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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
______________
No. 91-2840
______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
EMMA GONZALEZ-RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
______________
( July 2, 1992 )
Before GOLDBERG, JONES, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge:
In this challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must
unravel the argot of the drug trade to determine whether the
defendant joined a conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to
distribute, used communication facilities to facilitate narcotic
transactions, and laundered proceeds derived from the drug trade.
I.
Defendant-appellant Emma Gonzalez-Rodriguez ("Emma") was

2
romantically involved with one Mike Rena, Sr., owner of an auto
repair shop which, without dispute, served as a front for his drug
business. Rena had several people working under him, among them:
Joe Rena, who was arrested by police while transporting a large
quantity of marijuana in a rented, white Lincoln Continental;
Norma, who was in the white Lincoln with Joe; Jaime Gonzalez, who,
at some unspecified time, picked up a two-pound bag from Emma,
which reeked of marijuana, and delivered it to Rena; and Lydia,
another underling who was summoned to assist on several occasions.
The bulk of the evidence tying Emma to Rena's drug trade
consisted of audio-recorded phone conversations between Emma and
Rena, intercepted by the government pursuant to a court-authorized
wiretap. For the most part, the conversants did not speak in
explicit terms when discussing drug transaction, though on more
than one occasion they used the term "pot," a common slang term for
marijuana.1 This evidence, construed in the light most favorable
to the government,2 established that Emma discussed several
meetings and transactions relating to Rena's drug activity,
assisted Rena in making arrangements for the transportation of
certain drug quantities (including Joe Rena's thwarted effort in
1 In the district court, Emma vigorously contested whether
the word used was "pot" or "pop."
2 We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the government because the jury rendered a verdict of guilty.
United States v. Menesses, ___ F.2d ___, ___, slip op. 4888, 4894
(5th Cir. May 22, 1992); United States v. Sanchez, ___ F.2d ___,
___, slip op. 4768, 4772-73 (5th Cir. May 19, 1992).

3
the white Lincoln), and agreed to join Rena in picking up cash
derived from Rena's drug deals. To be sure, law enforcement agents
observed Rena and Emma board a commercial airplane at the Houston
airport. When they returned two days later, the agents approached
them and asked them whether they were carrying any cash. Emma and
Rena responded that they were, and each of them tendered
approximately $8,000 for the officers to count. The officers
returned the money to them and allowed them to continue on their
way without further interruption. In a conversation with another
conspirator about the incident at the Houston airport, Rena
expressed his relief that he had not picked up all of the cash,
confirming the illicit nature of the proceeds.
A jury convicted Emma on eight counts: one count of conspiracy
to possess marijuana with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. � 846,
six telephone counts, 21 U.S.C. � 843(b), and one count of money
laundering, 18 U.S.C. � 1956. The district court sentenced her to
63 months on each of the eight counts, all to run concurrently.
Emma contends that the evidence was insufficient to support
the convictions. She maintains that the government merely proved:
(1) that Emma was the girlfriend of Mike Rena, Sr., a drug dealer;
(2) that she and Rena were stopped in the Houston airport carrying
approximately $8,000 each; and (3) that at some unspecified time,
Jaime Gonzalez picked up a two pound bag from her, which smelled of
marijuana, and delivered it to Rena. According to Emma, those

4
facts cannot support the convictions on any of the eight counts.
She vigorously contests the significance of the wiretap evidence,
arguing that none of it established, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that she joined Rena's conspiracy, used a communication facility to
facilitate drug transactions, and knowingly laundered drug
proceeds. Although she concedes that her voice was properly
identified on six of the tapes, she disputes the identification of
her voice on the other tapes. She also contests the government's
suggestion that she was speaking in drug code.
II.
Our standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a conviction is "whether a reasonable jury could find that
the evidence establishes the guilt of the defendant beyond a
reasonable doubt." United States v. Menesses, ___ F.2d ___, ___,
slip op. 4888, 4894 (5th Cir. May 22, 1992); United States v.
Sanchez, ___ F.2d ___, ___, slip op. 4768, 4772-73 (5th Cir. May
19, 1992). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict, note 2, supra, and reverse the conviction only if the
evidence, viewed in that light, "gives equal or nearly equal
circumstantial support to a theory of guilt and a theory of
innocence of the crime charged." Menesses, slip op. at 4894
(quoting form other cases); Sanchez, slip op. at 4773 (same). We
need not rule out all hypotheses of innocence, however, for the
jury is entitled "to choose among reasonable constructions of the
evidence." Menesses, slip op. at 4894 (quoting United States v.

