State ex rel. Boggs v. Springfield Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

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THE STATE EX REL. BOGGS ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. SPRINGFIELD LOCAL SCHOOL
DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, APPELLEE.
[Cite as State ex rel. Boggs v. Springfield Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1998), ___
Ohio St.3d ___.]
Public employment -- When collective bargaining contract executed pursuant to
R.C. Chapter 4117 includes an express termination date, the agreement may
be deemed to continue by implied mutual assent after that date until either
party to the agreement acts in a manner inconsistent with inference that
parties wish to be governed by the contract.
Where a collective bargaining contract executed pursuant to R.C. Chapter 4117
includes an express termination date, the agreement may be deemed to
continue by implied mutual assent after that date only until such time as either
party to the agreement acts in a manner inconsistent with the inference that
both parties wish to be governed by the contract.
(No. 97-73 -- Submitted March 3, 1998 -- Decided June 24, 1998.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, No. 16451.

This cause is before this court for the second time. In State ex rel. Boggs v.
Springfield Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 94, 647 N.E.2d
788, we held that the court of appeals erred in dismissing the relators' complaint in
mandamus pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) by issuing summary judgment in favor of the
respondent, based on materials filed by the respondent that were extrinsic to the
complaint. This court reversed and remanded the cause for further proceedings and
resolution on the merits.

On remand the parties engaged in discovery and filed cross-motions for
summary judgment. The material facts are not in dispute.

Relators-appellants are twenty-one school bus drivers and mechanics who, at
one time, were subject to a collective bargaining agreement ("agreement") between
their employer, respondent-appellee Springfield Local School District Board of
Education ("board"), and Local 530 of the Ohio Association of Public School
Employees/AFSCME-AFL-CIO ("union"). The agreement became effective on
September 1, 1990, and, according to its terms, was to "remain in full force and
effect until 11:59 p.m., August 31, 1993." Section 12.1(C), Article XII of the
agreement, dealing with employee rights and obligations, provided that
"[p]rovisions of this article supersede [R.C. 3319.081]."

Early in 1993, the board notified the union that it was considering
subcontracting its transportation services to a private company, Settle Service, Inc.,
a division of Laidlaw Transit, Inc. ("Settle"). As the board and the union
commenced negotiations for a new collective bargaining contract on May 3, 1993,
the union was strongly opposed to the school administration's proposal to privatize
school bus services.

On August 30, 1993, the union gave notice to the board, pursuant to R.C.
4117.14, of its intent to commence a strike on September 14, 1993 by bus drivers
and mechanics. No new agreement was reached by August 31, the stated expiration
date of the existing agreement. Nor did either side expressly ask the other for an
extension of the expiration date of the agreement.

On September 13, 1993, the board adopted a resolution that authorized the
superintendent of the school district to enter into a transportation contract with
Settle and stated that "[a]ll classifications * * * of bus driver and mechanic shall be
abolished on the date the contract provided for in Section 1 of this resolution
becomes effective." The authorization was contingent upon the school

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administration either (1) reaching agreement with the union on a new agreement or
(2) meeting all obligations of R.C. Chapter 4117 and other legal requirements.

On Tuesday, September 14, the union implemented the strike described in its
prior notice.

On Friday, September 17, sixteen of the relators and two other employees
terminated their strike and delivered to the school superintendent a signed statement
that they "wish[ed] to have [their] continuing contracts and other contracts honored
by the School board and furthermore [wished] to go back to work as school bus
drivers of the Springfield Local Board of Education."

On the same date the same sixteen relators, and six other employees, initiated
this action in mandamus. In their complaint, the relators alleged that seventeen of
them "[held] continuing contracts of employment pursuant to R.C. § 3319.081." 1
They further alleged that the remaining five were "not yet continuing contract
employees pursuant to R.C. § 3319.081, but, nevertheless, [had] a contract of
employment for the school year 1993-1994 with Respondent." They sought a writ
of mandamus to compel the board, inter alia, to reinstate them and recognize their
"continuing contracts and written contracts * * * authorized by R.C. § 3119.081."

Thereafter, the drivers and mechanics went back to work driving buses and
performing their other regular duties.

