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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 91-4074
_____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DANNY K. CORLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas
_________________________________________________________________
On Remand from the United States Supreme Court
(November 16, 1992)
Before KING, GARWOOD and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This is the second time that this case has been before us.
The United States Supreme Court vacated our original affirmance
of Danny Corley's conviction and sentence for burglary of a
federal post office, United States v. Corley, 967 F.2d 101 (5th
Cir. 1991), and remanded in light of Williams v. United States,
112 S. Ct. 1112 (1992). See Corley v. United States, 112 S.Ct.
2932 (1992). We now vacate Corley's sentence and remand to the
district court.
I.

A full recitation of the relevant facts of this case is
adequately set forth in our prior decision. See Corley, 967 F.2d
at 104. As the Government concedes, "it is undisputed that there
was an incorrect application of the Guidelines in this case." In
particular, the district court erred in calculating Corley's
criminal history score to be 36. A correct application of the
Guidelines would have yielded a score of 21.
II.
Williams requires that, in a case where a district court has
misapplied the Guidelines, "[a] remand is appropriate unless the
reviewing court concludes that the error was harmless, i.e., that
the error did not affect the district court's selection of a
sentence." 112 S. Ct. at 1120-21 (emphasis added). The burden
of proving a misapplication of the Guidelines is on the party
challenging the sentence on appeal; however, after this, the
burden shifts to the party defending the sentence on appeal to
prove that "but for" the misapplication of the Guidelines, the
district court would have imposed an identical sentence. Id. at
1121.
In the instant case, the Government has not convinced us
that, had the district court in the first place correctly
calculated Corley's criminal history score to be 21, the court
still would have departed upward to the same sentence of 48
months. To understand our position, the district court's
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reasoning process in sentencing Corley must be set forth in some
detail.
First, in its erroneous attempt to apply the Guidelines, the
district court unintentionally under-calculated Corley's criminal
history score as 12. Dissatisfied with this score as a
reflection of Corley's actual criminal history and also
dissatisfied with the Guidelines' recommended sentence of 21-27
months,1 the court recalculated Corley's criminal history score
to be 36 under an "arbitrary [scoring] system," Corley, 967 F.2d
at 105, that had no relation to the Guidelines' scoring system.
The court's calculation of 36 was thus not actually a
"misapplication" of the Guidelines; rather, it was in total
disregard of the Guidelines' mechanism for calculating a
defendant's criminal history score.
The Guidelines' recommended sentencing ranges are based on a
combination of a defendant's criminal history category of I-VI --
which is determined by a defendant's criminal history score2 --
and the offense level for the crime committed. Because the
minimum criminal history score necessary for placement in
Category VI (the highest of the six categories) is 13, the
district court's miscalculated score of 36 yielded a recommended
1 This recommended sentence resulted from a criminal history
category of V and an offense level of 10.
2 Categories I through VI are inclusive of the following
criminal history point ranges: Category I (0-1 points); Category
II (2-3 points); Category III (4-6 points); Category IV (7-9
points); Category V (10-12 points); Category VI (13 points and
higher). See U.S.S.G., Sentencing Table, at 280.

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sentence of 24-30 months, which would have been the same
recommended sentence had Corley's score been correctly calculated
at 21. The district court considered that range to be inadequate
in view of Corley's extensive criminal history. Therefore, the
court felt compelled to depart upward from the high end of the
range (30 months) to 48 months.
Of course, a decision to depart upward is not a
misapplication of the Guidelines. However, in Corley's case, the
district court's rationale for the selection of the 48 month
figure is significant for our analysis under Williams. In
sentencing Corley to 48 months, the court noted that "[i]n your
case, the criminal history points [under the court's own
arbitrary scoring system] would be more than double the [minimum]
points assigned to criminal history category 6 [i.e., 13], and
thus the assigned imprisonment range of 24 to 30 months could be
doubled to 48 to 60 months." Thus, the 48 month sentence was "a
result of" a misapplication of the Guidelines, Williams, 112 S.
Ct. at 1120, even though the court did not err in placing Corley
in Category VI.
The Government, however, argues that "[t]he artificial
[calculations] that the trial court went through with regard to
the defendant's criminal history [score] are irrelevant. What is
relevant and determinative . . . is that the court first
considered Category VI, but rejected it because it . . .
under[-]represented the defendant's past criminal conduct." We
disagree with the Government's characterization of the district
4

court's arbitrary scoring as irrelevant. Although the court's
own scoring system was -- albeit unwittingly -- correct to the
extent that the court placed Corley in Category VI, the court's
articulated basis for departing upward to 48 months was premised
on a total disregard for the Guidelines criminal history scoring
mechanism.
We cannot say with assurance that, had the district court
correctly calculated Corley's criminal history score to be 21 --
rather than 36 -- it would have departed upward to 48 months.
Our conclusion is specifically based on the court's observation
that the score of 36 was "more than double" the minimum score of
13 necessary to place a defendant in Category VI. The difference
between 21 and 36 is, therefore, quite significant. Had the
court calculated the correct criminal history score of 21 in the
first place, the court might not have felt the need to "double"
Corley's sentencing range. The differential between 13 and 21
(8) is considerably less the differential between 13 and 36
(23).3
We do not intend to imply that the district court, after
considering the correct criminal history score of 21, will be
foreclosed from departing upward to 48 months in resentencing.
Rather, we are only complying with the Supreme Court's command in
3 Indeed, the district court very well might not have
totally disregarded the Guidelines mechanism for calculating a
criminal history score had the court correctly calculated
Corley's score to be 21 rather than 12. Obviously, the court's
decision to engage in its own arbitrary scoring was the result of
its frustration stemming from its erroneous under-calculated
score of 12.
5

Williams: We have identified a misapplication of the Guidelines,
and it is clear that Corley's 48 month sentence was imposed "as a
result of" the misapplication. We simply cannot say with
assurance that an identical sentence would have been imposed had
the court correctly applied the Guidelines in the first place.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we REMAND Corley's case to the
district court for resentencing.

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