State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts. - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

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[Cite as State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts., 95 Ohio St.3d 59, 2002-Ohio-1627.]

THE STATE EX REL. SHEMO ET AL. v. CITY OF MAYFIELD HEIGHTS ET AL.
[Cite as State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts. (2002), 95 Ohio St.3d 59.]
Mandamus sought to compel city of Mayfield Heights et al. to commence
appropriation proceedings to determine the amount for the city's
temporary taking of relator's property -- Writ granted, when.
(No. 01-1325 -- Submitted February 5, 2002 -- Decided April 10, 2002.)
IN MANDAMUS.
__________________

Per Curiam. Relators, Michael A. Shemo and Larry Goldberg, are co-
owners as trustees of a 22.6-acre parcel of land in respondent city of Mayfield
Heights. Relators acquired the parcel in January 1992.

On March 19, 1992, relators filed a complaint in the Cuyahoga County
Court of Common Pleas, naming Mayfield Heights and the Ohio Attorney
General as defendants. Relators requested a declaratory judgment that the
existing U-1(1) Single-Family House District zoning classification
unconstitutionally restricted the use of the property to single-family residential
development. Relators initially wanted the property rezoned to permit mid-rise,
multifamily development.

In June 1995, relators voluntarily dismissed the declaratory judgment
action and refiled it. Relators again requested a judgment declaring that the U-
1(1) zoning classification was unconstitutional as applied to their property. This
time, however, relators requested that the property be rezoned to U-4 Local Retail
and Wholesale District so that retail and warehouse development would be
permitted. Relators alleged that the U-1(1) zoning classification denied them an
economically viable use of the property without substantially advancing a
legitimate interest in the health, safety, or welfare of Mayfield Heights.

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

In December 1995, relators and Mayfield Heights stipulated that the U-
1(1) zoning classification as applied to relators' property was invalid. Over
relators' objection, the city rezoned the property to U-2-A Planned Unit
Development District, which restricted the use of the property to attached and
detached single-family residential dwellings. Relators then challenged the
constitutionality of this new classification in their pending declaratory judgment
action.

In May 1996, following a trial, the common pleas court held that the U-2-
A zoning classification was unconstitutional as applied to relators' property. The
common pleas court found that the U-2-A zoning classification did not
substantially advance any legitimate health, safety, or welfare concern of
Mayfield Heights and that the U-2-A zoning rendered the property economically
nonviable.

In September 1997, on remand from the court of appeals, the common
pleas court entered a judgment incorporating its May 1996 declaration that the U-
2-A zoning classification was unconstitutional as applied to the property and held
that relators' proposed retail use of the property, as described in their site plan,
was reasonable. The common pleas court ordered that relators make the
improvements to Golden Gate Boulevard specified in their site plan, that Mayfield
Heights take actions to facilitate these road improvements, that the city and
municipal officers named as defendants be enjoined from interfering with
relators' proposed retail use of the property and installation of the road
improvements, and that the city and the individual defendants allow retail
development and use consistent with the court's judgment.

On appeal, the court of appeals vacated the common pleas court judgment
and remanded the cause for further determination. On further appeal, we reversed
the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the September 1997 common
pleas court judgment. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts. (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 7, 722
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January Term, 2002
N.E.2d 1018 ("Shemo I"). In so holding, we stated that "[s]ince [relators] have
shown that the city lacks any legitimate governmental health, safety, and welfare
concerns in support of the U-2-A zoning classification, we find that the trial court
was correct in declaring the U-2-A zoning ordinance unconstitutional." Id. at 13,
722 N.E.2d at 1024. We also found that competent, credible evidence supported
the common pleas court's conclusions that the property was not suitable for
residential use and that relators' proposed commercial use of the property was
reasonable. Id. at 12-13, 722 N.E.2d 1018.

In August 2000, Mayfield Heights enacted an ordinance in which it
claimed ownership of certain unimproved streets located on relators' property and
authorized the mayor to sell these "paper streets." These streets had been
dedicated to the city in June 1927, but had never been constructed. After
Mayfield Heights accepted the dedication of an adjacent subdivision in 1959, the
paper streets were blocked from access to actual streets. The city did not claim
ownership of the paper streets during the declaratory judgment proceeding even
though there was testimony and evidence concerning them during that
proceeding.

