Hoelscher v. Hoelscher - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

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[Cite as Hoelscher v. Hoelscher, 91 Ohio St.3d 500, 2001-Ohio-103.]

HOELSCHER, APPELLEE, v. HOELSCHER; FAIRFIELD COUNTY CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, APPELLANT.
[Cite as Hoelscher v. Hoelscher (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 500.]
Domestic relations -- Parent's child support obligations pursuant to a child
support order continue beyond the age of majority, when -- R.C.
3103.03, as amended, supersedes In re Dissolution of Marriage of Lazor.
(No. 00-961 -- Submitted February 6, 2001 -- Decided May 30, 2001.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Fairfield County, No. 99-CA-50.
__________________
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT
1. A parent's child support obligations pursuant to a child support order continue
beyond the age of majority so long as the child continues to attend a
recognized and accredited high school on a full-time basis, in accordance
with R.C. 3103.03, even if contradicted by the express terms of a child
support agreement.
2. R.C. 3103.03, as amended, supersedes In re Dissolution of Marriage of Lazor
(1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 201, 572 N.E.2d 66.
__________________

LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. We are asked to determine whether In re
Dissolution of Marriage of Lazor (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 201, 572 N.E.2d 66,
remains good law in light of the 1992 amendment to R.C. 3103.03. For the
reasons that follow, we hold that a parent's child support obligations pursuant to a
child support order continue beyond the age of majority so long as the child
continues to attend a recognized and accredited high school on a full-time basis,
in accordance with R.C. 3103.03, even if contradicted by the express terms of a

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
child support agreement. In so holding, we recognize that R.C. 3103.03, as
amended, supersedes In re Dissolution of Marriage of Lazor.

Richard C. Hoelscher and Donna L. Hoelscher dissolved their marriage
on August 18, 1975. At the time, Donna L. Hoelscher was pregnant. The parties
executed a separation agreement that was incorporated into the dissolution order,
which provided that Mr. Hoelscher would pay $35 per week "for support of their
minor child" after the child was born.

The child was born on November 25, 1975, yet Mr. Hoelscher never paid
support following the birth of the child. In 1989, appellant, Fairfield County
Child Support Enforcement Agency ("CSEA"), filed a contempt action against
Mr. Hoelscher for failure to pay the court-ordered child support. The parties
eventually signed an agreed entry that established child support arrearages as of
December 1, 1989. The entry also provided that Mr. Hoelscher would continue to
pay $35 per week for support of the minor child, plus $10 per week against the
arrearage until the child reached age sixteen. Thereafter, Mr. Hoelscher was to
pay $35 per week in support and $25 per week toward the arrearage. When the
child turned eighteen, Mr. Hoelscher would pay $75 per week. The entry is silent
as to whether payments of $75 after age eighteen and before high school
graduation are a continuation of child support or are to be applied toward
arrearages only.

On November 25, 1993, the child turned eighteen; however, the child did
not graduate from high school until June 11, 1994.

In August 1998, CSEA filed a motion for arrearages in the amount of
$991.72 that CSEA alleged had accrued at the rate of $35 per week from the
child's eighteenth birthday until graduation from high school. The trial court,
interpreting the 1989 agreed entry, determined that Mr. Hoelscher was obligated
to continue the $35 per week child support payments after the child turned
eighteen so long as the child continued as a student on a full-time basis at an
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January Term, 2001
accredited high school. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial
court on the authority of In re Dissolution of Marriage of Lazor, 59 Ohio St.3d
201, 572 N.E.2d 66.

This cause is before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary
appeal.
In
Lazor, this court was faced with a similar question under a former
version of R.C. 3103.03.1 A sharply divided court relied on contract principles to
hold, "where the parties to a separation agreement agree that the obligation to
make child support payments will terminate when the child reaches the `age of
majority,' the obligation to make support payments terminates when the child
reaches his or her eighteenth birthday unless the parties specify some other
definition of the phrase `age of majority.' " Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.

