Gordon v. Gordon - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

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[Cite as Gordon v. Gordon, 98 Ohio St.3d 334, 2003-Ohio-1069.]

GORDON, APPELLEE, v. GORDON, APPELLANT.
[Cite as Gordon v. Gordon, 98 Ohio St.3d 334, 2003-Ohio-1069.]
Civil procedure -- Objections to magistrate's decision -- Prematurely filed
objections to a magistrate's decision are not untimely for purposes of
Civ.R. 53(E)(3).
(No. 2002-0299 -- Submitted January 21, 2003 -- Decided March 26, 2003.)
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Warren County, No. CA2001-04-033,
2001-Ohio-8648.
__________________
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT
Prematurely filed objections to a magistrate's decision are not untimely for
purposes of Civ.R. 53(E)(3).
__________________

ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.
{¶1} Appellant Mark H. Gordon and appellee Stephanie J. Gordon
divorced in 1995. At that time, appellant was ordered to pay child support for the
couple's minor son, who had been born in 1992. In June 2000, appellant moved
for a decrease in his child-support obligation, claiming that he had recently
suffered a substantial reduction in income. A magistrate held hearings on the
motion on August 10, 2000, and November 27, 2000.
{¶2} Appellant states in his brief, with no specific support in the record,
that in late 2000 in a telephone conference with the attorneys for the parties, the
magistrate communicated to them his decision to raise appellant's child-support
obligation to a specific amount. In response to the magistrate's telephone
pronouncement, appellant filed objections to the magistrate's decision on January
29, 2001.

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
{¶3} On February 22, 2001, the magistrate issued a written decision that
raised appellant's child-support obligation based on income that the magistrate
imputed to appellant. Appellant did not file new objections to the magistrate's
written decision and did not refile his earlier objections. Appellee never filed
anything in response to appellant's January 29, 2001 filing.
{¶4} On March 26, 2001, the trial court adopted the magistrate's
decision as its judgment, finding that no objections had been filed within 14 days
of the magistrate's decision. Also on that date, the trial court acknowledged in a
separate entry that appellant filed objections on January 29, 2001, but found that
those objections were untimely because they were filed before the magistrate
issued his written decision. The trial court overruled the objections for that
reason.
{¶5} Appellant appealed to the court of appeals on two grounds: the
trial court's decision to disregard his objections as untimely and the trial court's
substantive judgment to raise his child-support obligation. The court of appeals
affirmed the ruling that the objections were untimely and therefore declined to
consider the merits of the decision to raise appellant's child-support obligation.
See State ex rel. Booher v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc. (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 52, 53-
54, 723 N.E.2d 571 ("Civ.R. 53[E][3][b]1 prohibits a party from `assign[ing] as
error on appeal the court's adoption of any finding of fact or conclusion of law
unless the party has objected to that finding or conclusion under this rule' ").
{¶6} The court of appeals granted appellant's motion to certify a
conflict on the issue of whether his premature objections to the magistrate's

