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Case Law - save on Lexis / WestLaw. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D In the October 5, 2004 Charles R. Fulbruge III United States Court of Appeals Clerk for the Fifth Circuit _______________ m 03-21127 _______________ JOHN BRENNAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, VERSUS MERCEDES BENZ USA; UNIVERSAL TECHNICAL INSTITUTE, Defendants-Appellees. _________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas _________________________ Before JONES, SMITH, and STEWART, cans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. Circuit Judges. §§ 12112-12117, because Brennan could not prove "the requisite employer-employee rela- JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge: tionship to have standing to sue" under the ADA. Brennan further appeals the summary Plaintiff John Brennan appeals a summary judgment on his claim of intentional infliction judgment in favor of defendants Mercedes of emotional distress with respect to which the Benz USA ("Mercedes") and United Technical district court found that Brennan could not Institute of Texas, Inc. ("UTI"). The district demonstrate the necessary conduct. Agreeing court dismissed Brennan's claim of employ- with both determinations, we affirm. ment discrimination under title I of the Ameri- I. him at CTG. Despite his requests for these In February 1999, Brennan enrolled in accommodations, CTG refused to accommo- UTI's entry-level automotive mechanic school. date his disability, allegedly informing him, He suffers from learning disabilities in the form "We don't do that here." After failing an of dyslexia and attention deficit disorder. exam, Brennan was removed from the Elite While at UTI, he requested and received Program on April 9, 2001. numerous accommodations for his disabilities, including untimed tests, oral tests, color over- Brennan filed a charge of employment dis- lays, extra tutoring, and other assistance. He crimination with the Equal Employment Op- graduated from UTI in June 2000. portunity Commission and received a right to Although UTI's program focuses on basic sue letter. He then sued, alleging violations of entry-level automotive skills, its affiliate cor- the ADA and intentional infliction of emotional poration, Custom Training Group, Inc. distress The district court held that he lacked ("CTG"), provides more advanced training standing to bring his ADA claim and could not that focuses on automobiles from specific demonstrate evidence sufficient to support his manufacturers. Brennan's performance at UTI claim of intentional infliction of emotional earned him admission into CTG's Mercedes distress Benz Elite post-graduate training program (the "Elite Program"). CTG maintains separate II. staffs and facilities from UTI, and is also com- A. pletely independent from Mercedes. Merced- We review a summary judgment de novo es, however, does provide funding for CTG and are bound by the same standards as those and works with CTG in establishing admis- employed by the district court. See Chaplin v. sions and failure standards and developing a NationsCredit Corp., 307 F.3d 368, 371 (5th curriculum that will enable CTG's students to Cir. 2002). Namely, summary judgment is ap- gain employment with a Mercedes Benz deal- propriate only where "`the pleadings, deposi- ership. tions, answers to interrogatories, and admis- sions on file, together with the affidavits, if Admission into the Elite Program, however, any,' when viewed in the light most favorable is not an offer of employment. In fact, pro- to the non-movant, `show that there is no gen- gram graduates never end up employed by uine issue as to any material fact.'" TIG Ins. Mercedes (a parts distribution entity), but Co. v. Sedgwick James, 276 F.3d 754, 759 rather seek employment from independent (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Mercedes Benz dealerships and service cen- Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986)). ters. Brennan admits that he never received Once the moving party has demonstrated that wages, benefits, or compensation of any kind the non-moving party has no evidence such from UTI, CTG (which was not named as a that a reasonable jury could support a verdict defendant), or Mercedes. in its favor, t he non-moving party must put forth specific facts that demonstrate a genuine On January 29, 2001, Brennan began his factual issue for trial. Id. training in CTG's Elite Program under the im- pression that accommodations similar to those B. he received at UTI would be made available to Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination 2 in employment-related decisions based on the Under the text of the ADA, plaintiffs such disability of an otherwise qualified individual. as Brennan cannot state a viable claim. Sec- Specifically, § 12112(a) provides, "[n]o cov- tion 12112 specifically discusses employment ered entity shall discriminate against a qualified opportunities. Its only provision under which individual with a disability because of the Brennan can attempt to find shelter is its ref- disability of such individual in regard to job erence to "job training." This phrase, how- application procedures, the hiring, advance- ever, when read in context, is equally unhelpful ment or discharge of employees, employee to Brennan.2 compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." Id. The entirety of § 12112 affords protection to "qualified individuals with a disability," in the context of employment decisions. Under Brennan contends that this provision com- Brennan's reading of the statute, every educa- pels entities such as UTI and Mercedes to pro- tional institution in which a student received vide accommodations for his disabilities as part tutelage that may one day be useful in the pro- of the "job training" component of section curement of employment would be compelled 12112. Nevertheless, the district court held, by the ADA to provide the accommodations and the defendants argue strenuously on ap- peal, that the ADA does not provide a cause of action where the plaintiff is not in an employ- 1(...continued) ment relationship with, or an applicant for em- active or prospective employment relationship) ployment with, the defendant. Because