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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_________________________
No. 91-7041
(Summary Calendar)
_________________________
In the Matter of First Financial
Development Corporation,
Debtor,
Helen R. Adams, Independent
Executrix of the Estate of
Janie Hughston,
Appellant,
versus
First Financial Development
Corporation,
Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
_________________________________________________________________
( April 17, 1992)
ON REHEARING
Before JONES, DUHÉ, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Today we revisit the opinions we rendered in this case on
February 12, 1992,1 and on March 20, 1992.2 We do so to consider
1In the Matter of First Financial Development Corporation,
Debtor, Helen R. Adams, Independent Executrix of the Estate of
Janie Hughston, Appellant v. First Financial Development
Corporation, Appellee, 953 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1992).
2In the Matter of First Financial Development Corporation,
Debtor, Helen R. Adams, Independent Executrix of the Estate of
Janie Hughston, Appellant v. First Financial Development
Corporation, Appellee, No. 91-7041, slip op. at 3592 (5th Cir.
March 20, 1992).

whether, under the precedent of our opinion in In the Matter of
Texas Extrusion Corp.,3 we had jurisdiction to entertain this
appeal in the first place. On our own motion,4 we have granted
rehearings and determined that indeed we lacked jurisdiction to
hear this appeal. We therefore vacate our earlier opinions,
dismiss this appeal, and remand the case to the district court that
first heard the appeal from the bankruptcy court. In so doing we
urge the district court to re-examine its own jurisdiction to hear
its appeal of the bankruptcy court's order affecting a disclosure
statement when that order is granted prior to the bankruptcy
court's confirmation of the debtor's plan of reorganization under
Chapter 11.
I.
FACTS
In May of 1989, Janie Hughston obtained a Texas state court
judgment against First Financial Development Corporation (First
Financial) in the principal sum of $987,396.90, together with ten
percent post-judgment interest and court costs, none of which has
3844 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926, 109
S.Ct. 311, 102 L.Ed.2d 330 (1988).
4Based on the suggestion of a judge in active service on
this court, for whose vigilance we are indebted, we originally
granted rehearing on the issue of our jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 158(d). Based on that rehearing, we issued our first
opinion. Shortly after that opinion was released, but before the
mandate issued, the Supreme Court decided Connecticut National
Bank v. Germain, 112 S.Ct. 1146 (1992). We again held the
mandate to determine the effect, if any, of Germain on our
conclusion.
2

been paid. That judgment is currently on appeal to the Texas
Supreme Court.
In October of 1989, First Financial filed a voluntary Chapter
11 proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Texas. Shortly after the bankruptcy was
filed, Janie Hughston died, and Appellant Helen R. Adams was
appointed independent executrix of her estate.
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1125, First Financial filed a
disclosure statement with the bankruptcy court in anticipation of
confirmation of its plan of reorganization. Adams made numerous
objections to the disclosure statement including, inter alia, that
the statement should contain information regarding suits currently
pending against Robert E. Williams, the president, sole director,
and a forth-five percent shareholder of First Financial.5 The
suits referred to by Adams were filed by third parties against Mr.
Williams personally, not in his capacity as a principal in First
Financial, and none has been reduced to judgment.
The bankruptcy court overruled that particular objection to
the disclosure statement, and declined to require First Financial
to include information about Mr. Williams's personal suits in the
disclosure statement. We hasten to add that the bankruptcy court's
order was not an order approving the disclosure statement. The
court merely overruled some of Appellant's objections (including
5June Williams, wife of Robert E. Williams, is
secretary/treasurer and also owns forty-five percent of the
stock. Their daughter, Chris Regans, owns the remaining ten
percent share.
3

the one that forms the basis of this appeal) and sustained others,
instructing First Financial to include other information in an
amended disclosure statement in order to propitiate those of
Adams's objections that the court found meritorious.
Adams appealed the bankruptcy court's decision to the district
court insofar as that decision relates to the inclusion of personal
information with respect to Mr. Williams. The district court heard
the appeal and affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. Adams
then filed a notice of appeal of the district court's judgment.
II.
ANALYSIS
After this panel heard Adams's appeal, filed an opinion, and
disseminated the slip opinion, we revisited the issue of
jurisdiction sua sponte. When we did so we discovered that indeed
we did not have jurisdiction. We immediately ordered the mandate
of our prior opinion held, and now vacate that decision for the
reasons set forth below.
In In re Delta Services Industries6 we observed that the
limits of our jurisdiction to hear appeals from bankruptcy matters
are described by the unique jurisdictional relationship between the
bankruptcy court and the district court, and by 28 U.S.C. §158(d),
which provides that "courts of appeal shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from all final decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees"7
6782 F.2d 1267 (5th Cir. 1986).
7(emphasis added).
4

