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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 91-1377
_____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
BRUCE PATTERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
_________________________________________________________________
(May 21, 1992)
Before KING, JOHNSON, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
JOHNSON, Circuit Judge:
Bruce Patterson was convicted by a jury on seven counts of
illegal activities involving stolen vehicles. He appeals,
contending that the evidence was insufficient as to four of the
counts and that the district court erred in sentencing him. The
Government cross-appeals, also raising an issue involving the
federal sentencing guidelines.
I. Facts and Procedural History
As the result of an undercover sting operation, Bruce
Patterson was arrested and indicted on seven counts of illegal
activities involving stolen motor vehicles. Count 1 alleged that
Bruce Patterson had entered into a continuing conspiracy with his
brother Robert Patterson to receive stolen vehicles in interstate

commerce, to alter or remove vehicle identification numbers
(VINs), to buy and sell motor vehicles and parts knowing the VINs
had been removed or altered, and to obtain money by false
pretenses, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. งง 371, 511, 659, 1341,
1343, 2313, and 2321.
Count 2 alleged that Robert and Bruce Patterson, aiding and
abetting each other in violation of 18 U.S.C. งง 2 and 511, had
altered or removed the VIN on a 1986 Chevrolet Silverado that had
been stolen in the fall of 1987. This vehicle was recovered by
police during a search of an automobile workshop owned by Robert
Patterson.1
Count 3 charged the Pattersons with possession of goods
stolen while part of an interstate shipment, in violation of 18
U.S.C. ง 659. In particular, the Pattersons were charged with
possession of a red Mack truck which had been stolen in October
1987 while being shipped from Pennsylvania to Texas. This truck
was found concealed in Robert Patterson's barn.2
Count 4 also charged a violation 18 U.S.C. ง 659, possession
of goods stolen while part of an interstate shipment -- namely, a
white Mack truck which also was stolen in October 1987 while
1As noted below, the parties disagree as to whether the
evidence was sufficient to show that Bruce Patterson also owned
or controlled the workshop where this vehicle (and others) were
found. For the sake of convenience, this shop will be referred
to here as Robert Patterson's workshop.
2Robert Patterson's barn is not the same structure as the
workshop referred to in footnote 1. The Government does not
allege that Bruce Patterson had any ownership interest in or
control over Robert Patterson's barn.
2

being shipped from Pennsylvania to Texas. This truck was
recovered when Bruce Patterson caused it to be delivered from a
storage facility that he had leased to an undercover informant.
Count 5 alleged that Bruce Patterson, aided and abetted by
his brother, had violated 18 U.S.C. งง 2 and 511 by altering or
removing the VIN of a 1986 CJ-7 Jeep which had been stolen in May
1988.
Count 6 charged the Pattersons with receiving and possessing
a 1981 Chevrolet dual wheel truck which had been stolen in
Arkansas in February 1989 and then transported across state
lines, a violation of 18 U.S.C. งง 2 and 2113. This vehicle was
recovered during the search of Robert Patterson's workshop.
Finally, Count 7 alleged a violation of 18 U.S.C. งง 2 and
511, in that the Pattersons had altered or removed the VIN of a
1987 Silverado pickup truck which was stolen by Robert Patterson
with the collusion of the owner of the truck. This vehicle was
also recovered during the search of Robert Patterson's workshop.
A jury convicted Bruce Patterson on all seven counts. He
was sentenced to 40 months in prison on each of the counts, all
of the sentences to be served concurrently. Although the
district court did not impose a fine, it did order Patterson to
pay a $350 special assessment and to make restitution to his
victims. On appeal, Patterson does not contest the validity of
his convictions on counts 1, 4, and 5. He concedes that the
evidence was sufficient as to each of those. He argues, however,
that the evidence was not sufficient to convict him on counts 2,
3

