Fifth Circuit Court Cases - Case Law and Opinions from the 5th Circuit Federal Court - Court of Appeals

	ROMINGER LEGAL
		Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Opinions - 5th Circuit
					Need Legal Help?
					Need Legal Help?
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER			LEGAL HEADLINES - CASE LAW - LEGAL FORMS	NOT FINDING WHAT YOU NEED? -CLICK HERE

This opinion or court case is from the Fifth Circuit Court or Appeals. Search our site for more cases - CLICK HERE

LEGAL RESEARCH

COURT REPORTERS

PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS

PROCESS SERVERS

DOCUMENT RETRIEVERS

EXPERT WITNESSES

Find a Private Investigator

Find an Expert Witness

Find a Process Server

Case Law - save on Lexis / WestLaw.

Legal News - Legal Headlines

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
__________________
No. 91-4679
__________________
MINDY MICHELLE BLACKWELL,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
BENNY BARTON, sued individually
and in his official capacity,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas
______________________________________________
(September 23, 1994)
Before GARWOOD, DAVIS and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-appellant Mindy Michelle Blackwell (Blackwell) sued
defendant-appellant Benny Barton (Barton) asserting constitutional
and state law violations arising from an allegedly illegal arrest
and subsequent detention. Barton appeals the denial of his motion
for summary judgment in which he claimed that he was shielded from
personal liability on the constitutional claims by the defense of
qualified immunity. We reverse the denial of his motion for
summary judgment and remand for further proceedings in accordance
with this opinion.

Facts and Proceedings Below
On December 3, 1990, Barton, a peace officer investigating
"hot checks" for the Nacogdoches County, Texas, District Attorney's
Office, sought to arrest a Melinda K. Allen (Allen) on an
outstanding warrant. Barton knew that Allen worked in health spas
and went by the name "Mindy." He went to the Ultra Fit Health Club
in Nacogdoches, Texas, where, unbeknownst to him, plaintiff
Blackwell taught aerobics. Barton asked a receptionist if he could
speak to "Mindy." The receptionist replied that "Mindy" was
teaching a class but would be out soon. Barton waited.
After she finished working, Blackwell approached Barton and
identified herself as "Mindy." According to Barton, her appearance
was substantially similar to the physical description of Allen that
he had received from his dispatcher.1 Barton requested that she
accompany him, which she did. Outside the spa, he informed her
that she had $1,000 in outstanding checks. Blackwell protested.
According to her, she told Barton, "I had not signed any hot
checks." She gave him her driver's license, which he put in his
pocket, apparently without looking at it. Barton asked her to
follow him in her car to the county law enforcement center. She
did so.
When Barton and Blackwell arrived at the law enforcement
center, two jailers greeted them who knew Blackwell. The name
1
According to Allen's driving record, she is a white female;
born November 2, 1964; 5 feet 3 inches tall; weighing 115 pounds;
with brown hair and brown eyes. Blackwell's driving record shows
that she is a white female; born August 8, 1964; 5 feet 4 inches
tall; weighing 125 pounds; with red hair and green eyes.
2

Melinda Allen was mentioned, and Blackwell then informed Barton
that her name was not Melinda. When he had confirmed this
information, he escorted Blackwell to her car. While Barton does
not contend that he did not arrest or detain Blackwell, he asserts
without contradiction that she was never handcuffed, finger-
printed, photographed, booked, or placed in a holding cell. Barton
estimated, and Blackwell does not dispute, that twenty-five minutes
elapsed from the time he met Blackwell at the health spa to the
time she was allowed to leave the police station; no more than ten
minutes of that time was spent at the law enforcement center
(Blackwell says she was there "a few minutes").
Blackwell sued Barton, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. � 1983, alleging
that he unlawfully arrested and detained her in violation of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. In addition, she asserted
pendent state law claims for false imprisonment, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of
emotional distress.2 Blackwell sought compensatory damages of
$60,000, as well as punitive damages and attorneys' fees.
Barton filed a motion for summary judgment, supported by his
affidavit describing the events in question, asserting that
Blackwell had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted and that he was shielded from personal liability on the
constitutional claims by the defense of qualified immunity.
Blackwell filed a motion for partial summary judgment limited to
the issue of Barton's liability for arresting her without probable
2
Blackwell's state law claims are not at issue in this
appeal.
3

