State v. Murrell - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

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[Cite as State v. Murrell, 94 Ohio St.3d 489, 2002-Ohio-1483.]

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. MURRELL, APPELLANT.
[Cite as State v. Murrell (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 489.]
Criminal law -- Search and seizure -- When police officer has made a lawful
custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, the officer may, as a
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger
compartment of that automobile.
(No. 00-1757 -- Submitted October 17, 2001 at the Greene County Session --
Decided April 3, 2002.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-000103.
__________________
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT
When a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an
automobile, the officer may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest,
search the passenger compartment of that automobile. (New York v.
Belton [1981], 453 U.S. 454, 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2864, 69 L.Ed.2d 768,
775, followed; State v. Brown [1992], 63 Ohio St.3d 349, 588 N.E.2d 113,
syllabus, overruled; Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, harmonized.)
__________________

ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J. This case requires us to consider the allowable
scope of an automobile search incident to the arrest of an occupant of the vehicle.
For the reasons that follow, we overrule this court's decision in State v. Brown
(1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 349, 588 N.E.2d 113, and therefore affirm the judgment of
the court of appeals.
I
Facts and Procedural History

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

On September 15, 1999, a Cincinnati police officer stopped an automobile
driven by defendant-appellant, Marvin Murrell, on a street with a posted speed
limit of thirty-five miles per hour after the officer's laser device registered
appellant's speed at forty-nine miles per hour. The officer ran a check on
appellant's license, which showed that there was an outstanding warrant for
appellant's arrest for failure to pay child support. The officer arrested appellant,
handcuffed him, and placed him in the back seat of the police car.

The officer then proceeded to search appellant's vehicle. On the
floorboard in front of the driver's seat, the officer found a small cloth bag. He
opened it and found crack cocaine and powdered cocaine. The officer then also
arrested appellant for drug possession.

Appellant was indicted on two counts of possession of cocaine. He filed a
motion to suppress the results of the search, and the trial court held a hearing on
the motion on November 19, 1999. The arresting officer provided the only
testimony at the hearing, giving his account of the stop and arrest. The officer
testified that the traffic stop was a routine one, that he never felt that he was in
any danger during the course of the stop, that he never sought appellant's
permission to search the vehicle, and that he would not have impounded the car
(and therefore no inventory search of the vehicle would have occurred) if he had
not found the cocaine.

On February 10, 2000, the trial court granted the motion to suppress in a
handwritten entry that gave no reasons for the ruling. The trial court apparently
relied on this court's decision in Brown, 63 Ohio St.3d 349, 588 N.E.2d 113, in
which this court held at the syllabus that "[a] police officer may not open a small,
closed container found inside an automobile's glove compartment solely as a
search incident to the driver's arrest for a traffic violation, after the officer has the
suspect--and sole occupant of the vehicle--under control in the police cruiser.
(New York v. Belton [1981], 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768,
2

January Term, 2002
distinguished; the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution, applied.)"

The state appealed pursuant to R.C. 2945.67, certifying that the appeal
was not taken for the purpose of delay and that the trial court's ruling rendered the
state's proof so weak that any reasonable possibility of effective prosecution was
destroyed. See Crim.R. 12(K) (formerly Crim.R. 12[J]).

The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court,
distinguishing the situation before it from that in Brown. The court of appeals
focused on the fact that Brown's syllabus specifically mentioned arrest for a
"traffic violation," and found that Brown did not apply because appellant was not
arrested for a traffic violation but for nonpayment of child support. While
acknowledging that the officer did not have probable cause to believe that there
was contraband in the vehicle, the court of appeals upheld the search pursuant to
the United States Supreme Court's Belton decision.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a
discretionary appeal.
II
Search of Automobile Incident to Arrest of Occupant
In
Belton, 453 U.S. at 460, 101 S.Ct. at 2864, 69 L.Ed.2d at 775, the
United States Supreme Court articulated a specific rule for automobile searches
within the "search incident to arrest" exception to the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 The Belton court held that
"when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an
automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the

1.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
3

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
passenger compartment of that automobile." (Footnotes omitted.) Earlier, the
Supreme Court in Chimel v. California (1969), 395 U.S. 752, 762-763, 89 S.Ct.
2034, 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 694, a case not involving a motor vehicle, had held
that when a police officer makes a lawful custodial arrest, a warrantless search of
the person arrested and of the immediate surrounding area is justified to discover
any weapons that the arrestee might seek to use and to prevent the concealment or
destruction of evidence.

