State ex rel. United States Steel Corp. v. Zaleski - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

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[Cite as State ex rel. United States Steel Corp. v. Zaleski, 98 Ohio St.3d 395, 2003-Ohio-1630.]

THE STATE EX REL. UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, F.K.A.
U.S.X CORPORATION, APPELLANT, v. ZALESKI, JUDGE, APPELLEE.
[Cite as State ex rel. United States Steel Corp. v. Zaleski, 98 Ohio St.3d 395,
2003-Ohio-1630.]
Workers' compensation -- Prohibition -- Writs sought prohibiting common
pleas court judge from exercising any further jurisdiction over
claimants' appeals from Industrial Commission's orders denying claims
for the occupational disease asbestosis and asbestos-related pleural
disease on the ground that claimants' filing of joint notices of appeal
failed to comply with R.C. 4123.512 -- Court of appeals' dismissal of
complaints affirmed.
(Nos. 2002-1551 and 2002-1669 -- Submitted February 25, 2003 -- Decided
April 16, 2003.)
APPEALS from the Court of Appeals for Lorain County, Nos. 02CA008083,
02CA008095 and 02CA008097.
__________________

Per Curiam.
{¶1} Joe McLendon, Ralph William Jr., Joseph Makuch, Franklin
Wilson, Richard Reinoehl, Robert Mustard, Howard Carter, and Carl
McDonaldson each worked at a plant in Lorain, Ohio, owned and operated by
appellant, United States Steel Corporation, f.k.a., USX Corporation ("U.S.
Steel"). Each of these workers claimed that he was diagnosed with the
occupational diseases asbestosis and asbestos-related pleural disease, and each
worker filed a workers' compensation claim. The district hearing officer of the
Industrial Commission denied the claims, the commission's staff hearing officer

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
affirmed the district hearing officer's orders and denied the claims, and the
commission refused the claimants' further appeals.
{¶2} On January 4, 2002, Carter and McDonaldson filed in the Lorain
County Court of Common Pleas a joint notice of appeal from the commission's
orders as well as a complaint for a judgment declaring that they are entitled to
participate in the workers' compensation fund for asbestosis and asbestos-related
pleural disease. On February 26, 2002, Wilson, Reinoehl, and Mustard filed a
comparable joint notice of appeal and complaint in the common pleas court. On
March 7, 2002, McLendon, William, and Makuch filed a similar joint notice of
appeal and complaint in the common pleas court. The notices of appeal stated the
names of the claimants and their employer, the numbers of their claims, the dates
of the commission orders appealed from, and the fact that the claimants were
appealing therefrom. U.S. Steel moved to dismiss the appeals, claiming that
because the claimants' notices had been filed jointly, they failed to comply with
R.C. 4123.512. In April and May 2002, appellee, Judge Edward M. Zaleski of the
common pleas court, denied the motions.
{¶3} U.S. Steel subsequently filed complaints in the Court of Appeals
for Lorain County for writs of prohibition to prevent Judge Zaleski from
exercising any further jurisdiction over the claimants' appeals and to dismiss the
cases with prejudice. Judge Zaleski filed Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motions to dismiss the
complaints for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In July
and August 2002, the court of appeals granted Judge Zaleski's motions and
dismissed the complaints.
{¶4} In its appeals as of right, U.S. Steel asserts that the court of appeals
erred in dismissing its prohibition actions.1

1 We grant U.S. Steel's motion to consolidate these cases because
they involve the same background facts and they raise identical legal
2