3, 6, and 7. Further, he contends that the district court erred
in calculating his sentence under the federal sentencing
guidelines. The Government has cross-appealed, raising an issue
of its own with respect to the calculation of Patterson's
sentence.
II. Discussion
A.
Sufficiency of the Evidence Against Bruce Patterson
Given the variety of illegal activities alleged in the
indictment, it is helpful to begin by narrowing the evidentiary
issues before the Court. First, as noted above, Patterson
concedes that the evidence was sufficient to convict him on
counts 1, 4, and 5. Second, on those counts which Patterson does
challenge his convictions -- counts 2, 3, 6, and 7 -- it is
important to recognize that there is no evidence in the record
that Bruce Patterson personally participated in stealing those
vehicles, transporting them across state lines, or altering their
VINs. Additionally, it must be noted that the vehicle involved
in count 3 was seized in Robert Patterson's barn, and there is no
suggestion that Bruce Patterson owned or controlled that barn.
Similarly, the vehicles involved in counts 2, 6, and 7 were all
seized at the workshop owned by Robert Patterson. The Government
contends, and Bruce Patterson disputes, that Bruce also owned or
controlled that shop. Indeed, the Government repeatedly
characterizes that shop as "the Patterson shop," implying that it
belonged to both Bruce and Robert. Unfortunately for the
4

Government, however, the evidence does not appear to be
sufficient to support such an implication.
The testimony about the disputed workshop showed 1) that ten
to twelve years before the criminal activity alleged in the
indictment, Robert and Bruce, along with other members of the
community, had both contributed material and labor to the
building of the shop; 2) that the shop was used by several
members of the surrounding community in the early 1980s to work
on farm equipment; 3) that Bruce had a separate shop of his own,
on his own land, near his own house, where he works on his own
equipment; and 4) that the shop in question is generally known
in the community as Robert's shop. In addition, the
investigating officers testified that they had no knowledge that
Bruce owned or controlled the shop. One witness -- a local
wildlife conservation officer -- testified that he had seen Bruce
at the shop on one occasion sometime in the last few years. On
that occasion Bruce and Robert were working on a piece of farm
equipment outside the shop. The shop was closed, and there were
no other vehicles in sight. In sum, the only evidence to suggest
that Bruce Patterson owned or controlled the shop was that he had
helped to build it ten or twelve years before and that he had
been seen there once in the last few years. This evidence is
plainly insufficient -- despite the deferential standard of
review3 -- to support a finding that Bruce Patterson exercised
3"When reviewing claims that the evidence is insufficient to
support a conviction as a matter of law, this Court is obliged to
view the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, and all
5

any continuing dominion or control over the workshop where the
vehicles were seized.
Perhaps because the evidence linking Bruce Patterson to his
brother's shop was so attenuated, at trial the Government argued
that Bruce Patterson should be held liable on counts 2, 3, 6, and
7 on two other theories: either 1) that Bruce be held directly
liable for the acts alleged in those counts because, although it
was his brother who had actually engaged in the illegal activity,
Bruce had aided and abetted his brother in that activity; or, 2)
that Bruce should be held vicariously liable for the acts of his
brother, because he and his brother had entered a conspiracy and
the acts were undertaken by his brother in furtherance of that
conspiracy. Bruce disputes both theories. On appeal the
Government pursues only the second theory -- apparently, it has
abandoned the aiding and abetting theory. Thus, the precise
question before the Court is whether Bruce can be held liable on
counts 2, 3, 6, and 7 on the grounds that the illegal activity
alleged in those counts was undertaken in furtherance of a
conspiracy which Bruce had joined.
Bruce concedes that the evidence was sufficient to convict
him of conspiring with his brother. He contends, however, that
his vicarious liability for the acts of his brother extends only
as far as the conspiracy itself, and that the acts alleged in
counts 2, 3, 6, and 7 were no part of the the conspiracy between
inferences reasonably drawn from it, in the light most favorable
to the verdict." United States v. Molinar-Apodaca, 889 F.2d
1417, 1423 (5th Cir. 1989).
6