cause. Blackwell's motion was supported by her affidavit, which
does not materially contradict Barton's, and an affidavit of an
individual who said he knew both Blackwell and Allen and that they
do not look alike, having different color hair and eyes and
different skin tone and facial features. Analyzing the motions
under Fourteenth Amendment due process cases, the district court
denied both motions, concluding that the evidence created a
question of fact for the jury. The court reasoned that a
reasonable jury could find either that Barton acted in reckless
disregard of the possibility that he was arresting the wrong person
or that his conduct did not rise to the level of negligence
necessary for personal liability. Finally, the court held that
Blackwell failed to plead facts sufficient to support a section
1983 action against Barton in his official capacity and dismissed
that portion of her complaint.
Barton timely appeals the denial of his motion for summary
judgment. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. � 1291, as
the district court's denial of Barton's motion for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity, to the extent it turns on a question
of law, is deemed a final judgment for purposes of appeal.
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817 (1985); Reese v.
Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 498 n.3 (5th Cir. 1991).
Discussion
I.
Standard of Review
We review the district court's denial of summary judgment for
Barton de novo, applying the same standard as the district court.
Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d 816, 819 (5th Cir. 1993). Thus,
4

summary judgment for Barton is appropriate only if there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact, and if Barton is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P.56(c); Brewer, 3 F.3d
at 819. As Barton asserted his entitlement to qualified immunity
in a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the burden was
on Blackwell to come forward with summary judgment evidence
sufficient to sustain a determination that Barton's actions
violated clearly established federal law. Salas v. Carpenter, 980
F.2d 299, 304, 306 (5th Cir. 1992). We consider the evidence in
the light most favorable to Blackwell, the nonmovant.
The first inquiry in the examination of a defendant's claim of
qualified immunity is whether the plaintiff alleged the violation
of a clearly established constitutional right. Siegert v. Gilley,
111 S.Ct. 1789, 1793 (1991). The second inquiry is to determine
whether the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. State
officials are entitled to qualified immunity unless they violate a
constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of
their conduct. Pfannstiel v. Marion, 918 F.2d 1178, 1183 (5th Cir.
1990).
II.
Constitutional Violation
The standard in this Circuit for addressing section 1983
claims arising from allegedly unlawful arrests based on mistaken
identity is not readily ascertainable from our prior decisions, for
in similar contexts we have turned to both the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The Fourth Amendment establishes the right
to be secure against unreasonable seizures and provides that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause. Blackwell asserts
5

violations of both Amendments in her complaint.
In addressing the propriety of Barton's actions, the district
court relied on Fourteenth Amendment due process cases, discussing
Daniels v. Williams, 106 S.Ct. 662 (1986), and Herrera v. Millsap,
862 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1989). In Daniels, faced with a claim by
an inmate in a city jail who slipped on a pillow negligently left
on a stairway by a prison deputy, the Supreme Court concluded "that
the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act
of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life,
liberty, or property." 106 S.Ct. at 663 (original emphasis).
In Herrera v. Millsap, this Court applied the holding of
Daniels to a case of mistaken arrest. 862 F.2d at 1160. A police
officer investigating a theft was told that "Gerald Herrera" was
the perpetrator of the crime. In police records and in the case
submitted to a grand jury, however, the name of the perpetrator was
mistakenly given as that of "Gerardo Herrera," the plaintiff. The
grand jury indicted Gerardo Herrera, and an arrest warrant issued
under that name. Gerardo Herrera was arrested pursuant to the
warrant and incarcerated several days before the mistake was
discovered. In considering Gerardo Herrera's claim for false
arrest and incarceration, this Court concluded that the evidence
showed, at most, negligence, and we affirmed summary judgment for
the defendants. Id. The Herrera Court did not apply Fourth
Amendment analysis; in that case, however, unlike the present
appeal, the wrongdoing was not of the arresting officers but a
result of misinformation given to the grand jury.
The Fourth Amendment controlled this Court's decision in Brown
6