January Term, 2003
Request for Oral Argument
{¶5} U.S. Steel requests oral argument for these appeals pursuant to
S.Ct.Prac.R. IX(2). "Among the factors we consider in determining whether to
grant oral argument in appeals in which oral argument is not required is whether
the case involves a matter of great public importance, complex issues of law or
fact, a substantial constitutional issue or a conflict between courts of appeals."
Clark v. Connor (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 309, 311, 695 N.E.2d 751.
{¶6} Oral argument is not warranted here. Although the underlying
issue of whether R.C. 4123.512 prohibits joint notices of appeal may be
significant, the court of appeals did not expressly determine that issue, nor need
we; our review is instead restricted to whether extraordinary relief in prohibition
is warranted. The parties' briefs are sufficient to resolve this limited issue. No
issues of legal or factual complexity are involved, no constitutional issue is
implicated, and no conflict between courts of appeals is claimed.
{¶7} Therefore, we deny U.S. Steel's request for oral argument.
Prohibition
{¶8} The dismissals of the prohibition complaints were warranted if,
after all factual allegations of the complaints were presumed true and all
reasonable inferences were made in U.S. Steel's favor, it appeared beyond doubt
that U.S. Steel could prove no set of facts warranting the requested extraordinary
relief in prohibition. State ex rel. Suburban Constr. Co. v. Skok (1999), 85 Ohio
St.3d 645, 646, 710 N.E.2d 710. "In the absence of a patent and unambiguous
lack of jurisdiction, a court having general subject-matter jurisdiction can
determine its own jurisdiction, and a party challenging that jurisdiction has an

issues. See State ex rel. Lemmon v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. (1997),
78 Ohio St.3d 186, 187, 677 N.E.2d 347, fn. 1.
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adequate remedy by appeal." State ex rel. Nalls v. Russo, 96 Ohio St.3d 410,
2002-Ohio-4907, 775 N.E.2d 522, ¶ 18.
{¶9} U.S. Steel claims that Judge Zaleski patently and unambiguously
lacked jurisdiction over the appeals because the notices of appeal did not comply
with R.C. 4123.512. More specifically, U.S. Steel asserts that R.C. 4123.512
prohibits joint notices of appeal by multiple claimants from multiple common
pleas court decisions. Based on the following, U.S. Steel's prohibition claim is
meritless.
{¶10} Under R.C. 4123.512(A), "[t]he claimant or the employer may
appeal an order of the industrial commission made under division (E) of section
4123.511 of the Revised Code in any injury or occupational disease case, other
than a decision as to the extent of disability to the court of common pleas of the
county in which the injury was inflicted * * *." In these appeals, R.C.
4123.512(B) requires the following contents for the notice of appeal:
{¶11} "The notice of appeal shall state the names of the claimant and the
employer, the number of the claim, the date of the order appealed from, and the
fact that the appellant appeals therefrom."
{¶12} Notwithstanding U.S. Steel's claims to the contrary, a combined or
joint notice of appeal by multiple claimants pursuant to R.C. 4123.512 does not
patently and unambiguously divest a common pleas court of jurisdiction over the
appeal. In construing the statute, our paramount concern is legislative intent, and
words and phrases must be read in context. State ex rel. Moss v. Ohio State Hwy.
Patrol Retirement Sys., 97 Ohio St.3d 198, 2002-Ohio-5806, 777 N.E.2d 259, ¶
20-21. No language in R.C. 4123.512 expressly precludes joint appeals or
combined notices of appeal.
{¶13} Moreover, U.S. Steel's assertion that the language of R.C.
4123.512 referring to the claimant and the order appealed from prohibits
claimants from filing a joint notice of appeal ignores applicable rules of statutory
4

