State ex rel. Mora v. Wilkinson - Ohio Supreme Court Opinion - Ohio Supreme Court Decision

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[Cite as State ex rel. Mora v. Wilkinson, 105 Ohio St.3d 272, 2005-Ohio-1509.]

THE STATE EX REL. MORA, APPELLANT, v. WILKINSON, DIR., ET AL.,
APPELLEES.
[Cite as State ex rel. Mora v. Wilkinson, 105 Ohio St.3d 272, 2005-Ohio-1509.]
Res judicata -- Previous claims for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief
bar mandamus claim -- Court of appeals' denial of writ of mandamus
affirmed.
(No. 2004-1331 -- Submitted March 9, 2005 -- Decided April 13, 2005.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Wayne County, No. 03-CA-0062.
__________________

Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} In May 1990, a Wayne County jury convicted appellant, Juan
Mora, a.k.a. Dan Mora, of three counts of rape, four counts of felonious sexual
penetration, nine counts of gross sexual imposition, and three counts of corruption
of a minor. The Wayne County Court of Common Pleas sentenced Mora to 10 to
25 years on each of the rape and felonious-sexual-penetration convictions and 2
years on each of the gross-sexual-imposition and corruption-of-a-minor
convictions. The order specified that the sentences were to be served
consecutively, for an aggregate prison term of 94 to 175 years. The common
pleas court noted that, by law, Mora's minimum prison term of 94 years was
reduced to 15 years.
{¶ 2} On October 5, 1990, the common pleas court issued a nunc pro
tunc order deleting the language that had reduced Mora's aggregate minimum
sentence to 15 years and replacing it with the following language: "The twelve
consecutive 2-year definite sentences * * * of 24 years shall be consecutive to the
indefinite terms of 15 to 175 years * * *."