of district courts or bankruptcy appellate panels. In Delta
Services we concluded that it is not only the finality of the
district court decision that constrains us but also that "we must
focus on the nature of the underlying bankruptcy court order to
determine whether we have jurisdiction. We have jurisdiction only
if the underlying bankruptcy court order was final."8 Therefore,
under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d), interlocutory orders of the bankruptcy
court cannot appropriately be reviewed by courts of appeals,
notwithstanding the discretion afforded by the Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure to the district court to entertain review of non-final
orders.9 Congress has granted the courts of appeals no such
discretion, so we are authorized to review only final orders of the
bankruptcy court.
Very recently, however, the Supreme Court in Connecticut
National Bank v. Germain10 concluded that 28 U.S.C. § 158 is not the
exclusive provision governing bankruptcy appellate jurisdiction.
The Court reasoned that, notwithstanding § 158's grant of
jurisdiction to the courts of appeals for review only of final
orders of the bankruptcy court, one who is dissatisfied with an
interlocutory order of a bankruptcy court has available an
alternative avenue of appeal of such an order: the same grant of
jurisdiction afforded the federal courts of appeals in 28 U.S.C. §
8782 F.2d at 1268.
9See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a); Bankruptcy Rule 8003.
10112 S.Ct. 1146 (1992).
5

1292(b),11 which allows a court of appeals to hear an appeal of any
certified interlocutory order of a district court.
Recognizing now the import of both § 158(d) and § 1292 and
their applicability to the instant case, we nevertheless conclude
that we have no jurisdiction to hear this appeal. In In the Matter
of Texas Extrusion Corp.12 we reasoned that an order approving a
disclosure statement is not a final, appealable order because it is
only one step in the process of the approval and confirmation
of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code. By no stretch of the imagination does the approval of
a disclosure statement resolve any discrete dispute among the
various parties involved within the larger bankruptcy
proceeding or determine the rights of the parties to secure
their requested relief.13
In the instant case, the bankruptcy court order that was
appealed to the district court and then to us is not one approving
the disclosure statement, as was the order in Texas Extrusion.
Rather, the order in question here is one overruling some
1128 U.S.C. § 1292(b) provides in pertinent part:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an
order not otherwise appealable under this section,
shall be of the opinion that such order involves a
controlling question of law as to which there is
substantial ground for difference of opinion and that
an immediate appeal from the order may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he
shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of
Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of
such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an
appeal to be taken from such order, if application is
made to it within ten days after the entry of the
order.
12In our first opinion the instant case, we cited Texas
Extrusion in support of our pronouncement of standard of review.
We were remiss at that time in not recognizing that it also
governed our jurisdiction.
13844 F.2d at 1155.
6

objections and sustaining other objections made by Adams to the
proposed disclosure statement. The subject order was issued even
before there was any approval of a disclosure statement, much less
a plan of reorganization.14 Under these circumstances, the subject
order is even less dispositive in the confirmation process than an
order approving a disclosure statement, such as the one that we
found lacking in finality in Texas Extrusion.
The interlocutory nature of the instant order is still more
apparent when we recognize that Adams may well object to First
Financial's next amended disclosure statement when filed, and to
the one following that, and so on ad nauseam, until in Adams's view
First Financial finally "gets it right." To allow Adams to appeal
the result of each such repeated "bite of the apple" would be a
true waste of judicial resources and in direct contravention to the
concept of final adjudication in the bankruptcy courts as
contemplated by Congress when it enacted the Bankruptcy Code.
Because the orders of the bankruptcy court, and hence the
district court, are clearly interlocutory, we have no jurisdiction
under § 158(d). Because the district court did not certify its
decision for appeal, we have no jurisdiction under § 1292(b).15
14It is our understanding that the confirmation process in
this case, including the filing of a disclosure statement to
conform with the order on appeal, has been suspended pending the
outcome of this appeal.
15We cannot escape a certain irony in this situation. If
prior to Germain, the district court had certified its decision
for appeal under § 1292(b), we would have been forced to the same
conclusion we reach today, for under our prior precedent, even
certification would not have saved this appeal.
7

We hasten to add that Adams is not being denied her right to
appeal in this case. If she remains dissatisfied with the
disclosure statement, she may, when a plan is ultimately confirmed
by the bankruptcy court, appeal to the district court and if
necessary to this court under § 158(d). In the interim, as we
explained, Adams may also take advantage of the mechanism by which
she may seek to appeal interlocutory orders of the bankruptcy court
to the district court but only with the latter court's permission.16
In addition, Adams may seek to appeal any interlocutory decision of
the district court under § 1292(b).17
We find nothing in the record to indicate that the district
court considered its own jurisdiction to hear this interlocutory
appeal, or that Adams followed the procedures prescribed by the
Bankruptcy Rules for requesting leave of the district court to
appeal an interlocutory order.18 Therefore, we urge the district
court to consider whether Adams properly sought leave to appeal
this interlocutory order to the district court and whether the
court granted such leave, even implicitly, without leave having
been sought by Adams.19
16See 28 U.S.C. 158(a); Bankruptcy Rules 8001(b) and
8003(a).
17Of course, any appeal of an order under § 1292(b) can only
be had with the discretion of the court of appeals. See note 11
supra.
18See Bankruptcy Rule 8003(a).
19See In re Jartran, Inc., 886 F.2d 859, 865-66 (7th Cir.
1989).
8

III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, our prior opinion and holding in
this case are VACATED, the appeal to this court is DISMISSED, and
the case is REMANDED to the district court for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
9