State ex rel. Bradley v. Indus. Comm. - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

	ROMINGER LEGAL
		Ohio Court Cases and Opinions - Ohio Legal Research
					Need Legal Help?
					Need Legal Help?
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER			LEGAL HEADLINES - CASE LAW - LEGAL FORMS	NOT FINDING WHAT YOU NEED? -RESEARCH

This court case was taken from the web sites of the Ohio Courts. Search our site for more cases - CLICK HERE

LEGAL RESEARCH

COURT REPORTERS

PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS

PROCESS SERVERS

DOCUMENT RETRIEVERS

EXPERT WITNESSES

Find a Private Investigator

Find an Expert Witness

Find a Process Server

Case Law - save on Lexis / WestLaw.

Legal News - Legal Headlines

The State ex rel. Bradley, Appellee, v. Industrial Commission of Ohio,
Appellant, et al.
[Cite as State ex rel. Bradley v. Indus. Comm. (1997), Ohio St.3d .]
Workers' compensation -- Industrial Commission's denial of application
for temporary total disability compensation not an abuse of
discretion when there is evidence in the record to support the
commission's stated basis for its decision.

(No. 94-2680 -- Submitted November 12, 1996 -- Decided January 15,
1997.)

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 93AP-1019.

Appellee-claimant, Carolyn H. Bradley, was injured in November 1989
in the course of and arising from her employment with Kellermeyer Building
Services, Inc. Appellant, Industrial Commission of Ohio, allowed appellee's
workers' compensation claim for "twisted right knee, strain low back, tear of
lateral & medial meniscus of the right knee & patellar chondromalacia of the
right knee."

Nearly two years after being injured, appellee underwent surgery. In an
"operative report" prepared at the time of the surgery, Clark N. Hopson, M.D.,

claimant's surgeon, set forth a preoperative diagnosis of "Bone tumor, right
proximal tibia[;] Chronic right knee pain" and a postoperative diagnosis of
"Chronic right knee pain secondary to hypertrophic medial synovial plica[;]
Bone tumor right proximal tibia--pathology pending." Dr. Hopson also noted
in the operative report that a preoperative MRI taken of appellee's knee was
"suggestive of a brown cell tumor or Brodie's abscess. Because of persistent
knee pain and findings on bone scan and MRI she was brought to the operating
room for the above procedure."

Following the surgery, appellee filed with the commission a C-84
"Physician's Report Supplemental" claim for temporary total disability
compensation ("TTD") in which Dr. Hopson certified appellee as temporarily
totally disabled beginning on September 10, 1991, the date of surgery, to an
estimated return-to-work date of December 9, 1991. Dr. Hopson noted in the
claim that appellee's "present complaints and condition(s)" were
"Chondromalacia Patella (R)Knee, Hypertrophic Medial Synovial Plica, Bone
tumor (R)proximal tibia."

2

In response to appellee's claim for TTD, Dr. Chavez prepared a report
for the commission captioned "Physician Review Sheet," in which he stated
that "Based on data in the file, there is no indication that the resected tibial
tumor is related to the claim."

A district hearing officer denied appellee's claim for TTD, finding that
"claimant was disabled due to unrecognized conditions. The medical evidence
does not indicate claimant was disabled due to the recognized condition of this
claim." The order stated that the decision was based on the reports of Drs.
Hopson and Chavez.

Appellee appealed the hearing officer's decision to the Dayton Regional
Board of Review, which conducted a hearing. At the hearing, appellee
submitted a letter from Dr. Hopson that stated: "As you are aware we did
perform surgery on Carolyn Bradley for an alleged bone tumor of her proximal
tibia and chronic right knee pain. No bone tumor was documented by biopsy.
It was felt that the patient's knee pain was due to a hypertrophic medial
synovial plica or swollen lining of the knee in a localized area. This was

3

resected arthroscopically and documented by video. Therefore, the diagnosis
of tumor should be deleted. I would classify her as a chronic knee sprain
secondary to her Workman's Comp [sic] injury and secondary hypertrophic
medial synovial plica or localized synovial swelling."

The board of review affirmed the hearing officer's order, finding that
appellee had previously been allowed a claim "for twisted right knee, strain low
back, tear of lateral and medial meniscus of the right knee and patellar
chondromalacia of the right knee."

Appellee appealed the board of review's decision to the commission and
presented a second C-84 report, in which Dr. Hopson extended appellee's
return-to-work date to February 14, 1992, and stated appellee's "present
complaints and condition(s)" as "(R)Knee pain 717.7." Following a hearing,
two staff hearing officers affirmed the board of review's order, finding that the
regional board's decision was supported by proof in the record and citing
particularly the reports of Drs. Chavez and Hopson, including the operative
report.

