Elkem Metals Co., L.P. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

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ELKEM METALS COMPANY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, APPELLEE, v. WASHINGTON
COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL.; WARREN LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF
EDUCATION, APPELLANT.
[Cite as Elkem Metals Co., L.P. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision (1998), ___
Ohio St.3d ___.]
Taxation -- Real property valuation -- Complaint dismissed, when -- "Filing"
for purposes of the prohibition of R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) against a second
filing in the same interim period, construed and applied.
(No. 97-1088 -- Submitted January 27, 1998 -- Decided May 13, 1998.)
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 95-T-719.

On February 24, 1995, Elkem Metals Company, Limited Partnership
("Elkem"), appellee, filed a real property valuation complaint for tax year 1994
with the Washington County Board of Revision ("BOR"). In response, the Board
of Education of Warren Local School District ("BOE"), appellant, filed a counter-
complaint, which it later amended. On March 30, 1995, Elkem filed an amended
complaint and a counter-complaint.

The BOE filed a motion with the BOR to dismiss Elkem's complaint,
claiming that Elkem lacked standing to file. The BOE alleged that Elkem had
filed a prior complaint in the same interim period and the 1994 complaint had not
alleged any of the circumstances specified in R.C. 5715.19(A)(2)(a) through (d).

For tax year 1993, Elkem had filed a real property valuation complaint and
was granted some reduction in valuation by the BOR. Elkem filed an appeal with
the Washington County Common Pleas Court, seeking additional reduction (case
No. 94-AA-233). The BOE filed a motion to dismiss with the common pleas
court, alleging that Elkem's complaint had failed to state the amount of decrease it
was seeking or any basis for claiming a reduction. The common pleas court

sustained the BOE's motion and dismissed the appeal and the 1993 complaint for
lack of "subject matter jurisdiction to consider the merits of this case." No further
appeal was taken.

As to the 1994 complaint, after a hearing the BOR sustained the BOE's
motion and dismissed Elkem's 1994 complaint because "a complaint was filed for
a prior tax year within the same interim period." At the same time, the BOR also
dismissed the BOE's counter-complaint.

Elkem appealed to the BTA, where Elkem argued that the 1993 complaint
was not an effective complaint and, therefore, could not be considered a "filing"
for purposes of R.C. 5715.19(A)(2). The BTA agreed and reversed the BOR,
finding that the 1993 complaint was void ab initio "because it failed to comport
with the statutory requirements that are necessary for the filing of a proper
complaint." Thus, the BTA concluded that Elkem had standing to file the 1994
complaint.

The BOE filed a notice of appeal with this court. The Washington County
Auditor, joined by the BOR, filed a separate notice of appeal with this court. The
appeal of the Washington County Auditor and the BOR was dismissed for want of
prosecution.

This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right.
__________________

Theisen, Brock, Frye, Erb & Leeper Co., L.P.A., and James S. Huggins, for
appellee.

Bricker & Eckler LLP, Charles F. Glander and Mary W. Leslie, for
appellant.
__________________

Per Curiam. R.C. 5715.19(A)(2), provides:

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"No person, board, or officer shall file a complaint against the valuation or
assessment of any parcel that appears on the tax list if it filed a complaint against
the valuation or assessment of that parcel for any prior tax year in the same interim
period, unless the person, board, or officer alleges that the valuation or assessment
should be changed due to one or more of the following circumstances * * *:

"(a) The property was sold in an arm's length transaction as described in
section 5713.03 of the Revised Code;

"(b) The property lost value due to some casualty;

"(c) Substantial improvement was added to the property;

"(d) An increase or decrease of at least fifteen per cent in the property's
occupancy has had a substantial economic impact on the property."

None of the circumstances set forth in R.C. 5715.19(A)(2)(a) through (d)
was alleged in the complaint filed by Elkem for tax year 1994. Moreover, tax
years 1993 and 1994 were in the same interim period within the meaning of R.C.
5715.19(A)(2), and the 1993 and 1994 complaints concerned the same property.

The BOE contends that the complaint filed by Elkem for tax year 1993
constitutes a complaint filed within the same interim period, despite being
dismissed, and, therefore, the complaint filed for tax year 1994 is prohibited by
R.C. 5715.19(A)(2).

Elkem, on the other hand, contends that a dismissed property valuation
complaint does not constitute a "filing" for the purposes of the prohibition of R.C.
5715.19(A)(2) against a second filing in the same interim period.
In
Gammarino v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 388,
643 N.E.2d 1143, a real property valuation complaint for tax year 1990 was
dismissed for lack of standing. Tax year 1990 was the first year of the interim
period. Gammarino filed another complaint for tax year 1991 and it was dismissed

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by the board of revision for lack of prosecution. Gammarino appealed the
dismissal of the 1991 complaint to the BTA, where the county auditor moved to
dismiss it under R.C. 5715.19(A)(2). Gammarino's 1991 complaint did not allege
any of the special circumstances enumerated in R.C. 5715.19(A)(2)(a) through (d).
The BTA denied the auditor's motion, finding the board of revision lacked the
authority to dismiss the complaint.

On appeal, we reversed the BTA's decision. We stated that "R.C.
5715.19(A)(2) clearly provides that only one complaint can be filed during each
interim period absent any showing of a change in circumstances as described in
R.C. 5715.19(A)(2)(a) through (d)." Id. at 389, 643 N.E.2d at 1144.

