In re Anderson - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

	ROMINGER LEGAL
		Ohio Court Cases and Opinions - Ohio Legal Research
					Need Legal Help?
					Need Legal Help?
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER			LEGAL HEADLINES - CASE LAW - LEGAL FORMS	NOT FINDING WHAT YOU NEED? -RESEARCH

This court case was taken from the web sites of the Ohio Courts. Search our site for more cases - CLICK HERE

LEGAL RESEARCH

COURT REPORTERS

PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS

PROCESS SERVERS

DOCUMENT RETRIEVERS

EXPERT WITNESSES

Find a Private Investigator

Find an Expert Witness

Find a Process Server

Case Law - save on Lexis / WestLaw.

Legal News - Legal Headlines

[Cite as In re Anderson, 92 Ohio St.3d 63, 2001-Ohio-131.]

IN RE ANDERSON.
[Cite as In re Anderson (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 63.]
Juvenile court -- Delinquency proceedings -- Juvenile court proceeding is a
civil action.
(No. 00-906 -- Submitted February 27, 2001 -- Decided June 13, 2001.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Clark County, Nos. 99-CA-90 and 99-CA-
91.
__________________
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT
A juvenile court proceeding is a civil action.
__________________

FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J. In August and September 1997, two
complaints were filed in the Clark County Juvenile Court against appellant,
Charles M. Anderson. The complaints alleged that appellant was delinquent by
reason of having committed rape, R.C. 2907.02, a first-degree felony, and gross
sexual imposition, R.C. 2907.05, a third-degree felony. The rape charge was later
amended to gross sexual imposition.

Appellant admitted both charges. On December 17, 1997, the juvenile
court adjudicated appellant a delinquent and ordered him committed to the Ohio
Department of Youth Services ("DYS") for a minimum term of six months on
each charge. The commitment was then suspended, and appellant was placed on
indefinite probation and ordered to complete a sex offender program.

Appellant appeared before the juvenile court for a review hearing on
February 3, 1998. The next day, the court imposed the previously suspended
commitment and ordered that appellant's best interests required that he be

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
committed to DYS for a minimum of six months on each charge, to be served
consecutively.

On December 9, 1999, appellant filed two notices of appeal with the
Second District Court of Appeals. Appellant argued that his appeals had been
timely filed pursuant to App.R. 4(A), because the clerk of courts failed to serve
him with a copy of the judgment entry as required by Civ.R. 58(B).

On April 3, 2000, the court of appeals held that neither App.R. 4(A) nor
Civ.R. 58(B) permits a delayed appeal or tolling of the notice of appeal filing
period for juvenile cases. Thus, the court dismissed both appeals for lack of
jurisdiction. The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a
discretionary appeal.

In reaching its holding, the court of appeals determined that juvenile cases
are neither criminal nor civil. Appellant believes that this holding is erroneous
and presents two alternative arguments for our consideration: (1) juvenile
proceedings are criminal and pursuant to App.R. 5(A), he has the right to file a
delayed appeal; or in the alternative, (2) juvenile proceedings are civil and
pursuant to App.R. 4(A) and Civ.R. 58(B), his appeal was timely filed. For the
reasons that follow, we adopt appellant's second argument and hold that a
juvenile court proceeding is a civil action. Therefore, pursuant to App.R. 4(A)
and Civ.R. 58(B), we find that appellant's appeal was timely filed.

We have long held that juvenile court proceedings are civil, rather than
criminal, in nature. See Cope v. Campbell (1964), 175 Ohio St. 475, 26 O.O.2d
88, 196 N.E.2d 457, paragraph one of the syllabus, overruled on other grounds in
In re Agler (1969), 19 Ohio St.2d 70, 48 O.O.2d 85, 249 N.E.2d 808. See, also,
Agler at 74, 48 O.O.2d at 87, 249 N.E.2d at 811. To understand why this is so, it
is helpful to consider the history of the juvenile justice system.1

1. See,
also,
State v. Hanning (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 86, 88-89, 728 N.E.2d 1059, 1061-
1062.
2

January Term, 2001

The first juvenile court was established in Illinois in 1899. D'Ambra, A
Legal Response to Juvenile Crime: Why Waiver of Juvenile Offenders is Not a
Panacea (1997), 2 Roger Williams U.L.Rev. 277, 280. The early reformers were
appalled by the treatment of youth in criminal courts, and they sought to put in
place a separate system where the overriding concerns were the protection and
rehabilitation of the child. Id. It was a benevolent system based on the best
interests of the child, where child welfare and individual assessment and treatment
were the goals. Id. The formation of this system was premised on the legal
doctrine of parens patriae, i.e., the state, as parent, had the duty to care for and
guide these children with rehabilitation as the ultimate goal. Bell, Ohio Gets
Tough on Juvenile Crime: An Analysis of Ohio's 1996 Amendments Concerning
the Bindover of Violent Juvenile Offenders to the Adult System and Related
Legislation (1997), 66 U.Cin.L.Rev. 207, 209.