The Supreme Court viewed its holding in Belton as the establishment of a
bright-line rule that extended the principles of Chimel to arrest situations
involving motor vehicles. The Supreme Court in Belton, in explaining why
searching a closed container found in the passenger area of the vehicle is also
permissible, further illuminated its reasoning, stating that "[i]t follows [from
Chimel] that the police may also examine the contents of any containers found
within the passenger compartment, for if the passenger compartment is within
reach of the arrestee, so also will containers in it be within his reach. * * * Such
a container may, of course, be searched whether it is open or closed, since the
justification for the search is not that the arrestee has no privacy interest in the
container, but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any
privacy interest the arrestee may have." 453 U.S. at 460-461, 101 S.Ct. at 2864,
69 L.Ed.2d at 775.

In support of its decision to apply a bright-line rule, the Belton court stated
that "as one commentator has pointed out, the protection of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments `can only be realized if the police are acting under a set
of rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct
determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the
interest of law enforcement.' LaFave, `Case-By-Case Adjudication' versus
`Standardized Procedures': The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 S.Ct.Rev. 127, 142.

"* * *
4

January Term, 2002

"In short, `[a] single, familiar standard is essential to guide police officers,
who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and
individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront.'
Dunaway v. New York [1979], 442 U.S. 200, 213-214 [99 S.Ct. 2248, 2257, 60
L.Ed.2d 824, 836]." 453 U.S. at 458, 101 S.Ct. at 2863, 69 L.Ed.2d at 773-774.
The
Belton court then reviewed cases from other courts that had
encountered the issue before it, and observed that "[w]hile the Chimel case
established that a search incident to an arrest may not stray beyond the area within
the immediate control of the arrestee, courts have found no workable definition of
`the area within the immediate control of the arrestee' when that area arguably
includes the interior of an automobile and the arrestee is its recent occupant. Our
reading of the cases suggests the generalization that articles inside the relatively
narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact
generally, even if not inevitably, within `the area into which an arrestee might
reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary [item].' Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763
[89 S.Ct. at 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d at 694]. In order to establish the workable rule this
category of cases requires, we read Chimel's definition of the limits of the area
that may be searched in light of that generalization." 453 U.S. at 460, 101 S.Ct. at
2864, 69 L.Ed.2d at 774-775.

With this court's decision in Brown, 63 Ohio St.3d 349, 588 N.E.2d 113,
Ohio follows a different rule on automobile searches incident to an arrest than
was established in Belton. The Brown opinion actually set forth two separate
rationales for not following Belton. Although the syllabus in Brown and the text
of the opinion (see id. at 351-352, 588 N.E.2d at 115) assert that the court
"distinguishe[s]" the situation in that case from the situation in Belton, this court
in Brown also stated, "If Belton does stand for the proposition that a police officer
may conduct a detailed search of an automobile solely because he has arrested one
of its occupants, on any charge, we decline to adopt its rule." (Emphasis sic.) Id.
5

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
at 352, 588 N.E.2d at 115. The Brown opinion then included a footnote to the
effect that if the two cases were not distinguishable, the decision to decline to
adopt Belton's rule was based on Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution2:
" `Individual States may surely construe their own constitutions as imposing more
stringent constraints on police conduct than does the Federal Constitution.' " Id.
at fn. 3, quoting California v. Greenwood (1988), 486 U.S. 35, 43, 108 S.Ct.
1625, 1630, 100 L.Ed.2d 30, 39. See, also, Brown at 352, 588 N.E.2d at 115
(stating that the warrantless search of the automobile violated the Ohio
Constitution).

A close reading of both Belton and Brown reveals that, although the
Brown opinion attempted to distinguish that case from Belton based on the
differing facts of the two cases, the attempt was unfounded. While it appears
clear that there was probable cause for the search in Belton, while there was not in
Brown (the point upon which the opinion in Brown relied to distinguish the two,
id. at 351-352, 588 N.E.2d at 115), the United States Supreme Court in Belton
deliberately chose not to analyze the situation before it under the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement, which is based on probable cause. Id., 453
U.S. at 462-463, 101 S.Ct. at 2865, 69 L.Ed.2d at 776, fn. 6 ("Because of this
disposition of the case, there is no need here to consider whether the search and
seizure were permissible under the so-called `automobile exception.' "). Instead,
the Belton court purposely determined to craft a bright-line rule of sufficient
scope to encompass the facts of Brown, as well as those of the case sub judice.

