Lakewood v. Hartman - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

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[Cite as Lakewood v. Hartman, 86 Ohio St.3d 275, 1999-Ohio-101.]

CITY OF LAKEWOOD, APPELLANT, v. HARTMAN, APPELLEE.
[Cite as Lakewood v. Hartman (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 275.]
Criminal law -- Probation -- Trial court vested with discretion in determining
proper conditions of probation -- Trial court did not abuse its discretion in
restricting defendant's driving privileges and ordering an ignition interlock
device installed in defendant's automobile as a condition of probation,
when.
(No. 98-1368 -- Submitted May 18, 1999 -- Decided September 1, 1999.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 72622.

At 1:12 a.m. on April 5, 1997, Lakewood Police Officer Allen Beno was
eastbound on Madison Avenue on routine patrol when he was temporarily blinded
by the "high beams" of a westbound white Chevrolet Camaro. Officer Beno
stopped the vehicle and approached the driver of the vehicle, identified as appellee,
Rhonda Hartman ("Hartman").

Officer Beno advised Hartman of the reason for the stop, at which point,
Hartman informed Officer Beno that her license was under suspension. However,
Hartman also advised Officer Beno that she had driving privileges, allowing her to
drive for the purpose of grocery shopping. Upon being advised of the status of
Hartman's license, Officer Beno asked Hartman where her groceries were.
Hartman responded that she had only purchased a "pop."

Officer Beno then checked the status of Hartman's license through a
"LEADS" search. This search indicated that Hartman's license was under a
Financial Responsibility Act suspension. In addition, the search indicated that
Hartman's license was under suspension pursuant to a conviction for driving under
the influence of alcohol ("DUI"). Noting that Hartman did not appear to be driving
due to any emergency, Officer Beno cited Hartman for driving under suspension

("DUS") and caused her automobile to be towed to an impound lot.

When Hartman appeared in the Lakewood Municipal Court for a pretrial
hearing on the DUS charge, the city prosecutor moved to amend the charge to
driving without a valid operator's license ("DWOL"). The record indicates that
Hartman was given the amended charge because she represented that she believed
she was driving in compliance with an earlier order issued by the Oberlin
Municipal Court. The Oberlin Municipal Court had found Hartman guilty of DUI,
but granted her conditional driving privileges for occupational, grocery, medical,
and day care purposes, and to attend AA meetings.

After determining that the plea was voluntarily and knowingly made, the
court accepted Hartman's plea of no contest to the amended charge of DWOL in
violation of Lakewood Codified Ordinances 335.01. This charge is a first degree
misdemeanor with a maximum penalty of a $1,000 fine and up to six months in
jail.

Prior to sentencing, the trial court reviewed Hartman's driving record. The
record indicated that Hartman had been convicted of DUI four times in a four-year
period. It also indicated that Hartman had been convicted of driving under
suspension on eight occasions since 1993.

In light of Hartman's driving record, the trial court imposed the maximum
sentence of a $1,000 fine and six months in jail. However, the court suspended the
entire jail sentence and $750 of the fine, and placed Hartman on three years'
probation. The conditions of probation allowed Hartman to drive only to and from
work. As an additional condition of probation, the court ordered Hartman to have
an ignition interlock device installed in her car. This device requires the driver of
the car to blow into the device in order to start the car. If the device registers
alcohol on the breath of the driver, the car will not start.

Hartman filed a timely notice of appeal in the Cuyahoga County Court of
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Appeals. The court of appeals reversed the sentencing order and ordered the cause
remanded for resentencing. The court of appeals held that the trial court abused its
discretion in ordering Hartman to have the ignition interlock device installed in her
car. The court of appeals found that this condition of probation was not related to
the offense of which Hartman was guilty, nor was it intended to rehabilitate her.
The court of appeals also held that the trial court was within its discretion in
imposing the maximum sentence and would have remained so had it refused to
suspend any portion of the sentence.

The trial court, upon the recommendation of the court of appeals, sentenced
Hartman to the maximum six months in jail. This sentence, however, has,
according to the city prosecutor, been stayed pending appeal to this court.

The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary
appeal.
__________________

Kevin M. Spellacy, Lakewood City Prosecutor, Matthew J. King and
Jennifer L. Swallow, Assistant City Prosecutors, for appellant.
__________________

MOYER, C.J. The sole issue presented here is whether the trial court abused
its discretion in restricting Hartman's driving privileges and ordering that she have
an ignition interlock device installed in her automobile as a condition of probation
for the offense to which she pled guilty, driving without a valid operator's license.
For the reasons that follow, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in ordering the conditions of probation under the circumstances of this case.

A trial court is vested with discretion in determining the proper conditions of
probation. R.C. 2951.02; State v. Jones (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 51, 52, 550 N.E.2d
469, 470. R.C. 2951.02(A)(1) provides:

"In determining whether to suspend a sentence of imprisonment upon an
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offender for a misdemeanor and place the offender on probation * * *, the court
shall consider the risk that the offender will commit another offense and the need
for protecting the public from the risk, the nature and circumstances of the offense,
and the history, character, and condition of the offender." (Emphasis added.)

The statute clearly designates that a court shall consider several factors in
determining whether to place an offender on probation. It follows that these
factors should be considered in determining the appropriate conditions of such
probation. Additionally, R.C. 2951.02(C)(1)(a) provides mandatory conditions of
probation for misdemeanor offenders. The section further provides that "[i]n the
interests of doing justice, rehabilitating the offender, and ensuring the offender's
good behavior, the court may impose additional requirements on the offender * *
*."
In
Jones this court set forth the test to determine if conditions of probation
are related to "the interests of doing justice, rehabilitating the offender, and
[e]nsuring [the offender's] good behavior." Pursuant to Jones, the court should
consider whether the condition (1) is reasonably related to rehabilitating the
offender, (2) has some relationship to the crime committed, and (3) relates to
conduct which is criminal or reasonably related to future criminality and serves the
statutory ends of probation. Id. at 53, 550 N.E.2d at 470.

Here, the court of appeals found that restricting Hartman's driving privileges
and requiring her to have an ignition interlock device installed on her automobile
were not related to the offense of which she was found guilty, nor were these
conditions intended to rehabilitate her. We disagree.

When Hartman appeared before the trial court, she had been convicted of
DUI on four separate occasions. Additionally, she had been cited for driving with
a suspended license eight times. The number of offenses on Hartman's driving
record reflects her lack of appreciation for her responsibilities to operate a motor
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vehicle in conformance with the laws of Ohio. It was reasonable for the trial court
to believe that additional conditions were necessary to rehabilitate her and protect
those who may be injured by her conduct.

Despite the fact that Hartman was not facing an alcohol-related charge when
the trial court imposed conditions of probation, we conclude that her driving record
supports the imposition of restricted driving privileges and the order requiring the
installation of the ignition interlock device. Her suspended license was directly
related to her DUI convictions. The installation of the ignition interlock device
will protect others from her lack of responsibility. The imposition of such a
condition of probation is reasonably related to the crime of which Hartman was
found guilty, and will hopefully deter her from future acts of criminal driving. We
conclude that the conditions of probation imposed by the trial court do meet the
requirements of R.C. 2951.02 as clarified in Jones.

We further note that that the imposition of probation is more likely to
advance the goals of probation than the maximum sentence recommended by the
court of appeals. Clearly, sentencing Hartman, who is a single mother, to six
months in jail and a $1,000 fine is less likely to aid in her rehabilitation than
allowing her to continue working and caring for her child.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed
and the original sentencing order of the trial court is reinstated.
Judgment reversed
and order reinstated.

DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG
STRATTON, JJ., concur.
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