In the current matter, the BTA held that the 1993 complaint filed by Elkem
was void ab initio, a nullity, thereby finding that there was no filing for tax year
1993. We disagree and reverse.
In
Seventh Urban, Inc. v. Univ. Circle Prop. Dev., Inc. (1981), 67 Ohio
St.2d 19, 22, 21 O.O.3d 12, 14, 423 N.E.2d 1070, 1073, we stated that jurisdiction
is the authority to hear and determine a cause. See, also, Sheldon's Lessee v.
Newton (1854), 3 Ohio St. 494; State v. King (1957), 166 Ohio St. 293, 2 O.O.2d
200, 142 N.E.2d 222. The jurisdiction for boards of revision is set forth in R.C.
5715.01 and 5715.11. R.C. 5715.01 provides, "There shall also be a board in each
county, known as the county board of revision, which shall hear complaints and
revise assessments of real property for taxation." R.C. 5715.11 provides, "The
county board of revision shall hear complaints relating to the valuation or
assessment of real property * * *. The board shall investigate all such complaints
and may increase or decrease any such valuation * * *."

A review of the applicable statutes set forth above shows that a board of
revision has been given jurisdiction to hear and rule on complaints submitted to it.

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As part of its jurisdiction to hear and rule on complaints, a board of revision must
undertake a two-step analysis. First, the board of revision must examine the
complaint to determine whether it meets the jurisdictional requirements set forth
by the statutes. Second, if the complaint meets the jurisdictional requirements,
then the board of revision is empowered to proceed to consider the evidence and
determine the true value of the property.

The statutory requirements for filing and filling out a complaint are
contained in R.C. 5715.13 and 5715.19. In Stanjim Co. v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of
Revision (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 233, 235, 67 O.O.2d 296, 298, 313 N.E.2d 14, 16,
we stated that "full compliance with R.C. 5715.19 and 5715.13 is necessary before
a county board of revision is empowered to act on the merits of a claim." Thus,
only after a board of revision determines that the complaint meets the
jurisdictional requirements can it proceed to the second step to determine the case
on the merits. If the complaint does not meet the jurisdictional requirements, then
the board of revision must dismiss it because the complaint has not invoked the
board's power to proceed to a consideration of the merits.

Elkem's 1993 complaint was determined by the common pleas court not to
be filled out properly and, therefore, the BOR was not empowered to proceed to
determine the merits of the case. The fact that the BOR was not empowered by
Elkem's 1993 complaint to proceed to the second step to decide the merits does
not mean that it did not have jurisdiction to determine whether the complaint met
the jurisdictional requirements.
In
Sheldon's Lessee this court stated, "If the court had jurisdiction of the
subject matter, and the parties, it is altogether immaterial how grossly irregular, or
manifestly erroneous, its proceedings may have been; its final order cannot be
regarded as a nullity, and cannot therefore, be collaterally impeached." Id. at 498.

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The BTA's decision in this matter has the effect of declaring all the proceedings,
as regards the 1993 complaint, void and a nullity. The BTA's decision is
erroneous because the BOR had jurisdiction to determine whether the 1993
complaint met the jurisdictional requirements. The filing of a complaint with a
board of revision invokes its jurisdiction to rule whether the complaint meets the
jurisdictional requirements. A board of revision's decision as to whether a
complaint meets the jurisdictional requirements, while voidable, is not void and
likewise the complaint is not void ab initio.

Turning now to a consideration of Elkem's 1994 complaint, we conclude
that our decision here must turn upon the meaning of the word "filed" as used in
R.C. 5715.19(A)(2).
In Fulton v. State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. (1936), 130 Ohio St. 494, 5
O.O. 142, 200 N.E. 636, we considered a statute that required preference claims to
be filed within a certain period of time. In determining what the word "filed"
meant, we cited at 497-498, 5 O.O. at 144, 200 N.E. at 637, definitions for the
words "file" and "filed" from several different sources, all of which could be
summed up by the quotation quoted from United States v. Lombardo (1916), 241
U.S. 73, 76, 36 S.Ct. 508, 509, 60 L.Ed. 897, 898, that " `[a] paper is filed when it
is delivered to the proper official and by him received and filed.' " Thus, when
Elkem delivered its complaint for tax year 1993 to the BOR, it "filed" a complaint.

In commenting on an exception to the four-year statute of limitations for
making sales tax assessments, applicable when a vendor fails to file a return, we
stated in Petrarca v. Peck (1953), 159 Ohio St. 377, 379, 50 O.O. 333, 334, 112
N.E.2d 378, 379, that the phrase "failure `to file a return,' means failure to file any
return, not an accurate or perfect return." (Emphasis in original.) Likewise, in this

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case we believe that the relevant factor is the fact that a prior complaint was filed,
not whether the prior complaint was accurate or perfect.

While our reading of R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) makes the filing of a complaint
with a board of revision the relevant factor for determining whether a complaint
has been "filed," Elkem argues that we should ignore its first filing because it was
dismissed for jurisdictional reasons, and therefore was a nullity. We do not find
any wording in R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) or in any of the circumstances set forth in
subparagraphs (a) through (d) wherein a second complaint is permitted to be filed
in the same interim period if the first complaint was dismissed for jurisdictional
reasons.

Elkem finally argues that by dismissing the second complaint, it is being
denied a determination on the merits. Specifically, Elkem states that the purpose
of R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) is to provide at least one merit hearing in a triennium. We
cannot accept such an interpretation. We find nothing in R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) that
would support Elkem's interpretation. We cannot ignore the statute as written.
Slingluff v. Weaver (1902), 66 Ohio St. 621, 631-632, 64 N.E. 574, 577.

Accordingly, we hold that the decision of the BTA allowing Elkem to file
its 1994 complaint was unreasonable and unlawful, and it is reversed.
Decision reversed.

MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.

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