5
Bell, 678 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 462 U.S. 356
(1983)). With this standard of review in mind, we turn to the
eight counts on which Emma stands convicted.
A. The Conspiracy -- 21 U.S.C. � 846
The law of drug conspiracy in this circuit is well-settled,
and aptly summarized in Judge Reynaldo G. Garza's recent opinion in
Sanchez:
To establish guilt of a drug conspiracy, it must be
proven that an agreement with intent to distribute
existed, that the defendant had knowledge of the
agreement,
and
that
the
defendant
voluntarily
participated in the conspiracy. An agreement may be
inferred from concert of action, participation form a
"collocation of circumstances," and knowledge from
surrounding circumstances. Mere presence at the scene
and close association with those involved are
insufficient factors alone; nevertheless, they are
relevant factors for the jury.
Slip op. at 4773 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
Emma does not dispute that Rena was involved in the drug
trade, and that he conspired with others (Joe Rena, Jaime Gonzalez,
Norma, Lydia, and Tio) to possess marijuana for the purpose of
distributing it. Nor does Emma seriously contend that she was
unaware of Rena's drug activities. She was intimately familiar,
for example, with Joe Rena's failed attempt to transport a sizable
quantity of marijuana in the white Lincoln. Furthermore, Rena did
not hesitate to discuss his drug dealings with Emma. The existence
of the conspiratorial agreement and Emma's knowledge of it are
readily discernible from the record.

6
Evidence of Emma's participation in the conspiracy, though not
overwhelming, nevertheless suffices to sustain the jury verdict, as
well. In several of the conversations with Rena, Emma agreed to
call other coconspirators to make arrangements for upcoming
transactions. She also undertook to make travel arrangements with
regard to the cash pick-up. See Sanchez, slip op. at 4778
(evidence sufficient to sustain conspiracy conviction where
"government introduced two intercepted conversations of [the
defendant] making plane reservations for her husband, Juan, the
principal conspirator, and [another] named co-conspirator"). With
respect to the Joe Rena's arrest while driving the white Lincoln,
she told Rena that she had tried to persuade Joe to rent a less
ostentatious vehicle so not to draw attention to himself while
cruising on the highway. Her possession of one half of the $16,000
cash which she and Rena picked up also establishes her
participation.3 Contrary to Emma's intimation, the taped
conversations were "more than two individuals lamenting or
discussing the occurrences of the day before," for "[w]ere this the
only evidence the jury could consider regarding [Emma'] status as
a co-conspirator, we would be loathe to affirm her conviction."
3 Emma is correct that there is no direct evidence of her
knowledge that the money was derived from drug activity. Emma
observes that Rena's statement to another coconspirator that he
was relieved that he did not pick up all the cash establishes
Rena's knowledge, not hers. Nevertheless, in light of the other
evidence establishing her knowledge of the drug activity, a
reasonable jury could have concluded, based on circumstantial
evidence, that Emma was not merely present and innocently holding
onto drug proceeds, but that her participation in the trip was a
"voluntary act[] in furtherance of the conspiracy." Sanchez,
slip op. at 4779.