Bren- cannot state a viable claim under Title I. See nan could not demonstrate such an employ- Collins v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 262 F. Supp. ment relationship, the district court concluded 2d 959 (C.D. Ill. 2003) (rejecting claim of a that the ADA did not confer standing. spouse of an allegedly discriminatorily-treated former employee); Foote v. Folks, Inc., 864 F. This court has yet to address the proper Supp. 1327, 1328 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (conclud- scope of standing under title I. Facing similar ing that the legislative history of the ADA questions, other circuits have adopted the indicates it was intended to protect job appli- reading favored by the district court in this cants and employees). Similarly, other circuits caseSSi.e., requiring the existence of an em- have rejected claims under Title I of the ADA ployment relationship. In McGuinness v. where the plaintiff was a former employee and no Univ. of N.M., 170 F.3d 974, 979 (10th Cir. longer was an applicant for that position or was 1998), the court rejected a suit by a medical unable to perform the essential job functions as the student who claimed discrimination, because "qualified individual" provision of the statute the lack of compensation received by students requires. See, e.g., Weyer v. Twentieth Century for their work foreclosed the possibility of Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. finding the requisite employment relationship 2000). required to bring a claim under Title I.1 2 Cf. Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993) (noting that it is a "fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language 1Two district courts have concluded that itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be de- plaintiffs situated as Brennan is (i.e., lacking a termined in isolation, but must be drawn from the (continued...) context in which it is used"). 3 Brennan sought at CTG. We reject this whether alleged conduct is sufficiently outra- reasoning. geous to fall under the ambit of the cause of action, the Texas courts have warned that the Therefore, although it is obvious that Bren- conduct must have been "'so outrageous in nan and others are enrolled in CTG's Elite character, and so extreme in degree as to go program with an eye toward receiving training beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to that would help them gain employment from a be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolera- small group of specific employers (i.e., Mer- ble in a civilized society.'" Twyman v. Twy- cedes Benz dealerships and service centers), it man, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. 1993) (quot- is equally manifest that no such employment ing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 relationship yet existed. As noted above, cmt. d).4 Brennan never received compensation for his "work" at the Elite program (either from Mer- Brennan claims that defendants' conduct cedes, UTI, or even CTG), nor did he ever ap- meets this "utterly intolerable"5 level of mis- ply for employment with any of the named behavior in that he was not offered the accom- defendants. As a result, district court was en- modations for his disability that he believed tirely correct in granting summary judgment were necessary to his success. As a result, with respect to Brennan's ADA claim. Brennan alleges he suffered emotional distress because, in his own words, "I have lost my Brennan's brief makes repeated references chances of what I wanted to do with my life to to statutory provisions that neither formed the work on Mercedes Benz cars." basis of his complaint nor have any relevance to its allegations. Brennan's reliance, there- The district court appears quite correct in fore, on the Individual with Disabilities in Ed- its conclusion that Brennan has been unable to ucation Act, title II of the ADA, and the Reha- demonstrate any evidence suggesting the sort bilitation Act of 1973 is therefore misplaced.3 of "severe" distress that is required for recov- ery under this cause of action.6 But, putting C. the nature of the alleged distress aside, Bren- In Texas, for a plaintiff to prevail on a claim nan cannot demonstrate a scintilla of evidence of intentional infliction of emotional distress, suggesting the defendants' conduct constituted he must demonstrate that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly, that the conduct was extreme and outrageous, and that the 4 See also Hughes Training, Inc. v. Cook, 254 conduct caused him severe emotional distress. F.3d 588, 594 (5th Cir. 2001) (recognizing Texas's Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Cos. v. Sears, 84 requirements for claims of intentional infliction of S.W.3d 604, 610 (Tex. 2002). In determining emotional distress). 5 Hughes Training, 254 F.3d at 594 (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Bertrand, 37 S.W.3d 1, 3 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (does not apply 13 (Tex. App.SSTyler 2000, pet. denied)). to post-secondary institutions); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134 (deals solely with "public enti- 6 GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d ties," defined as instrumentalities of state of local 605, 618 (Tex. 1999) (requiring emotional distress governments); 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-795 (applies only that is "so severe that no reasonable person could to entities receiving federal financial support). be expected to endure it"). 4 anything near the sort of outrageous behavior needed to support a claim for intentional in- fliction of emotional distress Brennan concedes that UTI granted him the accommodations he desired while he was a student in UTI's entry-level training program, and Brennan's brief does not even make a cursory attempt to address this deficiency, so summary judgment was proper. Additionally, because Mercedes's participation in the CTG Elite Program is limited to establishing stan- dards and developing curriculum, Brennan cannot even muster evidence demonstrating contact with Mercedes, let alone contact of the outrageous sort necessary to support his claim. AFFIRMED. 5 |
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