Bruce and his brother. Bruce is certainly correct on the first
point. A conspirator is liable only for those actions of his co-
conspirators which are taken in furtherance of the conspiracy and
which are within the scope of the illegal agreement. Once a
defendant has been found to be a member of a conspiracy,
he can also be convicted of [a] substantive offense based
upon acts committed by a co-conspirator in furtherance of
the conspiracy as long as the acts fall within the scope of
the conspiracy and could reasonably be foreseen as a
necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement.
United States v. Tilton, 610 F.2d 302, 309 (5th Cir. 1980).
Thus, the question becomes whether the acts alleged in counts 2,
3, 6, and 7 were within the scope of the conspiracy between Bruce
and Robert.
The Government argues -- and count 1 of the indictment
charges -- that Bruce and Robert were partners in an on-going
scheme, from September 1987 through May 1990, to acquire, alter,
and resell stolen vehicles and parts, and that the activities
alleged in counts 2, 3, 6, and 7 were part of that enterprise.
Bruce argues that no such continuing conspiracy existed and that
he had absolutely nothing to do with the vehicles involved in
counts 2, 3, 6, and 7. At most, he argues, the Government proved
that he and his brother entered a limited, discrete conspiracy to
alter and sell the white Mack truck identified in count 4.
Having reviewed the record, this Court concludes that the
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government,
was sufficient to support an inference that Robert and Bruce
7

Patterson had been engaged in an on-going conspiracy to acquire,
alter, and resell stolen vehicles and parts.
Several items of evidence could support the finding by the
jury that there was a continuing conspiracy between Bruce and
Robert. In particular, the jury could have relied on all of the
following evidence to find that Robert and Bruce were engaged in
an on-going enterprise to obtain, alter, and resell stolen
vehicles: 1) the red and white Mack trucks were part of the same
shipment in interstate commerce and were stolen at the same time;
2) Robert had possession of the red Mack truck and Bruce had
possession of the white Mack truck; 3) Robert obtained and
disassembled a stolen Freightliner truck which he then delivered
to an undercover informant in Bruce's presence; 4) Bruce told
the undercover informant that the only person who helps him
convert stolen vehicles is Robert because Robert was the only
person he trusted; 5) Robert, Bruce, and the undercover
informant agreed to transport the white Mack truck from Bruce's
storage facility to the undercover informant's house; 6) Bruce
told the undercover informant that Bruce had a "world of parts,"
that he would help the undercover informant "fix" a Jeep, and
that he had "fixed a dozen [Jeeps]"; 7) Robert told the
undercover informant that Bruce was difficult to work with
because Bruce always wanted the best of the stolen vehicles; 8)
Bruce told the undercover informant that Bruce had a set of
stamps which Bruce could use to alter VINs, and one stamp found
at Robert's shop matched a digit in a stolen Jeep recovered from
8

Bruce; 9) Bruce admitted that the stamps were his and that he
knew they were at Robert's shop; 10) Bruce implicated himself in
schemes to defraud insurance companies in conversations with the
undercover informant; 11) two of the vehicles seized had been
purchased from the same salvage dealer and that salvage dealer
knew Bruce and Robert and had dealt with them for some years in
buying and selling wrecked vehicles; and 12) Bruce explained to
the undercover informant how he forged fictitious titles in order
to protect against charges that the vehicles were stolen.
Patterson reminds the court that
[m]ere knowledge of the purpose of the conspiracy or
association with conspirators without an agreement to
cooperate in the crime is not sufficient to make one a
conspirator. The requisite fact of intentional agreement or
participation cannot "be made out by piling inference upon
inference," or by "suspicion and innuendo."
United States v. Aguiar, 610 F.2d 1296, 1303-04 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 827 (1980) (citations omitted). Patterson
strenuously protests that he cannot be convicted on the basis
that his brother was engaged in a criminal enterprise. The
problem with Patterson's argument is that the evidence clearly
showed that both Bruce and his brother had been engaged in
criminal activity, and that they cooperated with one another in
carrying out their activities. From the evidence presented, the
jury could rationally have concluded that Bruce and Robert worked
together on a continuing basis, and such a conclusion would allow
the jury to convict Bruce on each of the seven counts alleged.
9