v. Byer, 870 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1989), decided approximately three
months after Herrera. In Brown, a deputy constable received arrest
warrants for a "Tamie Brown." The officer decided to write upon
the warrants the name of "Tammy Brown," the plaintiff. The officer
deliberately altered the driver's license number, address,
appearance, and date of birth to match information applicable to
Tammy Brown. The altered warrants were then entered into the
computer system in the area where the plaintiff lived, leading to
her arrest several months later when she was stopped for a traffic
offense. We determined that the jury was justified in finding the
officer who had altered the warrant knew the plaintiff was not the
person named in warrant and affirmed judgment for the plaintiff
against that officer. 870 F.2d at 979.
On the basis of Daniels and Herrera, the district court
determined that the evidence created a fact question for the jury:
whether Barton's conduct constituted mere negligence or whether it
amounted to reckless disregard for Blackwell's rights. The court
mentioned Brown but chose instead to evaluate the evidence under
the Fourteenth Amendment.
We hold that Blackwell's section 1983 claim against Barton for
illegal arrest and detention is properly considered under the
Fourth Amendment, the more specific constitutional right implicated
by her allegations. In Graham v. Connor, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989),
the Supreme Court held that all allegations of excessive force
during an arrest, investigatory stop, or other seizure should be
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" standard,
rather than under a substantive due process approach:
7

"Because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit
textual source of constitutional protection against this
sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct, that
Amendment, not the more generalized notion of
`substantive due process,' must be the guide for
analyzing these claims." 109 S.Ct. at 1871.
See also Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S.Ct. 1694 (1985) (analyzing
claim of excessive force to effect arrest solely under Fourth
Amendment notwithstanding complaint's allegations of violations of
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments); Albright v. Oliver, 114 S.Ct.
807, 811-813 (1994) (plurality opinion). Although the present case
does not involve a claim of excessive force, the reasoning of
Graham is equally applicable to Blackwell's claim for illegal
arrest based on mistaken identity.
Thus, the district court erred in examining Barton's claim of
qualified immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment and the
negligence analysis of Daniels and Herrera. Nevertheless,
Blackwell has asserted a clearly established constitutional right:
to be free from unreasonable seizure, or not to be arrested absent
probable cause. Our task must be to weigh Barton's qualified
immunity defense in light of this Fourth Amendment right.
III. Qualified Immunity
Barton is entitled to qualified immunity unless he violated a
constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of
his conduct. Pfannstiel, 918 F.2d at 1183. "If reasonable public
officials could differ on the lawfulness of the defendant's
actions, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity." Id.
Therefore, even if Barton violated Blackwell's constitutional
rights, he is entitled to qualified immunity if his conduct was
8

objectively reasonable. Id.
Blackwell has asserted that Barton violated her Fourth
Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure by
arresting her without probable cause. The clearly established law
at the time of Barton's conduct provided that an arrest, with or
without a warrant, must be based on probable cause. United States
v. Raborn, 872 F.2d 589, 593 (5th Cir. 1989). Probable cause
exists when the facts available at the time of the arrest would
support a reasonable person's belief that an offense has been, or
is being, committed and that the individual arrested is the guilty
party. Id. Although applying an objective standard, we may
consider Barton's experience and expertise in evaluating the
reasonableness of his conduct. Id.
The Fourth Amendment is not violated by an arrest based on
probable cause, even if the wrong person is arrested, if the
arresting officer had a reasonable, good faith belief that he was
arresting the correct person. Hill v. California, 91 S.Ct. 1106
(1971). In Hill, police officers had probable cause to arrest
Hill, but did not have an arrest or search warrant. The officers
arrived at Hill's residence where they were confronted by a man who
fit the description of Hill but who identified himself as Miller
and produced identification in that name. The officers, believing
that Miller was Hill, searched the residence; Hill was ultimately
found guilty of robbery based on the fruits of that search. The
Court upheld the search, concluding that the officers had probable
cause to arrest Hill and a reasonable, good faith belief that
Miller was Hill. Therefore the arrest of Miller was valid (even
9

