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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-40993
Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOEL R. LAMBRIGHT, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
--------------------
January 30, 2003
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Joel R. Lambright, Jr. (Lambright), appeals the sentence
imposed by the district court following his guilty-plea
conviction for willful deprivation, under color of law, of
another's constitutional rights under 18 U.S.C. § 242.
Lambright, who was working as a corrections officer at a Texas
state prison at the time of the offense, assaulted an inmate
named Michael McCoy (McCoy), causing his death. Lambright argues
that the district court erred in enhancing his sentence by two
levels based upon a finding that his victim was a "vulnerable
victim" under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1). Lambright also argues that

No. 02-40993
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the district court erred in denying his motion for downward
departure from the sentencing guidelines.
The sentencing guidelines provide for a two-level increase
in the base offense level "[i]f the defendant knew or should have
known that a victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim."
§ 3A1.1(b)(1). For the enhancement under § 3A1.1(b)(1) to apply,
the victim must be "unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or
mental condition, or . . . otherwise particularly susceptible to
the criminal conduct." § 3A1.1(b) & comment. (n.2); see also
United States v. Moree, 897 F.2d 1329, 1335-36 (5th Cir. 1990).
"We review the district court's interpretation of the
guidelines de novo; we review a finding of unusual vulnerability
for clear error and to determine whether the district court's
conclusion was plausible in light of the record as a whole."
United States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205, 1218 (5th Cir.
1997)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The district court based its conclusion that the victim
McCoy was a vulnerable victim on the findings that he was
completely dependent upon the care of the correction officers,
that he was locked in his cell prior to the assault, and that he
could not protect himself from the assault. The district court's
findings are consistent with our holding in United States v.
Clayton, 172 F.3d 347, 353 (5th Cir. 1999), in which we
determined that the sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.3,
which applies if the victim was physically restrained in the

No. 02-40993
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course of the offense, applied to a former deputy sheriff, who
assaulted an arrestee while she lay face down and handcuffed. We
noted that the victim "could not defend herself against an
assault, and could not flee from harm" and that "[the defendant]
took advantage of this restraint and the particular vulnerability
of the victim." Id.; see also United States v. Tapia, 59 F.3d
1137, 1143 (11th Cir. 1995) (incarcerated government informant
attacked by fellow inmates was vulnerable victim under § 3A1.1;
court found that informant "was particularly vulnerable by virtue
of his incarceration with [the defendants] and his inability to
escape"); United States v. Hershkowitz, 968 F.2d 1503, 1505-06
(2d Cir. 1992) (§ 3A1.1 enhancement applied to prisoner attacked
by detention facility guard).
Consequently, we find that the district court's conclusion
that Lambright knew or should have known that McCoy was a
vulnerable victim was "plausible in light of the record as a
whole" and it was not clear error for the district court to
enhance Lambright's sentence under § 3A1.1(b)(1). Robinson, 119
F.3d at 1218 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
"We have jurisdiction to review the district court's
decision not to depart downward from the guideline range only if
the court based its decision upon an erroneous belief that it
lacked the authority to depart." United States v. Yanez-Huerta,
207 F.3d 746, 748 (5th Cir. 2000). "[T]here must be something in
the record [to] indicate that the district court held such an

No. 02-40993
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erroneous belief." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
The record does not reveal that the district court
mistakenly believed that it could not depart downward on
Lambright's sentence. The record reflects that the district
court denied Lambright's requested downward departure after
hearing extensive argument from his counsel and considering not
only whether there were specific guideline provisions that would
support the defendant's request, but also whether this was an
extraordinary case that would fit under the general provisions of
§ 5K2.0. The district court also considered that the defendant's
conduct resulted in the victim's death.
Therefore, we do not have jurisdiction to review Lambright's
claim that the district court erred in declining to depart
downward from the sentencing guidelines in imposing his sentence.
Yanez-Huerta, 207 F.3d at 748.
Accordingly, Lambright's sentence is hereby AFFIRMED.