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United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
September 20, 2004
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
Charles R. Fulbruge III
No. 03-41356
Clerk
Summary Calendar
_____________________
THOMAS DOUGLAS BOND,
Petitioner - Appellant,
versus
DOUG DRETKE, DIRECTOR,
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION,
Respondent - Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
_________________________________________________________________
Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and PICKERING, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Thomas Douglas Bond, Texas prisoner # 874938, appeals the
district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition
challenging his guilty-plea conviction for burglary. We AFFIRM.
I
Bond pleaded guilty in Texas state court to burglary and was
sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment. The trial court had granted
Bond permission to appeal two issues: whether the State's
identification procedure was valid and whether the court had
administered the proper plea admonishments. Bond's conviction was

affirmed on appeal. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected
Bond's petition for discretionary review.
Bond next filed a state habeas corpus petition, asserting,
among other grounds, that his guilty plea had been involuntary
because his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by purposefully
misrepresenting that he could obtain a reversal of Bond's
conviction on appeal. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied
Bond's petition without a written order.
Bond then filed this federal habeas petition, raising all of
the same claims that he had asserted in his state habeas
application. Bond alleged that his counsel promised that he would
"beat this case" and that, at rearraignment, counsel advised him to
answer the trial court's questions regarding any promises in the
negative because, otherwise, the trial court would not accept his
guilty plea. Bond submitted affidavits of his mother, brother, and
his mother's friend, stating that they were present when counsel
promised that he could successfully appeal the conviction and
obtain a new trial based on the issues reserved for appeal. He
argues that he would not have pleaded guilty if counsel had not
made these promises.
Bond's counsel did not submit an affidavit to the district
court, but he wrote a letter to Bond, stating that he did not
guarantee that the appeals court would reverse the conviction.
The district court concluded that Bond's counsel did not
promise him a specific substantive benefit such as a downward
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departure at sentencing, a lesser sentence, or parole, commutation
or pardon after a certain period of incarceration. Accordingly,
the district court determined that Bond had not shown that his
guilty plea was involuntary due to his counsel's promise that the
conviction would be reversed on appeal and that he would get a new
trial.
The district court denied relief, but granted a certificate of
appealability on the limited issue of whether the statements
allegedly made by Bond's counsel rendered Bond's guilty plea
involuntary. The court noted that Fifth Circuit precedent had not
addressed whether a showing of inducement by counsel to plead
guilty extended beyond the guarantee of a lesser sentence or some
specific leniency to include, as here, a promise of victory on
appeal. The district court and this court denied Bond a COA on the
remaining issues.
II
As we have noted, Bond argues that his guilty plea was
involuntary because counsel guaranteed that he could successfully
appeal the conviction and obtain a new trial, based on the issues
reserved for appeal. To prove prejudice for an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim in the context of a guilty plea, the
habeas petitioner must show that "there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty
and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52, 59 (1985). To obtain federal habeas relief on the basis
3

of alleged promises, a petitioner must prove that he was promised
an "actual sentencing benefit" by showing (1) the exact terms of
the alleged promise, (2) exactly when, where, and by whom the
promise was made, and (3) the precise identity of an eyewitness to
the promise. Daniel v. Cockrell, 283 F.3d 697, 703 (5th Cir.
2002); see also United States v. Cervantes, 132 F.3d 1106, 1110
(5th Cir. 1998).
Bond did not establish that his counsel promised him a
specific substantive sentencing benefit, such as "(1) a downward
departure at sentencing; (2) a lesser sentence; or (3) parole,
commutation or pardon after a certain period of incarceration."
See Daniel, 283 F.3d at 704 (footnotes omitted). Bond did not show
that his guilty plea was induced by his counsel "clearly and
unequivocally guaranteeing a lesser sentence or some other specific
leniency." See id. at 703. Therefore, Bond has not established
that the state court's denial of relief on this claim was "contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see also Hill v. Johnson,
210 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2000).
III
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is
AFFIRMED.
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