though Miller was not Hill), and the search of the residence
incident to that arrest, under then-current law, was proper. 91
S.Ct. at 1110-1111.
The Court has extended this reasonableness analysis to other
elements of search and seizure law. See, e.g., Illinois v.
Rodriguez, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 2800 (1990), in which the Court held
that the Fourth Amendment is not violated when a warrantless entry
is based on an officer's reasonable, though erroneous, belief that
the person who has consented to the entry has authority to give
that consent.
Unlike Hill, our case of Brown v. Byer involved an intentional
and knowing alteration of an arrest warrant to match the
information pertaining to the plaintiff. We expressly
distinguished from that situation, however, circumstances in which
an officer arrested another person by an honest mistake:
"The existence of a facially valid warrant for the arrest
of one person does not authorize a police officer to
effect the arrest of another person, even if the officer
believes the second person guilty of the first person's
crimes and even if the two people have similar names.
The fact that officers may sometimes arrest the second
person by an honest mistake does not constitute a legal
excuse for the conduct of an officer who makes no such
mistake." 870 F.2d at 979 (emphasis added).
See Simons v. Clemons, 752 F.2d 1053, 1055 (5th Cir. 1985)
(plaintiff asserted no deprivation of constitutional right where
she was arrested on a facially valid warrant because of an honest
mistake).
Barton arrested Blackwell pursuant to a facially valid warrant
for Melinda K. Allen. At issue is the question posed by Hill,
whether he had probable cause to believe Blackwell was Allen, i.e.,
10

whether he reasonably mistook Blackwell for Allen. Couched in
terms of qualified immunity, however, we must address one further
level of reasonableness and ask ourselves whether a reasonable
officer in Barton's position could believe that there was
reasonable cause to believe that Blackwell was the person named in
the warrant. Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S.Ct. 3034 (1987).3 "The
relevant question in this case, for example, is the objective
(albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could
have believed [Barton's arrest of Blackwell on the warrant naming
Allen] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the
information [Barton] possessed." Anderson, 107 S.Ct. at 3040.
In this case, no inference can be drawn that Barton knew or
believed he was or likely was arresting someone other than Melinda
Allen. The person he arrested was of the same height and weight,
sex, race, age, nickname, and at the location where he expected to
find Melinda Allen. There is no evidence that Barton had available
information as to Allen's skin tone or facial features. Moreover,
discrepancies in hair and eye color or skin tone are not
determinative in this day when use of hair dyes, cosmetic contact
lenses, and tanning salons is relatively common.
Blackwell relies on the fact that Barton took her driver's
license and put it in his pocket without looking at it as evidence
that he acted unreasonably. This is not determinative. The
question is only whether a reasonable officer, in Barton's position
3
Anderson concerned facts similar to those at issue here, but
in the context of a warrantless search of an innocent third
party's home rather than an allegedly illegal arrest of the wrong
person.
11