B.
Calculating Patterson's Sentence Under the Sentencing
Guidelines
1.
The Number of Vehicles Involved
When calculating Bruce Patterson's sentence, the district
court determined Patterson's offense level on the basis of the
aggregate value of eight vehicles. Two of the vehicles were the
Freightliner truck and the red Mack truck identified in count 1
of the indictment; the other six vehicles were the vehicles
identified in counts 2 through 7. Patterson argues 1) that if
his convictions on counts 2, 3, 6, and 7 are reversed, then he
must be resentenced without reference to the vehicles in those
counts, and 2) that even if his convictions on counts 2, 3, 6,
and 7 are not reversed, that it nonetheless was error to consider
the value of the Freightliner and the red Mack truck in
calculating his sentence. Patterson's first argument clearly
must fail: the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that
Bruce and Robert were engaged in an on-going criminal conspiracy,
and was sufficient to support his convictions on all seven
counts. Accordingly, there was no error in including the
vehicles identified in counts 2, 3, 6, and 7.
There also was no error in basing Patterson's sentence on
all of the vehicles involved in the conspiracy, including the
Freightliner and the red Mack truck. The sentencing guidelines
state that a defendant's base offense level shall be determined
on the basis of "all acts and omissions committed or aided and
abetted by the defendant, or for which the defendant would be
10

otherwise accountable . . . ." U.S.S.G. ง 1B1.3(a)(1). The
Commentary to this section explains that
[i]n the case of criminal activity undertaken in concert
with others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy, the
conduct for which the defendant `would be otherwise
accountable' also includes conduct of others in furtherance
of the execution of the jointly-undertaken criminal activity
that was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant.
U.S.S.G. ง 1B1.3, Commentary ถ 1. The rule is well settled in
drug distribution cases that as long as the total amount of drugs
to be distributed by a conspiracy is forseeable by an individual
conspirator, that conspirator is to be sentenced on the basis of
the total amount of drugs distributed by the conspiracy, not just
the amount distributed by that individual conspirator. See,
e.g., United States v. Giraldo-Lara, 919 F.2d 19, 21 (5th Cir.
1990) (defendant convicted of participation in conspiracy to
distribute illegal narcotics sentenced on basis of conspiracy's
plan to distribute 20 kilograms of cocaine even though that
defendant was personally responsible for distributing only 7
kilograms).
Here the district court certainly could have concluded on
the basis of the evidence presented that the Freightliner and the
red Mack truck were vehicles obtained and altered within the
course of the Patterson brothers' joint criminal enterprise, and
that Bruce Patterson certainly could have forseen that as part of
that joint enterprise that his brother would obtain and alter
vehicles. Because the district court's determination was not
clearly erroneous, it cannot be reversed by this Court. See
United States v. Thomas, 870 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1989).
11

2.
Increasing the Sentence on Grounds that Bruce Patterson
was an Organizer or Supervisor of the Conspiracy
In calculating Bruce Patterson's sentence, the district
court determined that he was an organizer or supervisor of the
conspiracy and therefore increased his offense level by two,
pursuant to ง 3B1.1(c) of the sentencing guidelines. Patterson
contends that the district court did not have an adequate
evidentiary basis on which to find that he was an organizer or
supervisor of the conspiracy. Patterson's point is well taken.
Here the district court found that Bruce Patterson was an
organizer or supervisor of the conspiracy based solely on
information in the presentence report prepared by the United
States Probation Office. When Patterson objected to the
statement in the presentence report that he was an organizer or
supervisor of the conspiracy, the Probation Office prepared an
addendum to the presentence report which explains that the basis
for its conclusion that Patterson was an organizer or supervisor
of the conspiracy was an unsworn assertion by an Assistant United
States Attorney.
Information obtained from Assistant United States Attorney
(AUSA) Tom Dawson indicates that both the defendant and co-
defendant Robert Patterson managed and supervised other
persons who worked for them as they carried out their
illegal activities.
Addendum to Presentence Report at 17.
Under the sentencing guidelines, the party who seeks an
adjustment in the base offense level -- here, the Government --
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the adjustment
12