Relators subsequently filed a common pleas court action to enjoin the sale
of the paper streets and to declare that they had been abandoned by the city or, if
not abandoned, to declare them vacated under R.C. 723.09. In December 2000,
the parties resolved that case by consent and agreed that the paper streets were
vacated and that relators were declared the owners of the property that contained
the paper streets.

In March 2001, relators applied to respondent Mayfield Heights Planning
and Zoning Commission for road improvements consistent with the common
pleas court judgment reinstated by this court in Shemo I. The development also
required a modification of an easement by an adjacent property owner for a new
access drive. The city council initially disregarded the property owner's
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application for an improvement to modify the easement because it found that
relators were unable to demonstrate either that they had obtained a wetlands
permit for the property or that no permit was required. No city ordinance,
however, authorized the planning commission or city council to deny building
permits based upon environmental regulations.

In April 2001, the planning commission approved the application for
modification of the easement, but it refused to completely approve relators' road
improvement plans, instead restricting the use of Maplewood Road, which
provides access to the proposed retail development, to emergency use. The city
council confirmed the decision of the planning commission. As required by
Shemo I, the city rezoned relators' property from U-2-A to U-4 in April 2001.

On May 16, 2001, relators filed a complaint in this court against
respondents, Mayfield Heights and its mayor, city council, and planning
commission. Relators requested a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to
grant final approval of their road improvement plans, including unrestricted,
nonemergency access to Maplewood Road, in accordance with the September
1997 common pleas court judgment reinstated by this court in Shemo I. Relators
also requested a writ of mandamus to compel the city to commence appropriation
proceedings in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Probate Division, to
determine the amount of the city's alleged regulatory taking of relators' property.

In July 2001, we dismissed without prejudice relators' mandamus action
because they had failed to fully comply with the affidavit requirement of
S.Ct.Prac.R. X(4)(B). State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts. (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d
324, 750 N.E.2d 167 ("Shemo II").

On July 23, 2001, relators refiled their mandamus action, which fully
complied with S.Ct.Prac.R. X(4)(B). On relators' motion, we expedited our
consideration of relators' mandamus claim relating to their road improvement
plans for the proposed retail development. Upon consideration, we granted a
4

January Term, 2002
peremptory writ of mandamus to compel respondents to approve relators' road
improvement plans in connection with the proposed retail development. This
included unrestricted access to and from Maplewood Road once the specified
conditions are met, except for vehicles weighing over ten thousand pounds, and
granting all other approvals and permits necessary for the retail development of
the property ordered by the common pleas court's September 2, 1997 judgment.
State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts. (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 1, 752 N.E.2d 854
("Shemo III"). On August 20, 2001, the city council enacted a resolution
consistent with Shemo III by removing the emergency-use restriction for
Maplewood Road.

We subsequently granted an alternative writ and issued a schedule for the
presentation of evidence and briefs on relators' remaining mandamus claim. State
ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts. (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 1431, 755 N.E.2d 354.
Relators introduced evidence that "[a]s a direct consequence of the City's
unlawful enforcement of its U-1(1) and U-2A residential zoning against [the]
Property and the City's failure to comply with the Trial Court's Judgment set
forth above, [relators] have been deprived of the use of [their] Property from
March 19, 1992 until August 20, 2001." In addition, respondents' actions delayed
construction of a store to be built on the property as part of the development plan
from the summer of 2001 until the spring of 2002.

This cause is now before the court to consider relators' claim for a writ of
mandamus to compel appropriation proceedings as well as respondents' request
for oral argument.
Respondents' Request for Oral Argument

Respondents request oral argument because, among other reasons, it will
afford the parties the opportunity "to focus upon the significant issues" and will
"enhance a thorough understanding and appreciation of the case."
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

We have resolved comparable takings cases without the necessity of oral
argument. See, e.g., State ex rel. Elsass v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (2001), 92
Ohio St.3d 529, 751 N.E.2d 1032; State ex rel. Painesville v. Lake Cty. Bd. of
Commrs. (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 566, 569, 757 N.E.2d 347, 351.

Based on the foregoing, we deny respondents' request and proceed to the
merits of relators' mandamus claim.
Mandamus--Appropriation--Compensable Taking

Relators request a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to commence
appropriation proceedings for the city's temporary taking of their property.

