Keller v. LTV Steel Co. - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

	ROMINGER LEGAL
		Ohio Court Cases and Opinions - Ohio Legal Research
					Need Legal Help?
					Need Legal Help?
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER			LEGAL HEADLINES - CASE LAW - LEGAL FORMS	NOT FINDING WHAT YOU NEED? -RESEARCH

This court case was taken from the web sites of the Ohio Courts. Search our site for more cases - CLICK HERE

LEGAL RESEARCH

COURT REPORTERS

PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS

PROCESS SERVERS

DOCUMENT RETRIEVERS

EXPERT WITNESSES

Find a Private Investigator

Find an Expert Witness

Find a Process Server

Case Law - save on Lexis / WestLaw.

Legal News - Legal Headlines

Keller, Appellee, v. LTV Steel Company, Appellant.
[Cite as Keller v. LTV Steel Co. (1996), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.]
Workers' compensation -- R.C. 4123.512 -- Dismissal pursuant to
Civ.R. 41(A) -- Appellate procedure -- Judgment affirmed when
order not appealable.

(No. 95-388 -- Submitted April 16, 1996 -- Decided July 10, 1996.)

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Stark County, No. 94 CA 0275.

Brian & Brian and Steven J. Brian, for appellee.

Baughman & Associates Co., L.P.A., R. Patrick Baughman and Steven L.
Sterner, for Appellant.

Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, Robert A. Minor and Robin R. Obetz,
urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Self-Insurers Association.

COOK, J. The judgment of the court of appeals finding no appealable
order is hereby affirmed, see N. Canton v. Hutchinson (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d
112, 661 N.E.2d 1000, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings, including consideration of any pending motions.

Judgment
affirmed.

MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur.

STRATTON, J., dissents.
STRATTON, J., dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to
remand this case on the basis that there is no final appealable order. The court
bases its decision on the fact that a Civ. R. 41(A) dismissal terminates the case
and leaves no final appealable order for this court even to consider. The
majority remands this matter to the trial court to consider the motions filed on
August 29, 1994 by LTV Steel Company, so that there can be a final appealable
order.

I dissent from the court's decision to remand because Rule 41(A) was
improperly used and because the situation has a high likelihood of recurrence
without resolution. Under that posture, I would accept jurisdiction and rule on
the merits. The claimant presents himself as a "plaintiff" and asserts that he
therefore has the right to dismiss under Civ. R. 41(A). However, Civ. R. 41(A)
applies only to those who commence the action and the claimant was not the
one who commenced this action. In this case, under R.C. 4123.512, Keller is

2

simply the claimant who is required to file a petition in response to a notice of
appeal filed by the employer. To permit a claimant to unilaterally dismiss the
employer's appeal under Civ. R. 41(A) to delay or thwart the rights of an
employer who is contesting the findings of the Industrial Commission defeats
the purpose of the appeals process and is an abuse of Civ. R. 41(A).

Regretfully, the Tenth District Court of Appeals in Rhynehardt v. Sears
Logistics Services (1995), 103 App.3d 327, 659 N.E.2d 375, did not file its
order certifying a conflict to this court, leaving us to consider only Keller v.
LTV Steel Co.

Remanding this case in order to cross procedural hurdles when the rule
was improperly used in the first place only creates further delay in the appeal of
a claimant's award. I respectfully dissent from the majority and would consider
this matter on the merits.

3