The court recognized that a parent has an independent statutory duty under
R.C. 3103.03 to "support" a child so long as the child continuously attends an
accredited high school on a full-time basis even after the child has attained the age
of majority. The court acknowledged that a written agreement between the
parents cannot abrogate a parent's independent statutory duty to provide support
for the child. Both parents remained liable to the child still attending high school
to provide "necessaries," a term the court did not define or elaborate upon.
Nevertheless, the Lazor court relied upon the contract between the parents to
conclude that a parent's obligation to make scheduled child support payments
terminated in accordance with the terms of the agreement.
The
Lazor court limited its holding to the parent's obligation under the
separation agreement and did not terminate the parent's ultimate obligation to

1.
In 1989, when the child in Lazor turned eighteen, R.C. 3103.03 provided:

"Notwithstanding section 3109.01 of the Revised Code, the parental duty of support to
children shall continue so long as the child continuously attends on a full-time basis any
recognized and accredited high school, even when such child has attained the age of majority."
135 Ohio Laws 7, 19.
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
support the child. However, confusion resulted over what constituted "support"
after the eighteenth birthday but before high school graduation. The practical
effect of Lazor was to allow a parent to walk away from court-ordered support
payments for an eighteen-year-old even though the child continued to attend high
school. While the parent remained obligated by statute to "support" the child, the
Lazor court did not elaborate upon what form a parent's "ultimate obligation to
support" the child might take, whether monetary or merely nurturing and
emotional support. Litigation then became necessary to determine what otherwise
constituted sufficient "support."

As a result, the General Assembly amended R.C. 3103.03 in 1992 in
response to Lazor. 144 Ohio Laws, Part I, 134, 150. R.C. 3103.03(B) now
provides as follows:

"Notwithstanding section 3109.01 of the Revised Code, the parental duty
of support to children, including the duty of a parent to pay support pursuant to a
child support order, shall continue beyond the age of majority as long as the child
continuously attends on a full-time basis any recognized and accredited high
school."2 (Emphasis added to show the 1992 amendment.)

Subsequent to the 1992 amendment to R.C. 3103.03, several appellate
courts concluded that R.C. 3103.03(B) overrode Lazor and controlled even where
the terms of the written instrument between the parties terminated the parent's
support obligation at the age of majority. See Ballmer v. Ballmer (Aug. 21,
1998), Lucas App. No. L-98-1033, unreported, 1998 WL 526777; Smith v. Smith
(1997), 119 Ohio App.3d 15, 694 N.E.2d 476; Farra v. Farra (Oct. 18, 1996),
Montgomery App. No. 15890, unreported, 1996 WL 596536; Mazzuckelli v.
Mazzuckelli (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 554, 666 N.E.2d 620. We agree with the

2.
The statute has since been amended to add the following language:

"Except in cases in which a child support order requires the duty of support to continue
for any period after the child reaches age nineteen, the order shall not remain in effect after the
child reaches age nineteen." 147 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2606, 2661.
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January Term, 2001
analyses of these districts and reject the interpretation of the Court of Appeals for
Fairfield County in this case. It is clear that the General Assembly intended to
clarify that court-ordered child support payments were to continue for an
eighteen-year-old child as long as the child attends high school despite any
agreement to the contrary, even when the agreement is incorporated into a court
order. The 1992 amendment clarifies the meaning of "support" for that limited
period of time after a child reaches age eighteen until he or she completes high
school. Certainly a child's financial needs would change little during these
months.

Therefore, we hold that R.C. 3103.03 supersedes Lazor and mandates that
the parent is obligated to continue making support payments, in accordance with
the terms of the agreement, while the child is attending high school, even if the
document specifies another termination date. We reverse the judgment of the
court of appeals and reinstate the order of the trial court.
Judgment reversed.

MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ.,
concur.
__________________

R.C. Stoughton, Sr., for appellee.

Kathy S. Mowry and Jeffrey F. Bender, for appellant, Fairfield County
Child Support Enforcement Agency.
__________________
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