Middletown v. Flinchum - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

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[Cite as Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 2002-Ohio-1625.]

CITY OF MIDDLETOWN, APPELLEE, v. FLINCHUM, APPELLANT.
[Cite as Middletown v. Flinchum (2002), 95 Ohio St.3d 43.]
Criminal law -- Search and seizure -- When officers, having identified
themselves, are in hot pursuit of a suspect who flees to a house to avoid
arrest, police may enter without a warrant, regardless of whether offense
for which suspect is being arrested is a misdemeanor.
__________________
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT
When officers, having identified themselves, are in hot pursuit of a suspect who
flees to a house in order to avoid arrest, the police may enter without a
warrant, regardless of whether the offense for which the suspect is being
arrested is a misdemeanor.
(No. 01-233 -- Submitted November 28, 2001 -- Decided April 10, 2002.)
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Butler County, No. CA99-11-193.
__________________

ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J. The facts of this case are not in dispute. On
April 23, 1999, Middletown police officers observed appellant Thomas
Flinchum's car stopped at a red traffic light. When the light changed, appellant
spun the car's tires. The officers then observed appellant stopping his car and
then rapidly accelerating, causing the car to fishtail as it made a right turn. At this
point, the officers decided to follow appellant. The officers attempted to approach
appellant's vehicle twice, but on both attempts, appellant fled from the police.

Finally, the officers observed appellant standing on the driver's side of his
parked car. When appellant observed the officers stop their cruiser in front of his
car, he ran towards the rear entrance of a house. One of the officers, Officer
Wayne Birch, pursued appellant, yelling "Stop" and "Police" several times, to no

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
avail. As the pursuit continued, Officer Birch heard a rear screen door slam open
on a house that was later determined to be appellant's. The officer then observed
appellant standing in his kitchen approximately five feet inside his home.
Without appellant's permission, Officer Birch entered the home and arrested him.
Appellant was charged under Middletown ordinances with reckless operation,
DUI, and resisting arrest.

Before trial, appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a
result of the warrantless entry into his home at the time of arrest. The trial court
denied the motion, finding that the officer was in hot pursuit of appellant, thereby
making the entry permissible. Appellant was ultimately convicted of reckless
operation and DUI but acquitted on the charge of resisting arrest. The appellate
court affirmed the trial court's judgment.

This cause is now before the court as a certified conflict from the Court of
Appeals for Butler County.

We are asked to consider whether the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution is contravened by a warrantless home entry to effect an arrest
for a misdemeanor. We hold today that it is not and, therefore, affirm the
judgment of the court of appeals.

The Fourth Amendment states, "The right of the people to be secure in
their person, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause * * *." Furthermore, in United States v. United States Dist. Court for the E.
Dist. of Michigan (1972) 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 2134, 32 L.Ed.2d 752,
764, the court noted that the "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against
which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed."

Appellant contends that the Middletown police officers were precluded
from entering his home because probable cause and exigent circumstances were
absent, since the violation was simply a misdemeanor. We find, however, that
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January Term, 2002
appellant's argument is without merit and, if adopted, would create the illusion
that flight from police officers is justified and reasonable as long as no felony
offense has been committed.
In
United States v. Santana (1976), 427 U.S. 38, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49
L.Ed.2d 300, the court made it clear that a suspect may not avoid arrest simply by
outrunning pursuing officers and finding refuge in her home. The court noted that
hot pursuit "need not be an extended hue and cry `in and about [the] public
streets.' " Id. at 43, 96 S.Ct. at 2410, 49 L.Ed.2d at 305, quoting the trial court.
Moreover, the court went on to conclude that "a suspect may not defeat an arrest
which has been set in motion in a public place * * * by the expedient of escaping
to a private place." Id. at 43, 96 S.Ct. at 2410, 49 L.Ed.2d at 306.

In the case at bar, the officers observed appellant engage in the reckless
operation of his vehicle on more than one occasion. Once the officers attempted
to approach appellant to arrest him, he not only ignored their commands to stop
after they had identified themselves as police officers, but he also fled to his home
in order to avoid arrest. Although Santana deals with the issue of warrantless
home arrests in the context of a felony suspect, we see no reason to differentiate
appellant's offense and give him a free pass merely because he was not charged
with a more serious crime. The basic fact remains that appellant fled from police
who were in lawful pursuit of him and who had identified themselves as police
officers.

Similar conclusions have already been reached in other jurisdictions. In
Nebraska v. Penas (1978), 200 Neb. 387, 263 N.W.2d 835, paragraph two of the
syllabus, in which the defendant was convicted of DUI, the court held, "When a
citizen has knowingly placed himself in a public place, and valid police action is
commenced in that public place, the citizen cannot thwart police action by fleeing
into a private place." Further, in Minnesota v. Paul (Minn.1996), 548 N.W.2d
260, syllabus, that court held, "A police officer in hot pursuit of a person
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suspected of the serious offense of driving under the influence of alcohol may
make a warrantless entry into the suspect's home in order to effectuate an arrest."

We therefore hold today that when officers, having identified themselves,
are in hot pursuit of a suspect who flees to a house in order to avoid arrest, the
police may enter without a warrant, regardless of whether the offense for which
the suspect is being arrested is a misdemeanor. In so holding, we do not give law
enforcement unbridled authority to enter a suspect's residence at whim or with a
blatant disregard for the constraints of the Fourth Amendment, but rather limited
to situations present in today's case.
Judgment affirmed.

MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.

DOUGLAS and COOK, JJ., concur in judgment.

PFEIFER, J., dissents.
__________________

PFEIFER, J., dissenting. Our inquiry in this type of case should not be
how to effectuate the conviction of someone who did wrong. Instead, we should
ask ourselves how what we decide affects our core freedoms. Our Bill of Rights
contains a mere ten ideas. Any time we chip away at one of those ten we had
better have a good reason. We do not have one in this case.

The United States Supreme Court thought it had a good reason to limit
Fourth Amendment freedoms in United States v. Santana (1976), 427 U.S. 38, 96
S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300. Whether the court's decision in that case was right is
debatable, but the case is also so different from this one as to be irrelevant. In
Santana, police officers had arranged a heroin buy. Officers paid one suspect in
marked bills to purchase the heroin. The suspect went into a house, and then
came out and entered an officer's car with the heroin. Officers arrested the
suspect, and then returned to the house where the heroin had been purchased to
retrieve the marked money. The suspect told police that "Mom Santana" had the
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January Term, 2002
money. Police saw Mom Santana standing in the doorway of the house. When
they announced they were police, Santana retreated into the house. Officers
followed and caught her just inside the doorway. Packets of heroin fell from a
bag she was holding, and when she emptied her pockets, she produced $70 worth
of the marked money.

As the Supreme Court pointed out, the police in Santana were faced with
"a realistic expectation that any delay would result in destruction of evidence."
Santana, 427 U.S. at 43, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300. They were also dealing
with a felony. The Supreme Court was willing to limit Fourth Amendment
protections in a case where a serious crime was committed and where evidence of
that crime was liable to be compromised. Here, we are asked to weaken the
Fourth Amendment in exchange for an arrest on a minor traffic offense where
there was no threat of the destruction of evidence.

We are dealing in this case with a fundamental part of a fundamental right.
"It is axiomatic that the `physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which
the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.' " Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984),
466 U.S. 740, 748, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732, quoting United States v.
United States Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Michigan (1972), 407 U.S. 297, 313,
92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752. It is nearly as axiomatic that "the Court has
recognized, as `a "basic principle of Fourth Amendment law[,]" that searches and
seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.' " Id.
at 749, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732, quoting Payton v. New York (1980), 445
U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639. The Welsh court recognized
exceptions for exigent circumstances, but emphasized that "exceptions to the
warrant requirement are `few in number and carefully delineated' * * * and that
police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that
might justify warrantless searches or arrests." 466 U.S. at 749-750, 104 S.Ct.
2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732, quoting United States v. United States Dist. Court, supra,
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407 U.S. at 318, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752. In Welsh the court was quick to
point out that the exception carved out by Santana concerns "hot pursuit of a
fleeing felon." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732.

The gravity of tinkering with the protections of the Fourth Amendment is
appreciated by the Supreme Court, and that court emphasizes that the
circumstances of a particular situation must be grave enough to merit a lifting of
those protections: "Our hesitation in finding exigent circumstances, especially
when warrantless arrests in the home are at issue, is particularly appropriate when
the underlying offense for which there is probable cause to arrest is relatively
minor. * * * When the government's interest is only to arrest for a minor offense,
that presumption of unreasonableness is difficult to rebut, and the government
usually should be allowed to make such arrests only with a warrant issued upon
probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate." (Footnote omitted.) Id. at
750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732.

The government could not rebut the presumption of unreasonableness in
this case because it involved only a minor traffic offense. The majority
breathlessly depicts the pursuit and detention of Finchum in the manner of a
television police drama. They should have given it the Dragnet approach--the
facts, and only the facts. Finchum spun his tires when a traffic light turned green,
later fishtailed his car when making a right turn, and again spun his tires when
accelerating from a stop sign. Judging from the charge eventually brought against
him, it appears that Flinchum did not squeal his tires, did not cross a center line,
did not speed, did not make an illegal left turn, did not fail to use his blinker, did
not fail to stop at a stop sign, did not fail to update his license tags, did not
illegally park. The Middletown police officers, on the other hand, upon viewing
Finchum's acts, did not activate their flashing lights, or their siren. After
Flinchum had parked his car, he ran toward his house when he saw the
Middletown police cruiser stop in front of his parked vehicle. No one disputes
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January Term, 2002
that Finchum was already running toward his house before an officer said
anything to him. The ten to fifteen yards between Finchum's car and his back
door is the length of what the city calls "hot pursuit."

The whole chase of Flinchum was more lukewarm amble than hot pursuit.
In any event, no recitation of the facts can change the truth that the police officer
in this case burst into Finchum's house to arrest a mere tire spinner. What do we
gain by the majority's opinion? Police can enter the homes of tire spinners
without a warrant, without knocking, without asking the spinner to please step
outside. What do we lose? From a practical standpoint, we place homeowners
and police officers in dangerous situations. From a jurisprudential standpoint, we
give up part of a right that has been jealously guarded for over two hundred years.
__________________

Bruce E. Fassler, Middletown City Prosecutor, for appellee.

Repper & Powers and Christopher J. Pagan, for appellant.

Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and David M. Gormley, State
Solicitor, for the state of Ohio.
__________________
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