The United States and Ohio Constitutions guarantee that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution; Section 19, Article I, Ohio
Constitution. Mandamus is the appropriate action to compel public authorities to
institute appropriation proceedings where an involuntary taking of private
property is alleged. State ex rel. Elsass v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 92 Ohio
St.3d at 533, 751 N.E.2d 1032. Relators have the burden of proving their
entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief in mandamus. Id.

We must first determine whether relators have established a compensable
taking of their property.

The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that "application
of land-use regulations to a particular piece of property is a taking only `if the
ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests * * * or denies
an owner economically viable use of his land.' " See United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc. (1985), 474 U.S. 121, 126, 106 S.Ct. 455, 88 L.Ed.2d 419,
quoting Agins v. Tiburon (1980), 447 U.S. 255, 260, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 65 L.Ed.2d
106; Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis (1987), 480 U.S. 470, 485,
107 S.Ct. 1232, 94 L.Ed.2d 472.
6

January Term, 2002

We have also adopted this test for a taking caused by a zoning law. See
Goldberg Cos., Inc. v. Richmond Hts. City Council (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 207,
211, 690 N.E.2d 510, quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 65 L.Ed.2d
106 (" `The application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a
taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests * *
* or denies an owner economically viable use of his land * * *' ").

This test is disjunctive, i.e., a compensable taking can occur either if the
application of the zoning ordinance to the particular property is constitutionally
invalid, i.e., it does not substantially advance legitimate state interests, or denies
the landowner all economically viable use of the land. Although in previous cases
we have applied the test in a conjunctive fashion, those cases involved merely
challenges to the constitutionality of these ordinances and did not involve takings
claims. See, e.g., Gerijo, Inc. v. Fairfield (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 223, 638 N.E.2d
533, syllabus, modified in part in Goldberg, 81 Ohio St.3d 207, 690 N.E.2d 510,
syllabus. Similarly, although some of our language in Goldberg could be
construed to specify that both of the Agins prongs must be met in order to
constitute a compensable taking, see 81 Ohio St.3d at 211, 213, 690 N.E.2d 510,
this language is dicta because the landowner in Goldberg did not claim that the
application of the challenged zoning regulation to its property constituted a
taking.

We now clarify that satisfaction of either prong of the Agins test
establishes a taking. We implicitly recognized this in BSW Dev. Group v. Dayton
(1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 338, 343, 699 N.E.2d 1271, where we noted that "given
BSW's failure to properly raise any constitutional issue of whether the Dayton
historic preservation ordinances substantially advance legitimate state interests *
* * BSW could only establish entitlement to appropriation proceedings if it
established that appellees' denial of the demolition permit denied BSW all
economically viable use of the Wilcon Building property." (Emphasis added.)
7

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
More important, this clarification comports with the plain language of the Agins
test. In other words, "[w]here a regulation places limitations on land that fall
short of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may
have occurred * * *."1 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (2001), 533 U.S. 606, 617, 121
S.Ct. 2448, 2457, 150 L.Ed.2d 592, 607.

Relators claim that they have established a taking because they have
satisfied either prong of the Agins disjunctive test. It is evident that relators have
satisfied the first prong, i.e., the application of the U-1(1) and U-2-A zoning
classifications to their property was unconstitutional in that the application of
these classifications did not substantially advance legitimate state interests. The
parties stipulated that the U-1(1) zoning classification as applied to relators'
property was unconstitutional, and the common pleas court found, in the
declaratory judgment reinstated by this court in Shemo I, that the U-2-A zoning
classification was also unconstitutional because, as applied to relators' property, it
did not substantially advance any legitimate health, safety, or welfare concern of
Mayfield Heights. Respondents are collaterally estopped from asserting
otherwise. See State v. Bey (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 487, 491, 709 N.E.2d 484,
quoting Thompson v. Wing (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 176, 183, 637 N.E.2d 917 ("
`Collateral estoppel [issue preclusion] prevents parties * * * from relitigating facts
and issues in a subsequent suit that were fully litigated in a prior suit' ").