7
See Sanchez, slip op. at 4778 (internal quotations omitted). But
the evidence established more; it proved that Emma knowingly
participated in Rena's drug conspiracy.
B. The Telephone Counts -- 21 U.S.C. � 843(b)
In order to prove a violation of 21 U.S.C. � 843(b),
the Government must establish that the defendant
knowingly an intentionally used a communications
facility, e.g., a telephone, to facilitate the commission
of a narcotics offense. In order to establish the
facilitation element, the Government must show that the
telephone call comes within the common meaning of
facilitate -- `to make easier' or less difficult, or to
assist or aid. It is sufficient if a defendant's use of
a telephone to facilitate the possession or distribution
of controlled substances facilitates either his own or
another person's possession or distribution.
United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1032 (5th Cir. Unit B
1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982). Use of a telephone to
direct coconspirators to take actions in furtherance of the
conspiracy violates � 843(b). See United States v. Townsend, 924
F.2d 1385, 1414 (husband directing wife to "separate everything"
before he returned in order to prepare for drug sales). Even
"giving assurances to [a coconspirator] about the security of a
large quantity of concealed [narcotics] that was at that time being
protected by underlings in the enterprise, facilitate[s] the
unlawful possession or attempted possession of [narcotics]."
Phillips, 664 F.2d at 1032. However, using a phone to ascertain
the status or progress of a drug transaction, without more, will
not suffice. See United States v. Rivera, 775 F.2d 1559, 1562
(11th Cir. 1985) (calls that "were simply to find out whether any
sales had been made, and if so where was the money he was supposed

8
to get" did not suffice under � 843(b) because they did not
facilitate the possession of narcotics), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct.
1275 (1986); see also United States v. Jones, 839 F.2d 1041, 1047
(5th Cir.) (distinguishing Rivera), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1999
(1988).
The thrust of Emma's challenge to these six counts is that the
government failed to identify her voice on several of the audio
tapes and that, even assuming that she was the conversant, the
government failed to prove that she facilitated a narcotics
transaction. She does not contend that the government failed to
establish the predicate for the admission of the tapes, that the
tapes were so unintelligible that the district court abused its
discretion by admitting them into evidence, or that the district
court erred by permitting the jury to use transcripts as an aid.
See United States v. Stone, 960 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1992). Rather,
she maintains that the government's evidence establishing her
identity as a speaker on some of the tapes was less than
persuasive,4 and that the government's evidence that she was
speaking in code was too imaginative for any jury to accept.
4 We note that the district court allowed the jury to use
transcripts prepared by the government merely as an aid. Because
the transcripts identified Emma as the speaker in several
disputed conversations, and because there was some dispute
concerning the accuracy of the transcripts, the court wisely
instructed the jury on numerous occasions that the transcripts
were not evidence but only there to guide the jury as they
listened to the tapes. See generally Stone, 960 F.2d at 437 n.8.

9
As to Emma's identification argument, the government directs
our attention to the testimony of the intercepting agents who
identified Emma's voice at trial. They testified that after
listening to the voices over a period of time, they came to
recognize the voices of the conspirators, including Emma. (3 R. 46-
48, 76-77) With respect to each tape, the government asked the
intercepting agent whether he could identify the voices, and the
agent responded that he could.5 Whether the female voice on any
particular tape belonged to Emma was therefore a question for the
jury to decide. Cf. Stone, 960 F.2d at 438 ("[I]t was the province
of the jury to decide whether the government's transcript was
accurate, and the obligation of the defendant to raise specific
challenges to the transcript before the jury.").
As to the substance of the conversations, we are satisfied
that a reasonable jury -- even one lacking in cryptological
expertise -- could have concluded that Emma was discussing matters
pertaining to the drug conspiracy. True, much of what Emma said
was monosyllabic and lacked syntactical precision.6 But much of it
also evidenced her efforts to facilitate the aims of the
conspiracy. And one law enforcement agent testified that Emma and
5 It bears repeating that Emma does not contend that the
government failed to follow the ritualistic methodology for
laying the foundation for the admission of the tapes. See Stone,
960 F.2d at 436 (citing United States v. Biggins, 551 F.2d 64, 66
(5th Cir. 1977)).
6 More often than not, Rena would do the talking and Emma
would respond "Oh," "Yeah," or "Uh-huh."