Given these considerations, it becomes apparent that this court's statement
in Brown, 63 Ohio St.3d at 352, 588 N.E.2d at 115, that "the warrantless search of

2.
Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides:

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions,
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person and things to be seized."
6

January Term, 2002
Brown's automobile was unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution"
was, at most, only partially supportable. Since Belton should not have been
distinguished, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Belton as to the
Fourth Amendment was binding on this court, and this court should have held that
the Fourth Amendment was not violated by the search in Brown. Therefore, the
only possibly justifiable rationale behind this court's decision in Brown is the
alternative reasoning set forth in that case--that the search was inconsistent with
Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.
III
State v. Brown Reassessed

The resolution of the case before us thus turns on a consideration of this
court's decision in Brown, which can accurately be said to have relied on Section
14, Article I to decline to give full effect to Belton. Within that consideration, and
depending on its outcome, a further issue potentially could arise in the
circumstances here, based on the court of appeals' decision to distinguish
Brown--if Brown should be reaffirmed, what should its scope be?

The Fourth Amendment and Section 14, Article I contain virtually
identical language, with both prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures and
both imposing a warrant requirement. See State v. Robinette (1997), 80 Ohio
St.3d 234, 238, 685 N.E.2d 762, 766-767. For that reason, this court observed in
Robinette that, for some time, it "has interpreted Section 14, Article I of the Ohio
Constitution as affording the same protection as the Fourth Amendment." Id. at
238, 685 N.E.2d at 767. See, also, State v. Orr (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 389, 391,
745 N.E.2d 1036, 1038-1039. In making that point, this court in Robinette cited a
number of cases, including State v. Geraldo (1981), 68 Ohio St.2d 120, 125-126,
22 O.O.3d 366, 369-370, 429 N.E.2d 141, 145-146 (reach of Section 14, Article I
is coextensive with that of Fourth Amendment); and State v. Andrews (1991), 57
7

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Ohio St.3d 86, 87, 565 N.E.2d 1271, 1273, fn. 1 (this court has interpreted Section
14, Article I to protect the same interests and in a manner consistent with the
Fourth Amendment).

After reviewing the cases, this court in Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d at 239,
685 N.E.2d at 767, determined that "we should harmonize our interpretation of
Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution with the Fourth Amendment, unless
there are persuasive reasons to find otherwise." This court in Robinette obviously
left open the possibility that, depending on the circumstances, this court may
decide to give independent effect to Section 14, Article I in the appropriate case.

In actually relying on Section 14, Article I to find that the evidence was
inadmissible on the facts before it, the Brown court did not cite any authorities,
including those cited in Robinette that appear inconsistent, for its decision to
interpret Section 14, Article I more stringently than the Fourth Amendment.
Also, Robinette, decided more than five years after Brown, did not cite Brown in
its consideration of when Section 14, Article I might be interpreted differently
from the Fourth Amendment.

As several of the briefs in this case indicate, most jurisdictions, unlike
Ohio in Brown, follow the Belton rule regarding automobile searches incident to a
lawful arrest, even where the arrestee has been handcuffed and placed in a police
vehicle at the time of the search. See, e.g., State v. Fernon (2000), 133 Md.App.
41, 57-58, 754 A.2d 463, 472; United States v. Doward (C.A.1, 1994), 41 F.3d
789, 791-792, fn. 1; United States v. White (C.A.6, 1989), 871 F.2d 41, 44.
Included within the group of states that follow Belton are states with specific
constitutional provisions that, like Ohio's Section 14, Article I, essentially mirror
the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., State v. Charpentier (1998), 131 Idaho 649,
962 P.2d 1033; State v. Fry (1986), 131 Wis.2d 153, 171-172, 388 N.W.2d 565,
573. While a few states, such as Ohio in Brown, have rejected Belton in part,
most states have chosen to fully embrace Belton's bright-line rule.
8

January Term, 2002

In light of the standard set forth in Robinette, we take this opportunity to
review the propriety of this court's decision in Brown. To the extent that Brown
apparently found persuasive reasons not to harmonize Section 14, Article I with
the Fourth Amendment in the situation before it, we believe that the time has
come to reassess Brown and the assumptions upon which that decision was based.