1 Proposed amendments to Civ.R. 53 are pending. The amendments are due to take effect on July
1, 2003, unless they are modified, withdrawn, or disapproved prior to that date. Ohio Official
Reports Advance Sheets of Jan. 27, 2003, xxix, xxxi-xxxiv;
<ftp://ftp.sconet.state.oh.us/RuleAmendments/2003/r1010703-A.doc>. The proposed
amendments would have no effect on the resolution of this case but would renumber parts of
Civ.R. 53(E) and would alter the wording of some of the provisions of Civ.R. 53(E) quoted in this
opinion.
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January Term, 2003
decision should be regarded as timely, finding its holding on that issue in conflict
with the judgment of the Seventh District Court of Appeals in Koss v. Koss (June
29, 1982), Mahoning App. No. 81CA47, 1982 WL 6152.
{¶7} The cause is now before this court upon our determination that a
conflict exists.
{¶8} The issue certified by the court of appeals is "Where objections to
a magistrate's decision are filed in advance of the filing of the magistrate's
decision to which the objections apply, does the trial court err as a matter of law
or abuse its discretion by overruling the objections as untimely?"
{¶9} In agreeing with the trial court that the objections were untimely,
the court of appeals cited Civ.R. 53(E)(3)(a), which provides, "Within fourteen
days of the filing of a magistrate's decision, a party may file written objections to
the magistrate's decision." The court of appeals found that because appellant's
objections were filed before the magistrate's decision was filed, they had not been
filed "within fourteen days" of that decision's filing, and so were untimely.
{¶10} In Koss, the Seventh District Court of Appeals found on similar
facts that prematurely filed objections to a magistrate's decision should be
considered timely. The Koss court analogized the situation before it to that of a
prematurely filed notice of appeal, which under App.R. 4(C) "is treated as filed
immediately after" the filing of the final order being appealed. The court in Koss
found that no party would be prejudiced if the objections were treated as timely.
{¶11} In the case sub judice, the court of appeals recognized that App.R.
4(C) is applicable to premature notices of appeal but declined to extend that result
by analogy to premature objections to a magistrate's decision. The court of
appeals found that "the civil rules do not provide a mechanism for considering
premature objections to a magistrate's decision as timely filed when the decision
is journalized."
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
{¶12} Although we acknowledge that objections to a magistrate's
decision are significantly different in character from a notice of appeal, we agree
with the court in Koss that neither party would be prejudiced if prematurely filed
objections were to be considered timely. Civ.R. 53(E)(3)(a) does not specify that
prematurely filed objections to the magistrate's decision are untimely. The rule
simply provides that the objections must be filed within 14 days of the decision,
thereby setting the outside time limit for filing objections. The rule is silent on
the timeliness of prematurely filed objections.
{¶13} Civ.R. 1(B) provides that the Civil Rules "shall be construed and
applied to effect just results by eliminating delay, unnecessary expense and all
other impediments to the expeditious administration of justice." Treating
prematurely filed objections to a magistrate's decision as untimely would elevate
form over substance and would not promote just results because no prejudice to
either party would result from treating the prematurely filed objections as timely.
Furthermore, there is no jurisdictional problem if premature objections are treated
as timely. The premature objections should be deemed filed on the date the
magistrate's decision is filed.
{¶14} We do not mean to imply that appellant's decision to file his
objections prematurely and then not to file anything once the magistrate's
decision was filed was a prudent course of action. Civ.R. 53(E)(3)(b) provides
that objections to the magistrate's decision "shall be specific and state with
particularity the grounds of objection." A party who files premature objections
runs the risk of not complying with this rule and of having the objections
overruled because they are not responsive to the grounds ultimately relied on by
the magistrate.
{¶15} In addition, there is always the possibility that the magistrate will
reconsider his or her position after it is unofficially conveyed to the parties,
making it unwise to rely on the magistrate's early explanation of the expected
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January Term, 2003
final decision. The act of filing of the magistrate's decision confers upon it the
finality necessary for a party to be sure of making relevant objections to it.
{¶16} For all of the foregoing reasons, we hold that prematurely filed
objections to a magistrate's decision are not untimely for purposes of Civ.R.
53(E)(3). Even though the premature objections are timely, the party who files
premature objections runs the risk of having them overruled for a different
reason--that they are not responsive to the magistrate's decision.
{¶17} In this case, fortunately for appellant, his premature objections
were responsive to the magistrate's decision and did state with particularity the
reasons appellant disagreed with the magistrate's decision. For that reason, there
was no need for appellant to refile his objections. No prejudice to either party
will result from treating the objections as timely. We reverse the judgment of the
court of appeals and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings.
Judgment reversed
and cause remanded.

MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, CHRISTLEY, LUNDBERG STRATTON
and O'CONNOR, JJ., concur.

JUDITH A. CHRISTLEY, J., of the Eleventh Appellate District, sitting for
COOK, J.
__________________

John F. Kolberg, for appellee.

Rittgers & Rittgers, James A. Dearie and Ellen B. Rittgers, for appellant.
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