State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Winkler - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

	ROMINGER LEGAL
		Ohio Court Cases and Opinions - Ohio Legal Research
					Need Legal Help?
					Need Legal Help?
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER			LEGAL HEADLINES - CASE LAW - LEGAL FORMS	NOT FINDING WHAT YOU NEED? -RESEARCH

This court case was taken from the web sites of the Ohio Courts. Search our site for more cases - CLICK HERE

LEGAL RESEARCH

COURT REPORTERS

PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS

PROCESS SERVERS

DOCUMENT RETRIEVERS

EXPERT WITNESSES

Find a Private Investigator

Find an Expert Witness

Find a Process Server

Case Law - save on Lexis / WestLaw.

Legal News - Legal Headlines

[Cite as State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Winkler, 101 Ohio St.3d 382, 2004-Ohio-1581.]

THE STATE EX REL. CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, APPELLANT, v. WINKLER ET AL.,
APPELLEES.
[Cite as State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Winkler, 101 Ohio St.3d 382, 2004-
Ohio-1581.]
Public records -- Sealing of official records after not guilty finding or dismissal
of complaint -- R.C. 2953.52 does not violate the public's constitutional
right of access to public records.
(No. 2003-0157 -- Submitted October 8, 2003 -- Decided April 14, 2004.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-010763, 151
Ohio App.3d 10, 2002-Ohio-7334.
__________________
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT
R.C. 2953.52 does not violate the public's constitutional right of access to public
records.
__________________
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.
{¶1} In September 2001, appellee Hamilton County Municipal Judge
Ralph E. Winkler conducted a bench trial in which the defendant was acquitted of
all charges. On September 27, 2001, the day after the trial's conclusion, the
defendant filed a motion to seal the official record of his case pursuant to R.C.
2953.52. On November 5, 2001 (almost six weeks after the trial), Judge Winkler
held a hearing on the motion and later granted it. On December 6, 2001, the
Cincinnati Enquirer, appellant, delivered to Judge Winkler a written request to
inspect all records produced in the criminal case. Judge Winkler refused the
paper's request because the court records had already been sealed. Thereafter,
appellant filed this mandamus action in the First District Court of Appeals against
both Judge Ralph E. Winkler and Clerk of Courts James C. Cissell, appellees.

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
{¶2} Initially, the court of appeals ordered Judge Winkler to weigh the
individual's privacy interests against the public's legitimate interest in accessing
the records, as required by R.C. 2953.52. 149 Ohio App.3d 350, 2002-Ohio-
4803, 777 N.E.2d 320. In response, Judge Winkler determined that the
defendant's privacy interests outweighed the public's right of access. Thereafter,
the court of appeals, in a two-to-one decision, accepted Judge Winkler's findings
and declined to issue the requested writ. The cause is now before this court upon
an appeal as of right.
{¶3} Appellant presents three arguments in this appeal. First, appellant
argues that it is entitled to the release of the court records, as they are public
records as defined in the Public Records Act. Second, appellant asserts that R.C.
2953.52 is unconstitutional, since it is overbroad and, therefore, it cannot be used
as an exception to the Public Records Act. Third, appellant contends that in
applying the balancing test, the court should have found in favor of releasing the
records. Appellees, however, assert that R.C. 2953.52 is constitutional and that
records sealed pursuant to this statute lose their status as public records.
Appellees also contend that the case was improperly brought in mandamus.
{¶4} Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to seek compliance with the
Public Records Act under R.C. 149.43. State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing
Co. v. Bond, 98 Ohio St.3d 146, 2002-Ohio-7117, 781 N.E.2d 180, ¶ 50. We
have also held that mandamus may be used when a right of access to public
records is predicated on a constitutional challenge. Id. Therefore, we find that
appellant correctly sought mandamus relief. We turn now to the merits of the
case and consider whether the records that appellant seeks are public records and
whether R.C. 2953.52 is constitutional on its face and as applied.
{¶5} We begin with the purpose of Ohio's Public Records Act, R.C.
149.43, which is to expose government activity to public scrutiny. State ex rel.
WHIO-TV-7 v. Lowe (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 350, 355, 673 N.E.2d 1360.
Moreover, we have consistently construed the Public Records Act to provide the
2