It is less clear whether relators satisfied the second prong of the Agins test,
i.e., that the application of the U-1(1) and U-2-A zoning classifications to their
property denied them all economically viable use of their land. In this regard, our

1.
For state appellate cases expressing confusion over whether the test is conjunctive or
disjunctive, see Rumpke Rd. Dev. Corp. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Trustees (1996), 115 Ohio App.3d
17, 684 N.E.2d 353; MDJ Properties v. Union Twp. Bd. of Trustees (Mar. 27, 2000), Clermont
App. Nos. CA99-02-013 and CA99-02-019, unreported, 2000 WL 313502; James Place
Properties, Inc. v. Madison Twp. Bd. of Trustees (Sept. 25, 1998), Lake App. No. 97-L-143,
unreported, 1998 WL 682347; cf. Wilson v. Union Twp Trustees. (Oct. 26, 1998), Clermont App.
8

January Term, 2002
judgment in Shemo I, which reinstated the common pleas court's September 1997
declaratory judgment, did not determine this issue. Although in Shemo I we
concluded that relators introduced competent, credible evidence supporting the
declaration that the property was not suitable for residential use, that does not
necessarily mean that no economically viable use remained upon the application
of the unconstitutional zoning classifications. And even though relators' evidence
in this mandamus action states that the U-1(1) and U-2-A residential zoning
deprived them of "the use of [their] Property," it does not specify that it deprived
them of all economically viable use of their property. (Emphasis added.)
Relators therefore did not establish the second prong of the Agins test.

Nevertheless, because relators need to establish only one prong of the
Agins disjunctive test in order to prove a taking, their satisfaction of the first
prong is sufficient. The U-1(1) and U-2-A single-family residential zoning
classifications were unconstitutionally applied to relators' property, and the
property was, in fact, not suitable for this residential use. Therefore, relators have
proved a taking of their property.
Effect of Existence of Contested Zoning at the Time of Acquisition on Takings
Claim

Respondents contend that there can be no taking because the challenged
single-family residential zoning existed at the time relators acquired the property
and respondents did not further restrict the preexisting residential use of the
property after relators' acquisition of it.

Respondents' contention lacks merit. The United States Supreme Court
recently rejected a similar argument that a purchaser or a successive title holder is
deemed to have notice of an earlier-enacted land restriction and is barred from
claiming that it effects a taking:

No. CA98-06-036, unreported, 1998 WL 744089, holding that Goldberg adopted the Agins
disjunctive test for takings claims.
9

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

"The theory underlying the argument that post-enactment purchasers
cannot challenge a regulation under the Takings Clause seems to run on these
lines: Property rights are created by the State. * * * So, the argument goes, by
prospective legislation the State can shape and define property rights and
reasonable investment-backed expectations, and subsequent owners cannot claim
any injury from lost value. After all, they purchased or took title with notice of
the limitation.

"The State may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean
bundle. The right to improve property, of course, is subject to the reasonable
exercise of state authority, including the enforcement of valid zoning and land-use
restrictions. * * * The Takings Clause, however, in certain circumstances allows
a landowner to assert that a particular exercise of the State's regulatory power is
so unreasonable or onerous as to compel compensation. Just as a prospective
enactment, such as a new zoning ordinance, can limit the value of land without
effecting a taking because it can be understood as reasonable by all concerned,
other enactments are unreasonable and do not become less so through passage of
time or title. Were we to accept the State's rule, the post-enactment transfer of
title would absolve the State of its obligation to defend any action restricting land
use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable. A State would be allowed, in effect,
to put an expiration date on the Takings Clause. This ought not to be the rule.
Future generations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations on the
use and value of land.

"Nor does the justification of notice take into account the effect on owners
at the time of [the] enactment, who are prejudiced as well. * * * The proposed
rule is, furthermore, capricious in effect. The young owner contrasted with the
older owner, the owner with the resources to hold contrasted with the owner with
the need to sell, would be in different positions. The Takings Clause is not so
quixotic. A blanket rule that purchasers with notice have no compensation right
10

January Term, 2002
when a claim becomes ripe is too blunt an instrument to accord with the duty to
compensate for what is taken." (Emphasis added and citations omitted.)
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626-628, 121 S.Ct. at 2462-2463, 150 L.Ed.2d at 613-614.