The juvenile court movement reformers "designed an institution that
departed from the traditional criminal court of law in almost every respect."
Rossum, Holding Juveniles Accountable: Reforming America's "Juvenile
Injustice System" (1995), 22 Pepperdine L.Rev. 907, 911. Because reformers
"assumed that the interests of the state, delinquent children, and their families
were identical, they eliminated the adversarial atmosphere of criminal courts." Id.
"They replaced the cold, objective standards of criminal procedures with informal
procedures." Id. A specialized vocabulary was developed. "Criminal
complaints" gave way to "delinquency petitions." Instead of "trials," "hearings"
were held. Juveniles were not given "sentences"; they received "dispositions."
Juveniles were not "found guilty"; they were "adjudicated delinquent." Id. at 912.

Other differences included excluding the public from juvenile hearings to
protect children from the public stigma of criminal prosecution and giving judges
broad discretion to adjudicate delinquency and to set dispositions. Id. Again,
"[t]he principle underlying [this] system was to combine flexible decision-making
3

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
with individualized intervention to treat and rehabilitate offenders rather than to
punish offenses." Id.

Although the juvenile court operates in a separate system, the United
States Supreme Court has carefully imposed basic due process requirements on it.
We recognize that there are criminal aspects to juvenile court proceedings. For
instance, in In re Gault (1967), 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, the
court specifically held the privilege against self-incrimination applicable to
juvenile proceedings. Id. at 49-54, 87 S.Ct. at 1455-1458, 18 L.Ed.2d at 558-561.
In addition, notice of the charges, the assistance of counsel, and the rights of
confrontation and cross-examination were also afforded to the juvenile. Id. at 31-
57, 87 S.Ct. at 1445-1459, 18 L.Ed.2d at 548-563. In In re Winship (1970), 397
U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, the court further advanced due process
rights when it found that the state must prove its case against a juvenile beyond a
reasonable doubt. However, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971), 403 U.S. 528,
91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647, and Schall v. Martin (1984), 467 U.S. 253, 104
S.Ct. 2403, 81 L.Ed.2d 207, the court declined further expansions when it denied
juveniles the right to jury trials (McKeiver) and upheld the constitutionality of
pretrial preventive detention for accused juvenile delinquents (Schall).

In all these cases, the court attempted to "strike a balance--to respect the
`informality' and `flexibility' that characterize juvenile proceedings * * * and yet
to ensure that such proceedings comport with the `fundamental fairness'
demanded by the Due Process Clause." Id. at 263, 104 S.Ct. at 2409, 81 L.Ed.2d
at 216. In Schall, the court reiterated that "[t]here is no doubt that the Due
Process Clause is applicable in juvenile proceedings," yet reaffirmed that "[t]he
state has `a parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the
child,' * * * which makes a juvenile proceeding fundamentally different from an
adult criminal trial." Id. at 263, 104 S.Ct. at 2409, 81 L.Ed.2d at 216.
4

January Term, 2001
In
In re Caldwell (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 156, 157, 666 N.E.2d 1367, 1368,
we summarized the purpose of R.C. 2151.01: "to provide for the care, protection,
and mental and physical development of children, to protect the public from the
wrongful acts committed by juvenile delinquents, and to rehabilitate errant
children and bring them back to productive citizenship, or, as the statute states, to
supervise, care for and rehabilitate those children. Punishment is not the goal of
the juvenile system, except as necessary to direct the child toward the goal of
rehabilitation."2 See, also, Juv.R. 1(B)(3) and (4).

Thus, from their inception, juvenile courts existed as civil, not criminal,
courts. The basic therapeutic mission of these courts continues to this day.
Therefore, we hold that a juvenile court proceeding is a civil action. Applying our
holding to the facts of this case, we find that the Civil Rules and the Appellate
Rules pertaining to the filing of a civil notice of appeal apply to appeals from the
juvenile court.

