Medina Cty. Bar Assn. v. Grieselhuber - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

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Medina County Bar Association v. Grieselhuber.
[Cite as Medina Cty. Bar Assn. v. Grieselhuber (1997), ____Ohio
St.3d___.]
Attorneys at law -- Misconduct -- Public reprimand -- Violating
Disciplinary Rules relating to attorney advertising.

(No. 96-2783 -- Submitted February 19, 1997 -- Decided May 14,
1997.)

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances
and Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 95-52.

On June 5, 1995, relator, Medina County Bar Association, filed a
complaint against respondent, Pierre A. Grieselhuber of Strongsville, Ohio,
Attorney Registration No. 0005648, charging that respondent placed
advertisements in the 1994-1995 Medina/Brunswick GTE Yellow Pages and
the 1995-1996 Medina County Yellow Pages that violated the Disciplinary
Rules relating to attorney advertising. Respondent filed an answer denying
any violations and further asserted that the advertising was within his
constitutional rights and within the guidelines set down by the United States
Supreme Court.

As a result of a hearing on the complaint and answer, a panel of the
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme
Court ("board") on November 25, 1996, found that advertisements THAT
respondent placed in the above-mentioned publications contained the
heading "Body Injury Legal Centers" as a trade name, and concluded that
such a designation violated DR 2-102(B) (a lawyer in private practice shall
not practice under a trade name). The panel also found that respondent's
trade name suggested that he had multiple legal centers. In substance,
however, in addition to his office in Strongsville, respondent did some work
in Huron, Ohio, at the offices of a friend, knew two or three lawyers in Port
Clinton, Ohio, with whom he considered working, maintained a boat and a
condominium in Port Clinton, and was considering working with former
classmates in Florida.

The panel found that the words, "Pierre A. Grieselhuber and
Affiliates," which appeared below the trade name in the advertisements,
suggested that respondent had affiliates. In fact, he was a sole practitioner
and did not have "affiliates," although at one time attorneys had shared
space with him. The panel also found that the words in the advertisements,

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"Practice limited to representing the Injured across the Country and around
the World," were misleading because respondent did some work in other
areas of the law. While his national experience consisted in having done
some business in twenty-three other states, his international experience was
related to having some clients from foreign countries and having been
admitted pro hac vice in the British Virgin Islands. The panel concluded
that these misleading representations violated DR 2-101(A)(1) (a lawyer
shall not use any form of public communication that contains false,
fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive statements).

The panel additionally found that the words "WE GET PAID FROM OUR
RECOVERY OF MONEY DAMAGES FOR YOU" failed to inform prospective
clients about the costs and expenses of litigation and concluded that
respondent had violated DR 2-101(E)(1)(c) (contingent fees may be
communicated provided that the statement discloses that litigant could be
liable for the payment of court costs and expenses). The panel also found
that the words "We Do It Well," which appeared in the 1994-1995
advertisement, were not verifiable and concluded that their use constituted a
violation of DR 2-101(A)(4) (a lawyer shall not use any for of public

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communication that contains a claim that is not verifiable). The panel found
that respondent's violations were the result of error, not malice, and that no
one had been misled or otherwise harmed by the advertisements. Hence the
panel recommended that respondent receive a public reprimand. The board
agreed with the findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the panel.
____________________________________

Patricia A. Walker and Stephen J. Brown, for relator.

Pierre Grieselhuber, pro se.
____________________________________

Per Curiam. We recognize that advertising assists the public in the
selection of an attorney. EC 2-9. However, our Ethical Considerations,
which represent the objectives toward which every member of the
profession should strive warn that "[m]ethods of advertising that are false,
misleading or deceptive should be and are prohibited." EC 2-9. To enable
attorneys to meet these ethical objectives, our Disciplinary Rules provide
specific guidelines for the content of public communications by attorneys.
Underlying these guidelines is the standard of truthfulness.

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We accept the findings of the board and agree with its conclusions
that the advertisements of respondent contain unverifiable as well as
misleading statements. We further agree with the board that the wording in
respondent's advertisements violates specific Disciplinary Rules.

Respondent's claim that his advertisements are within the guidelines
regarding commercial speech by professionals set out by the United States
Supreme Court is inaccurate. For example, DR 2-102(B) proscribes the
practice of law under a trade name, a restriction found to be valid with
respect to professional optometrists in Friedman v. Rogers (1979), 440 U.S.
1, 99 S. Ct. 887, 59 L.Ed. 2d 100. DR 2-101(E)(1)(c) requires that
infomation regarding contingent fees be accompanied by a statement that
the litigant might be liable for costs and expenses. The Supreme Court
found such a restriction to be valid in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel (1985), 471 U.S. 626, 652-653, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2282-2283, 85
L.Ed.2d 652, 673. In short, our Disciplinary Rules do not infringe on
respondent's right of commercial speech.

We further agree with the recommendation of the board. Respondent
is hereby publicly reprimanded. Costs taxed to respondent.

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