January Term, 2003
interpretation. R.C. 1.43(A) provides that "[t]he singular includes the plural, and
the plural includes the singular."
{¶14} In Republic Steel Corp. v. Quinn (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 57, 58-59,
12 OBR 49, 465 N.E.2d 413, we relied on R.C. 1.43(A) to reject a comparable
argument in a case in which an employer sought a writ of prohibition to prevent a
common pleas court from considering a combined appeal by a single claimant
from two separate workers' compensation decisions by the Industrial
Commission:
{¶15} "Appellant contends that R.C. 4123.519[2] does not authorize two
or more decisions of the commission to be appealed to the court of common pleas
in a single action. Instead, appellant contends that Gordon was required to
institute a separate appeal from each claim addressed by the commission.
{¶16} "In support of this contention, appellant relies upon the language
of R.C. 4123.519 providing for an appeal of `a decision' of the commission within
sixty days of having received the `decision,' as it pertains to a `claim' made due to
the infliction of an `injury.' Since Gordon initiated a single appeal involving two
decisions of the commission, appellant argues that R.C. 4123.519 was not adhered
to and that, as such, [the court of common pleas] is wholly without jurisdiction to
consider the appeal.
{¶17} "We are unpersuaded by appellant's argument which completely
overlooks the provisions of R.C. 1.43(A) wherein the General Assembly has
stated, with respect to statutory construction, that `[t]he singular includes the
plural, and the plural includes the singular.'
{¶18} "* * *

2 Former R.C. 4123.519 was amended and recodified as R.C.
4123.512, 145 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2990, 3153.
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{¶19} "* * * [T]he application of R.C. 1.43(A) is neither prohibited by
the provisions of R.C. 4123.519, nor does it conflict with related provisions
contained in R.C. Chapter 4123, as long as any and all decisions sought to be
appealed are instituted within the sixty-day limitation period prescribed by R.C.
4123.519. In the subject cause, each decision was appealed within the sixty-day
limitation period. Accordingly, [the common pleas court] is not exercising
jurisdiction unauthorized by law and, therefore, the court of appeals properly
denied the writ [of prohibition]." See, also, Akers v. Johnson Controls, Inc. (June
27, 1997), Highland App. No. 96CA900, 1997 WL 360569, which reached a
similar conclusion.
{¶20} Furthermore, we have expressly noted that the "jurisdictional
requirements of R.C. [4123.512] are satisfied by the filing of a timely notice of
appeal which is in substantial compliance with the dictates of that statute."
(Emphasis added.) Fisher v. Mayfield (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 8, 30 OBR 16, 505
N.E.2d 975, paragraph one of the syllabus, construing former R.C. 4123.519.
"Substantial compliance for jurisdictional purposes occurs when a timely notice
of appeal filed pursuant to R.C. [4123.512] includes sufficient information, in
intelligible form, to place on notice all parties to a proceeding that an appeal has
been filed from an identifiable final order which has determined the parties'
substantive rights and liabilities." Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶21} The claimants' joint notices contained all of the information
required by R.C. 4123.512(B), notifying all parties, including U.S. Steel, of the
appeals and orders being appealed. See, e.g., Fisher at paragraph two of the
syllabus; Holmes v. Pipeline Dev. Co. (Feb. 17, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No.
76835, 2000 WL 193254. U.S. Steel does not assert that the combined notices
misled or prejudiced them in preparing a defense. In fact, U.S. Steel readily
concedes that the notices of appeal "contain sufficient information, without
6

January Term, 2003
misstatement or technical error, to put all parties on notice of the workers'
compensation claims being appealed."
{¶22} Notably, U.S. Steel cites no appellate case holding that R.C.
4123.512 requires an individual notice of appeal for each claimant.
{¶23} Therefore, Judge Zaleski does not patently and unambiguously
lack jurisdiction over the claimants' appeal. In so holding, we need not expressly
rule on U.S. Steel's jurisdictional claims because our review is limited to
determining whether Judge Zaleski patently and unambiguously lacks
jurisdiction. State ex rel. Shimko v. McMonagle (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 426, 431,
751 N.E.2d 472.
{¶24} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals properly dismissed
U.S. Steel's prohibition actions. U.S. Steel has adequate legal remedies by appeal
to raise its jurisdictional claims. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the
court of appeals.
Judgments affirmed.

MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK, LUNDBERG
STRATTON and O'CONNOR, JJ., concur.
__________________

Rademaker, Matty, McClelland & Greve, Robert C. McClelland and
Jennifer L. Whitt; and Roberta K. Spurgeon, for appellant.

Gregory A. White, Lorain County Prosecuting Attorney, and M. Robert
Flanagan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
__________________
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