As a starting point, it is critical to recognize that Belton's rule applies only
when there is already a lawful custodial arrest. Concerns about a possible lack of
probable cause to conduct a search in a Belton situation are eased by the fact that
probable cause must have been present to arrest the occupant of the vehicle in the
first place. In addition, as the Belton holding explicitly states, a Belton search
must be "contemporaneous" with the arrest, occurring at or very near the time of
the arrest. Id., 453 U.S. at 460, 101 S.Ct. at 2864, 69 L.Ed.2d at 775.
Furthermore, on its face, Belton's rule applies only if an arrest is "custodial." Id.
The United States Supreme Court, in Knowles v. Iowa (1998), 525 U.S. 113, 118-
119, 119 S.Ct. 484, 488, 142 L.Ed.2d 492, 497-498, found that a "search incident
to citation," in which a police officer searched a vehicle incident to the issuance
of a citation in lieu of an arrest in a routine traffic stop, violated the Fourth
Amendment when there was no prior arrest to justify the search.3 Belton does not
authorize indiscriminate fishing expeditions; only motor vehicles very recently
occupied by those who have already been lawfully arrested are subject to a Belton
search.

3.
The United States Supreme Court recently reiterated its commitment to Belton's bright-
line rule in Florida v. Thomas (2001), 532 U.S. 774, 121 S.Ct. 1905, 150 L.Ed.2d 1. In that case,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari "to consider whether [the Belton] rule is limited to situations
in which the officer initiates contact with the occupant of a vehicle while that person remains
inside the vehicle." Id. at ___, 121 S.Ct. at 1908, 150 L.Ed.2d at 5. However, the court never
reached that issue on the merits, holding that the case did not involve a final judgment or decree
from the court below and that the case did not fit any category that would nevertheless allow it to
be treated as final for jurisdictional purposes, and so dismissed the writ for want of jurisdiction.
Id. at ___, 121 S.Ct. at 1909-1910, 150 L.Ed.2d at 6. The specific issue in Thomas is not relevant
to the case sub judice.
9

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
The
Belton court reached a calculated conclusion that a search of the
motor vehicle incident to arrest in this situation is a reasonable one, justified
principally by concerns for officer safety and preserving evidence, and the
advantages of having a bright-line rule in such situations. We find it significant
that Justice Stewart, who wrote the majority opinion in Belton, also wrote the
majority opinion in Chimel, which established strict limitations on the "search
incident to arrest" exception, and which reversed the conviction at issue in that
case as based on a search the Chimel court determined to be unreasonable. See
395 U.S. at 768, 89 S.Ct. at 2043, 23 L.Ed.2d at 697. Obviously, Justice Stewart
and the other justices in the majority in Belton believed that the specific concerns
at issue in that case justified extension of the Chimel rule to cases involving an
arrest of the occupant of a motor vehicle. Both Chimel and Belton are seminal
Fourth Amendment decisions that contribute to a comprehensive jurisprudence
regulating what is acceptable police conduct and what is not in warrantless
searches incident to an arrest.

We believe that the same considerations that led the Belton court to
establish its bright-line rule justify the adoption today of that rule by this court.
We now conclude that Brown was erroneously decided, and that this court in
Brown failed to appreciate the practical advantages underlying Belton's bright-
line rule. The case before us and Brown do not present persuasive reasons to
depart from the principle that Section 14, Article I and the Fourth Amendment
should be harmonized whenever possible.

For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that in the circumstances before
us we should harmonize the Fourth Amendment and Section 14, Article I of the
Ohio Constitution. We thus overrule Brown and its syllabus paragraph.
Consistent with Belton, we hold that when a police officer has made a lawful
custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, the officer may, as a
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that
10

January Term, 2002
automobile. Under our holding, the warrantless search of appellant's vehicle did
not violate the Fourth Amendment or Section 14, Article I.

Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.

DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.

MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, J., dissent.
__________________

MOYER, C.J., dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the majority's
conclusion that this court must overrule State v. Brown (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 349,
588 N.E.2d 113, for the sole purpose of aligning our jurisprudence with that of the
United States Supreme Court. For the reasons that follow, I conclude that the trial
court was correct in granting the motion to suppress based upon this court's
decision in Brown.

The overarching question, which the majority fails to satisfactorily
answer, is why this court needs to reverse itself by overruling Brown, and in doing
so, adopt the United States Supreme Court's bright-line rule announced in Belton.
" `[S]tare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of
adherence to the latest decision.' " Gallimore v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr.
(1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 244, 257, 617 N.E.2d 1052 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting,
quoting Helvering v. Hallock [1940], 309 U.S. 106, 119, 60 S.Ct. 444, 84 L.Ed.
604). However, this court has also observed that " `any departure from the
doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification.' " Wampler v. Higgins
(2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 111, 120, 752 N.E.2d 962, quoting Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union (1989), 491 U.S. 164, 172, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132. The
majority offers no special justification for overruling the unanimous decision in
Brown.

