Fifth Circuit Court Cases - Case Law and Opinions from the 5th Circuit Federal Court - Court of Appeals

	ROMINGER LEGAL
		Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Opinions - 5th Circuit
					Need Legal Help?
					Need Legal Help?
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER			LEGAL HEADLINES - CASE LAW - LEGAL FORMS	NOT FINDING WHAT YOU NEED? -CLICK HERE

This opinion or court case is from the Fifth Circuit Court or Appeals. Search our site for more cases - CLICK HERE

LEGAL RESEARCH

COURT REPORTERS

PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS

PROCESS SERVERS

DOCUMENT RETRIEVERS

EXPERT WITNESSES

Find a Private Investigator

Find an Expert Witness

Find a Process Server

Case Law - save on Lexis / WestLaw.

Legal News - Legal Headlines

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
____________
No. 00-51242
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TAMMY MOODY, also known as Tammy Hope,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Texas
December 21, 2001
Before BALDOCK*, SMITH and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:
Tammy Moody ("Moody") appeals her four-year supervised release term imposed by the
district court upon revocation of her original term of supervised release. We hold that the district
court properly imposed the four-year term under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h).
Moody pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute 142 grams of methamphetamine
*
Circuit Judge of the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The government sought an enhanced penalty under §
841(b)(1)(B) based on evidence establishing drug quantity. The district court sentenced Moody to
forty-five months' imprisonment1, to be followed by five years' supervised release. Moody served
her prison sentence, and began her supervised release. Thereafter, the government moved to revoke
her supervised release for violations of the terms of her release. After Moody pleaded true to the
alleged violations, the district court revoked her supervised release, and imposed a nine-month
imprisonment term, to be followed by a new term of four years' supervised release. Moody now
appeals.
We will uphold a sentence after revocation of supervised release "`unless it is in violation of
law or is plainly unreasonable.'" United States v. Stiefel, 207 F.3d 256, 259 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting
United States v. Mathena, 23 F.3d 87, 89 (5th Cir. 1994)). Section 3583(h) authorizes a court, upon
revocation of a defendant's supervised release, to impose a new term of supervised release to follow
a term of imprisonment. Section 3583(h), however, limits the duration of supervised release a court
can impose:
The length of such a term of supervised release shall not exceed the
term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that
resulted in the original term of supervised release, less any term of
imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised
release.
18 U.S.C. § 3583(h). The issue in this case is whether the district court imposed a term of supervised
1Although the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment under § 841(b)(1)(B) is five years,
the district court imposed a shorter term in response to the government's motion stating that Moody
provided "substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has
committed an offense." See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (authorizing court to impose a sentence below the
statutory minimum based on substantial assistance); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K1.1
(stating factors a court may consider in determining the length of a reduction based on substantial
assistance).
-2-

release on Moody in excess of that permitted by § 3583(h). Specifically, we are asked to determine
which statute, in addition to § 841(a)(1), governed the offense that resulted in Moody's original term
of supervised release.
Moody contends that the relevant statute for her offense was 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C),
which authorizes no more than three years' supervised release. To support her claim, she relies on
our decision in United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied 121 S. Ct. 1152
(2001). In Doggett, we held that drug quantities set forth in § 841(b) must be alleged in an
indictment to trigger the escalating penalties associated with those quantities. Id. at 164-65. As a
result, we held that defendants charged with unspecified drug quantities could only be sentenced using
§ 841(b)(1)(C). Because § 841(b)(1)(C) authorizes no more than three years' supervised release,
Moody argues that her four-year term imposed by the district court must be vacated.
We find Moody's argument to be unavailing. Though Moody is correct that a defendant
convicted today of possession of a drug quantity not specified in the indictment would be sentenced
under § 841(b)(1)(C), that was not the state of the law at the time Moody was convicted and
sentenced. Moody has never challenged the language of her indictment or the drug quantity used in
calculating her original sentence, either by direct appeal or collateral review. She may not now use
her new term of supervised release as a vehicle to do so. The only issue here is whether the district
court looked to the proper statute to determine the maximum length of her new supervised release
term. The plain language of § 3583(h) directs courts to look to the "statute for the offense that
resulted in the original term of supervised release." § 3583(h) (emphasis added). At the time
Moody was convicted, the district court sentenced her under § 841(b)(1)(B). See § 841(b)(1)(B)
(authorizing supervised release term of "at least four years" for § 841(a) violations involving certain
-3-

drug quantities). The court determined Moody's guideline range to be four to five years, and
ultimately sentenced her to five years. Thus, the maximum term of supervised release the district
court could have imposed on Moody under § 3583(h) was five years less the nine months of
incarceration, or four years and three months.
AFFIRMED.
-4-