. 3279).
"I hereby elect to withdraw from the handicap
reimbursement program effective January 1, 1988.
"Jerome Borstein
"Vice President
"[Signature of Jerome Borstein]
"Vice President
"Title
"[Handwritten date of 9-18-87]
"Date"

Riser later sought reimbursement for further expenditures
made on the aforementioned claimant's behalf. Appellee
Industrial Commission of Ohio denied reimbursement, finding
that because Riser had opted out of the handicap program, it
was no longer eligible for reimbursement.
Riser filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of
Appeals for Franklin County, alleging that the commission
abused its discretion in denying reimbursement. The appellate
court denied the writ.
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of
right.

Garson & Associates Co., L.P.A., Stuart I. Garson and
Michael J. Skindell, for appellant.
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Gerald H.
Waterman, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.

Per Curiam. Riser claims that the appellate court erred
in (1) admitting into evidence the Borstein letter, and (2)
affirming the commission's reimbursement denial. Riser's
arguments lack merit.
Following the completion of briefing in this case, we
decided State ex rel. First Natl. Supermarkets, Inc. v. Indus.
Comm. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 582, 639 N.E.2d 1185, which
resolved the very issue currently raised. First Natl.
Supermarkets held that once a self-insured employer opted out
of the handicap reimbursement program, the self-insured was
entitled to no further reimbursement, even in those claims in
which the right to reimbursement accrued before the opt out.
We reasoned:
"FNS's [First National Supermarkets'] position fails to
recognize that it was FNS's own actions, not the amendment of
the statute, that eliminated its right to reimbursement. Had
FNS not voluntarily opted out of the program, its right to
reimbursement would still exist.
"* * *
"To hold as FNS urges would allow it to receive handicap
reimbursement without contributing to the Reimbursement Fund.
This is unfair to those employers who may have elected to
remain in the program and would continue to pay into it. When
FNS chose no longer to contribute to the fund, it also chose
not to receive money from it. Therefore, the commission did
not abuse its discretion in denying reimbursement." Id. at
585-586, 639 N.E.2d at 1188-1189.
First Natl. Supermarkets is directly on point and compels
affirmance of the appellate court's holding.
Turning to Riser's remaining assertion, the parties do not
seriously disagree that one of the documents of record is the
last page of a two-page letter which contains the above-quoted
statement signed by Riser's then Vice-President Jerome
Borstein, now deceased. The parties also agree that the
letter's first page has disappeared. Riser asserts that
because the letter is incomplete, Evid. R. 106 bars the
letter's admission. This, too, fails.
Evid. R. 106 states:
"When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require him at that

time to introduce any other part or any other writing or
recorded statement which is otherwise admissible and which
ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it."
Declaring the Borstein letter admissible, the appellate
court reasoned: (1) Relevant evidence is generally admissible
under Evid. R. 402; (2) Evid. R. 106 does not automatically
render inadmissible the introduction of only a portion of a
written statement; and Evid. R. 106 was instead "intended to
spare the adverse party the necessity of waiting until a later
point in the litigation to place the supplemental writing or
recording into its proper perspective."
Riser has not persuaded us that the stated intention to
opt out of the program has somehow been misread because of the
missing first page. We find, therefore, that the letter was
properly admitted and is "some evidence" supporting the
commission's decision.
The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Moyer, C.J., Douglas, Wright, F.E. Sweeney, Pfeifer and
Cook, JJ., concur.
Resnick, J., dissents.