4

Appellee filed a mandamus action in the Court of Appeals for Franklin
County, alleging that the commission had denied her TTD on the basis of "no
proper evidence." The court of appeals issued a limited writ of mandamus
ordering the commission to vacate its order denying appellee TTD and to enter
a new order, either granting or denying TTD, setting forth "not only the
evidence relied upon but also the requisite explanation of the reasoning for the
decision in full compliance with State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm. (1991), 57
Ohio St.3d 203 [567 N.E.2d 245]."

This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.
_________________

Kondritzer, Gold, Frank & Crowley Co., L.P.A., and Lane N. Cohen, for
appellee.

Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Dennis L. Hufstader,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.

5

COOK, J. The issues in this case are (1) whether the commission's order
denying appellee's claim for TTD satisfies the requirements of Noll, supra;
and (2) if the order complies with Noll, whether the commission abused its
discretion in denying appellee's claim for TTD.
In Noll, we stated in the syllabus that "[i]n any order of the Industrial
Commission granting or denying benefits to a claimant, the commission must
specifically state what evidence has been relied upon, and briefly explain the
reasoning for its decision." The order must make it apparent "from the four
corners of the decision that there is some evidence supporting it." Id., 57 Ohio
St.3d at 206, 567 N.E.2d at 248. The order must be fact-specific in order that a
meaningful review can be undertaken upon appeal. Id.

The hearing officer's order states that appellee's claim for TTD was
disallowed because appellee was "disabled due to unrecognized conditions."
Although appellee's supplemental claim for TTD stated that one of the
complaints and conditions supporting her claim was chondromalacia patella of
the right knee, an allowed condition, the claim also stated hypertrophic medial

6

synovial plica and bone tumor of the right proximal tibia, conditions that had
not been allowed in the original claim. The operative report prepared by Dr.
Hopson, and relied upon by the commission in its decision, indicated a
preoperative diagnosis of tumor and a postoperative diagnosis of "[c]hronic
right knee pain secondary to hypertrophic medial synovial plica," conditions
that were not included in appellee's original claim. Dr. Chavez's report, also
relied upon by the commission in its decision, noted that there was no
indication "that the resected tibial tumor is related to the claim." Although Dr.
Hopson's letter, prepared after surgery and submitted to the board of review,
"deleted" the diagnosis of tumor, this postoperative discovery does not remove
the suspected tumor as a reason for the surgery and does not, on this record,
prevent the commission from concluding that the surgery was performed
because of a nonallowed condition and that the surgery caused TTD.

A party challenging a commission order bears the burden of
demonstrating that the commission's determination manifests an abuse of
discretion. State ex rel. Burley v. Coil Packing, Inc. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 18,

7

20, 31 OBR 70, 72, 508 N.E.2d 936, 938. Abuse of discretion means that the
commission's decision was rendered without some evidence to support it. Id.
This court's role in reviewing a mandamus action challenging a decision of the
commission is limited to whether there is some evidence in the record to
support the commission's stated basis for its decision. Id. at the syllabus.

A claimant cannot be compensated for disability caused by conditions
unrelated to his employment injury or resulting from nonallowed medical
conditions. State ex rel. Waddle v. Indus. Comm. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 452,
454-455, 619 N.E.2d 1018, 1020. The mere presence of a nonallowed
condition in a claim for TTD does not in itself destroy the compensability of
the claim, but the claimant must meet his burden of showing that an allowed
condition independently caused the disability. The allowed condition cannot
combine with a nonallowed medical condition to produce TTD. Cf. State ex
rel. LTV Steel Co. v. Indus. Comm. (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 22, 599 N.E.2d 265.

Dr. Hopson's operative report states that surgery was performed on
appellee because of a suspected bone tumor. His postoperative diagnosis again

8

refers to the presence of a suspected bone tumor, and adds a further condition
not previously allowed by the commission, hypertrophic medial synovial plica.
Even Dr. Hopson's letter, clarifying that no bone tumor had been discovered
by biopsy following surgery, classified appellee's injury as chronic knee sprain
secondary to her workers' compensation injury, but attributed the injury only to
the specific nonallowed condition of hypertrophic medial synovial plica. The
letter did not attribute the TTD to any of the allowed conditions of appellee's
claim. Although the first C-84 claim for TTD includes one of the allowed
conditions along with the nonallowed conditions, nothing in that claim or in the
other evidence presented to the commission demonstrated that the allowed
condition independently caused appellee's TTD.

Under the facts of this case, the hearing examiner's report was
sufficiently specific to meet the requirements of Noll. The hearing officer's
order explains that TTD was disallowed because appellee's disability resulted
from "unrecognized conditions." The reports of Drs. Chavez and Hopson
constituted some evidence to support the hearing officer's finding that appellee

9

was disabled due to unrecognized conditions. The commission did not abuse
its discretion in denying appellee's claim for TTD.

For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and
reinstate the decision of the commission denying appellee's claim for TTD.

Judgment reversed.

MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER, COOK and STRATTON, JJ., concur.

DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., dissent.

DOUGLAS, J., dissenting. I respectfully dissent. I would affirm
the judgment of the court of appeals.

RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting
opinion.

10