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United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
April 8, 2003
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk

No. 02-50960
Summary Calendar

JAMES R. DUNBAR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER
OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Western District of Texas
_______________________________________________________
Before REAVLEY, BARKSDALE and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
We affirm for the following reasons:
1. We essentially agree with the analysis offered in the magistrate judge's
memorandum and recommendation and the district court's order accepting the
magistrate's recommendation.
2. The Commissioner's decision that appellant Dunbar was not disabled is

supported by substantial evidence. The Commissioner applied the proper legal standards
in making this determination.
3. We do not understand Watson v. Barnhart, 288 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2002), to
require an explicit finding in every case that the claimant can not only engage in
substantial gainful activity but maintain that employment as well. Here, the
administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that Dunbar was not disabled based on a
determination of his residual functional capacity, or RFC. The ALJ cited the regulation
describing RFC, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545 (2002), as well as a Social Security Ruling, SSR
96-8p (1996), both of which make clear that RFC is a measure of the claimant's capacity
to perform work "on a regular and continuing basis." The ALJ further found, after
hearing the testimony of a vocational expert, that Dunbar "was capable of making a
successful adjustment to work that exists in significant numbers in the national
economy." In these circumstances, and absent evidence that a claimant's ability to
maintain employment would be compromised despite his ability to perform employment
as an initial matter, or an indication that the ALJ did not appreciate that an ability to
perform work on a regular and continuing basis is inherent in the definition of RFC, we
do not read Watson to require a specific finding that the claimant can maintain
employment. See Frank v. Barnhart, 2003 WL 1534379, at *1 (5th Cir. March 25, 2003)
(on petition for rehearing) ("Watson requires a situation in which, by its nature, the
claimant's physical ailment waxes and wanes in its manifestation of disabling
symptoms.").
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4. The ALJ did not err in failing to consider Dunbar's cardiac condition. The ALJ
did consider this condition but properly held that it was not disabling. The ALJ noted
that Dunbar had suffered an infarction, but that medical evidence indicated that this event
was due to blood loss on one occasion, and that a cardiac specialist had released Dunbar
to return to his usual work shortly thereafter.
5. The ALJ did not err in discounting Dunbar's subjective complaints of pain as
inconsistent with other evidence in the record, including the findings of physicians. "The
ALJ must consider subjective evidence of pain, but it is within his discretion to determine
the pain's disabling nature." Wren v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 128 (5th Cir. 1991)
(citation omitted).
AFFIRMED.
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