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
{¶ 3} On appeal, the Court of Appeals for Wayne County reversed the
common pleas court's nunc pro tunc entry, reinstated the original aggregate
minimum sentence of 15 years, and otherwise affirmed Mora's conviction and
sentence. State v. Mora (Mar. 6, 1991), Wayne App. No. 2579, 1991 WL 35145,
appeal not accepted for review (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 1419, 574 N.E.2d 1090.
The court of appeals reasoned that the 15-year limitation on aggregate minimum
prison terms set forth in former R.C. 2929.41(E), S.B. No. 51, 142 Ohio Laws,
Part I, 1875, 1886, applied to all consecutive terms imposed, whether for definite
or indefinite terms, or for combinations thereof. Id.
{¶ 4} On October 8, 1998, the common pleas court issued an entry
reducing Mora's aggregate minimum term of imprisonment to 15 years based on
the court of appeals' 1991 judgment.
{¶ 5} In August 1999, we held that former R.C. 2929.41(E)(2) did not
apply to definite sentences; in other words, the 15-year limitation applied only to
the aggregate minimum term of indefinite sentences. Yonkings v. Wilkinson
(1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 225, 226-228, 714 N.E.2d 394; State ex rel. Hamann v.
Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 96 Ohio St.3d 72, 2002-Ohio-3528, 771 N.E.2d
254, ¶ 6.
{¶ 6} In October 2002, Mora filed a complaint for declaratory judgment
and injunctive relief in the common pleas court. Mora claimed that appellee
Reginald Wilkinson, Director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction ("ODRC"), and the chief legal counsel for ODRC had failed to comply
with former R.C. 2929.41(E)(2) and the court of appeals and common pleas court
orders to reduce his aggregate minimum prison term to 15 years. Mora requested
"a declaratory judgment that the [ODRC] comply with the mandates issued by the
Ninth District Court of Appeals and the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas
and for them to correct their records to reflect the correct and original sentence
imposed." In November 2002, the defendants moved for summary judgment
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January Term, 2005
based on Yonkings. On January 3, 2003, the common pleas court granted
summary judgment to the defendants and denied the relief requested by Mora.
{¶ 7} Instead of appealing from the common pleas court judgment, in
October 2003, Mora filed a petition in the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus
to compel appellees, Wilkinson and various other ODRC employees, to comply
with the 1991 court of appeals order and the 1998 common pleas court order and
reduce his aggregate minimum term of imprisonment to 15 years. Appellees
answered the petition and subsequently moved for summary judgment based on
res judicata. Appellees claimed that the common pleas court's January 3, 2003
judgment on Mora's claims for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief barred
his mandamus claim.
{¶ 8} On July 8, 2004, the court of appeals granted appellees' motion
and denied the writ.
{¶ 9} Mora initially asserts that the court of appeals abused its discretion
by denying his motion to strike appellees' filings in the mandamus case. Mora
moved to strike appellees' answer and motion for summary judgment because
they were not captioned in the name of the state on his relation.
{¶ 10} "A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to strike will not
be overturned on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion." Samadder v.
DMF of Ohio, Inc., 154 Ohio App.3d 770, 2003-Ohio-5340, 798 N.E.2d 1141, ¶
17; see, also, State ex rel. Cassels v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994),
69 Ohio St.3d 217, 223, 631 N.E.2d 150. " `Abuse of discretion' means
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable." State ex rel. Cranford v. Cleveland,
103 Ohio St.3d 196, 2004-Ohio-4884, 814 N.E.2d 1218, ¶ 24.
{¶ 11} The court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in denying Mora's
motion to strike. R.C. 2731.04 specifies that actions for a writ of mandamus must
be brought "in the name of the state on the relation of the person applying." We
have dismissed petitions for writs of mandamus when the actions were not so
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
captioned, the respondents raised timely objections, and the relators failed to
amend their petitions. Litigaide, Inc. v. Lakewood Police Dept. Custodian of
Records (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 508, 664 N.E.2d 521; see, also, Blankenship v.
Blackwell, 103 Ohio St.3d 567, 2004-Ohio-5596, 817 N.E.2d 382, ¶ 34-37. R.C.
2731.04 and this precedent are inapplicable here because the alleged improper
captioning was not on the petition. Moreover, there is no evidence that Mora was
prejudiced by appellees' failure to properly caption their answer and motion for
summary judgment. The court of appeals properly denied Mora's motion to
strike.
{¶ 12} Mora next asserts that the court of appeals erred in relying on res
judicata to deny his request for a writ of mandamus.
{¶ 13} "Under the doctrine of res judicata, `[a] valid, final judgment
rendered upon the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising
out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous
action.' " State ex rel. Denton v. Bedinghaus, 98 Ohio St.3d 298, 2003-Ohio-861,
784 N.E.2d 99, ¶ 14, quoting Grava v. Parkman Twp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 379,
653 N.E.2d 226, syllabus.
{¶ 14} In general, "[r]es judicata bars the litigation of all claims that either
were or might have been litigated in a first lawsuit." Hughes v. Calabrese, 95
Ohio St.3d 334, 2002-Ohio-2217, 767 N.E.2d 725, ¶ 12. Unlike other judgments,
however, "a declaratory judgment determines only what it actually decides and
does not preclude other claims that might have been advanced." State ex rel.
Shemo v. Mayfield Hts. (2002), 95 Ohio St.3d 59, 69, 765 N.E.2d 345; 1
Restatement of the Law 2d, Judgments (1982) 337, Section 33, Comment c.
{¶ 15} Res judicata barred Mora's mandamus claim because he had raised
the same claim about the 15-year aggregate minimum prison term against
Wilkinson in his previous common pleas court action for declaratory judgment
and injunctive relief. In that prior case, Mora expressly requested that Wilkinson
4

January Term, 2005
comply with the mandates of the common pleas court and the court of appeals.
His mandamus claim makes the same request of Wilkinson and other ODRC
employees in privity with Wilkinson.
{¶ 16} Therefore, appellees were entitled to summary judgment and
denial of the writ based on res judicata.
{¶ 17} Finally, Mora waived his claim on appeal that the attachments to
appellees' motion for summary judgment were not certified, because he failed to
raise this objection in the court of appeals. See State ex rel. Ross v. State, 102
Ohio St.3d 73, 2004-Ohio-1827, 806 N.E.2d 553, ¶ 7. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment of the court of appeals. We also deny Mora's motion to strike
appellees' merit brief.
Judgment affirmed.

MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O'CONNOR,
O'DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur.
__________________

Juan Mora, pro se.

Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Scott M. Campbell, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellees.
_____________________
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