January Term, 2004
broadest access to government records. State ex rel. Natl. Broadcasting Co. v.
Cleveland (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 79, 83, 526 N.E.2d 786. Therefore, in keeping
with policy, it is apparent that court records fall within the broad definition of a
"public record" in R.C. 149.43(A)(1): " `Public record' means records kept by
any public office, including, but not limited to, state, county, city, village,
township, and school district units * * *."
{¶6} However, there are exceptions to the general rule of openness. One
exception, found in R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v), is for "[r]ecords the release of which is
prohibited by state or federal law." Sealed court records fall within this
exception, since R.C. 2953.55(B) makes it a fourth-degree misdemeanor to
release sealed records. Thus, once the court records were sealed under R.C.
2953.52, they ceased to be public records. Since the sealed records lost their
status as public records, Judge Winkler was justified in refusing appellant's
request.
{¶7} Appellant next argues that R.C. 2953.52 is unconstitutional on the
ground that it violates the public's right of access. We reject this contention.
{¶8} The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides a
qualified right of access to criminal proceedings. Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court of California, Riverside Cty. (1986), 478 U.S. 1, 7-8, 106 S.Ct.
2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1. Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution guarantees the
public's right to open courts. This right of access found in both the federal and
state Constitutions includes records and transcripts that document the
proceedings. State ex rel. Scripps Howard Broadcasting Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty.
Court of Common Pleas (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 19, 21, 652 N.E.2d 179; Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, Riverside Cty. (1984), 464 U.S.
501, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629.
{¶9} The right of public access, as examined in the context of a criminal
proceeding, serves several lofty goals. First, a crime is a public wrong, and the
interest of the community to observe the administration of justice in such an
3

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
instance is compelling. Harrison, How Open Is Open? The Development of the
Public Access Doctrine under State Open Courts Provisions (1992), 60
U.Cin.L.Rev. 1307, 1322. Also, the general right of public access promotes
respect for and an understanding of the legal system and thus enables the public to
engage in an informed discussion of the governmental process. Bechamps,
Sealed Out-of-Court Settlements: When Does the Public Have a Right to Know?
(1990), 66 Notre Dame L.Rev. 117, 127. The right however, is not absolute. "No
one has a right to any particular degree of openness or secrecy, except as provided
by law." State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Waters (1993), 67 Ohio
St.3d 321, 324, 617 N.E.2d 1110. We have further held that it is a proper role of
the General Assembly to balance competing private and public rights. State ex
rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Univ. of Toledo Found. (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 258, 266,
602 N.E.2d 1159. The General Assembly has done so in R.C. 2953.52.
{¶10} R.C. 2953.52 makes another exception to the general rule of
openness. R.C. 2953.52(A)(1) allows a defendant found not guilty of an offense
to apply to the court to have his or her record sealed.1 The statute further requires
that following a hearing, the court must "[w]eigh the interests of the person in
having the official records pertaining to the case sealed against the legitimate
needs, if any, of the government to maintain those records." R.C.
2953.52(B)(2)(d). Thus, the court's discretion to seal records is not unfettered.
Instead, the statute balances the public's right of access and the acquitted
defendant's constitutional right to privacy. See Pepper Pike v. Doe (1981), 66
Ohio St.2d 374, 377, 20 O.O.3d 334, 421 N.E.2d 1303 (balancing and sealing
within inherent power of court, without statute). The defendant's right to privacy
takes into account the public policy of providing a second chance to criminal
defendants who have been found not guilty. State v. D.H.W. (Fla.1996), 686
So.2d 1331, 1336.

1. The statute also permits a court to seal records following a dismissal of the charges or a grand
jury's no bill.
4

January Term, 2004
{¶11} The only function of this statute is to allow a court, after balancing
the public and private interests, to limit the life of a particular record. The
public's ability to attend a criminal trial is not hindered. The media's right to
report on the court proceedings is not diminished. The statute does not restrict the
media's right to publish truthful information relating to the criminal proceedings
that have been sealed. In addition, the public had a right of access to any court
record before, during, and for a period of time after the criminal trial. In fact, the
public's access to the records is unrestricted until a decision is made to seal
records. The statute ensures fairness by balancing the competing concerns of the
public's right to know and the defendant's right to keep certain information
private. Therefore, on its face, R.C. 2953.52 is constitutional.
{¶12} Nor is R.C. 2953.52 unconstitutional as applied. In this case, there
was a full public trial with widespread media attention. Appellant's reporters
presumably attended the trial in its entirety. The court record remained open for
more than five weeks after the trial had concluded. Thus, appellant had ample
opportunity to report on and to access and copy the trial record for a substantial
period of time before its sealing. Once a case is sealed, however, the basis for
public access to the official records does not exist.
{¶13} We therefore conclude that R.C. 2953.52 does not violate the
public's constitutional right of access to public records and that the trial court
complied with its dictates.
{¶14} The court of appeals' judgment denying the writ is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.

MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O'CONNOR and
O'DONNELL, JJ., concur.
__________________

Graydon, Head & Ritchey, L.L.P., John C. Greiner and John A. Flanagan,
for appellant.
5

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Michaeil K. Allen, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and David T.
Stevenson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees.
__________________
6