Johnson v. Marshall - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

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[Cite as Johnson v. Marshall, 101 Ohio St.3d 418, 2004-Ohio-1498.]

JOHNSON, APPELLANT, v. MARSHALL, JUDGE, APPELLEE.
[Cite as Johnson v. Marshall, 101 Ohio St.3d 418, 2004-Ohio-1498.]
Prohibition -- Writ sought prohibiting judge of common pleas court from
proceeding with a sexual predator classification hearing -- Court of
appeals' dismissal of complaint affirmed.
(No. 2003-1916 -- Submitted March 15, 2004 -- Decided April 14, 2004.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Scioto County, No. 03CA2895.
____________________

Per Curiam.
{¶1} In 1991, appellant, Robert L. Johnson, pled guilty to rape and was
sentenced to prison.
{¶2} In 1996, the General Assembly enacted a sexual predator
classification provision in R.C. 2950.09. Am.Sub.H.B. No. 180, 146 Ohio Laws,
Part II, 2560, 2618. Johnson's trial court scheduled a July 31, 2003 hearing under
R.C. 2950.09(C) to determine whether Johnson should be classified as a sexual
predator as a result of his 1991 rape conviction.
{¶3} On July 18, 2003, Johnson filed a complaint in the Court of
Appeals for Scioto County for a writ of prohibition to prevent appellee, Scioto
County Common Pleas Court Judge William T. Marshall, from proceeding with
the July 31, 2003 sexual predator classification hearing. Johnson claimed that
Judge Marshall patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to conduct the
hearing because the judge never received a statutorily required recommendation
from the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction ("ODRC").
{¶4} On July 31, 2003, Judge Marshall conducted a hearing at which
Johnson stipulated that he was a habitual sexual offender. On August 1, 2003,
Judge Marshall classified Johnson as a habitual sexual offender and ordered him

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
to comply with the registration requirements of R.C. 2950.04, 2950.05, 2950.06,
and 2950.07.
{¶5} Judge Marshall subsequently moved to dismiss Johnson's
prohibition claim based on mootness. In his response to the motion, Johnson
attached an April 24, 2003 letter from ODRC to the trial court recommending that
several offenders, including Johnson, be designated as sexual predators. Johnson
claimed that the letter was falsified, was never received by Judge Marshall, and
was not sent in the proper form.
{¶6} On September 24, 2003, the court of appeals dismissed Johnson's
complaint. This cause is before the court upon Johnson's appeal as of right.
{¶7} As the court of appeals correctly concluded, Johnson had an
adequate remedy by way of appeal from Judge Marshall's August 1, 2003
judgment classifying him as a habitual sexual offender. See State ex rel.
Bruggeman v. Ingraham (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 230, 232, 718 N.E.2d 1285 (court
of appeals properly dismissed complaint for writ of prohibition to prevent trial
court judge from proceeding with sexual predator classification hearing because
relator could appeal issue concerning statutory prerequisite of ODRC
recommendation).
{¶8} Based on the foregoing, Johnson's prohibition claim was properly
dismissed. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.1
Judgment affirmed.

MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON,
O'CONNOR and O'DONNELL, JJ., concur.
__________________

Robert L. Johnson, pro se.

1. This renders moot Johnson's request for a stay of Judge Marshall's August 1, 2003
classification order.
2

January Term, 2004

Lynn Alan Grimshaw, Scioto County Prosecuting Attorney, and R.
Randolph Rumble, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
__________________
3