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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
______________________________
No. 00-41420
Summary Calendar
______________________________
ROBERT LEE CHAMBLISS,
Plaintiff-Appellant
VERSUS
LARRY G. MASSANARI, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee

___________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Texas
___________________________________________________
October 18, 2001
Before JOLLY, DeMOSS, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Robert Lee Chambliss ("Chambliss") appeals from the district
court's judgment affirming the denial of his application for
disability insurance benefits. He argues that the (1)
Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") improperly evaluated his
allegations of pain; (2) the ALJ did not give appropriate weight to
the Veterans Administration's ("VA") determination that he was
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permanently and totally disabled; and (3) the ALJ relied solely on
expert witness testimony and not his medical records.
1. Allegations of Pain
The ALJ did not improperly evaluate the claimant's allegations
of pain. Whether pain is disabling is an issue for the ALJ, who
has the primary responsibility for resolving conflicts in the
evidence. See Carrier v. Sullivan, 944 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir.
1991). It is within the ALJ's discretion to determine the
disabling nature of a claimant's pain, and the ALJ's determination
is entitled to considerable deference. See Wren v. Sullivan, 925
F.2d 123, 128 (5th Cir. 1991); James v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 702, 706
(5th Cir. 1986). The determination whether an applicant is able to
work despite some pain is within the province of the administrative
agency and should be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.
See Jones v. Heckler, 702 F.2d 616, 622 (5th Cir. 1983). Moreover,
pain must be constant, unremitting, and wholly unresponsive to
therapeutic treatment to be disabling. See Falco v. Shalala, 27
F.3d 160, 163 (5th Cir. 1994). Subjective complaints of pain must
also be corroborated by objective medical evidence. See Houston v.
Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1989).
In the instant case, the ALJ properly considered Chambliss'
complaints of chest pain. However, the ALJ determined that
Chambliss' statements concerning his impairments, i.e., chest pain,
and their impact on his ability to work were "not entirely credible
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in light of the reports of the treating and examining practitioners
and the medical history." The ALJ concluded that "nothing [in the
medical records] shows significant ongoing cardiac problems or any
basis for restricting the claimant to less than light work
activity, limited by seizure precautions and a restriction from
exposure to concentrated pulmonary irritants." (Tr. At 14). Based
upon the medical records in evidence, we find the ALJ's
determination that the claimant's alleged pain was not sufficient
enough to prevent substantial gainful employment to be supported by
substantial evidence.
2. VA Disability Determination
A VA rating of total and permanent disability is not legally
binding on the Commissioner because the criteria applied by the two
agencies is different, but it is evidence that is entitled to a
certain amount of weight and must be considered by the ALJ. See
Loza v. Apfel, 219 F.3d 378, 394 (5th Cir. 2000); Latham v.
Shalala, 36 F.3d 482, 483 (5th Cir. 1994); Rodriguez v. Schweiker,
640 F.2d 682, 686 (5th Cir. 1981). In Rodriguez and its progeny,
we have sometimes referred to a VA disability determination as
being entitled to "great weight." While this is true in most
cases, the relative weight to be given this type of evidence will
vary depending upon the factual circumstances of each case. Since
the regulations for disability status differ between the SSA and
the VA, ALJs need not give "great weight" to a VA disability
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determination if they adequately explain the valid reasons for not
doing so.
In the case at bar, the ALJ considered the VA's determination
that Chambliss was permanently and totally disabled, but gave it
diminished weight. However, the ALJ provided specific reasons for
giving the VA determination diminished weight. First, the ALJ
noted that the VA disability determination was made only a year
after Chambliss' heart surgery. Second, although not entirely
clear from the ALJ's decision, the ALJ apparently found that the VA
disability determination and the treating physician's opinion that
Chambliss could not work were "conclusory" in nature because they
did not adequately explain why Chambliss could not engage in light
work activity. Furthermore, the ALJ evidently discounted the
treating physician's opinion because it was made as part of an
application for food stamps (based upon need). Because the ALJ
considered the VA disability determination and set forth valid
reasons for giving the determination diminished weight, we cannot
say that the ALJ erred simply because it did not give "great
weight" to the VA disability determination.
3.
Inappropriate Weight Given to Expert Witness Testimony
Chambliss argues for the first time in this appeal that the
ALJ based his decision solely upon the expert witness' testimony
and not the medical records. As a general rule, this court does
not review issues raised for the first time on appeal. See Kinash
4

v. Callahan, 129 F.3d 736, 739 n.10 (5th Cir. 1997). Therefore, it
is not necessary to address this issue.1
4. Conclusion

Our review of the evidence indicates a mixed record concerning
Chamblis' health problems and their impact on his ability to engage
in substantial gainful work activity during the relevant time
period. However, the task of weighing the evidence is the province
of the ALJ. Our job is merely to determine if there is substantial
evidence in the record as a whole which supports the ALJ's
decision. See Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 240 (5th Cir.
1994). Since substantial evidence does exist, the ALJ's decision
is upheld.
AFFIRMED.
1 We note, however, that Chambliss' contention is without merit
because the ALJ based his decision upon both the testimony elicited
from the expert witness as well as claimant's medical records. The
relative weight to be given these pieces of evidence is within the
ALJ's discretion. See Johnson v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 340, 347 (5th
Cir. 1988).
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