For civil cases, App.R. 4(A) requires the notice of appeal to be filed within
thirty days of "the later of entry of the judgment or order appealed or, in a civil
case, service of the notice of judgment and its entry if service is not made on the
party within the three day period in [Civ.R.] 58(B)." App.R. 4(A) thus contains a

2.
Although not controlling in this case, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 179, signed into law January 5,
2001, and effective January 1, 2002, makes many substantive changes to the Juvenile Code.
Appellant argues that many of these provisions are punitive in nature and that they reflect the
deepening trend toward criminalizing juvenile adjudications. For instance, in some situations, if a
child is adjudicated a "serious youthful offender" as defined in R.C. 2152.02(X), the court is
required to impose a blended sentence consisting of two parts. R.C. 2152.13(E)(1). The first part
to be served is a traditional juvenile disposition and the second is a sort of provisional adult
sentence. Under certain circumstances, such as serious misconduct by the juvenile while in
custody, the adult sentence can be imposed. R.C. 2152.14(A). However, because this law is not
yet in effect, we leave for another day the question of whether provisions such as these convert
some juvenile proceedings into criminal actions. Yet, we do note that Am.Sub.S.B. No. 179
maintains the basic philosophy of the juvenile system, i.e., that juveniles are not criminals. The
new law still attempts to treat or dispose of youthful offenders in the juvenile system. The
overriding purposes for dispositions under new R.C. Chapter 2152 are "to provide for the care,
protection, and mental and physical development of children * * *, protect the public interest and
5

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
tolling provision that applies in civil matters when a judgment has not been
properly served on a party according to Civ.R. 58(B). Civ.R. 58(B) requires the
court to endorse on its judgment "a direction to the clerk to serve upon all parties
* * * notice of the judgment and its date of entry upon the journal." The clerk
must then serve the parties within three days of entering judgment upon the
journal. "The thirty-day time limit for filing the notice of appeal does not begin to
run until the later of (1) entry of the judgment or order appealed if the notice
mandated by Civ.R. 58(B) is served within three days of the entry of the
judgment; or (2) service of the notice of judgment and its date of entry if service
is not made on the party within the three-day period in Civ.R. 58(B)." Whitehall
ex rel. Fennessy v. Bambi Motel, Inc. (1998), 131 Ohio App.3d 734, 741, 723
N.E.2d 633, 638.

Here, the trial court never endorsed upon the judgment entry the required
"direction to the clerk to serve upon all the parties * * * notice of the judgment
and its date of entry upon the journal" pursuant to Civ.R. 58(B). Moreover, the
juvenile court's docket contains no indication that appellant was ever served with
notice. Therefore, the time for filing a notice of appeal never began to run
because the trial court failed to comply with Civ.R. 58(B). Therefore, appellant's
appeal in this case was timely filed under App.R. 4(A).

The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the cause is
remanded to that court for consideration of appellant's appeal.
Judgment reversed
and cause remanded.

MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ.,
concur.

COOK, J., dissents.

safety, hold the offender accountable for the offender's actions, restore the victim, and rehabilitate
the offender." R.C. 2152.01(A).
6

January Term, 2001
__________________

COOK, J., dissenting. Because this court has previously deemed juvenile
proceedings to be "civil in nature," the majority decides that a juvenile court
proceeding is a "civil action." From this, the majority reasons that because
App.R. 4(A)'s tolling provision applies by its terms to appeals "in a civil case,"
Anderson's time to file his appeal should have been tolled under that rule pending
compliance with Civ.R. 58(B). Superficially, the majority's approach seems
sound.

Upon closer examination, however, it is apparent that App.R. 4 recognizes
a distinction between a "civil case" and a "juvenile proceeding," and that the
tolling provision in division (A) of that rule applies to civil cases, but not to
juvenile proceedings. For evidence supporting this proposition, one need look no
further than division (B) of the very same rule. App.R. 4(B) enumerates several
exceptions to the general thirty-day rule embodied in division (A). Division
(B)(2) provides that "[i]n a civil case or juvenile proceeding" (emphasis added),
the time for filing a notice of appeal will be tolled pending disposition of certain
motions. If juvenile proceedings are simply "civil cases," as today's majority
decides, the words "or juvenile proceeding" contained in division (B) are rendered
mere surplusage.

When this court promulgated App.R. 4, it used specific language to
embrace both civil cases and juvenile proceedings within division (B)'s
enumerated exceptions to division (A)'s thirty-day rule. The same is not true,
however, for the tolling provision in division (A), which applies only to civil
cases. I agree, therefore, with the court of appeals that the tolling provision in
App.R. 4(A) does not apply to Anderson's appeal from juvenile court, and that the
court of appeals thus lacked jurisdiction to entertain Anderson's untimely appeal.
Given this, I must respectfully dissent from the majority's decision and would
7

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
reach the merits of the constitutional arguments raised in Anderson's first and
second propositions of law.3
__________________

Stephen A. Schumaker, Clark County Prosecuting Attorney, and Andrew
P. Pickering, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, and Thomas Kenneth Lee,
Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
__________________

3.
In his first proposition of law, Anderson claims that "[a] juvenile's right to due process is
violated when the state denies the juvenile the right to request a delayed appeal but provides
delayed appeals to adults with criminal convictions." In his second proposition of law, Anderson
submits that "[a] juvenile's right to equal protection is violated when the state denies the juvenile a
right to request a delayed appeal, even though the state provides delayed appeals to adults with
criminal convictions."
8