The majority relies on the United States Supreme Court's holding in New
York v. Belton (1981), 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768, as
11

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
justification to overrule Brown. In Belton, the court discerned a need for a bright-
line rule and held that "when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of
the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that
arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile." (Footnote
omitted.) Id. at 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768. The court thereby
concluded that such a search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The
Belton court derived its bright-line rule from its decision in Chimel v.
California (1969), 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685. However,
Chimel involved a search incident to an arrest in a residence, not an automobile.
The Chimel court held that, in a residential setting, once an arrest is made, police
officers may search the arrestee and the area within the arrestee's immediate
control. Id. at 762-763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685. The court concluded that
a search of the immediate area after the arrest was justified " `by the need to seize
weapons and other things which might be used to assault an officer or effect an
escape, as well as by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the
crime--things which might easily happen where the weapon or evidence is on the
accused's person or under his immediate control.' " Id. at 764, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23
L.Ed.2d 685. Thus, the justification for the search in Chimel was specifically
based on well-established exceptions to the search warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment, which are designed to protect the safety of the arresting
officer and to prevent the destruction of crime evidence.
In
Belton, the United States Supreme Court sought to create a bright-line
rule for the search of a motor vehicle by applying the rule in Chimel, allowing for
a search of the area within the immediate reach of the arrestee, to the facts in
Belton. Unfortunately, in applying Chimel to Belton, the court stretched the
underlying justification supporting Chimel beyond its rationale.

The Supreme Court applied the rationale of Chimel to a case where the
occupants of a motor vehicle were ordered out of the car and arrested. When a
12

January Term, 2002
police officer arrests a vehicle occupant, the arrestee is generally removed from
the automobile. At that point, there is no longer any danger to the officer from
anything in the passenger compartment of the vehicle and it is not possible for the
arrestee to destroy evidence that may be in the vehicle. In Brown, we observed
that the search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle after the occupant had
already been arrested could not be justified by the same motivations as Chimel
because "[t]he contents of the automobile were no longer within the arrestee's
immediate control." Brown, 63 Ohio St.3d at 353, 588 N.E.2d 113.

The majority concedes this point by stating that "only motor vehicles very
recently occupied by those who have already been lawfully arrested are subject to
a Belton search." The majority acknowledges that the occupant must first be
removed from the automobile and placed under arrest before the police officer
may search the automobile. Therefore, since the occupant is already under arrest
and separated from the vehicle, the Chimel justifications for the search, i.e., police
officer safety and the protection of evidence, disappear.

The absence of the Chimel justifications are apparent in the facts of
Belton. In Belton, a police officer stopped a motor vehicle for speeding. The
officer had probable cause to suspect that there was marijuana in the vehicle and
therefore he ordered all four men out of the vehicle, placed them all under arrest,
patted them down, and "split them up into four separate areas of the Thruway * *
* so they would not be in physical touching area of each other." Id. at 456, 101
S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768. It was not until the police officer completed this
procedure of securing the arrestees that he searched the passenger compartment of
the vehicle. The facts clearly demonstrate that at the point of the vehicle search,
the police officer was not in danger and any evidence in the vehicle was secure.

The facts of both Brown and the case at bar illustrate the obvious absence
of the Chimel justifications supporting the search of the passenger compartment
of an automobile after the occupants have been arrested. In Brown, the police
13

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
officer arrested the vehicle occupant and "placed him in custody in the patrol car"
before searching the arrestee's automobile. Brown, 63 Ohio St.3d at 349, 588
N.E.2d 113. Similarly, in the case sub judice the majority acknowledges that the
police officer "arrested appellant, handcuffed him, and placed him in the back seat
of the police car." Only after Murrell was secured did the police officer proceed
to search the appellant's vehicle.

The majority states that the Belton court "reached a calculated conclusion
that a search of the motor vehicle incident to arrest in this situation is a reasonable
one, justified principally by concerns for officer safety and preserving evidence,
and the advantages of having a bright-line rule in such situations."

Since the traditional justifications of officer safety and preservation of
evidence found in Chimel do not apply to Belton, and by extension do not apply to
the case at bar, the only valid justification for the Supreme Court's holding in
Belton is the need for a bright-line test.
The
Belton court stated that, without a bright-line rule, police officers
would be overwhelmed in attempting to decide whether probable cause exists to
search the passenger compartment of an automobile after the occupant is arrested.
Id., 453 U.S. at 458, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768. In order to alleviate this
supposed confusion, the court reasoned that " `[a] custodial arrest of a suspect
based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment;
that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional
justification.' " Id. at 461, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768, quoting United States
v. Robinson (1973), 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427.

