State ex rel. Jackson v. Miller - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

	ROMINGER LEGAL
		Ohio Court Cases and Opinions - Ohio Legal Research
					Need Legal Help?
					Need Legal Help?
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER			LEGAL HEADLINES - CASE LAW - LEGAL FORMS	NOT FINDING WHAT YOU NEED? -RESEARCH

This court case was taken from the web sites of the Ohio Courts. Search our site for more cases - CLICK HERE

LEGAL RESEARCH

COURT REPORTERS

PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS

PROCESS SERVERS

DOCUMENT RETRIEVERS

EXPERT WITNESSES

Find a Private Investigator

Find an Expert Witness

Find a Process Server

Case Law - save on Lexis / WestLaw.

Legal News - Legal Headlines

THE STATE EX REL. JACKSON, APPELLANT, v. MILLER, JUDGE, APPELLEE.
[Cite as State ex rel. Jackson v. Miller (1998), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.]
Prohibition -- Writ prohibiting judge from executing a final entry reflecting her
decision in a boundary dispute action denied, when.
(No. 98-700 -- Submitted September 15, 1998 -- Decided November 10, 1998.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 97APD11-1534.

After appellee, Franklin County Court of Common Pleas Judge Nodine
Miller, entered partial summary judgment in Jackson v. Bellomy, case No.
93CVH08-5931, she convened a hearing to consider sanctions under Civ.R. 11
and R.C. 2323.51. At the May 1997 hearing, the parties stated that they had
reached a settlement resolving all matters involved in the dispute. The agreement
was read into the record, including a statement "[t]hat the property line shall
extend from the northeast corner of the Bellomys' garage parallel to the north edge
of the garage and out to Linwood Avenue."

When the parties attempted to reduce the agreement to writing in the form
of a journal entry, a dispute arose concerning the actual location of the reformed
boundary between Jackson and the Bellomys. Jackson and the Bellomys filed
separate motions to enforce the settlement agreement, in which motions they
presented different interpretations of the agreement as to the location of the
boundary line.

Judge Miller held a hearing on this disputed aspect of the parties' settlement
agreement, and in November 1997, she issued a decision. Judge Miller found that
the parties had agreed to a binding settlement, that the agreement's provision
regarding the boundary line was "not vague, indefinite or uncertain," and that the
only uncertainty was the actual location of the boundary line on the ground. Judge
Miller concluded that based on the parties' settlement agreement and evidence at

the hearing, an existing fence between Jackson's property and the Bellomys'
property provided the boundary line.

Jackson then filed a complaint in the court of appeals for a writ of
prohibition to prevent Judge Miller from executing a final entry reflecting her
decision. In December 1997, Judge Miller entered a judgment incorporating her
previous decision. The court of appeals subsequently granted Judge Miller's
motion for summary judgment and denied the writ.

This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right.
__________________

Michael P. Jackson, for appellant.

Ron O'Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Zahid H. Siddiqi,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
__________________

Per Curiam. Jackson asserts in her sole proposition of law that the court of
appeals erred in denying her writ of prohibition.

Absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a writ of prohibition
will not issue because a court having general subject-matter jurisdiction can
determine its own jurisdiction, and a party challenging the court's jurisdiction has
an adequate remedy by appeal. State ex rel. Stern v. Mascio (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d
297, 298, 691 N.E.2d 253, 255. If, however, an inferior court patently and
unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the cause, prohibition will lie to prevent the
future unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the results of previous
jurisdictionally unauthorized actions. State ex rel. Rogers v. McGee Brown
(1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 408, 410, 686 N.E.2d 1126, 1127.

2

Jackson claims that the court of appeals should have granted the writ of
prohibition because Judge Miller patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction
to enter a judgment that contradicted the parties' settlement agreement.

Jackson's claim lacks merit because Judge Miller did not patently and
unambiguously lack jurisdiction. Judge Miller possessed jurisdiction to rule on
the parties' motions to enforce the settlement agreement. See, e.g., Continental W.
Condominium Unit Owners Assn. v. Howard E. Ferguson, Inc. (1996), 74 Ohio
St.3d 501, 660 N.E.2d 431; Spercel v. Sterling Industries, Inc. (1972), 31 Ohio
St.2d 36, 60 O.O.2d 20, 285 N.E.2d 324. In fact, "[w]here the meaning of terms of
a settlement agreement is disputed, * * * a trial court must conduct an evidentiary
hearing prior to entering judgment." Rulli v. Fan Co. (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 374,
683 N.E.2d 337, syllabus.

Since Judge Miller had jurisdiction to resolve the dispute between the
parties concerning their oral settlement agreement, "the fact that she may have
exercised that jurisdiction erroneously does not give rise to extraordinary relief by
prohibition." State ex rel. Enyart v. O'Neill (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 655, 656, 646
N.E.2d 1110, 1112. It is well settled that appeal, not prohibition, is the remedy for
the correction of errors or irregularities in the proceedings of a court having proper
jurisdiction. Id.; State ex rel. Levin v. Sheffield Lake (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 104,
109, 637 N.E.2d 319, 324.

If we were to adopt Jackson's argument, every potentially erroneous trial
court construction of a contract would be subject to review by extraordinary writ
rather than by appeal following final judgment. This is not the law. Cf. State ex
rel. Longacre v. Penton Publishing Co. (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 266, 268, 673
N.E.2d 1297, 1298, where we affirmed the dismissal of a mandamus action partly
on the basis that relator had an adequate legal remedy by a civil action for her

3

claimed breach of a settlement agreement. See, also, State ex rel. Russell v.
Duncan (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 538, 597 N.E.2d 142. Significantly, all of the cases
cited by Jackson to support her "jurisdictional" claim were resolved by appeal
rather than extraordinary writ. See, e.g., Spercel.

Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals properly denied the writ.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Judgment affirmed.

MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.

4