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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 92-2348
Summary Calendar
_______________
J.R. WHITTEMORE, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
VERSUS
SCHLUMBERGER TECHNOLOGY CORP.,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
_________________________
(September 21, 1992)
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
The plaintiffs, who are former employees of Schlumberger
Technology Corp. ("Schlumberger"), brought suit against that com-
pany for breach of an employment contract. Schlumberger removed
to federal court on the ground that the cause of action is pre-
empted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. In a thorough and persuasive
memorandum and order, the district court granted Schlumberger's
motion for summary judgment, denying any recovery to the plain-
tiffs. We agree with the district court's analysis and, accord-
ingly, we affirm.

I.
The plaintiffs basically claim a denial of severance pay
under a provision of the company's management policy manual that
had provided for severance pay in lieu of notice of termination.
That policy was amended on December 22, 1988, to provide that,
unlike the previous provision, an employee was not entitled to
pay in lieu of notice, where he or she was released from employ-
ment before the expiration of a prescribed period of notice of
termination, if he or she was offered full-time employment by a
company acquiring the division of Schlumberger in which the em-
ployee worked.
The plaintiffs worked in the MACCO Division of Schlumberger,
which was purchased by Arrow Oil Tools ("Arrow") on February 28,
1989. Apparently, the amended severance plan was adopted after
plans were made for the purchase by Arrow, although it became
effective before the sale took place. The plaintiffs, however,
seek severance pay under the former provision.
II.
The plaintiffs first argue that federal jurisdiction is
wanting because the Schlumberger plan is not an ERISA employee
welfare benefit plan. ERISA defines a covered "employee welfare
benefit plan" as one that provides "(A) . . . benefits in the
event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment
. . . or (B) any benefit described in [section 302(c) of the
Labor-Management Relations Act]." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). Benefits
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under section 302(c) of the Labor-Management Relations Act in-
clude ". . . pooled vacation, holiday, severance or similar bene-
fits . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(6).
The plaintiffs depart from the plain meaning of these provi-
sions to argue that Schlumberger's severance pay in lieu of no-
tice is not an ERISA plan in light of Fort Halifax Packing Co. v.
Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987), and Wells v. General Motors Corp., 881
F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 923 (1990). As
the district observed, however, these cases are distinguishable.
Fort Halifax involved a state law requiring severance pay, with-
out establishment of a plan, and Wells involved a one-time sever-
ance obligation without the ongoing administration of benefits
that is required of an ERISA plan. Schlumberger's plan, on the
other hand, was not created with a particular closing in mind and
had been in existence for some time.
The plaintiffs concede that "ordinarily, unfunded single
employer severance policies are benefit plans within the Scope
[sic] of ERISA." Their argument that the Schlumberger plan is
self-executing and thus does not require "administration" is to
no avail, as we perceive nothing about the Schlumberger plan to
take it out of the ordinary definition of an ERISA plan. More-
over, the plan plainly required some sort of an administrative
set-up in order to make payments to employees.
III.
The plaintiffs assert that if the Schlumberger plan is an
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ERISA plan, Schlumberger violated it by failing fully to disclose
the terms of the amendment to the employees prior to their termi-
nation. The plaintiffs concede, however, that the amendment
"technically occurr[ed] before the employees' termination." Even
if this concession were not enough, the district court specifi-
cally found that Schlumberger complied with ERISA's disclosure
requirements in that "plaintiffs admit receiving copies of the
amended severance . . . plan on February 7, and admit receiving a
summary description of this plan change on March 8, 1989." The
plaintiffs do not dispute these facts.
The plaintiffs acknowledge that Schlumberger gave notice
within the time permitted by ERISA. They argue only that "such a
technical reading of the disclosure provisions . . . work [sic]
an inequitable result and give [sic] effect to form over
substance." We conclude, to the contrary, that Schlumberger was
entitled to give notice within the statutory notice period and
was not required to provide it sooner. The plaintiffs' argument
is without merit.
IV.
The plaintiffs aver that their right to severance benefits
had vested, precluding any amendment. They admit, however, that
"ordinarily, severance benefits are unaccrued, unvested benefits
which an employer has no continuing duty to provide." The
strongest argument they can muster for the proposition that the
instant severance benefits are vested is that they "have been
4

unable to find any case law which conclusively holds that, under
ERISA, severance benefits never vest." In fact, severance
benefits consistently have been held not to vest. See, e.g.,
Reichelt v. Emhart Corp., 921 F.2d 425, 430 (2d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2854 (1991); Young v. Standard Oil (Ind.), 849
F.2d 1039, 1045 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 981 (1988).
V.
The plaintiffs argue that if the amended plan does not apply
to them because of Schlumberger's failure to make proper
disclosure, they are entitled to de novo review of the denial of
their benefits. In light of our conclusion that the district
court was correct in its determination that notice was legally
sufficient, we need not consider this issue.
The district court properly concluded that the plaintiffs
are entitled to no relief. Its judgment, accordingly, is
AFFIRMED.
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