10
Rena, like many entrepreneurs of the drug trade, spoke in a dialect
designed to conceal the substance of their discussions.
Particularly because the evidence established that Rena was in fact
involved in the drug trade, the jury was free to accept (or reject)
the testimony of the law enforcement agent and conclude that Emma
and Rena's conversations were veiled in code -- that when Emma and
Rena were discussing "parts," "working on cars," and "fixing cars,"
they were actually referring to narcotics activity. See United
States v. Guerra-Marez, 928 F.2d 665, 675 (5th Cir.) ("jury could
have reasonably concluded that certain phrases used by [the co-
conspirators] were code words for controlled substances"), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 322 (1991).
Turning to the individual counts, we conclude that the
evidence is sufficient to support five of the six telephone counts.
On February 19, 1990 (count 18), Emma and Rena discussed having
Emma contact Lydia about transporting some "pot." Emma also spoke
with Joe that evening about organizing "the troops." Both matters
aimed to facilitate the conspiracy.
On March 3, 1990 (count 21), Emma and Rena discussed Joe
Rena's delay in transporting the marijuana in the white Lincoln.
Although we have observed that a discussion about the status of
drug activity, without more, does not facilitate a conspiracy, see
Rivera, 775 F.2d at 1562, here, there was more. Emma and Rena
decided that Rena would have to reprimand Joe for renting a Lincoln

11
rather than some other, less extravagant vehicle. Emma told Rena
to "get after [Joe] you're the only one that can, he don't listen
to me." They were plainly discussing the need to correct the bad
working habits of one of their coconspirators.
On March 6, 1990 (count 23), Emma told Rena that she spoke
with someone whose name she could not disclose over the telephone,
and he instructed her to wire some money to him. Rena said that
would be okay and suggested that she contact Lydia, another
coconspirator, to assist. On March 7, 1990 (count 26), Rena and
Emma used a telephone to discuss and make flight arrangements to
pick up the $16,000 cash. They discussed the arrival of "parts" a
code word for the contraband. On March 16, 1990 (count 30), Emma
and Rena discussed the money she was holding and Emma wanted to
know what she should do with it. These conversation demonstrate
that Emma and Rena were making arrangements relative to drug
transactions, thus facilitating the conspiracy.
With respect to the conversations on March 15, 1990 (count
27), however, we find no evidence satisfying the facilitation
requirement of � 843(b). See Phillips, 664 F.2d at 1032 (use of
telephone must facilitate the underlying offense). Rena merely
informed Emma that "Tio" had been caught and that "they" had seized
"forty-five." This conveyance of information did not work to
facilitate the conspiracy; it was nothing more than a status
report, insufficient in and of itself to sustain the telephone

12
count. See Rivera, 779 F.2d at 1563.
C. Money Laundering -- 18 U.S.C. � 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)
Emma was convicted of money laundering in connection with her
possession of the $8,000 cash in the Houston airport. The
provision of the money laundering statute under which she was
charged and convicted, 18 U.S.C. � 1956(a)(1)(B)(i),7 "required
that the government prove that [Emma] knowingly conducted a
financial transaction which involved the proceeds of marijuana
distribution and that [she] did so with the knowledge that the
transaction was designed to disguise the nature, source or
ownership of those proceeds." United States v. Martin, 933 F.2d
609, 610 (8th Cir. 1991).
Emma contends first that she did not know that the cash she
was carrying were the "proceeds of marijuana distribution." We
7 The statute provides:
Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a
financial transaction represents the proceeds of some
form of unlawful activity, conducts such a financial
transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of
specified unlawful activity--
knowing that the transaction is designed in whole
or in part--
to conceal or disguise the nature, the
location, the source, the ownership, or the
control of the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity; ...
shall be sentenced to a fine ... or imprisonment....
18 U.S.C. � 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).

