State ex rel. The Timken Co. v. Hammer - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

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[Cite as State ex rel. The Timken Co. v. Hammer, 95 Ohio St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio-1754.]

THE STATE EX REL. THE TIMKEN COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. HAMMER ET AL.,
APPELLEES.
[Cite as State ex rel. Timken Co. v. Hammer, 95 Ohio St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio-
1754.]
Workers' compensation -- Violation of a specific safety requirement --
Applicability of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-13(F)(1)(d) to straddle truck
used to carry loads of pipe, lumber, and other long materials.
(No. 2000-2292 -- Submitted January 29, 2002 -- Decided May 1, 2002.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 99AP-905.
__________________

Per Curiam.
{¶1} In the early morning hours of June 3, 1995, longtime employee
Jimmy J. Mujais, Jr., was moving steel bars with a straddle truck at the
Gambrinus Steel Mill of his employer, the Timken Company, appellant. A
straddle truck is designed to carry loads of pipe, lumber, and other long materials.
With its wide wheelbase and high clearance, it moves materials--as the name
indicates--by straddling the material and hauling it in the large undercarriage
located beneath the elevated cab.
{¶2} On this particular vehicle--the number 40 Hyster--the cab was on
the right side. There was a mirror on the cab's left side, but not the right.
Claimant's right-side view was further obstructed by Timken's addition of parts
to the vehicle's right side.
{¶3} Shortly after 6:00 a.m., Mujais was moving steel from the plant to
an outdoor location. He was moving approximately three to four miles an hour as
he neared the door. As he approached, he noticed two men to his right. As he

