State ex rel. Childs v. Lazaroff - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

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[Cite as State ex rel. Childs v. Lazaroff, 90 Ohio St.3d 519, 2001-Ohio-9.]

THE STATE EX REL. CHILDS, APPELLANT, v. LAZAROFF, WARDEN, APPELLEE.
[Cite as State ex rel. Childs v. Lazaroff (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 519.]
Habeas corpus sought to compel warden to release relator from prison Court
of appeals' dismissal of petition affirmed Res judicata bars relator
from filing successive habeas corpus petitions.
(No. 00-1520 -- Submitted November 29, 2000 -- Decided January 3, 2001.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Madison County, No. CA2000-05-025.

Per Curiam. In June 1995, an Akron police officer filed a complaint in
the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, charging
appellant, Tawan R. Childs, with delinquency. The officer alleged that when
Childs was seventeen years old, he committed aggravated murder by purposely,
and with prior calculation and design, causing the death of Christopher E.
Robinson.

In October 1995, the juvenile court found probable cause that Childs had
committed aggravated murder and bound him over to the general division of the
common pleas court for trial as an adult. At the bindover hearing, the juvenile
court admitted a psychological report concerning Childs. In January 1996, the
common pleas court convicted Childs of murder and a firearm specification. The
court sentenced Childs to fifteen years to life for his murder conviction and to a
three-year term of actual incarceration for the firearm specification conviction, to
be served consecutively. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment.
State v. Childs (Sept. 18, 1996), Summit App. No. 17653, unreported, 1996 WL
525631, appeal dismissed (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 1519, 674 N.E.2d 372.

In 1997, Childs filed a petition in the Court of Appeals for Madison
County for a writ of habeas corpus to compel his release from prison. Childs
claimed that his convictions were void because he was charged in the juvenile

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
court with a different crime from the one upon which he was extradited. The
court of appeals dismissed the petition, and, on appeal, we affirmed the dismissal.
State ex rel. Childs v. Wingard (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 346, 699 N.E.2d 1278.

In 1999, Childs filed a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this
court, claiming that his sentencing court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. We
sua sponte dismissed the cause. State ex rel. Childs v. Wingard (1999), 85 Ohio
St.3d 1475, 709 N.E.2d 848.

In May 2000, Childs filed a third petition for a writ of habeas corpus, this
time with the Court of Appeals for Madison County. Childs requested the writ to
compel appellee, his prison warden, to release him from prison. Childs claimed
that his convictions and sentence were void because he was never given the
physical examination required by the then-applicable versions of R.C. 2151.26
and Juv.R. 30 before being bound over. The court of appeals granted appellee's
motion and dismissed the petition. The court held that res judicata barred
Childs's claims.

This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right.

Childs asserts that the court of appeals erred in denying the writ. He
contends that his petition stated a viable habeas corpus claim and that res judicata
did not bar him from raising his jurisdictional claim.

We have held that a juvenile who alleges that he received no physical
examination before being bound over, as required by the then-applicable versions
of R.C. 2151.26 and Juv.R. 30, states a potentially viable habeas corpus claim.
See Gaskins v. Shiplevy (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 149, 150-151, 656 N.E.2d 1282,
1283-1284; State v. Golphin (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 543, 546-547, 692 N.E.2d 608,
611-612.1 We have additionally recognized that habeas corpus actions are

1. R.C. 2151.26 and Juv.R. 30 were subsequently amended to delete the physical-examination
requirement. Golphin, 81 Ohio St.3d at 546, 692 N.E.2d at 612; 146 Ohio Laws, Part I, 19-20.

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January Term, 2001
typically exempt from res judicata because " `[c]onventional notions of finality
of litigation have no place where life or liberty is at stake.' " Natl. Amusements,
Inc. v. Springdale (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 60, 63, 558 N.E.2d 1178, 1181, quoting
Sanders v. United States (1963), 373 U.S. 1, 8, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 10 L.Ed.2d
148, 157.
Nevertheless,
in
Hudlin v. Alexander (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 153, 155-156,
586 N.E.2d 86, 87, after noting the foregoing statement from Natl. Amusements,
we held that res judicata is applicable to successive habeas corpus petitions
because habeas corpus petitioners have the right to appeal adverse judgments in
habeas corpus cases. See, also, McCleskey v. Zant (1991), 499 U.S. 467, 479, 111
S.Ct. 1454, 1462, 113 L.Ed.2d 517, 535 ("As appellate review became available
from a decision in habeas refusing to discharge the prisoner, courts began to
question the continuing validity of the common-law rule allowing endless
successive [habeas corpus] petitions"). We have since consistently applied res
judicata to bar petitioners from filing successive habeas corpus petitions. See,
e.g., Smith v. Walker (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 431, 432, 700 N.E.2d 592, 593; State
ex rel. Cotton v. Ghee (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 404, 696 N.E.2d 580, 581; State ex
rel. Brantley v. Ghee (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 287, 288, 685 N.E.2d 1243, 1244;
Freeman v. Tate (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 440, 441, 605 N.E.2d 14, 15.

Childs previously filed two habeas corpus actions in which he could have
raised his present claim. See id., 65 Ohio St.3d at 441, 605 N.E.2d at 15 ("In this
case, the record demonstrates that appellant has previously filed at least one
habeas corpus action * * * in which [his successive habeas corpus claim] could
have been raised").

Based on the foregoing, res judicata barred Childs from filing successive
habeas corpus petitions. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court of
appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
__________________

Tawan R. Childs, pro se.

Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Diane Mallory, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
__________________
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