State ex rel. Burchfield v. Printech Corp. - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

	ROMINGER LEGAL
		Ohio Court Cases and Opinions - Ohio Legal Research
					Need Legal Help?
					Need Legal Help?
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER			LEGAL HEADLINES - CASE LAW - LEGAL FORMS	NOT FINDING WHAT YOU NEED? -RESEARCH

This court case was taken from the web sites of the Ohio Courts. Search our site for more cases - CLICK HERE

LEGAL RESEARCH

COURT REPORTERS

PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS

PROCESS SERVERS

DOCUMENT RETRIEVERS

EXPERT WITNESSES

Find a Private Investigator

Find an Expert Witness

Find a Process Server

Case Law - save on Lexis / WestLaw.

Legal News - Legal Headlines

THE STATE EX REL. BURCHFIELD, APPELLANT, v. PRINTECH CORPORATION;
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO, APPELLEE.
[Cite as State ex rel. Burchfield v. Printech Corp. (1998), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.]
Workers' compensation -- Industrial Commission does not abuse its discretion
in denying a VSSR claim involving foot protection, when.
(No. 95-2505 -- Submitted June 24, 1998 -- Decided September 23, 1998.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 94APD11-1657.

Appellant-claimant, Jayne E. Burchfield, was employed as a "bindery
technician" for Printech Corporation. As part of her duties, claimant would pick
up the books, walk four to five steps, and place the books in a box that was resting
on a wooden skid. On November 8, 1989, claimant was putting the books into a
box when a co-worker inadvertently lowered the skid onto claimant's foot, causing
injury.

After claimant's workers' compensation claim was allowed by appellee,
Industrial Commission of Ohio, she sought additional compensation, claiming that
her employer had violated specific safety requirement ("VSSR") Ohio Adm.Code
4121:1-5-17(E), which reads:

"Foot protection shall be made available by the employer and shall be worn
by the employee where an employee is exposed to machinery or equipment that
represents a foot hazard or where an employee is handling material which presents
a foot hazard."

The commission denied claimant's VSSR application, writing:

"It is found the [sic] O.A.C. 4121:1-5-17(E) does not impose a clear
requirement upon this employer to provide foot protection. Operating a binding
machine in a publishing facility does not present a clear foot hazard. The claimant
testified she was unaware of any other similar foot injuries at the facility.

Additionally, per the testimony of the claimant and the accident report completed
by Robert Black, the skid should not have been raised off the floor. This was an
unforeseeable sequence of events and the employer was not on notice that a foot
hazard existed for this claimant.

"Additionally, even if foot protection were required, there is no evidence
that this injury would have been prevented or minimized had the claimant been
wearing steel-toed shoes. The claimant indicates the weight of the object dropped
onto her foot was approximately 1000 (one thousand) pounds. There is no
evidence [that] steel toed shoes would be effective against such excessive weight;
in fact, the steel toed shoes may have made the injury worse as the steel may have
severed the claimant's foot had it collapsed under such a weight.

"Therefore, claimant's IC-8 [VSSR] application is denied."

Rehearing was denied.

Claimant filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for
Franklin County, alleging that the commission abused its discretion in denying a
VSSR. The court of appeals denied the writ.

This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.
__________________

Daniel D. Connor Co., L.P.A., Daniel D. Connor and Kenneth S.
Hafenstein, for appellant.

Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Miltina A. Gavia, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
__________________

Per Curiam. A specific safety requirement must prescribe "specific and
definite requirements or standards of conduct * * * which are of a character
plainly to apprise an employer of his legal obligation towards his employees."

2

State ex rel. Trydle v. Indus. Comm. (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 257, 61 O.O.2d 488,
291 N.E.2d 748, paragraph one of the syllabus. Moreover, because a VSSR is an
employer penalty, the specific safety requirement "must be strictly construed, and
all reasonable doubts concerning the interpretation of the safety standard are to be
construed against its applicability to the employer." State ex rel. Burton v. Indus.
Comm. (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 170, 172, 545 N.E.2d 1216, 1219.

The commission found that claimant's job did not present a clear foot
hazard, rendering Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-17(E) inapplicable. Claimant "does
not dispute that, in and of itself, the operation of a binding machine does not
present a clear foot hazard." She nevertheless argues that there were other
potential foot hazards that mandated compliance with the safety requirement. This
argument is unpersuasive.

Claimant's proposed foot hazards are too nebulous. It is not that they are
not possible. To the contrary, using claimant's examples, they exist everywhere.
That claimant could drop a book on her foot or that something else conceivably
could fall on it is assuredly not the type of hazard envisioned by the
Administrative Code's authors as requiring protection. If it were, every employer
would be required to supply its employees with safety shoes should a drawer fall
from a desk or a desk chair roll over toes.
Turning
to
Trydle, we cannot envision how an employer would be plainly
apprised that the possibility of a foot injury that exists as a part of everyday life --
both at and away from work -- imposed upon it the legal obligation to provide
safety shoes. Coupled with Burton's underlying strict construction directive, we
hold that the commission did not abuse its discretion in finding that Ohio
Adm.Code 4121:1-5-17(E) was not violated.

The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.

3