(with Blackwell's driver's license in his pocket) could believe
that Blackwell was Allen, not whether a reasonable officer would
have looked at the driver's license to confirm the name and other
identifying information.4 See Hunter v. Bryant, 112 S.Ct. 534, 537
(1991) ("[T]he court should ask whether the agents acted reasonably
under settled law in the circumstances, not whether another
reasonable, or more reasonable, interpretation of the events can be
constructed . . . .") (emphasis added).
In United States v. De Leon-Reyna, 930 F.2d 396 (5th Cir.
1991) (en banc), a United States Border Patrol agent noticed a
suspicious truck near the Texas-Mexico border and radioed in the
truck's license plate number to a dispatcher. The dispatcher
misunderstood the number given and radioed back the information
that the plates were issued to a truck different from that the
agent was following. The agent stopped the truck; a later search
of the truck revealed over half a ton of cocaine.
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, on the ground
that the initial stop was without reasonable suspicion because the
agent had not followed the standard procedure of using code words
when radioing in the license plate letters. The district court
4
In addition, even had Barton looked at the license and
realized that the name was not that of Melinda K. Allen, a
reasonable officer still might have believed that Blackwell was
Allen. The Supreme Court has held that officers in good faith
believed an arrestee was their suspect even after the arrestee
had produced identification to show that he was not the man they
were seeking, observing that "aliases and false identifications
are not uncommon." Hill v. California, 91 S.Ct. at 1110. Here,
while Blackwell told Barton she "had not signed any hot checks,"
there is nothing to indicate that she ever suggested there might
be a mistake of identity, or stated her name, until at the
station just before she was released.
12

granted the motion to suppress. This Court, sitting en banc,
reversed. We determined that, regardless of whether the agent
acted negligently in calling in the license plate information, his
good faith reliance on the license information was objectively
reasonable in the circumstances. 930 F.2d at 399. We observed
that the code word policy was not constitutionally mandated, nor
did it establish "a constitutional minimum for reliability." Id.
at 400.
Similarly, under the facts in the present case, we may not
determine the reasonableness of Barton's actions by considering,
with the benefit of hindsight, what other, more reasonable actions
might have been available to him.
Because a reasonable officer in Barton's position could have
believed that there was reasonable cause to believe Blackwell was
Melinda Allen, Barton is entitled to qualified immunity.
IV.
Propriety of Summary Judgment for Barton
Summary judgment is appropriate only where there are no
disputed issues of material fact. Counsel for Blackwell asserted
during oral argument that summary judgment for Barton is improper,
alleging that the similarity of appearance, or lack thereof,
between his client and Melinda Allen is material to the
reasonableness of Barton's mistake. This issue was raised below by
an affidavit of someone who knew both women attesting that they did
not look alike, as their hair and eye color, skin tone, and facial
features were different. The affidavit does not suggest any
contradiction of what is otherwise shown by the evidence, namely
that both are of the same sex, race, age, height, weight, and
13

nickname and did similar type work. The district court concluded
that "Blackwell's appearance substantially matched the physical
description of Melinda Allen that Barton had earlier obtained from
his dispatcher." We hold that, under the circumstances, the
similarities between Blackwell and Allen were sufficient to allow
a reasonable officer to conclude therefrom that there was probable
cause to believe that Blackwell was Allen.
To the extent underlying facts are undisputed, as they
essentially are here, we may resolve questions such as probable
cause and reasonable suspicion as questions of law. Hunter v.
Bryant, 112 S.Ct. 534, 537 (1991). See also Crescent City v.
Butchers' Union, 7 S.Ct. 472, 476 (1887) ("when there is no dispute
of fact, the question of probable cause is a question of law, for
the determination of the court"); United States v. Kye Soo Lee, 962
F.2d 430, 435 n.17 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1057
(1993) (where determinative facts are not disputed, probable cause
is a question of law); United States v. Basey, 816 F.2d 980, 988
(5th Cir. 1987) (reasonableness in investigatory stop cases
ultimately a question of law).
Because we conclude, as discussed above, that Barton's actions
were objectively reasonable under Anderson v. Creighton, he is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his plea of qualified
immunity. We remand this case to the district court for entry of
judgment for Barton on Blackwell's section 1983 claims.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the order of the district court
denying summary judgment to defendant Barton is REVERSED, and the
14

cause is REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
15