13
reject this contention for much the same reason we rejected her
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as to the conspiracy
and telephone counts. We are satisfied that a jury could
reasonably have concluded that Emma was aware of the illicit origin
of the funds she was carrying. See supra note 3. We nevertheless
reverse the money laundering conviction for lack of evidence
establishing that Emma was engaged in a "financial transaction ...
designed to disguise the nature, source or ownership of those
proceeds." Martin, 933 F.2d at 610.
The money laundering statute defines a transaction to include
"a purchase, sale, loan, pledge, gift, transfer, delivery, or other
disposition"8 of proceeds derived from specified illegal activity,
including drug transactions. 18 U.S.C. � 1956(b)(3). The
government cites our circuit's decision in United States v. Gallo,
927 F.2d 815, 822 (5th Cir. 1991), to support its theory that
evidence of Emma's possession of $8,000 cash in the Houston airport
was sufficient to prove a money laundering transaction. In Gallo,
the defendant (Gallo) was arrested while transporting a box
8 The subsection continues:
... and with respect to a financial institution
includes a deposit, withdrawal, transfer between
accounts, exchange of currency, loan, extension of
credit, purchase or sale of any stock, bond,
certificate of deposit, or other monetary instrument,
or any other payment, transfer, or delivery by, through
or to a financial institution, by whatever means
effected.
18 U.S.C. � 1956(b)(3).

14
containing approximately $300,000 cash in his car on an interstate
highway. He had just accepted delivery of the box from Cruz, a
suspected drug trafficker, and fingerprints on the box matched
those of Balcazar, another known drug dealer. Gallo made two false
exculpatory statements to law enforcement officers about the car
and the box of cash. Moreover, Cruz and Balcazar had made a
similar exchange on the same day, Cruz tendering $300,000 cash to
Balcazar in exchange for twenty-five kilograms of cocaine.
On appeal from Gallo's money laundering conviction,9 we
addressed two issues: whether the evidence established his
knowledge that the funds in his possession were proceeds of
unlawful activity, and whether the transfer of currency in his car
"had any discernible impact on interstate commerce." We held that
[b]ased on the concert of action among [the
coconspirators], and Gallo's false statements, we
conclude that the jury could reasonably infer that Gallo
knew that he was transporting the proceeds of unlawful
activity.
Id. We held further:
reserving judgment on a case in which the connection
between the money and the drugs or illegal activity is
not so clear as it is here, we conclude that Gallo's
transportation of the proceeds of drug trafficking
affected interstate commerce....
Id. at 823. Significantly, we did not squarely address what
evidence would be necessary to satisfy the "transaction"
9 The Gallo opinion does not indicate whether Gallo was
convicted under subsection (A)(i) or (B)(i). In the case at bar,
Emma was convicted under subsection (B)(i).

15
requirement of the statute.10
In United States v. Hamilton, 931 F.2d 1046, 1051-52 (5th Cir.
1991), we defined the term "transaction" to include the mailing of
drug proceeds.11 In that case, the defendant mailed approximately
$18,000 cash from Mississippi to California. The cash was proceeds
from drug activity. A jury convicted the defendant under
subsection (A)(i) of 18 U.S.C. � 1956(a)(1), which prohibits a
financial transaction intended to "promote the carrying on of a
specified unlawful activity." 18 U.S.C. � 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). On
appeal we held that "the terms of the [money laundering] statute
prohibit mailing the proceeds of drug sales, and absent clearly
expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must be
regarded as conclusive unless exceptional circumstances dictate
otherwise." Hamilton, 931 F.2d at 1051. Because the defendant was
charged and convicted under subsection (A)(i), not subsection
(B)(i) (under which Emma stands convicted), we did not explore the
requirement, unique to subsection (B)(i), that the transaction be
"designed ... to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the
source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified
unlawful activity." 18 U.S.C. � 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).
10 Apparently, that issue was not raised on appeal.
11 We note that the Seventh Circuit has held that "the
placing of money and/or withdrawing of money from a safe deposit
box where no record is made and no interest is paid on the amount
of money" did not amount to a financial transaction under 18
U.S.C. � 1956(c)(3). United States v. Bell, 936 F.2d 337, 341
(7th Cir. 1991).