Respondents' reliance on cases like Community Concerned Citizens, Inc.
v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 452, 613 N.E.2d 580,
and Singer v. Fairborn (1991), 73 Ohio App.3d 809, 598 N.E.2d 806, is
misplaced. Community Concerned Citizens involved a challenge to an
administrative denial of a conditional-use permit rather than a takings claim
premised on the unconstitutional application of a zoning ordinance. And in
Singer, the landowner challenged a city's denial of his request for rezoning rather
than the constitutionality of the ordinance itself. 73 Ohio App.3d at 815, 598
N.E.2d 806.
Effect of Invalidation of Challenged Zoning Ordinances on Takings Claim

Respondents next assert that once the zoning ordinances were invalidated
as applied to relators' property, the case is terminated and relators are not entitled
to compensation for the period that the unconstitutional ordinances were applied
to the property. Respondents cite our following statement from Goldberg, 81
Ohio St.3d at 213, 690 N.E.2d 510:

"If the landowner has challenged the constitutionality of zoning and also
alleged that it constitutes a taking of the property, the case is terminated if the
zoning is found to be unconstitutional, because the landowner is free of the zoning
that restricted the use of the land."

Respondents' contention is meritless. The cited dicta did not consider the
possibility of a claim for temporary taking because the landowner therein did not
claim a taking. Id., 81 Ohio St.3d at 213, 690 N.E.2d 510.

More important, the United States Supreme Court has declared that
temporary takings are compensable:
11

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

"Once a court determines that a taking has occurred, the government
retains the whole range of options already available--amendment of the
regulation, withdrawal of the invalidated regulation, or exercise of eminent
domain. Thus we do not, as the Solicitor General suggests, `permit a court, at the
behest of a private person, to require the . . . Government to exercise the power of
eminent domain . . . .' * * * We merely hold that where the government's
activities have already worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent
action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for
the period during which the taking was effective." (Ellipsis sic.) First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cty. of Los Angeles (1987), 482 U.S.
304, 321, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250.
Although
First English involved the second prong of the Agins takings test
rather than the first prong, its holding "still contains nuggets of language helpful
to resolution of some other inverse condemnation issues not directly addressed."
See, generally, 8 Rohan & Reskin, Nichols on Eminent Domain (3 Ed.2001) 14E-
22, Section 14E.04[2]. In other words, "[t]he First English court stated that
damages from `temporary' takings, that is, resulting from interim ordinances, or
presumably, from ordinances intended to be permanent but later invalidated by
the courts as a taking and therefore effectively transformed into an interim
ordinance, are to be `measured by the principles normally governing the taking of
a right to use property temporarily,' that is, in the same way as in eminent domain
actions for temporary use of property." (Footnote omitted.) Id. at 14E-23,
Section 14E.04[2], quoting First English, 482 U.S. at 318, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96
L.Ed.2d 250.

Therefore, the invalidation of the U-1(1) and U-2-A residential zoning
ordinances as applied to relators' property did not relieve respondents of their
duty to compensate relators for the temporary taking of their property. When the
burden on the landowner "results from governmental action that amounted to a
12

January Term, 2002
taking, the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that the
government pay the landowner for the value of the use of the land during this
period. * * * Invalidation of the ordinance or its successor ordinance after this
period of time, though converting the taking into a `temporary' one, is not a
sufficient remedy to meet the demands of the Just Compensation Clause." First
English, 482 U.S. at 319, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250.
Delays in Use; Paper Streets

Respondents claim that relators were not entitled to compensation because
they were not prepared to make the required access road improvements for retail
use as authorized by the court until March 2001, when they submitted their road
improvement plans to Mayfield Heights, and relators did not address a wetlands
issue concerning their development of property until November 2000.

The United States Supreme Court emphasized in First English that it
expressed no opinion on "normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in
zoning ordinances, variances, and the like" in regulatory inverse condemnation
cases. 482 U.S. at 321, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250.

Respondents here, however, applied unconstitutional zoning
classifications to relators' property for over nine years after relators acquired the
property. Any delays by relators did not contribute to respondents' delay in
finally rezoning the property to U-4. In fact, as established by relators, there was
never a substantive wetlands issue.

Respondents further claim that there is no compensable taking because the
city owned "paper streets" until the December 2000 consent entry vacating the
streets and declaring relators the owners of the property. The evidence, however,
establishes that Mayfield Heights abandoned the paper streets long before the
taking of the property here.