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made the right turn through the door, his view on that side was blocked by the
parts added and he lost sight of the men. He completed the turn only to be
flagged down by a frantic coworker who told him that he had just run over
someone.
{¶4} Fellow employee Carl W. Hammer died of injuries received in that
accident. After a workers' compensation claim was allowed, his widow, Mabel,
appellee-claimant herein, sought an additional award, alleging that Timken had
committed several violations of specific safety requirements ("VSSR"). On
January 5, 1998, appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio, through a staff hearing
officer ("SHO"), granted the application.
{¶5} Timken successfully moved for rehearing based on newly obtained
evidence. The second hearing occurred on January 25, 1999, and in a nine-page,
single-spaced order, a second SHO found a violation of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-
5-13(F)(1)(d), which reads:
{¶6} "(F) Powered industrial trucks.
{¶7} "(1) General requirements.
{¶8} "* * *
{¶9} "(d) Trucks shall not be altered so that the relative positions of the
various parts are different from what they were when originally received from the
manufacturer, nor shall they be altered either by the addition of extra parts not
provided by the manufacturer or by the elimination of any parts, except as
provided in paragraph (F)(1)(e) of this rule. Additional counterweighting of fork
trucks shall not be done unless authorized by the truck manufacturer."
{¶10} In great detail, the SHO addressed the two primary issues
presented--the applicability of the specific safety requirement and the causal
relation between the undisputed alterations and the fatal accident. The
applicability of the rule was in dispute because of the absence of a definition
within the Ohio Adm.Code for "powered industrial truck." As a result, Timken
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January Term, 2002
argued that (1) Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-13(F) applied exclusively to forklifts;
(2) absent an Ohio Adm.Code definition, the commission was required to use the
definition supplied by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers ("ASME"),
which, according to Timken, excluded a straddle truck from its definition of
"powered industrial truck"; and (3) the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration ("OSHA") did not consider the straddle truck to be a powered
industrial truck.
{¶11} The commission rejected each contention. Addressing Timken's
initial argument, the commission wrote:
{¶12} "If the Industrial Commission had intended to limit 4121:1-5-13(F)
only to `forklifts' then the section would be entitled `forklifts' and not `powered
industrial trucks.' One should note that sections preceding subsection (F) and
those subsequent to it list different types of vehicles. For instance, subsection (C)
is entitled `general requirements for motor vehicles and mobile mechanized
equipment[.]' Subsection (D) refers to haulage vehicles and high lift rider trucks.
Subsection (E) is entitled to `Motor vehicles used to transport employees.' While
the employer is correct in pointing out that 4121:1-5-13(F)(1)(d) contains a
specific reference to `fork trucks,' the Staff Hearing Officer rejects the employer's
contention that the reference to `fork trucks' means that this particular subsection
applies exclusively to `fork trucks.' The Staff Hearing Officer finds that the
reference to `fork trucks' is meant to be included in the general category of
`Powered Industrial Trucks,' given the fact the section is not entitled `fork trucks'
or `forklifts.' It is reasonable to assume that due to this detailed list of coverage
had the drafters of this rule intended 4121:1-5-13(F)(1)(d) to apply only to
forklifts it would have so stated."
{¶13} As to Timken's second argument, the commission rejected the
assertion that it was required to use the ASME definition. Even if it were to use
the definition, the commission rejected as conclusory and without foundation
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testimony from a Timken witness that indicated that a straddle truck was excluded
from the ASME definition. To the contrary, it concluded:
{¶14} "It should be noted that Section B56-1-1993 entitled `Safety
Standard for Low Lift and High Lift Trucks Appendix,' on page 49 contains
definitions of `forklift' and `powered industrial truck.' The definitions are as
follows:
{¶15} " `Truck-forklift--a self loading truck, equipped with load carriage
and forks for transporting and tiering loads.'
{¶16} " `Truck-powered industrial--a mobile power propelled truck used
to carry, push, pull, lift, stack or tier material.'
{¶17} "The Staff Hearing Officer finds the fact that ASME provided two
different definitions for `forklift' and `powered industrial truck' defeats the
employer's earlier argument that `powered industrial truck' is limited to `forklift
truck.' It appears that powered industrial trucks were meant to cover a much
broader spectrum of vehicles than forklifts. On file is page 26 of an industry
instruction manual (chapter six-powered industrial trucks) which devotes an
inclusionary section to `straddle trucks.' P. 229 of that same manual indicates
that a straddle truck is an industrial truck used to lift and carry large loads. The
Staff Hearing Officer finds that `straddle truck' fits within the definition of a
`powered industrial truck' since it is a `mobile powered propelled truck used to
carry, push, pull, lift, stack or tier material.'
{¶18} "* * *
{¶19} "* * * [T]he Staff Hearing Officer further notes that the ASME
B56.1 Standard cited by the employer's counsel would not apply to the Hyster
straddle truck because the straddle truck has a 60,000 pound capacity (per the
11/14/1997 affidavit of Robert D. Newman) and the ASME B.56.1 `scope'
section states that the scope of ASME 56.1 only applies to powered industrial
trucks with a capacity up to 22,000 capacity."
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January Term, 2002
{¶20} A second ASME description was also discarded:
{¶21} "The employer further relies on ASME interpretation 1-28 for its
proposition that the straddle truck in question is not a `powered industrial truck.'
{¶22} "This interpretation provides in part:
{¶23} " `Question: What ASME or ANSI standards would apply to a
machine that fits the following description?
{¶24} " `The machine is used for moving containers between railroad
flatbeds[,] trailer trucks, and flatbed trailer trucks where these large containers
are moved by rail and then by truck. The function of this piece of equipment is to
lift and move containers approximately 35 to 40 feet in length between flatbed
railroad cars and flatbed trailer trucks. These containers are quite heavy,
weighing between 60,000 and 70,000 pounds.
{¶25} " `This piece of equipment is powered by a diesel engine. It has
hydraulic cylinders to operate the arms that lift and lower the containers. The
containers are either lifted by attachments to the top of the container or lifted by
hanging hooks that connect to the underside of the containers.
{¶26} " `The containers, once attached to the machine, are lifted only
