State ex rel. Larkins v. Baker - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

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The State ex rel. Larkins, Appellee, v. Baker, Warden, Appellant.
2
[Cite as State ex rel. Larkins v. Baker (1995), Ohio St.3d .]
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Criminal law -- Failure of trial court to comply with R.C. 2945.05 -- Habeas
4
corpus -- Writ will not lie where criminal defendant has waived right to a
5
jury trial by executing a written waiver, where waiver is handed to trial
6
judge and placed in court's file, but is not file stamped.
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(No. 95-278 -- Submitted June 21, 1995 -- Decided September 6, 1995.)
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Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Richland County, No. 94 CA 83.
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In October 1986, following a bench trial in the Cuyahoga County Court of
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Common Pleas, the trial judge found appellee, Ronald Larkins, guilty of
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aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and attempted murder. The trial court
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sentenced Larkins to life imprisonment among other things. In October 1994,
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Larkins filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals for
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Richland County, naming appellant, Dennis A. Baker, Warden of the Mansfield
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Correctional Institution, as respondent. Larkins claimed the trial court lacked
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jurisdiction to conduct his bench trial because Larkin's written waiver of his right
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to a jury trial was never filed or made a part of the case record.

1

The parties stipulated to the following pertinent facts. Prior to the start of
2
Larkins's bench trial, he executed a written waiver of his right to a jury trial in
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open court and handed the written waiver to the trial judge. Although the
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executed written waiver was physically located in the case file, it did not bear any
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file stamp by the clerk of the common pleas court indicating that it had been filed.
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The docket sheets of Larkins's criminal case did not indicate that any jury trial
7
waiver had been filed. It was the judge's normal practice to receive the executed
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jury trial waiver and place it in the case file. In October 1986, the common pleas
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court filed an entry stating that Larkins had waived, in writing, his right to trial by
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jury.
11

On January 18, 1995, the court of appeals granted Larkins a writ of habeas
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corpus. The court of appeals determined that the trial court had failed to strictly
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comply with R.C. 2945.05, since there was no evidence that the written waiver
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form was ever filed and made part of the record in Larkins's criminal case.
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The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.
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____________________
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David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, Kort Gatterdam and David
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Hanson, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellee.
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2

1

Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Charles L. Wille, Assistant
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Attorney General, for appellant.
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____________________
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PFEIFER, J. We determine today that a writ of habeas corpus will not lie
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where a criminal defendant has waived his right to a jury trial by executing a
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written waiver, where the waiver is handed to the trial judge and placed in the
7
court's case file, but is not file stamped. A writ of habeas corpus will lie in certain
8
extraordinary circumstances where there is an unlawful restraint of a person's
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liberty and there is no adequate legal remedy. State ex rel. Pirman v. Money
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(1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 591, 593, 635 N.E.2d 26, 29. A most common situation in
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which habeas corpus relief is available is when the sentencing court lacks
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jurisdiction. R.C. 2725.05.
13

The pertinent statutory provisions provide:
14

R.C. 2945.05:
15

"In all criminal cases pending in courts of record in this state, the defendant
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may waive a trial by jury and be tried by the court without a jury. Such waiver by
17
a defendant, shall be in writing, signed by the defendant, and filed in said cause
18
and made a part of the record thereof. ***" (Emphasis added.)
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1

R.C. 2945.06:
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"In any case in which a defendant waives his right to trial by jury and elects
3
to be tried by the court under section 2945.05 of the Revised Code, any judge of
4
the court in which the cause is pending shall proceed to hear, try, and determine
5
the cause in accordance with the rules and in like manner as if the cause were
6
being tried before a jury. ***" (Emphasis added.)
7