is warranted. United States v. Alfaro, 919 F.2d 962, 965 (5th
Cir. 1990). The district court is free to consider all relevant
evidence -- even inadmissible evidence -- as long as the evidence
relied upon has "sufficient indicia of reliability to support its
probable accuracy." Id. at 964. This Court has previously held
that the unsworn assertions of the Government's attorney do not
provide, by themselves, a sufficiently reliable basis on which to
sentence the defendant. United States v. Johnson, 823 F.2d 840,
842 (5th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, the sentence imposed on
Patterson must be vacated and the case remanded for a factual
determination of whether Bruce Patterson was an organizer or
supervisor of the conspiracy. Id. See also U.S.S.G. ง 6A1.3(b)
(resolution of disputed facts according to Fed. R. Crim. P. 32);
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.
3.
Grouping Closely Related Counts
Finally, the Government raises in its cross-appeal an issue
concerning the grouping of Patterson's crimes for sentencing
purposes. When a defendant is convicted on more than one count,
the sentencing guidelines require the sentencing court to 1)
combine the various counts into groups of closely related counts,
2) determine the offense level applicable to each distinct group
of counts, and then 3) determine a combined offense level
applicable to all of the groups. U.S.S.G. ง 3D1.1(a). In this
case the district court determined that all seven of Patterson's
counts were closely related, and therefore combined them into one
group. The Government contends that this was error. According
13

to the Government, Patterson's counts are not all closely
related; rather, the Government contends, they should be
combined into three distinct groups. If the district court had
so combined Patterson's counts, the result would have been a two-
level increase in Patterson's offense level. Patterson contends
that the district court correctly determined that all of his
offenses should be combined into one group. Resolving this
dispute requires a careful trek through a potentially confusing
thicket of guideline provisions.
Initially, in order to determine which of Patterson's
convictions are closely related (and therefore should be grouped
together), it is necessary to consider the nature of the crimes
Bruce Patterson committed. These counts break down as follows.
He was convicted on four counts of receipt or possession of
stolen vehicles: Count 1 (conspiracy to receive or possess
several stolen vehicles);4 Count 3 (possession of a stolen red
Mack truck); Count 4 (possession of a stolen white Mack truck);
and Count 6 (possession of a stolen 1981 dual wheel Chevrolet
truck). These four counts all allege that Patterson violated
either 18 U.S.C. ง 659 or 18 U.S.C. ง 2313 (or both), and each of
4The sentencing guidelines provide that for purposes of
grouping related counts, a conspiracy count is to be treated as a
substantive count charging the underlying criminal activity. See
U.S.S.G. ง 3D, Introductory Commentary ("Some offenses, e.g.,
racketeering and conspiracy, may be `composite' in that they
involve a pattern of conduct or scheme involving multiple
underlying offenses. The rules in this Part are to be used to
determine the offense level for such composite offenses from the
offense level for the underlying offenses.")
14

these offenses is covered by sections 2B1.1 and 2B1.2 of the
sentencing guidelines.
Patterson was convicted on four counts of altering or
removing VINs: Count 1 (conspiracy to alter or remove VINs on
several vehicles); Count 2 (altering the VIN on a 1986 Chevrolet
Silverado truck); Count 5 (altering the VIN on a 1986 CJ-7
Jeep); and Count 7 (altering the VIN on a 1987 Chevrolet
Silverado pickup truck). These four counts all allege violations
of 18 U.S.C. ง 511, and each of these offenses is covered by
section 2B6.1 of the sentencing guidelines. In addition,
Patterson was convicted of one count (Count 1) of buying or
selling a vehicle with an altered VIN knowing that that vehicle's
VIN has been altered. This conduct is also covered by section
2B6.1 of the sentencing guidelines.
Finally, Patterson was convicted of one count (Count 1) of
obtaining money by false pretenses. This conduct is covered by
section 2F1.1 of the sentencing guidelines. The following table
summarizes the number and nature of Patterson's offenses.
4 Counts of Receipt or Possession of Stolen Vehicles
Count 1 (several vehicles)
Count 3 (red Mack truck)
Count 4 (white Mack truck)
Count 6 (1981 Chevrolet dual wheel truck)
These counts covered by U.S.S.G. งง 2B1.1, 2B1.2
4 Counts of Alteration or Removal of VINs
Count 1 (several vehicles)
Count 2 (1986 Chevrolet Silverado)
Count 5 (1986 CJ-7 Jeep)
Count 7 (1987 Chevrolet Silverado)
These counts covered by U.S.S.G. ง 2B6.1
15