16
The Tenth Circuit did in United States v. Sanders, 929 F.2d
1466, 1471 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 143 (1991),
reversing a money laundering conviction because the government
failed to prove the concealment element. In that case, the
defendants (husband and wife) used drug proceeds to purchase
automobiles, one of which was titled in their daughter's name.
They readily identified themselves to the salesperson and
conspicuously used the automobiles, "making the association of
these vehicles with the [defendants] obvious to law enforcement."
Id. at 1472. In reversing the convictions, the court
reject[ed] the government's argument that the money
laundering statute should be interpreted broadly to
encompass all transactions, however ordinary on their
face, which involve the proceeds of unlawful activity.
To so interpret the statute would, in the court's view,
turn the money laundering statute into a "money spending
statute." This interpretation would be contrary to
Congress' expressly stated intent that the transactions
being criminalized in the statute are those transactions
"designed to conceal or disguise the nature, the
location, the source, the ownership, or the control of
the proceeds of specified unlawful activity." 18 U.S.C.
� 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). Thus, by the express terms of the
statute, a design to conceal or disguise the source or
nature of the proceeds is a necessary element for a money
laundering conviction. In other words, the purpose of
the money laundering statute is to reach commercial
transactions intended (at least in part) to disguise the
relationship of the item purchased with the person
providing the proceeds and the proceeds used to make the
purchase were obtained from illegal activities.
Id.; see also United States v. Edgmon, 952 F.2d 1206, 1211 (10th
Cir. 1991) ("These involved transactions, unlike the simple
automobile purchases in Sanders, certainly support a finding under
the money laundering statute of intent to conceal the origin and
nature of the proceeds of unlawful activity"), cert. denied, 1992

17
WL 127032 (1992).
The Seventh Circuit, endorsing the Sanders court reasoning,
explained that:
[t]he conversion of cash into goods and services as a way
of concealing or disguising the wellspring of the cash is
a central concern of the money laundering statute. ...
To convict under 18 U.S.C. � 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) the
government must prove not just that the defendant spent
the ill-gotten gains, but that the expenditures were
designed to hide the provenance of the funds involved.
United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 841 (7th Cir. 1991), cited
with approval in United States v. Webster, 960 F.2d 1301, 1308 (5th
Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Beddow, 957 F.2d 1330, 1334
(6th Cir. 1992) ("the government had the burden of proving beyond
a reasonable doubt that Beddow knowingly conducted a financial
transaction with the proceeds of drug distribution and that he did
so with the intent to conceal the nature or the source of the
proceeds....").
Like Sanders, we find no evidence in the record establishing
that Emma's possession (or transportation) of the $8,000 in drug
proceeds was "designed to conceal or disguise the nature, the
location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds
of specified unlawful activity." 18 U.S.C. � 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). In
the first place, the government did not introduce any evidence of
Emma's flight itinerary. All the jury knew was that Emma was
flying to some unknown destination to pick up something related to
narcotics activity, and that she was in possession of $8,000 cash

18
when she disembarked form the airplane in the Houston airport.
Moreover, Emma (and Rena) voluntarily cooperated with the law
enforcement officers when asked about the cash. She readily
disclosed that she was in possession of $8,000 and, indeed, turned
it over to the agents so that they could count it, hardly an effort
to conceal or disguise. Finally, there is no evidence that she
made "false exculpatory statements" to the agents. Contrast Gallo,
927 F.2d at 822 (defendant made two false exculpatory statements to
law enforcement officers). In the absence of evidence that Emma
endeavored to conceal or disguise, her conviction under 18 U.S.C.
� 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) must be reversed.
III.
Having deciphered the patois of the narcotics trade, we
REVERSE the convictions on count 27 [telephone count] and count 102
[money laundering]. The convictions as to all other counts are
AFFIRMED.