In the absence of strict compliance with R.C. 2945.05 to waive the right to a
8
jury trial, we have held that the trial court is without jurisdiction to conduct a
9
bench trial of the defendant. State ex rel. Jackson v. Dallman (1994), 70 Ohio
10
St.3d 261, 638 N.E.2d 563; State v. Tate (1979), 59 Ohio St.2d 50, 13 O.O.3d 36,
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391 N.E.2d 738, syllabus. See, also, State v. Harris (1991), 73 Ohio App.3d 57,
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596 N.E.2d 563. In Dallman, we recently held that since the record did not
13
contain any evidence that the petitioner's written waiver form was ever filed and
14
made a part of the record in the petitioner's criminal case, the common pleas court
15
did not comply with R.C. 2945.05, and the petitioner was entitled to a writ of
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habeas corpus.
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4

1

Similarly, in the case at bar, the record contains no evidence that Larkins's
2
written waiver was ever formally filed and thereby made a part of the record in his
3
criminal case. The common pleas court did not strictly comply with R.C. 2945.05.
4

However, the dispositive issue is whether this failure to strictly comply with
5
R.C. 2945.05 by failing to file stamp the written waiver and make it formally part
6
of the record deprived the court of jurisdiction to conduct the bench trial of
7
Larkins, entitling him to extraordinary relief in habeas corpus. We hold that
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extraordinary relief in the nature of habeas corpus is not warranted. The failure to
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strictly comply with R.C. 2945.05 under the circumstances here is neither a
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jurisdictional defect nor an error for which no adequate remedy at law exists.
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Larkins could have raised the error in his direct appeal. See State ex rel. Keenan
12
v. Calabrese (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 176, 631 N.E.2d 119.
13

We now reexamine Dallman and Tate under these limited facts. These cases
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held that failure to comply with R.C. 2945.05 results in the trial court lacking
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subject-matter jurisdiction to proceed to try a criminal defendant without a jury.
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Section 4(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, provides that "courts of
17
common pleas and divisions thereof shall have such original jurisdiction over all
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justiciable matters *** as may be provided by law." While R.C. 2931.03 generally
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gives courts of common pleas "original jurisdiction of all crimes and offenses,"
2
courts have held that R.C. 2945.05 and 2945.06 must be read in context and that
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they regulate not only the procedure, but also the jurisdiction of the trial court.1
4

However, a previous amendment to the statutory jury trial waiver provisions
5
evinces an intent on the part of the General Assembly to limit the jurisdictional
6
effect of a failure to strictly comply with R.C. 2945.05. G.C. 13442-5, the
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statutory predecessor to R.C. 2945.06, provided that, "[i]n any case where a
8
defendant waives his right to trial by jury and elects to be tried by the judge of
9
such court as provided in the next preceding section, any judge of the court in
10
which such cause is pending shall have jurisdiction *** and shall proceed to hear,
11
try and determine such cause in accordance with the rules, and in like manner as if
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such cause were being tried before a jury." (Emphasis added.) (115 Ohio Laws
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530, 531.) In the Code Revision of 1953, R.C. 2945.06 deleted the "shall have
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jurisdiction" language from the text of the statute. While R.C. 2945.06 retained
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G.C. 13442-5's "Jurisdiction of judge when jury trial is waived" section heading,
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the statutory title, chapter, and section headings do not constitute any part of the
17
law contained in the Revised Code. R.C. 1.01; Cosgrove v. Williamsburg of
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Cincinnati Mgt. Co. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 281, 284, 638 N.E.2d 991, 993.
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1

Of greater import is the express language of R.C. 2945.06, which conditions
2
the trial judge's authority to proceed with a bench trial in those cases that "a
3
defendant waives his right to trial by jury and elects to be tried by the court under
4
section 2945.05 of the Revised Code." Larkins fulfilled this condition to the
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common pleas court's authority to hold a bench trial, by executing a written
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waiver of his right to a jury trial and electing to be tried by the court. The failure
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to strictly comply with R.C. 2945.05 by not filing the executed written waiver was
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not the result of Larkins's failure to properly waive his right to be tried by a jury
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and elect to be tried by the court. The evidence is uncontroverted that he did so.
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Instead, the failure to comply with R.C. 2945.05 was the result of an error on the
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part of the trial court to formally file the executed written waiver.
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Based on the foregoing, the failure to strictly comply with R.C. 2945.05 by
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failing to file a properly executed written jury trial waiver under these unique
14
circumstances is not a jurisdictional defect and did not affect the trial court's
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authority to proceed with a bench trial. Dallman is partially distinguishable from
16
the instant case since the written waiver was not physically placed in the record in
17
that case, and since Dallman did not stipulate that he had waived his right to a jury
18
trial but instead disputed whether the waiver had been made. Tate addressed the
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7