about 5 ft. normally. This piece of equipment can travel at a speed of
approximately 15 mph and is not normally used on highways but is used on
railroad transfer cars.
{¶27} " `Reply: It appears that the piece of equipment described above is
a type of straddle carrier or van container handler. Neither of these types of
vehicles is covered by the B56 Standards and we are not aware of any other
standards that would apply.' "
{¶28} "The Staff Hearing Officer finds the employer's reliance on this
interpretation to be misplaced. The straddle truck that the employer uses carries
large sections of steel, not containers. It carries its load on internal lifting shoes
and guides rather than cables. See the Specification Sheet, dated October 1994,
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for the straddle truck. The Staff Hearing Officer also finds that Interpretation 1-
28 only applies to a container carrier capable of moving containers that are 35-40
feet long. The straddle truck in question is only 20 feet long." (Emphasis added
by SHO.)
{¶29} Turning finally to Timken's OSHA assertion, the commission
found:
{¶30} "Lastly, the employer asserts, as one of its defenses, that the
Industrial Commission should rely upon the outcome of the OSHA investigation
with regard to the classification of the Hyster straddle at issue herein. It should be
noted that OSHA initially issued two citations and levied a fine of $10,000. It
appears that the OSHA citations were based upon a finding that the straddle truck
in question was a `powered industrial truck.' The employer asserted, on several
occasions, the OSHA citation was vacated because OSHA conceded that the
Hyster straddle truck was not a powered industrial truck. * * *
{¶31} "* * *
{¶32} "* * * The Staff Hearing Officer finds this assertion to be
disturbing for the simple reason that it is, at best, false, and, at worst, intentionally
misleading. The Staff Hearing Officer finds that OSHA has never vacated the
aforementioned citations based upon a finding that the straddle truck was not a
powered industrial truck. * * * [T]he citations were vacated for an entirely
different reason." (Emphasis sic.)
{¶33} Having found that the rule applied to the straddle lift and that it
was violated by the undisputed modification of the straddle truck, the commission
turned to proximate cause. Based on the testimony of driver Jimmy Mujais, the
commission indeed found the requisite connection between the violation and the
death, and ordered the maximum award. Reconsideration was denied.
{¶34} Timken petitioned the Court of Appeals for Franklin County to
issue a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to vacate its order. The court
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January Term, 2002
of appeals rejected each of Timken's arguments and denied the writ, prompting
this appeal as of right.
{¶35} All agree that the straddle truck had been altered. Timken
challenges the specific safety requirement's applicability to the straddle truck and,
alternatively, the finding of proximate causation. Both objections lack merit.
{¶36} As to the former, Timken makes two arguments. Absent an Ohio
Adm.Code definition for "powered industrial truck," the commission, according
to Timken, was compelled to accept ASME's definition. This is false. Where a
relevant term is left undefined by the safety code, its interpretation rests solely
with the commission. While the commission may rely on an outside definition, it
is not required to do so. State ex rel. Go-Jo Industries v. Indus. Comm. (1998), 83
Ohio St.3d 529, 534, 700 N.E.2d 1264. In the commission's excellent order, as
quoted earlier, the commission set forth the reasoning it used to determine that the
straddle truck was a "powered industrial truck." It also went a step further in
painstakingly explaining why it considered Timken's interpretation and
counterarguments unpersuasive. No more is required.
{¶37} Timken also argues that the points it raised created a reasonable
doubt as to the regulation's applicability and, in so doing, required the
commission to interpret the rule in favor of the employer. Timken states a correct
proposition of law that does not apply here. Because an award for a VSSR is a
penalty, all reasonable doubts as to applicability must indeed be resolved in the
employer's favor. State ex rel. Burton v. Indus. Comm. (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d
170, 172, 545 N.E.2d 1216. Timken, however, incorrectly presupposes that the
introduction of any counterargument or contrary interpretation automatically
raises a reasonable doubt as to interpretation. This obviously is not so. In this
case, the commission found that Timken's arguments lacked merit and did not,
therefore, raise any doubt as to the applicability of the code section. Accordingly,
this contention, too, is rejected.
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{¶38} Timken's remaining propositions assume that the specific safety
requirement is applicable. It initially argues that (F)(1)(d)'s prohibitions are so
vague as to offend due process. Specifically, Timken argues that nothing in the
specific safety requirement addresses line-of-sight hazards and that the rule
therefore "fails to plainly apprise relator of its legal obligation, to wit, that it must
protect its employees against whatever dangers may be posed by a partially
obstructed line of sight."
{¶39} This assertion is meritless. Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-13(F)(1)(d)
clearly prohibits the addition of any extra parts except as provided in section
(F)(1)(e). Timken's additions did not fall under (F)(1)(e), so Timken was on clear
notice that its alteration violated the specific safety requirement. It does not
matter that the hazard posed was not enumerated. What matters is that the
proscribed conduct was clearly set forth--i.e., acceptable alterations were
enumerated and Timken's was not among them.
{¶40} Finally, Timken contests the finding of a causal relation between
the alterations and the accident. Its argument is based on the fact that no one
could actually explain how the decedent happened into the path of a straddle
truck. That is immaterial. As stated by the commission, the straddle truck's
driver testified that the added equipment caused him to lose sight of the decedent.
Certainly, the commission was entitled to infer that had the driver been able to see
the decedent, he would have made an effort to avoid him. It was not, therefore, an
abuse of discretion to conclude that the driver's inability to see the decedent--
which was caused by Timken's add-on equipment--resulted in the accident.
{¶41} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.

MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
__________________
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January Term, 2002

Day, Ketterer, Raley, Wright & Rybolt, Ltd., Darrell N. Markijohn and
Stephen E. Matasich, for appellant.

William F. Mikesell, for appellee Mabel Hammer.

Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Cheryl J. Nester, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio.
__________________
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