State ex rel. Childs v. Wingard - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

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THE STATE EX REL. CHILDS, APPELLANT, v. WINGARD, WARDEN, APPELLEE.
[Cite as State ex rel. Childs v. Wingard (1998), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.]
Criminal law -- Extradition and subsequent proceedings do not divest common
pleas court of jurisdiction, when -- R.C. 2963.26, applied.
(No. 98-509 -- Submitted September 16, 1998 -- Decided October 14, 1998.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Madison County, No. CA97-12-061.

In February 1995, a Summit County Grand Jury returned a secret indictment
charging appellant, Tawan R. Childs, with murder and an accompanying firearm
specification. Childs was extradited from Michigan to Ohio to be tried on the
charges. The Summit County Court of Common Pleas dismissed the charges
without prejudice when it discovered that Childs was a juvenile at the time the
murder was committed.

In June 1995, an Akron police officer filed a complaint in the Summit
County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, charging Childs with
delinquency because he had committed aggravated murder. The juvenile court
found probable cause that Childs had committed aggravated murder and bound
him over to the general division of the common pleas court for trial as an adult.
Childs was subsequently charged, tried, and convicted of murder and a firearm
specification. The common pleas court sentenced him to fifteen years to life for
the murder conviction, to be served consecutively to a three-year term of actual
incarceration for the firearm specification conviction. The judgment was affirmed
on appeal. State v. Childs (Sept. 18, 1996), Summit App. No. 17653, unreported,
1996 WL 525631, appeal dismissed (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 1519, 674 N.E.2d 372.

In 1997, Childs filed a petition in the Court of Appeals for Madison County
for a writ of habeas corpus to compel his release from prison. The court of appeals

granted the motion of appellee, Madison Correctional Institution Warden Curtis
Wingard, and dismissed the petition.

This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right.
__________________

Tawan R. Childs, pro se.

Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Karen L. Killian, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
__________________

Per Curiam. Childs asserts in his propositions of law that the court of
appeals erred by dismissing his petition. Childs claims that his conviction is void
because like the petitioner in Ex parte McKnight (1891), 48 Ohio St. 588, 28 N.E.
1034, he was charged in juvenile court with a different crime, i.e., aggravated
murder, than the one upon which his extradition was obtained, i.e., murder. Childs
argues that due to this defect, his bindover was also defective. For the following
reasons, however, Childs's claims are meritless.
First,
McKnight is inapposite. In McKnight, the petitioner was extradited
from New York to Ohio to be tried on a forgery charge, but he was subsequently
tried and convicted of obtaining property by false pretenses. We granted a writ of
habeas corpus and held at paragraph one of the syllabus that "[a] person
surrendered to the authorities of this state by another state or territory on
extradition proceedings cannot, while held in custody thereunder, be lawfully tried
for a different crime than the one upon which his extradition was obtained, unless
he voluntarily waives his privilege." Unlike the petitioner in McKnight, Childs
was ultimately tried for the same crimes for which he was extradited, i.e., murder
and a firearm specification.

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Second,
McKnight preceded the enactment by the General Assembly of the
predecessor to R.C. 2963.26. See G.C. 109-28. R.C. 2963.26 provides that "[a]
person returned to this state by, or after waiver of, extradition proceedings, may be
tried in this state for other crimes which he may be charged with having committed
here, as well as that specified in the requisition for his extradition." Based on R.C.
2963.26, the extradition and subsequent proceedings did not divest the common
pleas court of jurisdiction. See State v. Moore (Nov. 3, 1993), Hamilton App. No.
C-920927, unreported, 1993 WL 512868, where the court held that extraditing a
defendant for a crime charged that was different from the ones for which he was
eventually tried did not divest his trial court of jurisdiction.

Finally, the juvenile court bindover entry attached to Childs's habeas corpus
petition established full compliance with the bindover procedure. See Gaskins v.
Shiplevy (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 380, 382, 667 N.E.2d 1194, 1196.

Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals properly dismissed the petition.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Judgment affirmed.

MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.

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