1
general issue of compliance with R.C. 2945.05 only in the context of a direct
2
appeal. In addition, to the extent that they are inconsistent with our holding, we
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limit the holdings of Dallman and Tate. As Judge Gwin aptly noted in his
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concurring opinion in the court of appeals below, a contrary holding would force
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the victims of Larkins's crimes "to suffer through a new trial more than eight years
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after the matter was closed." Neither the language of the pertinent statutes nor the
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applicable case law should be tortured to achieve such an inequitable result.
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Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals granting the writ of
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habeas corpus is reversed.
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Judgment reversed.
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DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and COOK, JJ., concur.
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MOYER, C.J., and WRIGHT, J., dissent.
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___________________
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1. See
State v. Fife, (1954), 100 Ohio App. 550, 551-552, 60 O.O. 419, 420,
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137 N.E.2d 429, 431; Winters v. Alvis (1958), 106 Ohio App. 423, 7 O.O.2d 171,
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152 N.E.2d 339 (writ of habeas corpus granted when, among other deficiencies,
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R.C. 2945.05's requirement that written waiver be filed was not satisfied); see,
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also, State v. McCoy (1969), 26 Ohio App.2d 62, 64, 55 O.O.2d 86, 87, 269
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1
N.E.2d 51, 53 ("R.C. 2945.06 limits the court's jurisdiction to hear, try, and
2
determine cases without a jury to those in which the right to trial by jury has been
3
waived in harmony with R.C. 2945.05."); State v. Smith (1931), 123 Ohio St. 237,
4
240-241, 174 N.E. 768, 769-770 (jurisdiction of the trial court to hear a criminal
5
case in the event of a criminal defendant's waiver of jury trial is fixed by G.C.
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13442-4 and 13442-5, statutory predecessors to R.C. 2945.05 and 2945.06).
7

WRIGHT, J., dissenting. The majority holds that even though the trial court
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did not strictly comply with the jury trial waiver requirements set forth in R.C.
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2945.05, the nature of its failure does not rise to the level of a jurisdictional defect
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capable of being redressed in a habeas corpus proceeding. Instead, the majority
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finds that the errors that occurred in this case were only capable of review on
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direct appeal. Because I cannot sanction ignoring or undermining important
13
statutory protections that are designed to ensure that a defendant knowingly and
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intelligently waives his constitutional right to a trial by jury, I must respectfully
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dissent.
16

The majority relies on an interpretation of R.C. 2945.06 which appears to be
17
at war with its terms. The majority concludes that the failure to strictly comply
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with R.C. 2945.05 does not create a jurisdictional defect in appellee's bench trial.
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1

Section 4(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution provides the General
2
Assembly with the authority to enact laws setting forth the jurisdiction of the
3
courts of common pleas. R.C. 2945.06 provides the courts of common pleas with
4
the jurisdiction to conduct bench trials in criminal cases: a court may conduct a
5
bench trial where "a defendant waives his right to trial by jury and elects to be
6
tried by the court under section 2945.05 ***." R.C. 2945.05 provides four
7
requirements for valid waiver of a defendant's right to a jury trial: "Such waiver
8
by a defendant, shall be in writing, signed by the defendant, and filed in said cause
9
and made a part of the record thereof."
10