There is nothing in the record before us to support a conclusion that since
our decision in Brown, law enforcement officers have encountered particular
difficulty in knowing when to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle
incident to an occupant's arrest.
14

January Term, 2002

The majority, stating no special justification for adopting the Belton
bright-line rule, contends that "[c]oncerns about a possible lack of probable cause
to conduct a search in a Belton situation are eased by the fact that probable cause
must have been present to arrest the occupant of the vehicle in the first place."
(Emphasis sic.) In my view, we need a more persuasive reason to justify the
automobile search.

It is well settled that a state supreme court may interpret its state
constitution to provide greater individual rights than those provided in the federal
Constitution. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins (1980), 447 U.S. 74, 81, 100
S.Ct. 2035, 64 L.Ed.2d 741. We did that in Brown when we unanimously held
that the warrantless search of Brown's vehicle was unreasonable and violated
Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.

In the time since Brown was decided, nothing has changed to warrant the
majority's sudden compulsion to overrule Brown. The only reason given by the
majority to demonstrate that the time is now ripe to overrule Brown is this court's
decision in State v. Robinette (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 685 N.E.2d 762. In
Robinette we acknowledged the similarity in language between the Fourth
Amendment and Section 14, Article I, and therefore indicated that the two should
be harmonized. Id. at 766-767, 685 N.E.2d 762. However, as the majority
correctly observes, "Robinette obviously left open the possibility that, depending
on the circumstances, this court may decide to give independent effect to Section
14, Article I in the appropriate case." The case at bar is an appropriate case for
this court to give independent effect to Section 14, Article I.
In
Brown, this court unanimously rejected Belton in stating that "[w]e do
not believe that the certainty generated by a bright-line test justifies a rule that
automatically allows police officers to search every nook and cranny of an
automobile just because the driver is arrested for a traffic violation." Brown, 63
Ohio St.3d at 352, 588 N.E.2d 113. Moreover, the facts in Belton were
15

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
significantly different from those in Brown and the case at bar. In Belton the
police officer had probable cause to search the vehicle after the arrest because the
arrest was based on probable cause that there was marijuana in the vehicle. The
vehicle search therefore flowed directly from the arrest.
However,
in
Brown, the arrest was for driving under the influence of
alcohol. The probable cause that the officer possessed to make the arrest had no
connection to the contents of the vehicle. In the case at bar, the connection is
even more difficult to make. Murrel was arrested for failure to pay child support.
There was no connection between the reason for the arrest and the contents of the
automobile.
Because
Robinette does not prevent this court from giving independent
effect to Section 14, Article I, Brown should continue to control. Moreover, since
the determinative facts here are closer to Brown than they are to Belton, we
should follow our own jurisprudence as reflected in Brown.

The unanimous opinion of this court in Brown, that the sole justification of
the need for a bright-line rule is not enough to warrant "an extensive search based
on facts that could never support a warrant because of the lack of probable cause,"
should not be altered. Brown, 63 Ohio St.3d at 352, 588 N.E.2d 113.

I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the
judgment of the trial court.

PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.
__________________

PFEIFER, J., dissenting. This court's holding in State v. Brown (1992), 63
Ohio St.3d 349, 588 N.E.2d 113, should control this case. The Brown opinion is
measured and wise, and allows for the search of the interior of an automobile
incident to a driver's arrest when necessary. Under Brown, police officers can
search an automobile if there is probable cause to suspect that the vehicle contains
contraband, if there is a suspicious item in plain view, or if an officer is searching
16

January Term, 2002
for weapons within the immediate control of the suspect. These are all reasonable
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment prohibition against warrantless searches.
The majority's holding today seems inclined to skirt the Fourth Amendment
rather than work within it. I dissent and also join the dissent of Chief Justice
Moyer.
__________________

Michael K. Allen, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Scott A.
Rubenstein, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Arenstein
&
Gallagher
and Hal R. Arenstein, for appellant.
Ron
O'Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L.
Taylor, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio
Prosecuting Attorneys Association.

H. Fred Hoefle, urging reversal for amicus curiae Greater Cincinnati
Criminal Defense Lawyers Association.
Kravitz
&
Kravitz
and Max Kravitz, urging reversal for amicus curiae
Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
__________________
17