1 Count of Buying or Selling Vehicles with an Altered VINs
Count 1 (several vehicles)
This count covered by U.S.S.G. ง 2B6.1
1 Count of Obtaining Money by False Pretenses
Count 1 (several violations)
This count covered by U.S.S.G. ง 2F1.1
Having set out Patterson's convictions in this form, we now turn
to the guidelines to ascertain which of them should be grouped
togther.
When determining which counts are closely related, and
therefore should be grouped together, the primary consideration
under the guidelines is to group together "[a]ll counts involving
substantially the same harm." U.S.S.G. ง 3D1.2. Thus, generally
speaking, counts that involve the same victim and either the same
transaction or the same criminal enterprise will be grouped
together. See U.S.S.G. ง 3D1.2(a), (b). If, however, the counts
involve different victims -- as they do here -- then they may be
grouped together only according to the provisions of subsections
(c) or (d) of ง3D1.2. U.S.S.G. ง 3D1.2, Commentary, Background.
The questions of whether and how to group a defendant's offenses
are legal questions, as they involve "a purely legal
interpretation of Guidelines terminology and the application of
that terminology to a particular set of facts." United States v.
Ballard, 919 F.2d 255, 257 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 1429 (1991). Accordingly, this Court reviews the district
court's grouping of Patterson's offenses de novo. Id.
16

Subsection 3D1.2(d) governs this case. Among other things,
that subsection provides that offenses covered by certain
specified guideline sections should be grouped together if the
offenses are of the "same general type." U.S.S.G. ง 3D1.2,
Commentary ถ 6. Each of Patterson's offenses are covered by
guideline sections specified in subsection (d). That is,
subsection (d) includes among its list of specified guideline
sections งง 2B1.1, 2B1.2, 2B6.1, and 2F1.1, which are the
guideline sections that cover all of Patterson's offenses.
Accordingly, Patterson's offenses should be combined into groups
of offenses of the "same general type." Unfortunately, the
guidelines provide very little guidance as to what is meant by
the "same general type" of offense, although they do indicate
that "[t]he `same general type' of offense is to be construed
broadly, and would include, for example, larceny, embezzlement,
forgery, and fraud." U.S.S.G. ง 3D1.2, Commentary ถ 6.
Initially, it is clear that most of Patterson's offenses can
be combined into groups of closely related counts. First, each
of Patterson's offenses involving receipt or possession of stolen
vehicles must be grouped together, as each of those offenses is
certainly of the same general type. Second, each of Patterson's
offenses involving alteration of VINs and the offense involving
buying or selling vehicles with altered VINs should be grouped
together, as they too involve the same general type of offense.
These two groups include all but one of Patterson's offenses. A
17

third category, therefore, will contain only this one remaining
offense -- the offense of obtaining money by false pretenses.
While Patterson's offenses may be combined into these three
groups, they may not be combined further. For one thing, it is
not possible to group the offense of obtaining money by false
pretenses with either of the other two groups. There simply is
no basis on which to hold that receipt or possession of a stolen
automobile, or alteration of an automobile VIN, is the same
general type of offense as obtaining money by false pretenses.
Further, this Court has previously refused to group together,
under ง3D1.2(d), the offenses of receiving a stolen vehicle and
alteration of a VIN. In United States v. Ballard this Court held
that the offense of receiving a stolen car and the offense of
altering a VIN do not present "substantially the same harm" and
therefore should not be grouped together. 919 F.2d at 257.5
Thus, Patterson's offenses involving receipt or possession of
stolen vehicles cannot be combined with his offenses involving
alteration of VINs.
In sum, this Court holds that Patterson's offenses may be
combined into three groups of closely related counts, but may not
be combined further. Accordingly, it was error for the district
court to combine Patterson's counts into one group, and the case
must be remanded for resentencing.
5Patterson protests that Ballard was wrongly decided, but
this panel is not free to re-examine the holding of a prior panel
of this Court. See, e.g., United States v. Fields, 923 F.2d 358,
360 n.4 (5th Cir. 1991).
18

III. Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is affirmed with respect
to Bruce Patterson's convictions on counts 2, 3, 6, and 7.6 The
sentence imposed by the district court is vacated, and the case
is remanded for resentencing in accord with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED
6As noted above, Patterson did not appeal from the remaining
convictions on counts 1, 4, and 5.
19