Even though R.C. 2945.05 explicitly sets forth four requirements for a valid
11
waiver of a defendant's right to a jury trial, the majority construes R.C. 2945.06 as
12
providing fewer and less rigorous requirements for purposes of providing a court
13
with the jurisdiction to conduct a bench trial.2 R.C. 2945.06 provides, in relevant
14
part: "In any case in which a defendant waives his right to trial by jury and elects
15
to be tried by the court under section 2945.05 of the Revised Code, any judge of
16
the court in which the cause is pending shall proceed to hear, try, and determine
17
the cause in accordance with the rules and in like manner as if the cause were
18
being tried before a jury." (Emphasis added.) The above language, which the
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1
majority interprets as providing the only requirements for a valid waiver for
2
purposes of a court's jurisdiction to conduct a bench trial, obviously refers to the
3
four requirements set forth in R.C. 2945.05. In fact, the majority's reading of R.C.
4
2945.06 as setting forth independent requirements for a valid waiver makes little
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sense because the language of R.C. 2945.06 provides no insight as to what
6
constitutes a valid waiver. Only R.C. 2945.05 provides any meaningful guidance
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as to what constitutes a valid waiver. Additionally, we have consistently held that
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statutes concerning the same subject matter must be read in pari materia. See,
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e.g., United Tel. Co. of Ohio v. Limbach (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 369, 372, 643
10
N.E.2d 1129, 1131, quoting Johnson's Markets, Inc. v. New Carlisle Dept. of
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Health (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 28, 35, 567 N.E.2d 1018, 1025. In construing
12
statutes together, we must give each a reasonable construction so as to give the
13
proper force and effect to each statute. Id. Courts that have interpreted R.C.
14
2945.05 and 2945.06 have applied this analysis and held that a court's authority to
15
conduct a bench trial depends upon the fulfillment of the four requirements for a
16
valid waiver set forth in R.C. 2945.05. See, e.g., State v. Smith (1931), 123 Ohio
17
St. 237, 174 N.E. 768 (interpreting the predecessors to R.C. 2945.05 and 2945.06);
18
State v. McCoy (1969), 26 Ohio App.2d 62, 55 O.O.2d 86, 269 N.E.2d 51; Lima v.
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1
Rambo (1960), 113 Ohio App. 158, 17 O.O.2d 133, 177 N.E.2d 554; Winters v.
2
Alvis (1958), 106 Ohio App. 423, 7 O.O.2d 171, 152 N.E.2d 339; State v. Fife
3
(1954), 100 Ohio App. 550, 60 O.O. 419, 137 N.E.2d 429. In my view, the
4
majority opinion simply provides no basis for departing from this well-reasoned
5
interpretation.
6

The majority's opinion also lacks a reasoned basis for overruling many
7
years of case law by holding that the failure to file the jury trial waiver and make it
8
part of the record does not create a jurisdictional defect. In 1979, after stressing
9
the importance of the right to a trial by jury, we held that compliance with R.C.
10
2945.05 was an absolute prerequisite to a court's exercise of jurisdiction in a
11
bench trial. State v. Tate (1979), 59 Ohio St.2d 50, 54, 13 O.O.3d 36, 38, 391
12
N.E.2d 738, 740. Less than a year ago, when faced with facts almost identical to
13
those in the case before us, we followed Tate and held that even where a written
14
waiver was executed, the failure to file the waiver and make it part of the record of
15
the case deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to try the defendant. State ex rel.
16
Jackson v. Dallman (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 261, 638 N.E.2d 563. See, also, State
17
v. Harris (1991), 73 Ohio App.3d 57, 596 N.E.2d 563. The reason for our jealous
18
protection of a defendant's right to a trial by jury is simple. The right to a trial by
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1
jury is a fundamental tenet of our justice system. United States v. Sharp (C.A.6,
2
1993), 12 F.3d 605; Scruggs v. Williams (C.A.11, 1990), 903 F.2d 1430. As a
3
result, courts should indulge every reasonable presumption against a waiver of that
4
right. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy (1937), 301 U.S. 389, 57 S.Ct. 809, 81 L.Ed.
5
1177. The requirements necessary for a valid jury trial waiver ensure that the
6
defendant acts knowingly and intelligently in waiving this fundamental right. See
7
Minnesota v. Sandmoen (Minn.App. 1986), 390 N.W.2d 419. Specifically, the
8
requirements that the waiver be filed and made part of the record ensure that the
9
waiver is actually executed and that this occurs at the proper stage in the
10
proceedings. Furthermore, "[i]t is a fundamental principle that papers pertaining
11
to the trial of a case can exist in only two ways: first, by an actual filing of the
12
paper with the clerk of the trial court, and, second, by admission into the record
13
during the course of a trial which then makes the paper an exhibit to the transcript
14
of the proceedings." Harris, supra, at 62, 596 N.E.2d at 566. Because the jury
15
trial waiver was neither filed with the clerk, nor made a part of the record in this
16
case, it does not even "exist" for purposes of determining whether the appellee
17
waived his right to a trial by jury. The majority advances no justifiable reason to
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1
support its decision to remove these two requirements from the list of those
2
necessary for a court to have jurisdiction to conduct a bench trial.
3