On September 23, 1993, the board notified the president of the union of its
intent to lay off all employees in the positions of bus driver and mechanic at the
close of business on October 8, 1993, apparently based on its plan to proceed with
privatization of school bus transportation services. The prior agreement at Section
12.2(A), Article XII, required that the union president "be notified two (2) weeks in
advance of any anticipated layoff."

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On October 1, 1993, the board issued what it termed its "Final Offer," setting
forth proposed guaranteed wages and benefits the school employees would receive
under a privatized school transportation system. It notified the union that, absent its
agreement to those terms, it would view the situation as one of "ultimate impasse,"
and would unilaterally implement the terms of the final offer at the close of business
on October 8, 1993. The union rejected the offer on October 8, and demanded, in
writing, that the board honor the union members' "existing and continuing contracts
under O.R.C. 3319.081."

On October 11, 1993, the board executed a contract with Settle pursuant to
which Settle agreed to "provide drivers for the buses used in providing"
transportation for the school district. Settle agreed to "offer all Existing Drivers
employment" and to recognize their accumulated seniority and benefits. "Existing
Drivers" were defined as "those drivers who were employed by the District as of
September 1, 1993 and subsequently accept employment with the Company."

On the same date the board deemed all of its positions of bus driver and
mechanic to be abolished, consistent with its previous resolution. Thereafter, it
appears an unknown number of the relators continued to drive school buses, but
reported to Settle supervisors, and were deemed by the board and Settle to be
employees of Settle.

Based on these facts, the court of appeals granted summary judgment in favor
of respondent, and again denied the relators the writ of mandamus they sought.

The cause is now before us upon an appeal as of right.
__________________

Buckley King & Bluso and James E. Melle, for appellants.

Johnson, Balazs & Angelo and Michael J. Angelo, for appellee.
__________________

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MOYER, C.J. We conclude that the relators are entitled to a writ of
mandamus and therefore reverse the court of appeals.

The board contends that the agreement was in effect until the point of
"ultimate impasse" in renegotiations, and that the agreement authorized the layoffs
of the relators. The relators contend that the agreement was not in effect, having
expired prior to their return to work on or after September 17, 1993. Thus, we must
initially determine whether the provisions of the agreement governed the legal rights
and responsibilities of the board and the relators during the relevant events
underlying this dispute, as asserted by the board, or whether to apply the law set
forth in R.C. 3319.081, as argued by the relators.

The board argues that, by declaring ultimate impasse on October 1, 1993, it
manifested its intent to no longer be bound by the terms of the expired collective
bargaining agreement. In State ex rel. Rootstown Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v.
Portage Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 489, 493, 678 N.E.2d
1365, 1368, we rejected an argument similar to that made by the board in this case.
The contention rejected was that a new agreement governed by R.C. Chapter 4117
resulted when an employer unilaterally implemented its final offer upon an ultimate
impasse in renegotiations after an express termination date of a prior collective
bargaining agreement. Rootstown did not, however, deal with the continued
viability of a prior collective bargaining agreement subsequent to an express
expiration date set forth in that agreement.

We hold that where a collective bargaining agreement reached pursuant to
R.C. Chapter 4117 includes an express termination date, the agreement may be
deemed to continue by implied mutual assent after that date only until such time as
either party to the agreement acts in a manner inconsistent with the inference that
both parties wish to be governed by it.

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The record reveals that the agreement at issue in the case at bar was no longer
in effect on or after September 17, 1993 when the relators returned to work. By that
time the relators had already indicated their intent not to be bound by the terms of
the expired agreement by returning to work after expressing their desire to be
governed by statutory law rather than the expired agreement, and by filing this
action in mandamus asserting that they were entitled to the protection offered by
R.C. 3319.081.

Thus, when the relators returned to work, no agreement existed to supersede
the statutory rights imposed by the Revised Code,2 and the employment relationship
between the relators and the board was therefore governed by the Revised Code.
Accordingly, we must determine the mutual rights and responsibilities of the parties
according to the provisions of the Revised Code, rather than according to the
expired agreement. More particularly, we must determine the extent of protection
provided by R.C. 3319.081 to relators, nonteaching school employees of a local
school district.

Pursuant to R.C. 3319.081, local district school boards are required to enter
into written employment contracts for a period of not more than one year with newly
hired, regular nonteaching school employees. If those employees are then
reemployed, the school board is required to enter into a written two-year contract
with the employee. After three years of full-time employment, a nonteaching school
employee is deemed to be employed pursuant to a continuing contract.