The land constituting the paper streets was dedicated to the city in 1927.
Once land is dedicated, it is held in trust for street or alley purposes and reverts to
13

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
the grantor or those claiming under the grantor when it is abandoned or vacated.
See, e.g., State ex rel. Bedard v. Lockbourne (1990), 69 Ohio App.3d 452, 457,
590 N.E.2d 1327; Chillicothe Bowling Lanes, Inc. v. Kitchen Collection, Inc.
(Aug. 15, 1995), Ross App. No. 94CA2066, unreported, 1995 WL 495959.
Nonuse of the property, i.e., ceasing all acts of enjoyment on the property, must
occur for at least twenty-one years in order to constitute abandonment. Nail &
Iron Co. v. Furnace Co. (1889), 46 Ohio St. 544, 22 N.E. 639, paragraph two of
the syllabus; Anderson v. Alger (May 14, 1999), Hardin App. No. 6-98-10,
unreported, 1999 WL 378377. The city never constructed or used the paper
streets here.

In fact, when Mayfield Heights accepted the dedication of an adjacent
subdivision in 1959, access to these never-constructed streets from actual streets
was blocked. The city's 1959 acceptance of this dedication consequently evinced
its intent to abandon the paper streets, and its nonuse of these streets continued for
over the requisite twenty-one-year period before the taking here. See Anderson,
citing Wyatt v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 1, 5, 621 N.E.2d
822, regarding the requirement of an intent to abandon. Therefore, relators owned
the property consisting of the "paper streets" at the time the temporary taking
occurred because the city had abandoned the property.
Res Judicata

Respondents finally argue that res judicata bars relators' takings claim
because relators could have raised their takings claim in their declaratory
judgment action, which was the subject of Shemo I. Respondents are correct that
res judicata generally bars litigation of all claims that either were or might have
been litigated in a first lawsuit. State ex rel. Carroll v. Corrigan (2001), 91 Ohio
St.3d 331, 332, 744 N.E.2d 771.

Unlike other judgments, however, and consistent with the persuasive
weight of authority, a declaratory judgment is not res judicata on an issue or
14

January Term, 2002
claim not determined thereby even though it was known and existing at the time
of the original action. See Jamestown Village Condo. Owners Assn. v. Market
Media Research, Inc. (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 678, 685-687, 645 N.E.2d 1265.
Thus, a declaratory judgment determines only what it actually decides and does
not preclude other claims that might have been advanced. 1 Restatement of the
Law 2d, Judgments (1982) 337, Section 33, Comment c; Ketchel v. Bainbridge
Twp. (1992), 79 Ohio App.3d 174, 177-178, 607 N.E.2d 22.

Therefore, relators' failure to raise their takings claim in their previous
declaratory judgment action does not bar their takings claim in this mandamus
proceeding.
Temporary Taking--Duration and Measure of Damages

Relators request compensation for the period from March 19, 1992, when
they filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the existing U-1(1) zoning
classification, until August 20, 2001, when the city council enacted a resolution
removing the emergency-use restriction for one road providing access to the
proposed retail development.

Under the first prong of the Agins test, relators established a temporary
taking during the time that the U-1(1) and U-2-A zoning classifications were
unconstitutionally applied to their property. These single-family residential
classifications were applied to their property on March 19, 1992, the date they
claim as the beginning date of the temporary taking. But the zoning
classifications had been invalidated and the requested zoning, U-4, was applied by
Mayfield Heights to their property in April 2001. Although the Maplewood Road
emergency-use restriction was not removed until August 2001, April 2001 is the
ending date for the temporary taking because the challenged zoning regulations
no longer applied to relators' property. And relators did not establish that they
were denied all economically viable use for their property under the second prong
of the Agins test after the rezoning in April 2001.
15

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

For the measure of damages, relators are entitled to the diminution in the
value of the use of their property during the period of the temporary taking. See
Norwood v. Sheen (1933), 126 Ohio St. 482, 494, 186 N.E. 102; First English,
482 U.S. at 319, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250.
Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, relators have established their entitlement to the
requested extraordinary relief in mandamus to compel respondents to commence
appropriation proceedings to determine the amount of the city's temporary taking
of relators' property. Therefore, we grant the writ.
Writ granted.

MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur but would also award attorney
fees.

DOUGLAS, J., concurs in judgment.
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Sheldon Berns and Benjamin J. Ockner, for relators.

Leonard F. Carr and L. Bryan Carr; Calfee, Halter & Griswold, L.L.P.,
and Phillip J. Campanella, for respondents.
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