A final problem with the majority's opinion is that it leaves defendants,
4
lawyers, and the courts of this state with no meaningful test for determining what
5
errors with respect to jury trial waivers constitute jurisdictional defects. The
6
majority simply states that the interpretation of R.C. 2945.05 enunciated in Tate,
7
supra, and followed in Dallman, supra, does not apply under these "unique
8
circumstances." In the place of the well-reasoned standard provided in R.C.
9
2945.05, we are left with only what might be termed a "substantial compliance"
10
test for purposes of determining when a court has the jurisdiction to conduct a
11
bench trial. This was precisely the type of test that we have previously rejected, in
12
favor of a requirement of strict compliance. See Tate, supra. Additionally, the
13
majority's opinion, in essentially rewriting R.C. 2945.06 to remove the reference
14
to R.C. 2945.05, embodies the very essence of judicial legislation. The Ohio
15
Constitution provides the General Assembly with the authority to detail the
16
jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas. By enacting R.C. 2945.05, the General
17
Assembly clearly articulated the limits of that jurisdiction with respect to jury trial
18
waivers. I believe our role is to apply statutes, not rewrite them. Applying R.C.
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14

1
2945.05 and 2945.06 properly, the trial court's failure to file the waiver and make
2
it part of the record deprived the court of the jurisdiction to conduct a bench trial
3
in appellee's case.
4

MOYER, C.J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.
5

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1
FOOTNOTES
2

2. I am somewhat puzzled by the majority's conclusion that the 1953
3
amendment to the predecessor of R.C. 2945.06, which removed some
4
jurisdictional language from the statute "evinces an intent on the part of the
5
General Assembly to limit the jurisdictional effect of a failure to strictly comply
6
with R.C. 2945.05." Indeed, the language which was removed over forty years
7
ago seemed redundant, in that the clear purpose of R.C. 2945.06 is to set forth the
8
jurisdiction of a court to conduct a bench trial following a jury trial waiver. If the
9
General Assembly had acted with the intent the majority imparts to it, the
10
legislature would have either deleted the reference to R.C. 2945.05 in R.C.
11
2945.06 or, more directly, modified the requirements of R.C. 2945.05. In so far as
12
the General Assembly left the reference to R.C. 2945.05 and its requirements
13
intact, I cannot agree with the majority's interpretation that the 1953 amendment
14
shows that the General Assembly intended to limit the jurisdictional effect of a
15
failure to strictly comply with R.C. 2945.05.
16

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1 See Fife, supra, 100 Ohio App. at 551-552, 60 O.O. at 420, 137 N.E.2d at 431;
Winters, supra (writ of habeas corpus granted when, among other deficiencies,
R.C. 2945.05's requirement that written waiver be filed was not satisfied); see,
also, State v. McCoy (1969), 26 Ohio App.2d 62, 64, 55 O.O.2d 86, 87, 269
N.E.2d 51, 53 ("R.C. 2945.06 limits the court's jurisdiction to hear, try, and
determine cases without a jury to those in which the right to trial by jury has been
waived in harmony with R.C. 2945.05."); State v. Smith (1931), 123 Ohio St. 237,
240-241, 174 N.E. 768, 769-770 (jurisdiction of the trial court to hear a criminal
case in the event of a criminal defendant's waiver of jury trial is fixed by G.C.
13442-4 and 13442-5, statutory predecessors to R.C. 2945.05 and 2945.06).
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17