R.C. 3319.081 gives statutory job security to nonteaching local school district
employees, in that it provides for termination of employment contracts only for the
express enumerated reasons set forth in R.C. 3319.081(C), or for "any other acts of
misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance."

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Despite the clarity of the language of R.C. 3319.081, the board argues that it
nevertheless had the authority to abolish relators' positions and to lay off the
relators. The statute does not, however, authorize layoffs, nor has the board cited to
us any other statutory provision authorizing layoffs of nonteaching local school
district employees for economic reasons. The General Assembly has expressly
provided authority for such layoffs in R.C. 124.321, 3319.02(C), and 3319.17,
which authorize reductions in force based on economic considerations, even where
those reductions result in layoffs or suspension of contracts of state civil servants,
school district administrators, and teachers, respectively. See, also, Ferdinand v.
Hamilton Local Bd. of Edn. (1984), 17 Ohio App.3d 165, 17 OBR 296, 478 N.E.2d
835, paragraph one of the syllabus ("There is no statutory provision for job
abolishments or layoff of non-teaching personnel of a local school district."). We
should not and, therefore, do not, judicially graft an exception to the express
language of the statute.

The relators have a clear legal right to recognition of their rights to continued
employment pursuant to R.C. 3319.081. The judgment of the court of appeals is
reversed, and the cause is remanded for application of this decision to each of the
relators, including award of back pay to be calculated in accord with established
principles. See, e.g., Monaghan v. Richley (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 190, 61 O.O.2d
425, 291 N.E.2d 462; State ex rel. Hamlin v. Collins (1984), 9 Ohio St.3d 117, 118,
9 OBR 342, 343, 459 N.E.2d 520, 522.
Judgment reversed
and cause remanded.

DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, DESHLER and LUNDBERG
STRATTON, JJ., concur.

DANA A. DESHLER, JR., J., of the Tenth Appellate District, sitting for COOK, J.

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FOOTNOTES:
1.
R.C. 3319.081 provides:

"Except as otherwise provided * * *, in all school districts wherein the
provisions of Chapter 124. of the Revised Code do not apply, the following
employment contract system shall control for employees whose contracts of
employment are not otherwise provided by law:

"(A) Newly hired regular nonteaching school employees, including regular
hourly rate and per diem employees, shall enter into written contracts for their
employment which shall be for a period of not more than one year. If such
employees are rehired, their subsequent contract shall be for a period of two years.

"(B) After the termination of the two-year contract provided in division (A) of
this section, if the contract of a nonteaching employee is renewed, the employee
shall be continued in employment, and the salary provided in the contract may be
increased but not reduced unless such reduction is a part of a uniform plan affecting
the nonteaching employees of the entire district.

"(C) The contracts as provided for in this section may be terminated by a
majority vote of the board of education. Such contracts may be terminated only for
violation of written rules and regulations as set forth by the board of education or for
incompetency, inefficiency, dishonesty, drunkenness, immoral conduct,
insubordination, discourteous treatment of the public, neglect of duty, or any other
acts of misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance. In addition to the right of the
board of education to terminate the contract of an employee, the board may suspend
an employee for a definite period of time or demote the employee for the reasons set
forth in this division. The action of the board of education terminating the contract
of an employee or suspending or demoting him shall be served upon the employee
by certified mail. Within ten days following the receipt of such notice by the

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employee, the employee may file an appeal, in writing, with the court of common
pleas of the county in which such school board is situated. After hearing the appeal
the common pleas court may affirm, disaffirm, or modify the action of the school
board.

"* * *

"(D) All employees who have been employed by a school district where the
provisions of Chapter 124. of the Revised Code do not apply, for a period of at least
three years on November 24, 1967, shall hold continuing contracts of employment
pursuant to this section."
2.
R.C. 4117.10 provides:

"(A) An agreement between a public employer and an exclusive
representative entered into pursuant to this chapter governs the wages, hours, and
terms and conditions of public employment covered by the agreement. * * * Where
no agreement exists or where an agreement makes no specification about a matter,
the public employer and public employees are subject to all applicable state or local
laws or ordinances pertaining to the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of
employment for public employees."

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