Disciplinary Counsel v. Shrode - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

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[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Shrode, 95 Ohio St.3d 137, 2002-Ohio-1759.]

OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. SHRODE.
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Shrode, 95 Ohio St.3d 137, 2002-Ohio-1759.]
Unauthorized practice of law -- Individual not licensed to practice law in Ohio
files pleadings on behalf of a company -- Engagement in the
unauthorized practice of law enjoined.
(No. 2001-2196 -- Submitted January 30, 2002 -- Decided May 1, 2002.)
ON FINAL REPORT of the Board of Commissioners on the Unauthorized Practice
of Law, No. UPL0011.
__________________

Per Curiam.
{¶1} On October 27, 1999, respondent, John C. Shrode of Tiffin, Ohio,
filed an answer on behalf of Court Street Properties, Ltd., a defendant in a
foreclosure action in the Seneca County Court of Common Pleas. Respondent,
who is not licensed to practice law in Ohio, signed the answer as "statutory
agent." On July 13, 2000, in the same case, respondent filed a "Motion to Modify
Order of Confirmation and Distribution" on Court Street Properties' behalf, again
signing as "statutory agent."
{¶2} On October 10, 2000, relator, Office of Disciplinary Counsel,
advised respondent that it was investigating allegations that his filings of
pleadings constituted the unauthorized practice of law. On October 17, 2000, the
trial court stayed the matter pending the outcome of the investigation by
Disciplinary Counsel. However, the trial court denied a motion filed by Old Fort
Banking Company, another defendant in the foreclosure action, to strike the
pleadings filed by respondent because he was not attorney.
{¶3} On November 22, 2000, respondent filed a motion in the trial court
requesting the court to hold Old Fort Banking Co. and its attorney in contempt for

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
allegedly violating the stay and signed the pleading on behalf of Court Street
Properties as "statutory agent."
{¶4} On December 13, 2000, relator filed a complaint before the Board
of Commissioners on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, alleging that, by filing
the pleadings on behalf of Court Street Properties, respondent was engaging in the
unauthorized practice of law. On January 18, 2001, relator received respondent's
answer to the complaint; however, the answer was never filed with the board. On
June 26, 2001, after several attempts to contact respondent, relator filed a motion
for default.
{¶5} The board heard the matter on August 15, 2001, found the facts as
set forth above, and concluded that respondent had engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law. The board recommended that respondent be enjoined from
further such activity.
{¶6} On review of the record, we accept the facts as found by the board.
In Land Title Abstract & Trust Co. v. Dworken (1934), 129 Ohio St. 23, 1 O.O.
313, 193 N.E. 650, paragraph one of the syllabus, we held that "[t]he practice of
law * * * embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings and the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts."
{¶7} Respondent prepared and filed pleadings in the Common Pleas
Court of Seneca County on behalf of another and was therefore engaged in the
practice of law. Respondent, however, has never been and is not now an attorney
admitted to practice in Ohio.
{¶8} R.C. 4705.01 provides: "No person shall be permitted to practice
as an attorney and counselor at law, or to commence, conduct, or defend any
action or proceeding in which the person is not a party concerned, either by using
or subscribing the person's own name, or the name of another person, unless the
person has been admitted to the bar by order of the supreme court in compliance
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January Term, 2002
with its prescribed and published rules." Since Union Sav. Assn. v. Home Owners
Aid, Inc. (1970), 23 Ohio St.2d 60, 52 O.O.2d 329, 262 N.E.2d 558, where the
president of a corporation attempted to file a pleading on behalf of the
corporation, we have consistently held that a corporation may not maintain an
action through an officer who is not a licensed attorney. We so held again in
Disciplinary Counsel v. Lawlor (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 406, 750 N.E.2d 1107,
where the president and majority shareholder attempted to file a pleading on
behalf of a corporation.
{¶9} It was Court Street Properties, not respondent, that was a named
defendant in the action in the Common Pleas Court of Seneca County. Only an
attorney could file pleadings on behalf of Court Street Properties. Respondent's
status as a "statutory agent" under R.C. 1701.07 did not give him the right to file
pleadings for the company. Thus, by filing those pleadings, respondent was
engaging in the unauthorized practice of law.
{¶10} Therefore, we concur in the recommendation of the board.
Respondent is hereby enjoined from any further activities that constitute the
practice of law in Ohio. Costs are taxed to respondent.
Judgment accordingly.

MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
__________________

Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Stacy Solochek
Beckman, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.
__________________
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